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This study investigates the strategies for Europeanisation that are available to European and 
national social partners – in particular in the context of European Monetary Union (EMU). The 
main focus is on the question of whether developments within the European Community in 
recent years (Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdam Treaty, EMU) have favoured the development of a 
European multi-level system of industrial relations.  Of particular interest are developments at 
sectoral level. On this basis, the future prospects of a Community-wide system to coordinate 
social regulation will be investigated. The following research questions can be formulated: 
 
• In what form can a European system of industrial relations be compatible with the trend 
towards growing divergence within and between national collective bargaining systems 
(cf. Traxler 1995, Traxler and Schmitter 1995, Marginson and Sisson 1996, Traxler et 
al. 2001)? 
 
• Do the organisational and institutional differences between national systems of 
collective bargaining require differing paths to Europeanisation?  
 
• Are centralised and decentralised forms of coordination mutually incompatible, or can 
both forms complement each other within a European multi-level system of industrial 
relations?  
 
In the first part of the paper, the phenomenon of Europeanisation of industrial relations will be 
subjected to a theoretical analysis of the concept, and this in turn will enable the conditions for 
Europeanisation processes to be analysed. The focus will then be further narrowed in order to 
formulate general and specific assumptions regarding the complex interaction between 
economic, actor-specific and political/institutional factors. The central level of analysis in this 
paper is the transnational sectoral level. In particular we look at the question of what specific 
sectoral conditions – both economic and institutional – favour decentralised or centralised 
Europeanisation processes in wages and employment policy.  
 
Both collectively agreed wage settlements and regulation of working conditions are the subject 
of coordination attempts. As wages policy is explicitly excluded from regulation at Community 
level, only the national social partners have any coordination powers. It is generally only the 
trade unions that have any interest in coordination, while employers benefit from wage 
differentials. Mobility of capital often enables employers to threaten national negotiating partners 
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on the employee side and force them to make concessions.  One counterstrategy of the trade 
unions takes the form of cross-border initiatives to coordinate wage negotiations and 
settlements with partner organisations in economically closely linked regions and sectors, the 
aim being to combat the rush to undercut wages and working conditions.  
 
The situation in the case of regulation of working conditions is rather different. Matters related to 
regulation of social and employment policies are separately identified in the Social Policy 
Agreement Annexd to the European Community Treaty as being subject to regulation as part of 
Social Dialogue. Since the changes introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), dialogue 
between the European social partners can also take place at sectoral level. To date, a large 
number of joint statements, recommendations and agreements have been made for a number of 
different sectors of industry.   
 
Analysis of the specific dynamics and interaction at sectoral level is of particular interest 
because this level is crucial for the emergence of a European system of industrial relations. 
Firstly, the distribution of powers between the Community organs and the European social 
partners on the one hand and the social partners within the member states on the other is such 
that the European sectoral level represents an interface for coordination of wage and working 
standards. In the eurozone, in which a common monetary policy has to be harmonised with the 
diverging degrees of coordination achieved by (sub)nationally fragmented collective bargaining 
systems in order to maintain macroeconomic stability within the EU, coordination of decisions on 
wages policy at transnational level is particularly important. With the loss of the exchange rate 
as an instrument for national policymakers to respond to economic shocks and changes in the 
competitive situation, the scope in terms of fiscal policy – in any case limited as a result of the 
stability and growth pact – for anti-cyclical measures within an individual state is drastically 
reduced. Limited labour mobility and the lack of any Community-wide system of financial 
compensation along the lines of the US model (cf. Eichengreen 1997) mean that the task of 
economic adjustment falls to wages. This means that the actors in the field of wages and social 
policy, above all the trade unions, have a key role to play in coordinating wage settlements 
based on collective agreements within the Community.  
 
Eastern enlargement of the EU has also underlined the need for coordination of wages policy. 
Rapidly growing wage differentials between the new and old member states – combined with 
transparency regarding the diverging wage levels between them – increases the pressure on 
wage settlements, particularly in western Europe. Thus in most member states since the early 
1990s there has been a return to macro-political social pacts aimed at improving national 
competitiveness, and during the same period the number of in-company micro-pacts between 
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management and workforce representatives has also increased. The new member states, for 
their part, have to grapple with increased regime competition, as poor labour standards and 
lower levels of trade union membership represent an incentive for some companies. Investment 
decisions by businesses thus not only delay the process of catching up in terms of economic 
growth and improved productivity but also the development of efficient and effective social policy 
institutions and sustainable industrial relations in the new member states. 
     
Secondly, industrial sectors represent the level at which national and class-specific interests 
crystallise. In contrast to the rational logic of decision-making according to functional 
requirements and dynamics ascribed by neo-functional integration theory to economic actors, 
the policies of European employers’ and employees’ associations are often subject to 
asymmetries of power and lines of conflict. Within the political system of the European 
Community, the class interests of capital and labour are embedded in a complex network of 
national, sectoral and regional interests. Political decision-making structures in the EU, which 
are dominated by inter-governmental modes of governance, combined with the wide range of 
different areas in which decisions are being made, results in constellations of interests that cut 
across the normal class-related positions.  
 
The implications of these configurations of interests and decision-making structures in the EU 
political system for European industrial relations affect the organisation of national and 
European employee and employer organisations in a similar manner. As the architecture of 
European social policy is based on national systems of industrial relations and the Community is 
not in a position to mobilise the political resources that would be required to build up a supra-
state political order, the social partners in the member states direct their activities towards 
participation in national policy-making processes. Whereas the trade unions, since the 
preparatory and transitional phases of European Economic and Monetary Union, have 
increasingly participated in national alliances for improving employment and competitiveness (cf. 
Fajertag and Pochet 2000), the employer associations have attempted to pursue their 
‘European’ interests through inter-governmental channels, above all through lobbying the 
Council of Ministers (cf. Streeck and Schmitter 1992). As the employer associations in the 
member states have always rejected the idea of Community regulation of working standards, 
there has been no transfer of resources to the supranational level. Thus Business Europe, the 
European umbrella organisation for employers’ associations, possesses neither a 
comprehensive mandate to carry out negotiations nor an agenda on which Europe-wide 
coordination of collective bargaining at association level is a priority.  
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In contrast to national, cross-sectoral and company levels, there has been relatively little 
systematic comparative analysis of the transnational sectoral level, despite the fact that the level 
of industrial sectors offers considerable advantages for negotiating partners.  Thus joint, 
international interests are more likely to be identified and negotiated within more narrowly 
defined sectoral limits than superordinate general interests at a macro-level. This greater degree 
of homogeneity is strengthened as a result of increasing ‘regionalisation’ of the European 
economic area. The European Single Market creates the opportunity to develop cross-border 
regional cooperation in certain sectors. For Streeck, for example, ‘regionalisation of Europe’ is 
accompanied by ‘Europeanisation of the regions’ (Streeck 1995, 220).  
 
In functional terms, the sectoral level plays an important role as the link between central 
(national) coordination and decentralised, company-level agreements (Marginson and Traxler 
2005). Within a European multi-level system of collective bargaining coordination, macro- and 
meso- levels of political action reinforce and complement each other, with the latter providing 
some kind of ‘leverage credibility’ for the former (Dolvik 2000b). Under certain circumstances, 
national agreements on wages and social policy that have a macroeconomic scope can have a 
deflationary impact on prices as a result of the implicit effect they have on maintaining moderate 
levels of wages. In periods of weak economic growth and against a background of the stability-
oriented monetary policy pursued by the ECB, the likelihood of a negative wage-price spiral 
being triggered by a wage policy based entirely on the criterion of national competitiveness is 
greater than the probability of inflationary trends. Effective instruments for combating one-sided 
developments and imbalances can be found above all at sectoral level, as it is here that in many 
cases macro-agreements are implemented. One fundamental problem when it comes to 
implementing agreements made by supra-ordinate negotiating units is the willingness of 
subordinate units to go along with such agreements.  The degree to which so-called ‘vertical’ 
coordination can take place varies considerably amongst the industrial relations systems in the 
member states. As collective agreements ultimately have to be implemented at company level, 
the closeness of actors at sectoral level to the micro level in hierarchical terms means they are 
in a better position to coordinate and monitor company agreements than actors at the macro 
level. The effectiveness and efficiency of vertical coordination depend largely on the prevailing 
institutional conditions in the various systems of industrial relations.  
 
In order to systematically analyse the interaction of coordination activities and instruments used 
by national and European actors in the field of social policy, basic theoretical hypotheses are 
developed as part of a comparative, sector-specific investigation and then examined for their 
plausibility. In so doing we take into account the different – frequently contradictory – 
perspectives, assumptions and conclusions of researchers into Community social policy. Three 
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scenarios are drawn up from the point of view of the ‘Europeanisation optimists’ and the 
‘Europeanisation pessimists’. In the first scenario, decentralised and centralised forms of social 
policy coordination complement each other, whereas the two types of coordination in the second 
scenario compete with one another.  In the third scenario, potential Europeanisation processes 
never get beyond their initial phase, or a trend towards renationalisation of social policy activities 
can be observed.  
 
The theoretical part of this paper provides an overview of the various theoretical approaches on 
the basis of which the assumptions underpinning the three scenarios have been developed. The 
specific conditions that ideally prevail in the three scenarios provide a background for 
formulating main hypotheses that bring out the general connections between the four central 
explanatory factors and the three paths to Europeanisation (see Diagram 1). On the basis of 
this, further background theories regarding the detailed links between certain (sub) factors 
and/or certain situations and the corresponding Europeanisation options are developed.  
 
The empirical section is devoted to describing the methodological approach taken for examining 
the hypotheses presented in section 4.1. The component parts of the hypotheses are initially 
transformed into operational definitions in order to make them susceptible to empirical analysis.  
The next step involves examining the hypothetical links between the operationalised 
phenomena on the basis of the empirical material. The results of the empirical analysis make it 
possible – taking into account the specific conditions prevailing in the Community – to assess 
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Diagram 1: 
 
Diagrammatic representation of the relationships and interaction of Europeanisation 








      Hypotheses:  
 
 
QUESTION:                                              
   
   
                                                     
Relationshipship 
between the three forms 
of Europeanisation: 
 
              
        1.Neutral relationship 
     Hypotheses:    2. Complementary    
    3. Displacement 
  
           









































mobility of labour and 
capital,  
export dependence, 




- Institutional factors 
related to national  
systems: trade union 
density,  








  15  
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND   
 
1. Europeanisation of industrial relations: the social dimension of the EU 
 
The development of structures for collective industrial relations within the European 
Community during recent decades can by no stretch of the imagination be characterised as an 
evolutionary, gradual development in line with the neo-functional view. As the EU has to be 
regarded as a singular regional unit and cannot, on account of the scope and depth of its 
political and legal regulatory powers, be compared with other transnational policy regimes 
(e.g. ASEAN Free Trade Area, NAFTA or the planned FTAA – Free Trade Area of the 
Americas), the only way to assess the state of development of the social dimension is to take 
a linear view of the historical development of the Community. Given the progress achieved by 
the Community since its creation, in terms of procedural and material regulation of matters 
relating to social policy and labour law, it is difficult to deny that the EU has a ‘social 
dimension’.  There is, however, little agreement as to whether this includes a European 
system of procedural regulations for collective industrial relations in general and collective 
bargaining in particular. Can one speak at all in terms of the existence of a Community-wide 
system for regulating industrial relations?  As a starting point for the definition of the concept of 
‘Europeanisation’ in the field of collective bargaining – we will first provide an overview of the 
particularities of the European system of multi-level governance in the field of industrial 
relations (cf. section 1.1). Subsequently, the state of development of the two main instruments 
within the framework of European industrial relations which are central to this analysis will be 
laid out in more detail: First, the coordination of collective bargaining policies on the sector 
level (cf. section 1.2), and, second, European social dialogue on the sector level which 
enables the social partners to conclude joint agreements in certain areas of work organisation, 
employment, training and health and safety (cf. section 1.3).   
 
1.1 The Community multi-level system of social policy coordination and 
regulation 
 
The dynamics of processes involved in the development of European social policy gave rise to 
the complex multi-level structure of the social policy subsystem. On the one hand, the 
European multi-level system of industrial relations developed against a background of rapidly 
accelerating internationalisation of markets in constant interaction with the political economies 
of other regions, above all the USA, and an international economic regime (the most important 
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institutions being the IMF, World Bank and the WTO). In the context of liberalisation of global 
financial and capital markets, the development of the politically ‘created’ European Single 
Market appears to be merely one small step within a worldwide trend. The combination of the 
global product market and the regionally confined political structures of the EU gives rise to a 
particular form of political multi-level economy that imposes certain restrictions on European 
policymakers. On the other hand, the EU decision-making system also offers new – as yet 
largely unused – possibilities for political governance.  
 
H. W. Platzer (1998, 242) describes one of the elements of an ‘European multi-level system of 
industrial relations’ as being a large degree of diversity of historically determined national 
labour relationships whose change is subject to a path-dependent development, a 
‘convergence’ of national practices and orientation that are the result of adaptation to the 
legal/structural context of the Community, and the growing importance of transnational forums, 
institutions and actors in the field of labour policy (see also section 1.3). The legislative 
activities of the European Commission have a significant role to play in developing 
transnational networks of intermediary actors and new labour policy institutions such as, for 
example, European Works Councils.  
 
A specific form of political control that the European multi-level system produced with the 
Treaty of Maastricht is the ‘Open Method of Coordination’. This leaves political decisions to be 
made at national level but subjects them to jointly agreed objectives and criteria.  Assessment 
of political measures takes place within the framework of peer reviews based on voluntary 
cooperation between member states. Although monitoring and evaluation procedures are 
precisely laid down, this coordination mechanism does not provide for any sanctions. The 
European Employment Strategy was the first example of formal application of the Open 
Method of Coordination (Goetschy 1999). Member states provide the Commission with annual 
reports about the measures they have taken for achieving employment objectives.  The 
Commission makes non-binding recommendations on how to attain objectives and, more 
recently has started to formulate guidelines and target agreements. The Open Method of 
Coordination is based on the principle of voluntarism and ‘soft governance’ (see section 
1.5.2.2). Under Article 129 of the European Treaty, harmonisation of the regulations and laws 
of the member states is explicitly excluded. For this reason, the changed basis for powers and 
decision-making in the Maastricht Treaty involves ‘a general paradigmatic change in the 
approach to European harmonisation and regulation towards greater proceduralisation and 
optionalisation rather than ‘hard’ materialisation’ (Platzer 1998, 262).  
The compatibility of a wide degree of national diversity means that the Open Method of 
Coordination offers the possibility of ‘policy learning’ through an exchange of information and 
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processes such as benchmarking, best practices and peer-reviews. While national 
governments are responsible for implementing political measures, they also sign up to binding 
goals and agreements.  Despite a lack of any possibility of imposing sanctions, the pressure 
resulting from joint monitoring and control can ensure that member states do not pursue 
damaging ‘beggar-my-neighbour’-strategies (Scharpf 2002). On the other hand it would be 
unrealistic to expect the Open Method of Coordination to pursue different political goals to 
those that are compatible with the Single Market and the European Monetary Union (cf. 
section 1.5.2). With the exception of the goal of gender equality, all the requirements and 
guidelines are related to the supply-side.  Even the goal of ‘social inclusion’ proclaimed at the 
Lisbon Summit is supposed to be achieved via lifelong learning and improved levels of training 
and employability. The Open Method of Coordination creates the dilemma of the Community’s 
limited scope for action in the field of social policy combined with the limited ability of nation 
states to exercise political control against a background of internationally integrated markets 
(Scharpf 2002). Despite the opportunity for policy learning within the framework of the Open 
Method of Coordination ‘it remains true that the European Social Model that could best 
emerge from these learning processes can only be a model of ‘competitive solidarity’ (Scharpf 
2002, 658). 
 
Scharpf sees one of the possibilities of solving this dilemma in a mode of regulation based on 
differentiated framework directives agreed on by certain groups of countries in which industrial 
relations have comparable structures and similar market conditions prevail. Implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of these differentiated agreements would be carried out by the 
Open Method of Coordination, which would enable institutional and economic differences 
between the member states to be taken into account and would ensure policy learning. 
However, the author stresses that the combination of differentiated framework directives with 
the Open Method of Coordination would require binding decisions by the Council and 
authorisation of the Commission to take action against infringements.  
 
A more positive assessment of the ability of European multi-level regulation to solve problems 
in the field of social policy emerges if one looks at the new elements introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992), which allows for extending the principle of qualified majority voting to 
social policy issues. This makes it possible to avoid the kind of ‘joint policy-making trap’ 
(Scharpf 1985) whereby the EU organs mutually block each other (Falkner 2000). Formalised 
consultation of the social partners, combined with the possibility of a decision by the Council, 
at the request of the Commission, to raise a joint agreement by the European social partners 
to the level of a binding directive, has resulted in the establishment of a ‘corporatist policy 
community’ (Falkner 1998) at European level, within which the conditions for learning effects 
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are particularly favourable. In their search for compromises, the negotiating partners are 
themselves incorporated into the process of calculating their own interests. Involvement of the 
social partners in shaping European social policy made an important contribution towards 
overcoming the crisis of legitimation that the EU went through in the 1980s. However, more 
recent developments suggest few grounds for euphoria. The active role taken by the 
Commission in the corporatist policy community has slowed down integration processes ever 
since it largely withdrew from the legislative process within Social Dialogue (see section 1.3.1). 
After concluding a number of legislative projects that the Commission regarded as important 
(e.g. European Works Councils, workforce information and consultation in national companies) 
or which were uncontroversial from the point of view of the social partners (parental leave, 
part-time working and fixed-term contracts), the Commission has passed the initiative more to 
the social partners within the framework of the Open Method of Coordination. The potential 
threat represented by the Commission's draft directives to the employers, who, faced with the 
possibility of legally binding regulation, took up voluntary negotiations with the employees, has 
receded somewhat in recent years. Eastern enlargement of the EU has also increased the 
complexity of any differentiated multi-level regulation. Only time will tell whether this means 
the limits of the European multi-level system’s ability to solve problems has been reached. 
 
1.2 Sectoral coordination of collective agreements as a trade-union driven 
pattern of Europeanisation 
 
One promising approach to coordination is for trade unions to take the initiative, as this fits 
best with the structural and political conditions prevailing in the system of industrial relations 
within the EU. The trade unions have the advantage that they are independent of the 
employers, who reject coordination activities. Thus the European umbrella organisation for 
employers, Business Europe, criticises agreements reached within the framework of European 
social dialogue as ‘not minimum, but rather unnecessarily high maximum standards, the 
implementation of which involved heavy costs for companies’ (Hornung-Draus 1998, 230).  
 
From the perspective of the trade unions, the creation of collective bargaining networks can 
help avoid the structural disadvantages of European sectoral dialogues. Organisation of 
employers at sectoral level in Europe is relatively underdeveloped compared with trade union 
organisation. Associations simply do not exist in a certain sectors, and in others they are 
limited to strictly defined sub-sectors. Representativeness is therefore a particular problem at 
sectoral level.  The negative attitude of European employers can also be seen in the lack of 
any mandate for sectoral industrial associations, which often are merely economic or trade 
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associations without any powers related to social policy (Dufresne 2002, Keller 1997).  But 
even the obstacles located on the side of employee organisations can be avoided by adopting 
a joint approach to sectoral negotiations. Shared interests, similar market conditions and the 
geographical closeness of participants in interregional or transnational bargaining networks 
reduce the problem of national differences in trade union culture. 
 
The metalworking sector has played a pioneering role in transnational sectoral coordination of 
collective bargaining.  As early as 1997, on the initiative of the German IG Metall trade union – 
with the support of the European Metalworkers Federation (EMF) – an interregional network of 
various district organisations of IG Metall and metalworking trade unions in neighbouring 
countries (Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, 
Hungary etc.) was set up. The network’s initial goals were: to send foreign observers to 
negotiations, to develop an information network and to improve trade union negotiators’ 
knowledge of negotiating practice in the partner countries (Gollbach and Schulten 2000). The 
greatest progress was made in building up a transnational information and monitoring system: 
the Eucob@ Network set up in 2000 enables ex-post comparisons of negotiation results in 
virtually all EU member states to be made – and a year later it was extended to cover the 
textile sector as well. 
 
Although there has been some expansion of such networks to cover other sectors (e.g. 
textiles, construction industry, chemicals) and regions, the key question is that of the 
coordinating role of the European sectoral associations concerned. A few of the European 
sectoral trade unions have agreed on ‘wage formulas’ to compensate for price rises and, to 
some extent, productivity improvements (e.g. textile/leather, construction/timber, chemicals, 
services), and implementation of these provides relatively large scope for national trade 
unions to act (Dufresne and Mermet 2002). The advantages of such a flexible arrangement 
however, are balanced by two crucial disadvantages.  Firstly, implementation of non-binding 
agreements is often unsatisfactory, as there are no sanctions for any deviations from the 
standards laid down. Transnational inter-union coordination initiatives are characterised by a 
decentralised and voluntaristic mode of action (Marginson and Traxler 2005, Dufresne and 
Mermet 2002). Despite considerable differences between the approaches to bargaining 
coordination across sectors, the European industry federations (EIF) merely carry out a 
coordinating function and leave a large degree of autonomy to their national member 
organisations (EMF 2001a, EMF 2001b). This ‘soft’ coordination mechanism, which is 
characterised by a network structure rather than a strong hierarchy, is burdened with a lack of 
vertical coordination capacity (Traxler 1995). The problem of ensuring compliance of lower-
rank members or member organisations that is inherent in union-led coordination initiatives, 
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can be summarised as follows: ‘The (...) coordination rules and common standards adopted 
carry moral force only, and whilst benchmarking and peer review processes can reveal the 
extent to which implementation has been achieved across countries, they cannot enforce it’ 
(Traxler and Marginson 2006, 6). The other problem is that the coordination standards of the 
national trade union negotiators leave relatively large room for interpretation, which can be a 
hindrance to standardised implementation, particularly when it comes to quality issues such as 
vocational further training and equality of opportunity.  There are differences of opinion above 
all between the trade unions in the German speaking countries, which traditionally favour 
implementation of classical wage formulas, whereas pressure to take qualitative aspects into 
consideration comes from the French-Belgian trade union federations. 
 
Furthermore it has emerged that institutional differences in national systems of industrial 
relations can be considerable, even in the networks set up between economically closely 
related neighbour states (such as Belgium and Germany) (Gollbach and Schulten 2000). This 
problem has been exacerbated by EU enlargement. Thus it can be expected that negotiation 
networks involving trade unions from the new member states will increasingly be faced with 
problems of coordination and implementation. One crucial element for the effectiveness of 
independent trade union coordination networks is improved vertical coordination between 
implementation at sectoral and at company level, as the vast majority of the new member 
states have decentralised, company-based systems of collective bargaining. An additional 
problem is the fact that even in countries with traditionally strong sectoral industrial relations – 
particularly Germany – a trend towards decentralisation of collective bargaining can be 
observed. It is therefore doubtful whether the German trade unions will be in a position to 
continue to play their central role in transnational coordination networks and to ensure the 
continued existence of effective joint negotiating.  
 
Solution of the problem of coordination in an enlarged European Community can only lie in a 
dual approach to trade union coordination strategies based, on the one hand – in states with 
multi-employer bargaining systems – on closer incorporation of European sectoral trade 
unions and, on the other hand – in states with decentralised single-employer bargaining – on 
new collective actors (e.g. European Works Councils) and mechanisms. This includes, for 
example the setting of a ‘going rate’  agreed by the negotiating parties in major companies that 
sends out a signal to negotiating parties in other companies in the same sector (Traxler and 
Marginson 2006).  
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1.3 European social dialogues: from discussion to negotiation forums  
 
The instrument of ‘Social Dialogue’ involves the Commission promoting ‘consultation of 
management and labour at Community level’ by ‘ensuring balanced support for the parties’ 
(Article 138, ECT).  The provisions of the Maastricht Treaty allow the social partners to 
conclude both sectoral and cross-sectoral agreements on social and employment policy at 
European level. Issues related to wage policy are excluded from regulation within the 
framework of social dialogues. 
 
Together with the European Employment Strategy, social dialogues constitute a core element 
of European social and employment policy, which is based on the agreement on social policy 
incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty.  The two instruments differ both in terms of their 
procedural structure and also their output. The European employment strategy represents an 
intergovernmental method of control in which the relevant ministries (social affairs, economics 
and finance) assume the main role. At the request of the European Commission and following 
consultation with the European Parliament (EP), the Economic and Social Committee, the 
Committee of the Regions and the Employment Committee, they draw up guidelines that are 
then implemented by the relevant social policy actors in the member states. This is one reason 
why the joint employment policy therefore carries the signature of the national political 
decision-makers, because monitoring of implementation of the agreed guidelines is also a 
matter for the Council of Ministers, with the Commission only having a limited monitoring 
function as in the case of inadequate implementation of the guidelines (and following 
consultation with the Employment Committee), it may only make non-binding 
recommendations.  
 
The negotiation methods of the European Social Dialogue (ESD) on the other hand, are more 
strongly characterised by supranational elements, as the European social partners have an 
important role in shaping them. The European social partners the Commission has recognised 
on the employee side consist of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the 
European industrial trade unions that make up its membership, while the employers are 
represented by Business Europe (formerly UNICE – Union des Industries de la Communauté 
Européenne) and the umbrella organisation for public sector employers in Europe, CEEP 
(Centre Européen des entreprises à participation publique et des entreprises d'intérêt 
économique général).  
 
Since the 1970s, structures have existed for joint discussion forums organised by the social 
partners at European level.  In the Economic and Social Committee – a consultative body – 
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representatives of employers, employees and other stakeholder organisations represent their 
social and employment policy interests and formulate joint declarations. The Standing 
Committee on Employment (set up in 1972) brings together representatives of employers and 
employees, the Commission and the Council in order to encourage coordination of the 
member states’ labour market policy. Tripartite Conferences with representatives of both sides 
of industry, Community institutions and member states’ governments aimed to formulate joint 
social policy strategies, but produced no concrete results.  No tripartite conferences have been 
held since 1978.  
 
At a meeting with representatives of the ETUC, Business Europe and CEEP in the 1980s, the 
Commission under President Jacques Delors decided to relaunch the Social Dialogue, and 
this has since been referred to as the Val Duchesse Process, after the venue for the summit. 
The result of this was formalisation of the structures for social dialogue at cross-sectoral and 
for the first time, also sectoral level. The Single European Act (which came into force in 1987) 
states that the Commission ‘shall endeavour to develop the dialogue between management 
and labour at European level which could, if the two sides consider it desirable, lead to 
relationships based on agreement’. The most important function of social dialogue is 
discussion and the drawing up of non-binding, joint declarations, although these tend to be 
formulated in very general terms. One of the perceived weaknesses from the trade union point 
of view is the lack of any obligation to implement any joint agreements. 
 
Although the European social partners have held joint discussions since the beginning of the 
1970s, one important innovation in the legal/institutional structures of the Community did make 
an important contribution towards institutionalising this instrument. The development took 
place in two steps. Firstly, with the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the EU Treaty was modified to 
take into account planned Economic and Monetary Union. The aim was to strengthen the 
social dimension in order to extend the powers of the Community in the field of social policy 
parallel to the greater degree of integration in the economic dimension brought about by 
monetary union. Various political actors (usually closely associated with the trade unions) and 
the trade union associations themselves pressed for greater account to be taken of 
employees’ interests in European policymaking. In an effort to enhance the legitimation of 
what at the time was a controversial project – a single currency – decision-makers from a wide 
political spectrum took up the argument that the Community could only counter the enhanced 
dynamism of economic integration by extending its powers in the field of social policy. 
 
The second innovation relevant to the issue at hand took place a few years later with the 
incorporation of the Agreement on Social Policy into the Treaty. Since then, the social partners 
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at European sectoral level, i.e. the European Industry Federations on the side of organised 
labour and the industry-specific employers’ associations, have had a formal negotiating 
structure at their disposal for concluding joint agreements.  The sections that follow will 
summarise the implications of these procedural innovations for the actual practice of European 
social dialogue at supra-sectoral and sectoral level. 
 
1.3.1  The ‚Decentralisation’ and ‚Autonomisation’ of ESD: The European 
Social Dialogue on the sector-level 
 
Although social dialogues between the social partners and sectoral level have been taking 
place since the 1960s – much longer than at supra-sectoral level – the status of this level of 
European industrial relations was only upgraded at the end of 1998 with renewal of the 
dialogue structures. The heterogeneous structures of the ‘old’ Val Duchesse dialogue were 
given a more standardised form through the possibility of setting up ‘sectoral dialogue 
committees’. Joint ‘representativeness criteria’ aimed to achieve a more even distribution of 
the dialogue committees across the various sectors of industry have been adopted (EC 1998). 
However, developments so far indicate that the result was mainly a transfer of the old dialogue 
structures into the new structural framework.  Thus the number of dialogue committees only 
increased marginally between 1999 and 2004, with only five sectors (shipbuilding, furniture, 
mining, leather and chemical industry) that did not previously have any representation setting 
up new dialogue committees (see Tab. 1). In the ensuing years from 2006 to 2008 committees 
for new sectors such as hospitals, steel, gas, catering and football have been established. 
However, social partner organisations from important industries such as automotive yet have 
to be formally recognised by the Commission. 
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Table 1 – Sectoral dialogue committees  







‘Old’   dialogue structure (1990-97) 
















Banking - 1999 1  1  
Cleaning - 1999 1  1  
Commerce - 1999 1  1  
Construction- 1999 1  1  
Footwear - 1999 1  1  
Hotel/Restaurant/ 
Catering- 1999 
1  1  
Inland waterways - 1999 1 1   
Insurance- 1999 1  1  
Live performing arts - 1999 1    
Personal services -1999 1    
Postal Services - 1999 1 1   
Private security services- 1999 1  1  
Railways - 1999 1 1   
Road transport- 1999 1 1   
Sea fishing- 1999 1 1   
Sea transport - 1999 1 1   
Sugar - 1999 1   1 
Telecommunications- 1999 1 1   
Textiles/clothing - 1999 1  1  
Total (1998-99/1990-97) 20 8 9 2 
2000-04:  







Electricity - 2000 1   1 
Temporary work agencies – 2000 1     
Woodworking - 2000 1   1 
Furniture - 2001 1    
Tanning and Leather- 2001 1    
Mining - 2002 1    
Shipbuilding- 2003  1    
Local and regional governments - 
2004 1   1 
Audiovisual media - 2004 1   1 
Chem.  industry - 2004 1    
Total 1999-2004 31 9  6 
2006-2008 
Hospitals -2006 
Steel - 2006 
Gas - 2007 
Contract catering – 2007 







   
Total up to 2008 36 
 
   
















Formal request to set up a committee: 
 
Automotive industry – 2006 
Non-ferrous metals – 2007 
Cycling – 2008 






   




An examination of the dynamics of the development reveals a weakening of the initiatives 
following the first year of introduction of the possibility of setting up sectoral dialogue 
committees. In particular, no committees at all were established in 2005, and between 2006 
and 2008 only a few sectors set up dialogue committees.  
 
Apart from the number of sectoral committees set up, an assessment of the qualitative results 
of sectoral dialogues would seem to indicate that this particular regulatory instrument was only 
modestly successful. With the exception of the transport sector, no binding agreements have 
so far been reached between the social partners. Extension of the directive concerning certain 
aspects of the organisation of working time (93/104/EC) to cover various areas of the transport 
sector proved to be a lengthy and contentious process. Without the proposals for directives 
from the Commission, agreement would not have been reached by the social partners in any 
cases. The earliest decision to implement an agreement in the form of a directive came in 
1999, with the agreement on provisions in respect of seafarers' hours of work on board ships 
registered in the territory of any member state (1999/63/EC). Another proposed directive, the 
so-called ‘horizontal directive’, which provided for extension of working time regulation to other 
groups of employees in the transport sector and also to trainee doctors, was passed on to an 
arbitration committee and revised after the Council failed to reach agreement. Finally, in 2000, 
a directive (2000/34/EC) was passed that regulated the working times for trainee doctors, 
mobile workers in the aviation and road transport sector and also deep sea fishermen. Further 
directives based on several recommendations made by the Commission were passed in 2000 
(aircraft crews, (2000/79/EC) and 2002 (mobile employees in road transport, with temporary 
exclusion of self-employed lorry drivers, (2002/15/EC), see Tab. 2).  
 
It should be noted that there is a slight variation in the function of directives between the inter-
professional and the sectoral level. The regulatory power of Council directives at inter-sectoral 
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level is greater than those at sectoral level. Whereas Council directives at inter-sectoral level 
are considered to be an instrument for European-wide harmonisation of the member states’ 
legal frameworks, implementation of social partner agreements at European sectoral level 
through Council decisions tends to aim at ensuring implementation of Community provisions in 
accordance with the specific needs of the sector. Therefore Council decisions at sectoral level 
implicitly generate a more flexible and decentralised mechanism for implementing Community 
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Table 2 – Results of sectoral social dialogues in the transport sector since 1998:  
 
Extension of working time directive (93/104/EC 1998) to other areas within the transport sector: 
Four Commission proposals : 
 
1) ‘horizontal’ directive:  
Extension to the following sectoral areas 
hitherto excluded by the provisions of the 
directive:  
2) Proposal on working 
time regulations for 
specific sectors in the 
directivea 
3) Proposal for 
implementing the 
Agreement for  
4) Proposal on 
working time 
directive for  
- ‘non-mobile’ employees in road 
and air transport, inland waterway 
transport, sea transport, sea 
fishing; 
            -      doctors in training  
- and basic protection for              
‘mobile’ employees in the 
transport sector 
-  ‘mobile’ employees in 
road transport and 
self-employed truck 
drivers  
-    aircraft crews 





working on ships 
(e.g. sailors ),that 
put into 
Community ports  
 
Implementation of the proposals: 
As Council approval was not forthcoming, 
despite suggested amendments by the EP, 
the proposal was referred to an arbitration 
committee for revision. In 2000 the 
committee agreed on the following 
proposals: 
 
- Transition periods and exceptions 
for organisation of working time of 
doctors in training  
- Restrictions on working time 
regulations for mobile employees 
in the air, road and inland 
waterway transport sectors that 
provide for certain basic protection 
measures (e.g. rest periods). 
- Basic working time regulations for 
sea fishermen  
 
Proposals passed as a directive in June  
2000 (2000/34/EC) 
 
No approval in Council 
of Ministers in 1999 for 
regulations relating to 
mobile workers in road 
transport: 
 
New proposals by 
Commission that 
provide for exclusion of 
self-employed truck 
drivers from working 
time provisions for a 
period of 2 years;  
Agreement in Council 
of Ministers in Dec. 
2000,  




For employees forming 
part of aircraft crews, 
agreements on working 
time reached by the 
sectoral social partners 
were passed as a 




















a adequate rest periods, annual leave, limits to annual working time, health checks 
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With regard to the qualitative aspects of social dialogue texts, one has to distinguish between 
the two functions of European social dialogues (Pochet et al. 2006). First, from its outset social 
dialogues have been considered as a means of consultation of the social partners by 
European political actors. Originally, European Social Policy was shaped by the Commission’s 
proposals for directives regulating important areas such as social protection, health and 
safety, co-determination and equal opportunities. With the stagnation of the regulatory process 
in the 1980ies, the Commission aimed at re-activating European social dialogues. At the 
summit of Val Duchesse the Commission’s president Jacques Delors and the European social 
partners (UNICE, ETUC and CEEP) agreed on a new start of European social dialogues with 
the strengthening of ‘autonomous’ social partner negotiations and the formalisation of dialogue 
structures on both the inter-sectoral and the sectoral level1. The increased autonomy of the 
European social partners is indicated by the growing importance of joint work programmes 
and ‘new generation’ texts that incorporate follow-up procedures and recommendations of the 
European social partners for their members on the national level (EC 2004a). The Agreement 
on Tele-work (2002) signed by the social partners in the commercial sector has played an 
important role for the development of voluntaristic industrial relations at European level 
(Streeck 1995). Following the collapse of negotiations at supra-sectoral level, it was the wish 
of the negotiating partners that the regulation should be covered for the inter-sectoral level by 
a draft directive from the Commission. The social partners in the rail transport sector had 
similar hopes when they reached agreement on Europe-wide, standardised certification of 
locomotive drivers and sector-specific minimum standards. The regulations are supposed to 
be taken into account proposals by the Commission for statutory regulation of certification of 
train drivers (EC 2003). Other examples for ‘voluntary’ autonomous agreements are the 
agreement on stress at work (2004) and the European licence for drivers carrying out cross-
border operations (2004). So far, the hopes of the sectoral social partners have not been 
fulfilled, as the Commission – as part of the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ that it is 
encouraging – has withdrawn from the legislative process (see section 1.5.2.2).  
 
However, in view of the results of the European social dialogues, the negotiation function is 
comparably weak. With the exception of the extension of the directive on the organisation of 
working time to different sub-branches and employee groups in the transport sector (cf. table 
2) and the recently negotiated inter-sectoral agreement on Workers Health Protection through 
the good handling and use of crystalline silica (2006), social partner agreements concluded on 
                                                 
1
 The Single European Act (1997) providing for the adaptions required for the implementation of the Internal 
Market promotes the development of the dialogue between the social partners on the European level, and ‘should 
management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them at Community level may lead to contractual 
relations, including agreements’ (Article 118b).  
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the sector level have been a very rare phenomenon.   
 
In terms of the differentiation between centralised and decentralised forms of Europeanisation, 
what is crucial is that a clear differentiation should be made between the sectoral dialogue and 
coordination strategies pursued by the EIFs, which are implemented by their national member 
organisations. Centralised coordination strategies incorporate instruments for orientation, 
concertation and coordination of national collective bargaining negotiations, while the 
European sectoral dialogues cannot be denied their potential function for achieving 
harmonised regulation. As far as the results and agreements of sectoral social dialogues are 
concerned, there exists, in principle, the possibility of passing a framework agreement in the 
form of a directive – although this seldom happens in practice, or at least comes with many 
preconditions.  
 
1.4 Defining the concept of ‘Europeanisation’ - centralised and 
decentralised patterns 
 
How can one analytically conceptualise the phenomenon of ‘Europeanisation’, given that the 
meaning of the term varies so much? Firstly, the term implies adaptation/integration processes 
between the various systems of industrial relations within the EU member states.  This means 
that at the level of empirical analysis, it should be possible to identify patterns of convergence 
in the development of national systems. The second characteristic of Europeanisation 
processes is the fact that developmental trends within the member states of the Community 
should be different from those in states outside the EU. One basic deficit that can be identified 
in studies of this area is the lack of any link between comparative research into labour 
relationships with research into political integration (cf. the criticism expressed by Ebbinghaus 
and Visser 2000), which would make it much easier to define more precisely the phenomenon 
under investigation. A gradualist concept of Europeanisation of industrial relations offers the 
advantage of revealing relevant ‘Europeanisation processes’ both empirically and analytically 
(cf. Platzer 1998).  
 
Europeanisation/transnationalisation processes in their early stages can, for example, be 
identified using indicators that reveal processes resulting from a change in value-orientation 
and patterns of behaviour of national social policy actors caused by the specifically European-
transnational dynamic relationshipship. Empirically observable phenomena in this case are 
cross-border networks of formal and informal communication, cooperation and coordination.  
During the course of the integration process these structures developed into transnational 
arenas for social, employment and collective bargaining policymaking that differ from other 
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international communication structures in the field of industrial relations.  Only when the 
transnational arenas ‘permanently influence, change and in important areas complement or 
even to some extent replace national industrial relations can one say that a genuine system of 
‘European collective labour relationships (...) exists’ (Platzer 1998, 242).  
 
As a central focus of actors under the current system of European social policymaking is on 
the national level, the question arises whether the existing regulatory framework of social 
policy in the EU offers any potential for the development of a system of European industrial 
relations. One promising way of avoiding the teleological misconception of (neo)-functionalist 
integration theories that assume finality of the integration process is to refer to the widely used 
concept (described in section 1.1) concept of the ‘European multi-level system’.  
 
This conceptual and analytical approach to Europeanisation that is both evolutionary and has 
clearly delineated development phases forms the basis for operationalisation of the 
Europeanisation process as a dependent variable. In order to avoid an over-complex analysis, 
this paper focuses on examining two patterns of Europeanisation. On the one hand, we 
differentiate between the decentralised pattern of Europeanisation based on adaptation of 
national trade union associations as members of European (cross-sectoral and sectoral) 
umbrella organisations. The strategies pursued by these collective actors normally follow 
national or sectoral interests or those of specific groups of employees. In order to achieve 
transnational coordination, the trade unions must themselves relinquish their claim to 
represent workers within one nation state and extend their activities to cover new, 
transnational interests. The aim of decentralised coordination initiatives is to achieve 
coordination of national regulations. On the other hand, the centralised pattern of 
Europeanisation is much more strongly shaped by the legal/institutional framework created by 
the Community. The active actors in this case are the European social partners, i.e. the 
European umbrella organisations for employers and employees and also, to a great extent, 
the European institutions such as the Commission and the Council. The most important 
characteristic of a centralised Europeanisation is the implicit top-down  approach to regulation 
with the aim of achieving Europe-wide harmonisation of social policy regulations.  
 
As the forces and effects involved in the European multi-level system do not follow a 
straightforward, hierarchical pattern, but rather overlap and mutually reinforce one another, 
both top-down and bottom-up effects take place within the centralised and decentralised 
patterns of coordination, and these can trigger political learning processes both amongst the 
political elite and the grassroots (see section 1.2).  
  31  
Due to the lack of a genuine supra-national regulatory authority the nation states are still of 
most relevance within the European multi-level system of governance when it comes to 
determine wages and working conditions. The national collective bargaining systems or not 
only subject to the forces of market integration but also influenced – in the form of ‘top-down 
effects’ – by the regulatory initiatives of the European institutions and social partners. 
Likewise, the decisions of national and sub-national social political actors feed back to supra-
national interest organisations and community institutions. Thus, linkages of interaction are 
multi-directional and also appear in the form of bottom-up effects. In the following two sections 
the most relevant top-down effects originating in the initiatives of European-level actors which 
affect the arenas of action of national social partners will be presented in more detail. 
Secondly, possible spheres of influence of national regulation or coordination on supra-
national political structures and actors should be addressed.  
 
1.4.1 The centralised pattern: Top-down effects in the European multi-
level system 
 
In principle, the ‚European’ framework of industrial relations rests upon two dimensions, first, 
the structural-institutional setting and secondly, the ‘espace social’ or the arena of action of 
European and national political and societal actors. Both dimensions are inter-dependent and 
influence and complement each other. The process of Europeanisation is not gradual but 
highly dynamic whereby phases of stagnation are succeeded by impacts that give new 
impetus to further integration. In most of the cases, changes in the structural-institutional 
framework are the outcome of top-down decision by European political actors. For instance, 
the new framework for European social dialogue that aims at fostering decentral, autonomous 
dialogue on the both the inter-professional and the sectoral level and legislative initiatives of 
the Commission such as the European Works Council directive or the employment directives 
adopted under the Maastricht principles, such as the framework agreements on parental leave 
(1995), part-time work (1997) and fixed-term work (1999) (cf. section 1.1). The developments 
in the broader field of social policy and labour relationships have not been without influence on 
collective bargaining, per definition a domain of competence of national social partners. 
However, the ETUC and some EIF embarked on a European-wide approach to collective 
bargaining, employing common guidelines and principles to orchestrate collective bargaining 
in their member countries. Although some of these formal guidelines and procedures are 
strongly influenced by certain powerful member organisations, these coordination instruments 
are the result of ‘top-down’ decisions of the European peak organisations of labour.  
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A typical feature of top-down processes is their relatedness to decisions and developments of 
the European policy institutions. European social partner organisations of labour often 
responded to EU regulatory initiatives when adopting certain policy guidelines and principles. 
One of the most active Industry Federations in this respect is the European Metalworkers’ 
Federation (EMF), the first European social partner organisations that adopted common 
guidelines for the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining. With its ‘European 
Coordination Rule’ the EMF responded to the changed conditions for collective bargaining and 
the importance of coordinated wage policies against the background of the EMU and the 
EBC’s monetary policy shaped by the overriding principle of price stability. The ETUC mainly 
followed the EMF approach when defining common criteria for collective bargaining in its 
resolution at the Congress in Helsinki (ETUC 1999). The common norm proposed by the 
ETUC combines quantitative wage goals such as the off-set of the consumer price increase 
and the participation in productivity gains to the largest possible extent as well as 
improvements of qualitative aspects of employment such as training and equal pay (Mermet 
2002). With regard to collective bargaining on the transnational level, the EMF set up an 
‘internal procedure’ for negotiations on the level of MNC as a (late) response to the growing 
importance of European Works Councils (EMF 2006). Likewise, the 1st EMF Common 
Demand on Training adopted in 2004 specifies a step-by-step procedure for the 
implementation of goals in vocational training (EMF 2004). The elements of top-down 
Europeanisation of collective bargaining are exemplified by the EMF’s approach to the 
transnationalisation of collective bargaining policies which is addressed in more detail in 
section 3.3.1.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, top-down processes of Europeanisation are the result of a 
multiplicity of spill-over effects2 (Falkner 1998). Such effects are arising on both the vertical 
and the horizontal level. The ‘vertical dimension’ of spill-over effects refers to lines of influence 
between European policy-making institutions such as the European Commission and the 
European social partners on the one hand, and the European and the national social partners 
on the other hand. The vertical relationshipship between the three sets of actors is described 
as follows: Policy-making institutions set the legal-institutional framework together with the 
                                                 
2
 The concept of ‚spill-over’ processes is central in the neo-functional theory approach and is based on the notion 
of the inter-linkage and inter-dependence, or ‘engrenage’, of different policy fields (cf. Schmitter, 1969, Lindberg 
and Scheingold 1970). In contrast to the neo-functional integration theory of the 1950 (cf. Haas 1958), a 
gradualistic automatism of the integration process towards a political union is rejected by proponents of the 
‚revised’ neo-functionalism (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, Schmitter 1970, Nye 1971). Rather, the process of 
integration is driven by functional and normative pressures and is conceived as an actors-driven process 
(Schmitter 1969).  
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European social partners which however have a less active and rather consultative role in the 
norm-setting process. However, with regard to the implementation and adoption of European 
legal norms the social partner organisations on both the European and national level are of 
particular relevance. The ‘horizontal’ dimension of spill-over effects refers to the inter-linkage 
of various policy fields such as monetary, financial, economic and social policy as well the 
inter-dependence of policies in different industrial sectors. The EMU is without doubt one of 
the most important sources for spill over effects between policy areas (Marginson and Sisson 
1998, Schulten 1998, Dolvik 2000). But also EU initiatives aiming at the regulation of product 
markets such as the REACH regulation on the handling of tradable chemicals (2004) triggered 
off deliberations and negotiations among social partner in various branches of the chemical 
sector (cf. section 10.2.5).  
 
The inter-dependence of various policy fields enables political actors to strike package-deals 
or log-rolls in a corporatist pattern of decision-making and thus to produce spill-over effects 
between different policy fields. However, the number of potential issues of overriding 
relevance which prompt the social partners to overcome their differing interest positions is 
limited. For instance, with the conclusion of the European framework agreements on parental 
leave, part-time work and fixed-term work the ‘negotiated legislation’ (Falkner 2003) approach 
of the  Commission on the issue of ‘atypical employment’ came to a halt. Since then the 
European Commission withdrew from the legislative process and instead promoted the 
conclusion of ‘autonomous’ social partner agreements.  
 
Another typical element of top-down processes of Europeanisation is the inherent goal of 
harmonisation of national minimum standards in certain issues of social and labour market 
policy. The regulatory initiatives of the Commission with regard to European Works Councils 
and employee participation and consultation in MNC as well as the European framework 
agreements on several employment related topics (parental-leave, part-time and fixed-term 
work) are clearly driven by the Commissions aim to set a bottom-line for European labour 
standards in decisive areas. The same holds true for the Commissions aim to establish 
common procedures for the negotiation of European agreements and as well as for the 
implementation of texts produced in the framework of European social dialogue. However, the 
promotion of ‘follow-up procedures’ and ‘work programmes’ by the Commission (EC 2004) 
which should be negotiated by the European social partners of the sector level are merely 
recommendations and do not represent procedural rules in the strict sense (cf. section 1.1.1). 
Thus, the outcomes of European sectoral social dialogue vary largely between sectors both in 
quantitative and qualitative terms. What is more important is the Commission’s top-down 
influence in setting standards for the recognition of social partner organisations through 
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‘criteria of representativeness’ which are applied to sectoral trade unions and employer 
associations. The procedure for the recognition of social partner organisations in the European 
social dialogue is burdened with the one of the typical shortcomings of top-down policy 
processes, i.e. the inherent democracy-deficit, and the lack of taking specific socio-economic 
conditions in the member states into consideration. However, the Commission’s 
representativeness criteria are – at least indirectly – influencing the decisions of European 
social partner organisations with regard to the affiliation of new national members. Thus, the 
establishment of common criteria for the representativeness of social partner organisations 
can be considered as top-down process that directly or indirectly affects decision-making of 
European and national social political actors.  
 
1.4.2 The decentralised pattern: Bottom-up effects in the European multi-
level system 
 
Although the innovations that have been introduced with the Maastricht Treaty (1992) such as 
the principle of ‘qualified majority voting’ for Council decisions in a range of issues, the new 
structure for European social dialogue on the sector level, the establishment of procedures for 
European social partners to conclude autonomous agreements and the increased consultative 
role of the European social partners were undoubtedly the result of top-down processes, their 
importance and effectiveness clearly diminished over the years. With the adoption of the 
Lisbon Agenda (2000) the elements of a ‘corporatist policy community’ (Falkner 1998) that is 
based on a tripartite pattern of decision-making whereby the ‘state’ actor takes on a strong 
role in agenda-setting and initiating negotiations receded into the background with the 
withdrawal of the Commission from the European regulatory process in the field of social 
policy. However, the question whether the European social partners are moving to a ‘bipartite 
corporatist pattern’ (Falkner 2003) with the increased focus on social partner autonomy in the 
European social dialogue is addressed in the qualitative analysis.  
 
The Lisbon Agenda strongly focuses on the goals of increasing employment and 
competitiveness which should be best reached through the ‘open method of coordination’ 
(OMC) (EC 2005, EC 2008). The OMC is a governing mode which rests upon the voluntary 
co-operation of national social partners whereby joint European goals and guidelines are 
implemented by national social policy actors and institutions (cf. De la Porte/Pochet 2002). 
Social policy measures are identified and implemented via mechanisms of ‘best practice’ and 
‘peer pressure’ (Kok 2004). Moreover, as a voluntary mechanism of European coordination 
the OMC fosters ‘a shared vision of social challenges’ among member states and ‘a 
willingness to cooperate and learn from each other's practices’ (EC 2008b, 16).  
  35  
Thus, the OMC which assigns a decisive role to the national social partners strongly 
incorporates and promotes the principle of subsidiarity. Contrastingly to the rather optimistic 
assessment of the OMC by the Commission, this brings about the question whether the OMC 
in the current EU social policy arrangement brings about a re-nationalization of industrial 
relations. In line with this argument some observers state that social dialogue has been 
‘redirected away from the EU intersectoral and sectoral levels towards decentralisation at the 
national level’ (Gold et al. 2007, 12). However, one implication of the OMC as the most 
important governing mechanism in the EU social policy is the increased emergence of bottom-
up processes. Thus, Europeanisation of industrial relations and collective bargaining is largely 
driven by the actions of national social partner organisations.  
 
From a ‘Euro realist’ perspective ‘which recognised the modesty of achievements in European 
social regulation but without dismissing these as insignificant (Hyman 2001, 290) the process 
of Europeanisation of industrial relations is to a large extent driven by the European social 
partners’ national affiliates. The notion of the Europeanisation of industrial relations as an 
actors-driven process that involves instruments such as benchmarking, best practice and peer 
review is also taken up by the Commission and often referred to as  ‘horizontal 
Europeanisation’ (EC 2004b). However cross-border co-operation of national unions as well 
as the adoption of benchmarking and ‘good practice’ as instruments of a decentralised 
approach to the transnationalisation of collective bargaining is still perceived as a ‘learning 
experience’ by the involved actors (cf. section 3.2). Therefore, the crucial question which has 
to be addressed in the qualitative analysis is that of the perceived gains, benefits and the 
future potential of voluntary cross-border cooperation between trade union actors from 
different countries.  
 
 
1.5 Three routes towards Europeanisation 
 
Since research into European integration first started, two opposing camps have developed in 
the literature on European social policy and European industrial relations. Whereas right up to 
the 1980s it was possible to organise the various views of the process of European integration 
into two clear theoretical approaches, since the European Single Market, with its legal basis in 
the form of the Single European Act (1987), a large number of researchers have concerned 
themselves with a wide range of different aspects of European integration. The aim of this 
paper is, however, to analyse one clearly circumscribed aspect, namely transnationalisation of 
wage and social policy within the EU. This being the case, a return to the basic theoretical 
perspectives of integration research in the field of political science can enable us to achieve a 
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better understanding of the contrasting lines of argumentation adopted by proponents of the 
two approaches. Any comparative analysis of patterns of Europeanisation and the underlying 
conditions for their use assumes that it is possible to compare the relationships postulated in 
the hypotheses. In order to adhere as far as possible to this premise, we refer above all to 
those elements that the theoretical approaches have in common. As, however, both lines of 
theory focus on particular aspects, are based on differing assumptions and result in divergent 
conclusions, we will start by providing a basic description of them.  
 
1.5.1. The ‘Euro-optimist’ scenario: development of a European system of 
industrial relations 
 
For some observers, development of the ‘social dimensions’ of the EU in recent years 
provides grounds for optimism. After years of Euro-scepticism and functional deficits in the 
Community's political system which can be summed up by the term ‘Euro-sclerosis’, the mid 
1990s saw a new departure in European social policy. The extra impetus to market integration 
amongst member states provided by the plan for Monetary Union and the prospect of 
enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe called for an approach to coordination that took 
account of growing differences in socio-economic conditions in the member states and at the 
same time ensured certain standards in social and labour market policy. The Social 
Agreement (1991) is considered as the major innovation in EU social policy. It provided for a 
recognised role for the European social partners in the legislative process: The Commission 
has to consult both sides of industry twice before submitting proposals in the field of social 
policy. Moreover, the social partners gained authority to enter into autonomous bi-partite 
negotiations that block the legal process for the duration of 9 months. A second innovation 
was the extension of the principle of qualified majority voting to issues beyond health and 
safety to areas such as working conditions, worker information and consultation or gender 
equality with regard to labour market opportunities3. Thus, the inherent danger of individual EU 
decision-making bodies being blocked – the ‘joint policy-making trap’ (Scharpf 1985) – 
became a thing of the past.  
 
 
With hindsight, the 1990s proved as a highly dynamic period for EU social policy both in 
                                                 
3
 However, important issues such as wages, the right to strike and the right to association are explicitly excluded 
from Community competencies. These fundamental shortcomings of the EU social dimension are often referred to 
by adherents of a more pessimistic view on the development of a European system of industrial relations (cf. 
Streeck 1998).  
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qualitative and in quantitative terms. The social policy innovations in the early 1990s laid the 
foundations for a governing mechanism which incorporates elements of a ‘corporatist pattern’ 
of decision-making (Falkner 1998, Scharpf 1998). In the first years after the adoption of the 
Social Agreement framework conditions have been conducive to compromise and political 
exchange. For instance, the conclusion of the parental leave and part-time agreements which 
are labelled as ‘negotiated legislation’ (Falkner 2003) was carried out ‘under the shadow of the 
law’. The Commission’s credible threat to legislate in case of failure of negotiations set an 
inventive for employers to enter into dialogue with the trade unions’ side and to their ‘natural’ 
interest in avoiding collective agreements on the European level. Secondly, the issue has 
been considered as being of Europe-wide relevance and appropriate for social partner 
negotiations. Thirdly, ‘self-interested industrial relations considerations’ of both European 
social partner organisations (Falkner 2003, 19) have been a driving force to prove the 
functioning of the existing European industrial relationship arrangements and to further 
contribute to the emergence of such as system by further strengthening it. This normative 
process of ‘preference formation’ among the social partners goes beyond power 
configurations and perceived economic and political interests as the determinants for political 
exchange and constitutes a genuine driving force in the emergence of a corporatist political 
community (Falkner 1998)4.  
 
In the years following the adoption of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, the ‘Open Method 
of Co-ordination’, which originated under the Portuguese presidency in 2000, was supposed to 
be a further step towards enhancing the Community’s ability to take action. The structural 
elements of the Open Method of Coordination involve ‘non-binding common objectives, 
coupled with a surveillance procedure, to progressively establish a European level framework 
for analysis and action’ (de al Porte and Pochet 2002, 12). The authors come to the following 
conclusion: ‘OMC [open method of co-ordination] represents a new form of regulation that is 
softer than the classical legalistic approach, but is more than a simple non-binding 
recommendation or a political declaration’ (de al Porte and Pochet 2002, ibid.). Similar to the 
corporatist processes of decision-making that provide an ‘option for intersubjective learning 
and of the development of internal norms (such as, e.g. social dialogue) at the European level’ 
                                                 
4
 In contrast to a purely ‘rationalist’ approach to European integration, interactions between social partners bring 
about the ‘social construction of rationality’ which shapes their motives and actions. Political theories on 
European integration can be related to the sociological theory of ‚social constructivism’ (Berger and Luckmann 
1986) according to that ‘social reality’ is constructed through social interaction between organisational and 
individual social actors. Since the process of European integration is strongly actors-driven, these related theory 
approaches provide a valuable framework for analysis.   
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(Falkner 1998, 204), ‘political learning’ emerges also from the interaction pattern (e.g. best 
practice, benchmarking) inherent in the OMC. Thus, these ‘horizontal’ or ‘decentral’ patterns of 
Europeanisation which strengthen the autonomy and competences of social partners change 
the nature of ‘political dynamics’ as they are, first, ‘no longer purely state-centric and, second, 
no longer unilaterally favouring national responses’ driven by national interests (Falkner 1998, 
ibid). What remains to be proved within the framework of the qualitative analysis is the factual 
and perceived independence of European social partners from the initiating, moderating and 
monitoring function of a ‘state’ actor, i.e. the European Commission, in European social 
dialogue.  
 
1.5.2 The Euro-pessimist scenario: neo-voluntarism and negative integration in 
the EU as the implications of the power gap between capital and labour 
 
In this section, a coherent argument in favour of consolidation and stabilisation of the priority 
given to national powers in the field of labour market and employment policy is described. The 
implications for the integration process in the field of social policy are examined using 
concepts drawn from Staatstheorie and organisational sociology, both of which emphasise 
opposing class interests and positions of power that are linked to diverging organisational 
problems/strategies and communication patterns and flow into the structure of political 
decision-making processes.  The aim of this description is to establish a theoretical basis for 
the conditions underlying the behaviour of social policymakers at national and transnational 
level within the Euro-pessimist scenario. There are three main influencing factors: firstly the 
exogenic factor of liberalisation and geographical opening of the markets for capital, finance, 
goods and services; secondly the power imbalance between labour and capital; and thirdly, 
the specific political structure of the EU – including the Economic Community – which is partly 
determined by this and contributes to a further shift of power between the organised interests 
of the actors in favour of labour. 
 
1.5.2.1 The predominance of supranational legislation – asymmetry between 
economic and political integration 
 
At the latest since the Treaties of Rome (1957) setting up the European Economic 
Community, the primacy of the market over political union has been established as the main 
principle determining the European integration process. The political/economic consequences 
of this institutional asymmetry can be described in terms of the dualism of ‘positive’ integration, 
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i.e. aimed at correcting the market, and ‘negative’ integration, i.e. aimed at creating a market.5 
The predominance of supranational Community legislation aimed at removing all legal barriers 
to trade results in a virtually unproblematic expansion of negative integration. While laws and 
regulations removing obstacles to competition are incontestable, any measures limiting the 
market mechanism require the explicit approval of the Council of European Ministers. 
Although since the Single European Act was passed (1987) the principle of qualified majority 
voting has speeded up decision-making processes, the interests of individual member states 
still predominate, as these processes take place mainly on an intergovernmental basis.  
 
Conflicts of interest between economically more developed member states and less 
developed ones occur above all with regard to the regulations that do not affect the quality of 
final products but rather production processes and conditions.  Binding social, environmental 
and safety standards can trigger resistance in states with low productivity and factor costs, 
whereas states whose competitive advantage consists of superior quality rather than low 
production and labour costs, prefer stricter regulations or retention of their high national 
standards (Scharpf 1996). The implications of the asymmetry between economic and political 
integration for European social policy are difficult to assess. Although the Treaty of Maastricht 
(1992) extended the principle of qualified majority voting to areas such as employee 
protection, employee safety, co-determination and equality of opportunity (Article 137 
European Treaty), basic powers in the fields of social and labour market policy remain in the 
hands of the member states.   
 
The predominance of the intergovernmental mode of governance is also expressed in the 
principle of subsidiarity which is explicitly incorporated into the Single European Act and gains 
the status of a basic principle within the Treaty6. However, with regard to the division of 
powers between the Community and the member states in the field of social policy, the 
principle of subsidiarity, borrowed from German constitutional law, does not contribute to a 
more precise delineation of political responsibilities. As in the case of the German Basic Law, 
which is committed to the principle of federalism, the Community powers are based on goals 
                                                 
5
 Tinbergen, Jan (1965), International economic integration, Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
6
 In the development of Community law, the principle of subsidiarity appears for the first time in Article 130 
section 4 of the Single European Act. Its status was further strengthened by being explicitly incorporated into 
Article 5 of the European Treaty. However, the Treaty does not provide a precise definition of the principle of 
subsidiarity, which originated in the German Basic Law and was transferred into European law.  Reference to the 
meaning of the term as defined in German constitutional law, which is based specifically on the principle of 
federalism, is unhelpful for the situation of the European Community.  
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that reveal different types of emphasis during the course of the integration process (cf. Zach 
2001). Targeted distribution of responsibilities between supra-state institutions and member 
states results in an area of Community legal powers that cannot be defined from the outset.  In 
terms of responsibilities in the field of social policy, the dynamics of the integration process 
and the variability of the Community’s goals mean that it is not entirely clear whether the 
principle of subsidiarity is applicable in the case of exclusive Community powers or only in the 
case of competing powers.   
 
Employee protection (Article 137 section. 5 European Treaty) is not an area for which the 
European Union has exclusive powers, as it is possible for member states to introduce 
stronger protection measures. In other words, the exclusive powers of the Community in the 
field of social policy only apply to the setting of minimum standards. The priority given to 
market integration still has an impact on the current Community treaties, as ensuring the four 
basic freedoms was not significantly changed, unlike other aims, and has remained the 
overriding goal of the Community during its entire development7. Thus, for example, Scharpf 
points out that the far-reaching decision to introduce the principle of majority voting to areas 
such as environmental, health and consumer protection has not contributed to positive 
integration. Specifically those requirements contained in the Treaty that provide for 
harmonisation of regulations (such as Article 100 European Treaty) are based on protection 
measures related directly to the common market.  
 
The treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam added further areas of application to the principle of 
subsidiarity, with functional or sub-national units also being allocated powers. Thus Articles 
137 and 139 of the Treaty support the involvement of the social partners at all levels.  The 
national social partners have a key role in implementing joint social policy measures, with 
supranational institutions at best only being responsible for coordinating nationally 
implemented agreements in the form of minimum standards. The principle of non-intervention 
in national industrial relations blocks any harmonisation of social policy. Thus the functionality 
and political output of national systems are extended to the upper, European level (cf. Streeck 
1998, 13).  Decisions by the European Court of Justice also tend to work against 
harmonisation of social policy, as they tend to increase the powers of the member states, 
especially in the case of competing responsibilities (cf. Zauner 2001; Scharpf 1996).  
 
                                                 
7
 Thus in the European Economic Community (EEC) any harmonisation of social policy regulations that went 
beyond ensuring free movement of labour was only possible via the so-called subsidiary competence standards of 
the EEC Treaty, for example Article 235 EEC, which allows the Community to take action to achieve  ‘one of the 
objectives of the Community’ in cases in which the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers.  
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1.5.2.2 Neo-voluntarism and soft regulation as the predominant style of 
governance in European social policy 
 
The orientation of the European Community in the original treaties towards a common 
economic and market project merely transfers a well-known dilemma amongst liberal 
democracies onto the transnational level – in an amplified form. Even at the level of the 
national state there is a contradiction between creating an economic order aimed at ensuring 
efficient functioning of market forces and a social system aimed at minimising the negative 
impact of market mechanisms and thus legitimising political decisions. The predominance, 
described above, of supranational competition law means that the current form of the 
Community – European Economic and Monetary Union – is still far from being an all-
embracing political union.  But it is not just the negative integration mechanism contained in 
the legal/institutional system of the EU that limits the scope for national governments to take 
action.  The weakness of the social dimension is due above all to the basic asymmetry of 
power between capital and labour. That is why – as observed, for example, by Streeck – 
policy analyses of the European social dimension are inadequate if they exclude the power 
structures within the systems of industrial relations in the individual member states. If we take 
Marshall’s definition of social policy as ‘redistributive and market correcting, generating 
entitlements for workers that the market would not provide on its own, including collective 
statutory rights that change the relative power of the two classes in the labour market’8 then a 
comprehensive analysis of the process of Europeanisation in the field of social policy requires 
us to take into account the specific features of the national systems of collective bargaining. 
Particularly relevant are any clashes of interests between the various actors on the labour 
market who are provided with differing levels of resources by the political system.  
 
The practical distribution of powers between the European institutions and social partners  for 
drawing up, negotiating and implementing European framework agreements has resulted in 
considerable diversity of the effective political output of European social policies. The reasons 
for this lie not only in the institutional differences between the various national systems of 
industrial relations, the different practices and traditions of the social partners and the 
divergent legal frameworks (based on legislation or collective agreements) in which systems of 
collective negotiation are embedded, but also in the organisational and political strength of the 
actors involved. The heterogeneity of social policy regulations exposes the member states to 
regime competition that companies can exploit by establishing themselves in those states that 
have the most flexible and non-binding working and social standards. An even more crucial 
factor, however, is the fact that because of the greater mobility of capital, differences in social 
                                                 
8
 Marshall, T.H. (1965), Social Policy, London: Hutchinson, 15. 
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and labour market regulation lend greater credibility to threats by companies to relocate all or 
part of their operations.  The competition between regimes that member states are exposed to 
and the predominance of European competition legislation over other areas of regulation 
means that ‘(...) national systems in today’s Europe must operate simultaneously under the 
institutional constraints of a supranational competition regime and the economic constraints of 
international regime competition’ (Streeck 1998, 18).  
 
Streeck describes the mechanism underlying negative integration as being the interplay 
between ‘mutual recognition’ of competition regulations and harmonisation of national product 
market regulations: ‘A new (...) regulatory instrument, mutual recognition, (...) voids the need 
for supranational harmonisation of national product regulations as a condition of free trade’ 
(Streeck 1995, 393). As harmonisation of regulations and requires consensus amongst the 
actors involved, the relatively untrammelled principle of mutual recognition prevails almost by 
default.  This ‘sophisticated version of ‘negative integration’ results in the following 
development, which is typical for the political order of the EU. ‘(…) mutual recognition makes 
economic integration possible without replacement of national regulations at the supranational 
level and without supranational political institution building’ (Streeck 1995, 394).  
 
The new strategic orientation of European Commission policy is in line with the mechanism of 
negative integration.  Referring to the principle of subsidiarity and a coordination process 
based on voluntary co-operation between the European social partners, the Commission is 
promoting the ‘Open Method of Coordination’. This leaves effective political decision-making 
processes at national level, but these are evaluated according to jointly agreed objectives and 
criteria.  Evaluation according to the principle of best practice is intended to ensure 
effectiveness and efficiency of the measures (Scharpf 2002, Grande 2000). The Open Method 
of Coordination thus represents a coordination mechanism that is precisely equivalent to the 
functional mechanism of the European multi-level system (see section 1.2). Following a phase 
of relatively active involvement in introducing certain regulations such as the directives on the 
European Works Council, information and consultation of the workforce in nationally operating 
companies and regulation of atypical forms of work (agency work, temporary work), the 
European Commission withdrew from the legislative process (see section 1.3.1). Earlier, draft 
directives produced by the Commission were perceived by employers as a threat, because 
they had to reckon with the passing of a legally binding agreement. Commencement of 
negotiations with the employees therefore often only took place in the ‘shadow of the law’ 
(Bercusson 1992).  With the withdrawal of the Commission from legislative activities, this 
mechanism became virtually completely ineffectual.    
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1.5.2.3. The class-specific logic of collective action: causes and implications of 
the asymmetry of power between labour and capital 
 
In the subsequent two sections, reasons and implications of the multi-dimensional logic of 
collective action are presented in more detail. The first section gives an overview on definitions 
and theoretical considerations derived from collective action theory approaches on labor 
market interest organisation and their implications on collective action of trade unions and 
employer assocations whereby the problems of organisation and action capacity are of central 
interest.The second section summarizes the mulit-faceted functions of multi-employer 
bargaining for employers, emplyees and state actors, that can be inferred from previous 
theoretical reasoning.  
 
1.5.2.3.1 The trade union dilemma: between the ability to organise and the ability to act 
 
‘(...) differences in the position of a group in the class structure (...), not only lead to 
differences in power that the organisations can acquire, but also lead to differences in the 
associational practices, or logics of collective action, by which organisations of capital and 
labour try to improve their respective position vis-à-vis each other’ (Offe and Wiesenthal 1985, 
180). 
 
In looking at the question of the underlying conditions for collective actors such as employers’ 
associations, trade unions or political parties, a combination of approaches based on neo-
Marxist ‘Staatstheorie’ (cf. Offe 1984; Lindblom 1980) and the organisational sociology of 
collective action (cf. Olson 1965) would appear to be helpful, as both these attach central 
significance to the conflict of interests between the parties on the labour market. The classical 
game theory assumption of a ‘zero sum game’ can be applied to the constellation of interests 
in employee and employer organisations in the field of social and labour market policy without 
having to accept the disadvantage of the simplification represented by economic-reductionist 
rational choice approaches. A combination of actor-centred, behaviouristic theories (cf. e.g. 
Berger and Luckmann 1986) with systems-theoretical approaches (cf. Offe 1985; Luhmann 
1993) can be extended with the addition of theoretical elements derived from political 
economy and from new institutional economy9, and this allows analysis of a further important 
                                                 
9
 The ‘new institutional economy’ approach was developed in the 1970s in the USA.  The aim of this approach is 
to explain economic phenomena in terms of institutional factors, taking into account micro-economic and 
behaviouristic elements (cf. Williamson, O. E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies. New York : Free Press.; 
Williamson, O. E. (1981), ‘The Economics of Organisation: The Transaction Cost Approach’, American Journal 
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aspect of political action by organised interest groups representing employees and employers 
– namely their embedding in a specific political-institutional framework (cf. Streeck 1991; Offe 
and Wiesenthal 1980; Traxler 1993).  
 
Any comprehensive analysis of the ability of employers and employees to organise 
themselves calls for a multi-dimensional concept of collective action. The need for a complex 
conceptualisation of organisational structures for action and communication is derived from 
the fact that organisations are not just active actors per se who make certain rational 
decisions, but rather that their creation and their continued existence are the result of their 
own actions under specific environmental conditions. Collective action can be seen as a multi-
dimensional process governed by the relationshipship between potential and actual members 
of the organisation, between organisations in the same domain and between organisations 
from different domains within the framework of the network.  These intra-class-specific 
structures are often neglected by organisational sociology, whereas the differences in power 
structures between labour and capital organisations are often regarded as the only force 
determining collective action (cf. Olson 1965).  
 
The question now arises as to how the consequences of intra- and inter-class differences are 
to be interpreted for the conditions of collective action. In line with the argument put forward by 
Offe und Wiesenthal (1985), who made an important contribution to the theoretical 
conceptualisation of the problem of collective action by organised labour market interests10, 
trade unions are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis employers associations in all three dimensions of 
the process. The authors differentiate the following dimensions, in each of which specific 
aspects of organisational action strategies are identified that are either directed towards one of 
one’s own actors/potential members or at organisations/political actors on the other side: 
 
• Input factors: 
This dimension of the problem is related to the characteristics of the elements to be organised. 
Whereas employers’ associations embrace organisations in the form of companies, trade 
unions have to deal with individuals as members.  However, because the ability and 
willingness to work cannot be separated from the individual concerned, the interests of 
employees cannot be reduced simply to market aspects. This incongruence cannot be solved 
                                                                                                                                                           
of Sociology, 87, 548-77; North, Douglass C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge Univ. Press : Cambridge.   
10
 The essay by Offe and Wiesenthal appeared under the title ‘Two logics of Collective Action. Theoretical Notes 
on Social Class and Organisational Form’ for the first time in Zeitlin, M. (ed.), (1980), Political Power and Social 
Theory, Vol. 1, 67-115. 
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through contractual regulation. An employment contract is not an instrument that gives 
complete control of the individual offering his or her labour to the individual or body requiring 
that labour, as the actual work carried out ultimately always remains under the physical control 
of the employee concerned.   The greater homogeneity of interests results from the particular 
form of ‘good’ represented by labour (see also Point 2.2.4): ‘Since the worker is at the same 
time the subject and the object of the exchange of labour power, a vastly broader range of 
interests is involved (…) than in that of capitalists (…) In the case of workers, those interests 
that have directly to do with, and are directly affected by, the exchange of labour power (…) 
include not only material rewards but also such things as job satisfaction, health, leisure time, 
and continuity of employment’ (Offe and Wiesenthal 1985, 179).  
 
The power gap between labour and capital, the origins of which lie in the particular 
characteristics of human labour has an impact – beyond the mechanism of the logic of 
collective action – on the ability to join forces and/or mobilise, on the one hand, and the ability 
to reconcile shared interests on the other. In order to successfully organise themselves, 
employees, because of their ‘insuperable individuality’ (Offe and Wiesenthal 1985, 178) and 
their ‘atomised’ form only have the possibility of forming associations, whereas companies, 
through the mere fact that they operate on the market, have an advantage in terms of their 
ability to take collective action as they are able to make their investment decisions 
autonomously. Thus, independently of their market power, industry organisations have social 
power derived solely from the laws of capitalist production and do not require any additional, 
i.e. extra-market, effort to organise. Employers also have an advantage in terms of 
reconciliation of interests. Whereas they have clearly quantifiable labour market interests 
(labour costs that are as low as possible, a clearly calculable supply of labour for a particular 
area of deployment), employees, with their diverse interests, first have to enter into a process 
of communication in order to agree on common organisational objectives.  
 
Employees have only one option for overcoming their subordinate position of power. They can 
only solve their collective problem of atomisation and individualisation of resources by 
developing a collective identity that enables them to overcome a constellation of power and 
communication that is exclusively determined by the efficiency criteria of the market.  
 
• Internal processes: 
The process of mutual communication between an organisation and its (potential) members is 
shaped by the organisation’s internal process of transformation from individual to collective 
resources. Because of the particular characteristics of the units they have to organise, trade 
unions are affected by the following organisational dilemma; in order to secure the resources 
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necessary for accumulating power, the union has to follow the principles of bureaucratic 
organisation. On the other hand, wielding power requires a strategy of ongoing globalisation of 
its members to work for joint goals that becomes increasingly difficult the bigger and more 
organisationally efficient the trade union becomes, because the interests of its expanding 
membership become increasingly diverse. The requirement to constantly recruit new members 
and become an efficient, bureaucratic organisation exacerbates the problem of reconciling the 
interests of differing groups of employees.  
 
It is this contradiction that underlies the problem of collective action.  Weber’s concept of the 
formal rationality of bureaucratic administration displays the highest degree of system-
integrative efficiency on condition that there is a strict separation between policymakers and 
administrators (Weber 1980). Putting aside the question of whether this assumption is still 
possible in western welfare states11, the organisational dilemma faced by trade unions can be 
                                                 
11
 In his comments on the divergence of the rationality principles of administrative action, Offe raises the question 
of whether Weber’s ‘ideal-type’ rationality prevailing in bureaucratic administrations and therefore also the 
organisation of state power with regard to other functional requirements of a highly-developed capitalist industrial 
society is, in fact, still ‘rational’. As Weber’s concept of rationality is based on a strict separation between 
administration and policymaking, his concept of rationality does not cover the functional adequacy of rational 
decisions. Offe, on the other hand, differentiates between organisational and systemic rationality, which are in 
conflict with one another in a modern welfare state. Organisational rationality refers to the subjection of 
bureaucratic actions to general rules, and systemic rationality to the bureaucratic fulfilling of the functional 
requirements (Offe 1985). There is incongruence between the internal structure and its relationship to the 
environment (or function). For Offe the origins of the state’s crisis of action can be found not so much in structural 
deficits in state organisation as in the functional demands on the state, the meeting of which serves to legitimise 
political decisions.  
 
The administrative system of a modern welfare state faces the dilemma that the demands of the environment force 
it to deviate from goal-oriented and efficient concepts of rationality subject to fiscal and institutional restrictions, 
despite the fact that these are required in normative terms. In order to escape this dilemma the administrative 
system has to be adequate in terms of both goals and norms. This double strategy not infrequently leads to stopgap 
solutions that fulfil neither the one nor the other criterion of rationality. The specific restriction of the 
administrative systems results from the combination of legal safeguarding of administrative actions and the 
binding nature of legal norms that result in the administrative system having to supplement its legal legitimacy 
with extra-legal legitimation in the form of consensus-finding processes.  
 
The need for consensus has two consequences that may be regarded as typical features of corporatist welfare 
states: on the one hand, the practice of ‘political exchange’ , in which the administrative system passes on some of 
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described as the contradiction between rationality criteria based on the mechanisms of system 
integration (bureaucratic organisation), and the concept of rationality that meets the 
requirements of social integration (democracy) (cf. Michels 1989).  
 
Because of their ability to make autonomous investment decisions, employers’ organisations 
do not need any collective organisation in order to be able to exert power. Moreover the 
interests of businesses in securing the best possible conditions for accumulating capital in a 
capitalist welfare state, which is, after all, dependent on corporate tax revenues, represent 
superordinate objectives for political action, the implementation of which does not require any 
explicit representation of interests. Even the harmonisation of interests and the mobilisation of 
members’ resources is easier for employers’ associations because of the unambiguous and 
quantifiable interests involved, even if organisational problems can be caused by differences 
between large and small companies or between exporting companies and those focused more 
on the domestic market.  Thus there is, in most European countries, a disproportionately high 
number of major companies represented in employers’ associations (cf. Traxler et al. 2001). At 
the level of European umbrella organisations the under-representation of small and medium-
sized enterprises led to the setting up of their own, separate association (UEAPME – Union 
européenne de l’artisanat et des petites et moyennes entreprises), which exists parallel to the 
other two umbrella organisations for private companies (Business Europe) and the public 
sector (CEEP). However, UEAPME has not been recognised by the Commission as an 
organisation of social partners within the framework of European Dialogue (see section 1.3.1).  
 
• Outputs: 
The different dynamics of system and social integration are reflected in contrasting patterns of 
communication between the organisations and their members (see above) and the actors on 
the policy-making stage. Compared with the trade unions, communication between employers’ 
associations and the government is less publicly visible (lobbying) and of a more technical and 
universal nature. Businesses have greater scope for pursuing their political ends with threats, 
as they are both mobile and autonomous in their investment decisions. Employers’ 
organisations are characterised by an instrumental-monological pattern of collective action in 
which transformation of interests is virtually automatic and decisions on objectives are 
                                                                                                                                                           
its negotiating authority to the social partners, and one the other hand, a division of labour between ‘policymaking’ 
and ‘administration’ in a corporatist discussion and decision-making  process with the former taking on the 
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exclusively taken at top management level, whereas trade unions can only achieve definition 
and transformation of their collective interests via a process of discussion between the 
leadership and the grass roots. According to Offe und Wiesenthal (1985), collective action by 
trade unions follows a dialogue-based pattern.  
 
1.5.2.3.2 The functions of multi-employer bargaining 
 
The changes in the functions of collective bargaining systems from the point of view of the 
interests of the employers can be summed up as follows: 
 
• Cartel-forming function:  
As the market becomes increasingly integrated and European and international markets for 
goods and services become more interdependent, national collective agreements are 
increasingly losing their effectiveness as instruments for controlling wage competition between 
companies. Wages thus become factors determined exogenously by market forces that are 
increasingly taken out of the scope of the companies to actively shape them as part of a 
company-specific pay policy. The wage policy strategies of the employers are now, more than 
ever before, influenced by the criteria of economic efficiency and the ‘factual constraints’ of 
competition. 
• Neutralisation function :  
During the era of sometimes radical shop-floor movements in the 1960s and 70s that affected 
above all monistic industrial relations systems which allow representation of employees either 
in the form of in-company workforce representation bodies or trade unions, supra-company 
collective agreements succeeded in keeping trade union activities away from individual 
companies. With the spread of the practice of trade unions being involved in negotiations on 
wages and working conditions, this function loses some of its importance. Trade unions and 
workforce representatives are nowadays less in competition with one another - indeed they 
are interested in building up a co-operative relationshipship.  
 
• Coordinating function:  
One classic function of collective agreements is to reduce the transaction costs that employers 
face up to the point where the agreement is concluded. Because of the lack of information 
about actual ability and willingness to perform, individual trade unions or company trade 
unions are in a position to pursue strategic wage negotiation strategies.  Collective negotiating 
systems involving umbrella organisations representing the parties on the labour market 
prevent the use of such tactics by unaffiliated actors representing employees.  However the 
spread of mass unemployment and the concomitant weakening of the trade unions weaken 
  49  
the efficient reduction of transaction costs through collective agreements. 
 
For the state the collective bargaining system takes on the following function: 
 
• Macroeconomic control function: 
Particularly within the framework of a Keynesian monetary and economic policy, collective 
bargaining on wages represents an effective instrument for controlling inflation, employment 
and growth.  Apart from national governments’ move away from demand-oriented policies 
since the 1980s, a combination of European monetary union and the related trans-
nationalisation of monetary policy, together with a high degree of integration in the European 
single market and the dynamic development of global market competition has considerably 
reduced the scope and influence of national policy actors.    
 
These developments mean that the attraction of entering into cross-company negotiations with 
employees has been reduced.  The reduction in the negotiating power of trade unions in 
corporatist decision-making systems is also increased by the fact that political elites are less 
prepared to take into account the demands of trade unions. In addition to this, in political 
discourse the legal regulations protecting employee representatives are increasingly regarded 
as illegitimate privileges that have to be dismantled. 
 
1.5.2.4 The multi-dimensional logic of collective action - extension of the 
approach taken by Offe and Wiesenthal (1985)   
 
Traxler (1995) extends the approach taken by Offe and Wiesenthal (1985)12 and identifies, in 
addition to ‘generalisability’ and ‘associability’, a third dimension of collective action and the 
ability of trade unions and employee associations to oblige their members to pursue common 
goals. The basic assumptions and implications of this dimension, which is referred to as 
‘governability’ are described in the following section.  
 
If one follows Traxler’s definition of the capacity to recruit members as a classical collective 
action problem that hinges on the choice between cooperation and deviation, whereas the 
degree of reconciliation of interests and the capacity to control the behaviour of members are 
interpreted as negotiation problems in the strictest sense (i.e. as a process of negotiating the 
distribution of costs and benefits as a result of the transformation of individual goals into 
                                                 
12
 The essay ‘Two Logics of Collective Action’ by Claus Offe und Helmut Wiesenthal appeared for the first time 
in M. Zeitlin (ed.), Political Power and Social Theory, (1980), 67-115. 
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collective goals), it becomes clear that the interests of the actors are not the only variable but 
that the question of distribution of power resources is also at stake.  The multi-dimensionality 
and multi-logical functioning of collective action is based on the fact that these resources are 
unevenly distributed not only between but also within the two classes. In the following section, 
the class-specific differences in terms of the three dimensions of action (generalisability, 
associability, governability) and their implications for the power relationshipship between the 
two parties in the labour market will be summed up.   
 
1.5.2.4.1 Generalisability – Harmonisation of interests 
 
Empirical examination of the thesis put forward by Offe and Wiesenthal should show that the 
number of employer organisations is smaller than the number of trade unions, as companies 
have homogenous and clearly quantifiable labour market interests that make it easier for them 
to organise. Empirical investigations (Streeck 1991; Traxler 1993) indicate, however, that there 
is no significant difference between the number of employers’ associations that represent both 
labour market and product market interests) and trade unions.  In contrast to the argument put 
forward by Offe/Wiesenthal, trade unions and employer organisations seem to pursue similar 
strategies in terms of reconciliation of interests.  Both try to organise as comprehensive as 
possible a segment of the labour market in order to maximise their sphere of influence. Thus, 
a high degree of associational concentration is generally regarded as a factor favourable to 
collective bargaining coordination as the organisational actors’ willingness and capacity to 
internalize negative externalities of their actions is positively related with their domain 
comprehensiveness (Olsen 1982).  
 
1.5.2.4.2 Associability – organisation capacity of associations 
 
It can be demonstrated that, in terms of the associability of employer organisations, in systems 
with voluntary membership the density of organisation, i.e. the proportion of members who are 
actually organised compared with the totality of potential members in the particular area 
covered by the organisation concerned, is actually higher for organised employees than for 
organised companies (Traxler 1993). This means that large companies are disproportionately 
represented in employers’ organisations. The reason for this is the intra-class differences in 
terms of distribution of resources that make it possible for large companies not only to bear the 
costs of membership (membership subscriptions) but also to transfer resources and thus 
significantly shape the association concerned (in terms of organisation, funding, staffing, ideas 
and strategy). The greater inclination of major companies to organise and the statutory 
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requirement in some countries for membership means that the figure for organisational density 
of employer associations is higher than for trade unions (Traxler 1993). The greater 
competition between companies is thus balanced by government measures to promote 
organisational ability (e.g. compulsory membership), whereas trade unions, against a 
background of increasing social individualisation in all areas of life, increasingly have to decide 
between growth goals, pooling of resources and membership recruitment on the one hand, 





Although Offe and Wiesenthal point to the autonomy of corporate decision-making abilities as 
an important element in explaining collective actions, this fact remains of little consequence for 
the question of organisational leadership in employer associations because of the authors’ 
strong orientation towards the interests of labour and capital. The capacity to ensure member 
support for agreed collective organisational objectives is less strong in employer organisations 
than in trade unions for two reasons. Firstly the asymmetrical distribution of power between 
the classes means that certain organisational activities such as establishing wage levels, 
public relationships, lobbying etc can also be carried out by the companies themselves. 
Secondly, the attraction is greater for employers to deviate from organisational goals while at 
the same time retaining membership of the organisation. Consideration of the labour market 
specific inter-and inter-class relationshipships leads Traxler to reach the conclusion that ‘(...) 
employers’ salient ability to pursue their self-interest significantly impairs their governability but 
not their associability’ (ibid. 1995, 32). In other words, employers are at an advantage over 
trade unions when it comes to ability to organise, but at a disadvantage in terms of capacity to 
control the strategies of their members. An empirical investigation supports the plausibility of 
this theory; if one examines the number of affiliated member organisations of national, cross-
sectoral umbrella organisations as an indicator of governability, it emerges that employers’ 
associations have significantly more membership organisations than the trade union umbrella 
organisations (Traxler 1993).  
 
The ability of employee and employer organisations to harmonise the interests of their 
members and persuade their members to work towards agreed goals (Traxler, 1996) is 
directly relevant for the effectiveness of the system of coordinating wage and collective 
bargaining policy. The capacity to make lower-rank members comply with agreements 
negotiated on a superordinate level is a typical collective action problem that is rooted in intra-
class interest differences. Thus, collective action problems differ from bargaining problems 
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that originate from different interest positions between capital and labour. The lack of 
governability is of particular relevance in wage bargaining where some associational actors 
are able to shift negative side effects of excessive wage increases, i.e. a rise of unemployment 
and inflation, to other groups of actors outside their own organisational domain. In this respect, 
small and particularistic organisations are better able to externalise negative effects of 
excessive wage increases that are beneficial for their own constituency but that are harmful for 
groups outside their narrowly defined organisational domain than larger and more all-
embracing associations. Hence certain organisational features of associational bargaining 
agents directly affect their ability to exert bargaining ‘governability’ on their members.  
 
Any analysis of the degree of governability of national collective bargaining systems requires 
differentiation between two basic patterns of coordination, i.e. horizontal and vertical 
coordination (see section 6.1.2). The aim of effective coordination is, on the one hand, to bring 
the collective agreements between the various different sectors and groups of employees into 
line with one another (horizontal coordination) and, on the other hand, to ensure that 
agreements are also complied with at downstream levels (vertical coordination). The ability to 
achieve vertical coordination depends on the statutory framework that ensures implementation 
of collective agreements at local level. The precondition for this is the ‘bargaining governability’ 
of vertical coordination mechanisms that aims ‘to set incentives for the shop floor to comply 
voluntarily’ (Traxler/Kittel, 2000, 1182). Horizontal and vertical coordination compete with one 
another, as the incorporation of a large number of different groups of employers and 
employees into collective agreements makes it all the more difficult to coordinate the various 
interests of the individual groups and ensure compliance with the agreement (Traxler, 2000). 
In concrete terms, a high degree of governability requires mandatory applicability of collective 
agreements and also a guarantee of no industrial action during their period of validity (Traxler, 
2000).  
 
A crucial element for coordination is therefore solution of the problem of vertical coordination, 
and the various collective bargaining systems are capable of this to differing degrees.  When it 
comes to coordination through wage leadership, the decentralised mode of coordination 
means that the control problems of vertical coordination hardly occur, whereas the existence 
of the two legal guarantees is crucial for the effectiveness of coordination by the umbrella 
organisations. Authoritative state coordination forces the members of the negotiating parties to 
comply, but is less effective in terms of coordination than other, voluntary, forms of horizontal 
coordination (Traxler and Kittel, 2000).  
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As the problem of vertical coordination is reduced by greater decentralisation of negotiations, 
effective coordination in collective bargaining systems in which agreements are concluded at 
the level of the umbrella organisations depends on the extent to which the local level can be 
controlled in terms of implementation of the agreement. The precondition for this is a set of 
labour regulations that ensures, on the one hand, statutory application of collective 
agreements and, on the other hand, guarantees freedom from industrial action for the period 
of its validity. Following the concept of ‘vertical coordination’ of Traxler and Kittel (2000) which 
rests upon a double scale, according to which vertical coordination is high when both legal 
guarantees exist and is low when one or both are not provided (Traxler and Kittel, 2000) only 
the co-existence of both legal pre-requisites ensures the compliance of individual lower-rank 
members to the organisation’s goals. 
 
1.5.2.5 Consequences of the different logic of collective action for the policies of 
trade unions and employers associations 
 
‘The capitalist class attempts to create state structures which channel working class political 
activity in ways that do not threaten capitalist political dominance. The internal structure of the 
state is simultaneously a product, an object and a determinant of class conflict. State structure 
is itself a source of power’ (Esping-Andersen 1990, 27). 
 
According to Offe and Wiesenthal, the differences in organisational practices in the political 
decision-making process between labour and capital are increased as the employee side is 
systematically disadvantaged in articulating and implementing its interests. The system of 
political decision-making that is intended to mediate between system- and social-integration is 
itself the result of the asymmetrical power balance between market forces and democratic 
organisation. This ‘doubling’ of the class conflict in the market and the political system can 
also be seen as a configuration of conflict on two levels; on the first level there is a conflict of 
distribution that can be solved within the system of ‘political forms’, i.e. the existing ‘rules of the 
game’ in the political decision-making process, and there is a latent conflict on the second 
level, in which what is at stake are the political forms of articulation and implementation of 
collective interests themselves. It is precisely at the second level that the multi-dimensionality 
and class-specific logic of collective action becomes clear: what is at stake is no longer a 
conflict between the classes but rather - given the dialog logic of collective action - a conflict 
within the working-class.  
 
In concrete terms this is all about the specific political form of corporatist decision-making, an 
essential element of which is the achievement of consensus between the organised interests 
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of labour and capital. Negotiation of collective interests in the corporatist system, however, 
presupposes that these are defined and articulated, and this generally happens according to a 
monological logic. The instrumental-monological pattern, which is in line with the laws of 
representation of corporatist interests, displaces the organisational pattern based on dialogue. 
The reason for this can be found in the internal dynamics of the organisation of employee 
interests: the element of bureaucratic organisation in trade unions grows, whereas at the same 
time the aspect of individuality in a heterogeneous membership increases in importance and 
hinders the development of a collective identity.  
 
Although under certain conditions the mode of corporatist decision-making can represent a 
highly efficient form of political control for European welfare states, one crucial disadvantage is 
its inherent tendency towards instability. Setting aside the judgment that classical corporatism 
in the current post-industrial and post-Fordist society has lost much of its efficiency and 
legitimacy as it is based on certain social-economic conditions such as constant economic 
growth, full employment, mass production, nationally limited markets and the predominance of 
a particular type of employee who is regarded as the target group for trade union organisation, 
the pattern of corporatist representation of interests encourages opportunistic strategies by all 
the groups of actors involved. 
 
1.5.2.5.1 Two phenomena of opportunism: Political Exchange and freeriding 
 
Offe and Wiesenthal define their concept of ‘opportunism’ as follows: ‘For class theory, 
opportunism involves implicit acceptance of structural subordination through elimination, for 
organisational convenience, of a range of ‘systemically usage‘ interests from collective action’ 
(Offe/Wiesenthal 1980, quoted by Streeck 1991, 191). 
 
Although the authors are not concerned with the negative connotations of the concept of 
‘opportunism’ but rather its analytical meaning as a tendency to use tactical possibilities 
without reference to principles, opportunistic behaviour can lead to destabilisation of inter-
class relationshipships: ‘Opportunism, then, is a type of organisational practice that resolves 
the problems connected with the precarious coexistence of the two logics of collective action 
(...), by preferring the monological pattern of collective action’ (Offe/Wiesenthal 1985, 215).  
 
Opportunistic strategies contain an ‘inherent committee logic’ as they are largely oriented 
towards established interests or sub-groups and established and recognised political parties 
and channels.  
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Two constellations of interests, resulting from opportunistic behaviour by the parties on the 
labour market are of particular significance:  
 
a) Political exchange : implications of class differences for the political actions of 
the organised interests of labour and capital  
 
a) Free-riding: individual and collective strategies of opportunistic behaviour  
 
On a) political exchange: 
In order to free themselves from their organisational dilemma, trade unions try to make 
themselves as independent as possible of the willingness of their members to take action. 
Instead the idea is to achieve as large as possible an element of external resources via the 
political system in which trade unions achieve political recognition and legal security for their 
activities, e.g. collective bargaining autonomy, the right of association, and the right to strike. 
In response, the state actors, by incorporating the trade unions into the political decision-
making process ensure legitimacy in the eyes of employed voters. But the organised interests 
of capital also profit via the politically mediated recognition of the trade unions as negotiating 
partners from the concession made by the trade unions to renounce militant, anti-capitalist 
goals. Institutionalised pay bargaining between the umbrella organisations of the two labour 
market parties also help solve the employers’ problem of collective action by removing wages 
from the competition mechanism.  
 
Ad. b) Free-riding:  
 
This variant of opportunistic behaviour by collective actors involves deviating behaviour by the 
weaker party. However, Offe und Wiesenthal (1985) do not look at the collective action 
problem of free-riding, as they only attribute opportunistic behaviour to the trade unions (not 
the employers associations) because of their disadvantaged position with regard to the 
aspects analysed by them, i.e. the question of harmonisation of interests and associability (cf. 
Traxler 1995).  
 
For trade unions the possibility of free-riding is derived from the fact that shared product 
market interests of employees and entrepreneurs are ‘co’-represented in business and trade 
associations. Employees thus save the cost of organising their own product–related interests 
(cf. Streeck 1991). However, it can be assumed, that the product market interests of 
employees and employers are different, as ‘(...) there can be no doubt that trade unions and 
workers (...) have quite significant product- and production-related interests. In many cases, 
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however, these are similar to the respective business interests in the same form or sector, 
whereas they differ from the interests of workers employed in other firms or sectors, or from 
the interests of workers as consumers or citizens (Streeck 1991, 190 ff.).  
 
Thus, with the transformation of industrial organisation into a ‘post-Fordist production 
system13, with greater demands in terms of flexibility and innovation, there is a need for the 
employee's side to be more organised.  Externalisation of representation of product-related 
interests means that traditional trade unions are excluded from decisions that have an impact 
on the labour-related interests of their members. The possibility of free-riding for trade unions' 
put forward by von Streeck is therefore linked to the sorts of conditions that prevailed in 
traditional systems of industrial relations under Keynesian economic policy regimes and 
Taylorist systems of work organisation.  
 
Free-riding strategies on the employer side appear more significant. As soon as trade unions 
pursue a moderate wage policy in order to ensure macroeconomic stability, individual 
employers have an incentive to deviate from collectively agreed wage structures - either down 
words, in order to reduce labour costs and secure a market advantage over the competition, or 
upwards in order to gain an advantage in a situation of scarcity on the labour market by 
recruiting workers from the existing pool without having to make any additional investment in 
training.  In phases of stagnating economic growth and during structural crises in particular 
parts of the markets or in particular sectors of industry, the incentive for free-riding with regard 
to collectively agreed wages increases even more. 
 
1.5.2.6 Diversity within and between national systems of industrial relations and 
regime competition 
 
In his later publications, Streeck, however, explicitly points out that the institutional logic of 
European integration does not permit equation of liberalisation and deregulation (Streeck 
1998).  
 
The mechanism of negative integration operates in two ways: although international market 
liberalisation calls for removal of legal barriers to trade, new regulations have to be created in 
                                                 
13
 Boyer, Robert (1988), The search for labour market flexibility: the European economies in transition. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press; Sabel, Charles F. (1982), Work and Politics: The Division of Labor in Industry. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
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order to ensure smooth functioning of market processes14. Thus, for example, international 
competition regulations are required that forbid ‘state aids’ to national industries. The regular 
waves of regulation by the Community that takes the form of ongoing revision, reviewing and 
extension of the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, merely reflects the logic of the 
integration process: ‘That European integration is closely associated with extensive rule-
making is therefore not at all a proof that it is not in its core a process of liberal market-making’ 
(Streeck 1998, 8).  
 
However the market not only requires rules related to competition and products; at the same 
time the need to maintain the legitimacy of political decisions also calls for social regulation to 
cushion the insecurity and instability affecting people in the labour market and elsewhere 
caused by freeing up of market forces. As the specific asymmetries of power on the labour 
market have considerable implications for organising the interests of the parties in the labour 
market, we will now examine the particular characteristics of the organisation of social labour. 
 
The unique position of labour as a ‘good’ consists in the fact that, although it is traded on 
markets, it does not come into these markets in the same way as most other ‘goods’ 
(Offe/Hinrichs, 1984, 50). Thus the production and marketing of labour is not controlled by 
expectations of marketability but rather - in quantitative terms - by democratic processes.  
Another important factor is the extent to which an individual offering his labour is dependent on 
a market-derived income because of the lack of other possibilities of subsisting outside the 
labour market.  The elasticity of the offers being made in the market is determined by this 
dependency.  In terms of the temporal aspects of their strategies, individuals offering their 
labour do not (or only to a limited extent) have the necessary means of production that would 
make it possible to strategically wait for the most favourable moment to sell. In addition to this, 
their need for subsistence is much more inflexible than the need of the demanders for their 
labour, as production can be maintained even if labour input per unit declines in the long-term, 
whereas subsistence is not possible if an individual's income declines in the long-term. This 
asymmetry can be seen in the fact that demanders are less dependent on the supply of labour 
than vice versa.  The qualitative potential for adjustment on the part of those offering their 
labour is more limited than that of capital; certain professional qualifications and experience 
make an individual only deployable for certain functions in the production process, whereas 
capital goods can constantly be replaced and varied.  Compared with the highly qualitative 
mobility of capital, the individual offering his labour can only offer - limited - geographical 
                                                 
14
 cf. Vogel, S. (1996), Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press; Majone, G. (1994), Understanding Regulatory Growth in the European Community. 
EUI Working Paper SPS No. 94/17. Florence: European University Institute. 
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mobility (migration, commuting).  
 
The close link between a citizen’s right to a social system based on the principle of paid work 
and conditions of employment strongly oriented towards market principles (e.g. efficiency, 
unlimited access to information, contractual freedom between autonomous economic entities) 
is what underlines the responsibility of national governments and the organised interests of the 
parties on the labour market for taking action in the field of social policy. The interest of 
citizens on the labour market in limiting contractual freedom and market logic is therefore 
always directed towards the (socio-)political decision-makers at national level, who themselves 
depend on legitimisation of the totality of their political decisions by the vast majority of the 
working population. The close interplay of ‘industrial’ and ‘social’ rights described by Marshall 
is only one reason for the predominance of the national level in the field of social policy which, 
however is basically unaffected by the superordinate framework of the legal and institutional 
system of the EU, based as it is on the principle of subsidiarity. The impact of the international 
market order and the European multi-level system on the relationships between class interests 
and national interests opens the way for competition between national social policy regimes.  
In the next section we will describe the impact of regime competition on the power 
relationshipship between labour and capital.  
 
1.5.2.7 Effects of regime competition on the negotiating position of the 
collective bargaining parties   
 
Setting aside the buzzword ‘regime competition’, which could suggest a deliberate reduction of 
social benefits and protection measures by national governments, initiatives to increase the 
national level of social benefits have come to a halt in all member states (cf. Leibfried 1998). 
The increasing difficulties that the trade unions are experiencing in pursuing their demands for 
greater possibilities of social participation indicates that there has been a change in the 
relationshipship between capital, labour and politics. If competition in the field of social policy 
does result in a shift of power to the advantage of mobile capital as a factor, enabling it merely 
to threaten an ‘exit strategy’ in order to force actors to make concessions, then one can indeed 
speak of a structural change in the tripartite mediation of interests within the framework of 
political exchange. As described in section 1.5.2.6.1, the existence of structures for political 
exchange represents an incentive both for trade unions and employers associations to adopt 
opportunistic strategies. 
 
For trade unions, rejection of anti-capitalist goals improves the conditions for political 
exchange aimed at achieving political recognition and legal protection. The employer side can 
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also solve some problems of collective action by recognising the trade unions as negotiating 
partners. Binding collective regulation of wages, for example, offers employers the advantage 
that wages are removed from the competitive mechanism (see section 1.5.2.3.2). With the 
setting up of the European Single Market and internationalisation of product markets, 
however, this function loses effectiveness, for wages, as part of labour costs, are increasingly 
subject to the pressure of competition to reduce labour-related production costs.  
 
Any analysis of the possible impact of the increasing pressure of competition on national 
systems of social security and industrial relations has to differentiate between the actual 
(medium and long-term) structural effects of political decisions (policy outcomes) on the one 
hand, and the direct results of the political negotiating and decision-making process (policy 
outputs) on the other. Long-term policy outcomes have been analysed in a number of 
comparative studies and there is little basic evidence of any convergence of national systems 
of industrial relations (cf. Traxler/Schmitter 1995). Thus, for example, Traxler in his 
comparative analysis of association and collective bargaining systems and macro economic 
governance in the EU and EFTA in the 1980s comes to the following conclusion:  
 
General trends such as internationalisation of markets and differentiation of the market 
interests of employers (because of differences in exposure to the global economy, size of 
company, productivity development etc.) ‘(…) increase the burden of problems on industrial 
relations (…). Against a background of this convergence of problems it is worth noting that the 
reactions of the various countries in terms of adjustment of industrial relations are 
extraordinarily divergent. (…) This means that basically similar problems (…) are tackled in 
very different ways and thus also have very different impacts on the industrial relations 
institutions themselves’ (Traxler 1995, 207).  
 
Traxler see the reason for the relative stability of industrial relations systems as lying in the 
basic principles of collective bargaining autonomy and freedom of association, which are also 
valid in European social policy.  For this reason it can be expected that ‘Europeanisation’ of 
institutions in this area will also in the future take longer to achieve than in other areas’ (ibid.).  
 
An assessment of such comparative studies of the long-term development of industrial 
relations systems is also difficult because they are based on different basic assumptions 
regarding the ability of the systems to control unemployment and inflation.  Without looking 
more closely at the contradictory performance assumptions of centrally, sectorally or 
decentrally structured collective bargaining systems at this stage, comparative analyses would 
seem to confirm that durability and stability are typical characteristics of institutionally 
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embedded systems of industrial relations even in the 1990s (cf. Traxler et al. 2001; Traxler 
and Kittel 2000).  
  
If, however, one looks at the conditions for the political decision-making process, then it 
becomes very clear that the negotiating strength of collective actors on the employee's side is 
declining vis- à-vis political decision-makers and employers’ organisations. The inevitable 
results of economic internationalisation have put both companies and also policymakers under 
increasing pressure to rationalise, restructure, reduce costs and achieve savings.  Policy 
measures such as reductions in corporate taxation and social costs, cuts in social budgets, 
social benefits, stricter conditions for access to social benefits, relinquishment of economic 
policy aimed at controlling demand and the liberalisation and flexibilisation of labour markets 
are adopted throughout Europe. 
 
The functioning and effectiveness of political exchange can be directly measured by the social, 
group-specific and macroeconomic functions of collective wage bargaining systems. From a 
functionalist point of view, collective bargaining systems take on a certain function for the 
negotiating parties (cf. Traxler 1998a). Internationalisation of the markets for finance, goods 
and services has, however, not been without an impact on the functioning of industrial 
relations systems. Whereas the interests of employees are still focused (or, in increasingly 
flexibilised labour markets and pared-down social security systems, even more focused) on 
social protection (working conditions), consultation or codetermination and profit-sharing, the 
transformation from Fordist market, production and labour organisation structures to a post-
Fordist configuration of socio-economic and political structures has meant (cf. Lash and Urry 
1988) that certain functions have lost their significance for employers and state actors or have 
become completely obsolete. The section that follows will describe the most important 
functions of ‘multi-employer bargaining systems’, which, in contrast to systems in which ‘single 
employer bargaining’ predominates (for example in the United Kingdom), can contribute 
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1.5.3 Beyond ‘Euro-optimism’ and ‘Euro-pessimism’: ‘Euro-pragmatism’ 
as an interest- and actors driven approach to Europeanisation  
 
Following neither a ‘Euro-optimist’ nor a ‘Euro-pessimist’ view on the Europeanisation of 
industrial relations, it can be drawn on the assumptions of a class-specific logic of collective 
actions in order to develop an alternative approach to the transnational coordination of 
collective bargaining.  
 
The coordination of collective bargaining policies across borders is driven by actors’ interests 
and embedded in the structural and economic conditions that determine the collective 
bargaining process, outcomes and their implementation. From a ‘Euro-pragmatic’ perspective 
of the Europeanisation of industrial relations the conception of a uniform process that either 
brings about a ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ Europeanisation is abandoned. Rather, a complex and 
context-dependent configuration of – both inter- and intra-class – actors’ interests shapes the 
room of manoeuvre of wage bargaining actors and allows for the creation of multiple and ad-
hoc alliances between different sets of actors. For instance, intra-class interest divergence 
arises between trade union actors of the sheltered and the exposed sector or between small 
companies operating in national markets and globally integrated MNC. The nature and 
outcome of the ‘Europeanisation’ process is therefore fragmented, diverse and reversible. 
Within this setting of ‘Europeanisation’ ‘à plusieurs vitesses’ the establishment of effective and 
efficient coordination arrangements in certain areas, e.g. regions and sectors co-exists with - 
so far however limited – processes of de-regulation, dis-organisation and decentralisation.  
 
In the following section a possible alternative approach to the cross-border coordination of 
collective bargaining will be developed. The mechanism of pattern-bargaining is considered as 
the key instrument for trade unions to orchestrate and co-ordinate their policies with regard to 
collective bargaining, in particular wage bargaining, across borders.  
 
 
1.5.3.1 Pattern Bargaining – A means for the transnational coordination of 
collective bargaining? 
 
Taking the assumptions on the multi-logic and multi-dimensionality of associational action as a 
starting point for the discussion of coordination of collective bargaining on both the national 
and transnational level from a theoretical perspective, a further investigation into the functions 
and implications of pattern bargaining seems to be a profitable endeavor.  
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Theoretical reasoning about the nature of pattern bargaining diverge in conceiving it either as 
a process or an outcome. This conceptual ambiguity originates in the way pattern bargaining 
produces results. In contrast to centralised, peak-level modes of coordination that are intended 
to synchronise actions of different bargaining units (Traxler et al. 2001), outcomes from pattern 
bargaining may be unintended side effects produced by the participating bargaining agents. 
However, the focus solely on outcomes falls short of the intended actions of the bargaining 
parties and puts patterned outcomes close to convergence effects induced purely by market 
forces. Rather, coordination via pattern bargaining arises from implicit roles taken up by 
bargainers. Thus, coordination intentions may be concealed. Wage leadership of a certain 
organisation is not necessarily openly announced by it, nor do the pattern-taking bargaining 
agents declare their intention to follow the pattern setter. Pattern bargaining may involve 
compulsion for bargaining units that are unwilling to follow, pattern bargaining nevertheless is 
an non-hierarchical mode of coordination since it lacks sanctions imposed on deviant 
bargaining parties.  
 
The fact that pattern bargaining is a non-hierarchical coordination mode does not rule out 
possible compliance problems. This becomes particularly clear in the case of wage 
bargaining15. In this respect, two forms of pattern bargaining can be distinguished; First, wage-
pushing pattern bargaining whereby the pattern setting union(s) fix wage rates far above 
inflation and productivity growth and are therefore labeled ‘excessive’, and second, wage-
moderating pattern bargaining where wage increases are strictly in line with the development 
of productivity and inflation. Whereas the first variant of pattern bargaining is only feasible 
when labour markets are tight, the second form corresponds to the current bargaining situation 
with high levels of unemployment and increasing competitive pressures from internationalised 
markets. As far as inter-class interests are concerned, business clearly favours moderate 
wage increases16. The trade unions’ interest in a moderate wage policy is less unequivocal. 
Naturally, trade unions aim at preserving high wages for their constituency. However, trade 
                                                 
15
 Although it is disputed weather the patterned outcome of wage bargaining are similar percentage increases or 
similar wage levels (Capelli 1990, Ready 1990), it is clear that both outcomes can not be achieved simultaneously. 
Converging percentage increases maintain pay differentials between sectors and occupations. A reduction in wage 
dispersion presupposes above-average pay hikes for low-wage and below-average increases for high-wage groups. 
16
 The univocal interest of business and unions in taking wages out of competition by collectively negotiated 
agreements is receding into the background with the internationalisation of product markets. The ‘cartelising’ 
function of multi-employer bargaining is considered as one of the most important incentives for business to 
engage into collective negotiations. However, in markets that are subject to international competition, it is no 
longer feasible to insulate wages from market forces by collective pay agreements with national scope (see section 
1.5.2.3.2). 
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unions which organise sectors that are subject to international competition are less able to 
externalise negative externalities of excessive wage increases than trade unions in sectors 
that are sheltered from international competition (Crouch 1993). The higher the degree of 
integration into international markets, the more difficult is it for an industry to pass increases in 
labour costs over to output prices without facing severe reductions in demand. Thus, trade 
unions in exposed sectors have a twofold interest in keeping wages low across industries 
(Traxler et al. 2008a). First, they are directly affected by price rises of the sheltered sectors as 
their customers or indirectly by a general increase in inflation. Second, with steep pay hikes in 
sheltered sectors employment in exposed industries becomes less attractive as their wage 
position declines relative to that of sheltered sectors. This problem is aggravated by the 
dependence of the exposed sector on high qualified labour in order to maintain its international 
competitiveness.  
 
However, the fact that trade unions in exposed sectors have a strong interest in a moderate 
wage policy and are therefore willing to act as wage setters does not guarantee the 
compliance of sheltered-sector bargaining agents to conclude wage rates below those of the 
patterned wage agreement. Compliance of the pattern-takers is determined by the intra-class 
power configuration (see section 1.5.2.4). The bargaining power of trade unions in strongly 
unionised sectors is larger than that in weakly organised industries. Weak and marginal unions 
may benefit from relying on the pattern setter and orient their demands towards the patterned 
agreement whereas strong unions may reject any restrictions put upon them by another union 
organisation. The willingness to follow the pattern setter is usually contingent on the trade 
unions of the public sector since they are traditional strongholds in terms of membership 
organisation. As strongly organised sheltered-sector trade unions there are most explicitly 
opposed to orient their bargaining strategies towards that of other unions. As the exemplary 
case of Austria indicates, large public sector unions tend to publicly declare their reservation 
vis-à-vis the idea of pattern setting although they concede ‘that agreements for the metal 
industry provide a ‘marker’ that shapes expectations of their own members’ (Traxler et al. 
2008b, 17). Since the power of manufacturing-sector unions is withering with the expansion of 
the service sector segment of the economy, certain institutional features that function as inter-
sectoral spill-over mechanisms are required in order to make strong sheltered-sector unions 
comply to pattern bargaining (Traxler et al. 2008a). Statutory provisions that exclude the public 
sector from collective bargaining and austere budgetary policy weaken the bargaining power 
of the sector’s unions vis-à-vis the despite the existence of de facto negotiations.  
 
Empirical evidence supports the argument for the metal sector as industry that is best suited 
the perform wage leadership (Sisson and Marginson 2002, Traxler et al. 2008a, Traxler and 
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Brandl 2009, forthcoming). In all countries where pattern bargaining is the dominant mode of 
coordination, i.e. Germany, Austria and Japan, it is the metal industry that sets the pattern for 
other sectors. The pertinence of the metal sector as the leading industry rests upon its 
particular economic and institutional features. Within the manufacturing sector, it ranks among 
the most export-dependent industries and is thus strongly integrated in international markets. 
Besides, the metal industry is characterised by its high vertical integration in product markets, 
insofar as the sector is the main producer of intermediate products. Effects produced by the 
bargaining conduct of the metal industry, e.g. industrial action, wage increases that are directly 
affecting labour costs, are therefore likely to spill over to other sectors. With regard to 
institutional features of industrial relations in the metal sector, it is characterised by strongly 
organised trade unions and a highly centralised associational system of labour interest 
representation. Trade union densities in the metal industry are in general markedly above 
aggregate inter-industry levels (e.g. Beguin 2005) and the number of relevant metalworkers’ 
unions is rather limited (Traxler et al. 2001). For instance, taking the tow countries where wage 
pattern bargaining is the predominant mode of bargaining coordination as examples, in 
Germany there is only one metalworkers’ union for both blue- and white-collar workers, and in 
Austria, metalworkers are represented by the blue-collar GMTN whereas white-collar 
employees are organised by GPA.   
 
In conclusion, pattern bargaining constitutes a non-hierarchical and relatively decentralised 
mechanism of bargaining coordination. It is less demanding than centralised forms of 
coordination in terms of institutional prerequisites that guarantee a high degree of vertical 
coordination. As a covert mechanism, pattern bargaining does not rest upon decision-making 
by peak-level organisations that presuppose a constant and explicit ensuring of legitimacy vis-
à-vis its members.  
 
So far, these conclusions have been drawn with respect to inter-industry pattern bargaining on 
the national level. In general, they are also appropriate for pattern bargaining as a mode for 
the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining in a certain sector. Leaving aside the 
differences between inter- and intra-industry pattern bargaining with regard to functions, 
agency, interest and power configurations as well as the economic context (Traxler et al. 
2008a), is the transnational dimension of collective bargaining within a sector that is of interest 
here. Given competitive pressure arising from the Common market, it is evident that it is the 
wage-moderating variant of pattern bargaining that is inherent in any form of transnational 
bargaining coordination. Although transnational collective bargaining coordination is 
exclusively driven by trade unions, aiming at countering the international mobility of capital, it 
is not necessarily based on a common interest among trade unions from different countries. 
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Trade unions have to deal with the dilemma to reconcile the aim of securing jobs by 
maintaining international competitiveness with the purpose of transnational coordination 
initiatives, that is, curbing wage and social dumping. Thus, the problem at hand is not only one 
of the power asymmetry between capital and labour but also intra-class problems that magnify 
with the transnational scope of action. Decentralised and union-led initiatives for the cross-
border coordination of collective bargaining sidestep the problem of employers’ reluctance to 
engage into joint coordination activities with the trade unions’ side. Due to the employers’ 
higher capacity for transnational mobility, they are benefiting from differences in labour 
standards that allow them to embark on strategies of ‘regime shopping’ (see sections 1.5.2.7 
and 1.5.2.8). Despite the growing awareness among trade unions with regard to the cross-
border dimension of collective bargaining in the context of the European Monetary Union, 
beggar-my-neighbour tendencies are still continuing to exist.  
 
Since it are the export-dependent industries that are best able to take on the role of wage 
leadership, competitive pressures are strongest in these sectors. Thus, trade unions in these 
sectors are pushed into a strategy of strict wage-moderation that is hardly appropriate to 
prevent wage dumping. The tendency to increase international competitiveness in the wage of 
the European Monetary Union in the 1990ies lead to a resurgence of national ‘social pacts’ 
(e.g. Fajertag and Pochet 2000). In order to achieve the ‘convergence criteria’ of the Euro, 
state-led interventions into wage and incomes policies became popular throughout Europe. In 
the case of Belgium, the policy-makers returned to state-imposed bargaining coordination in 
the second half of the 1990ies (Traxler et al. 2001) after the social partner failed to reach an 
agreement17. In 1996 the Belgian government introduced the creation of the ‘European Wage 
Area’, a de-facto currency area that includes Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and France. 
Since then, the settlement of wage increases on the basis of wage developments in the three 
neighbouring countries was stipulated by law. Similarly, the Netherlands embarked on a 
competition-orientated approach to wage policy (e.g. Verdun 2002, Crouch 2000) that 
repeatedly resulted in ochestrated wage freezes, the last  concluded for the years 2004/05 
(e.g. Van het Kaar 2002 and 2003). The upcoming introduction of the Euro triggered trade 
union-led initiatives aiming at the coordination of collective bargaining policies. On the 
European level, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) set up a collective 
bargaining committee in 1999 and adopted principles on the coordination of collective 
bargaining. Among the European Industry Federations (EIF) under the umbrella of ETUC, the 
European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) was the first union that adopted a European-wide 
approach to collective bargaining policy based on the ‘European Coordination Rule’ that sets 
                                                 
17
 After a social partner agreement failed in 1997/98 they concluded an inter-professional agreement for the years 
1999-2000.  
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out orientation criteria for wage bargaining (see sections 3.2.1 and 10.1.5). In addition, the 
‘Doorn Initiative’ launched by trade union confederations of Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg and Germany in 1997 aimed at the cross-border of coordination of collective 
bargaining18. However, after a period of regular annual meetings up to the year 2001 
(Schulten 2000 and 2001) the Doorn initiative fell asleep, or at least escaped from public view. 
However, it seems that attempts resuscitate the Doorn initiative have been successful as 
member unions of the Doorn group resumed their meetings later on – on a however less 
regular basis19. The repeatedly suspended meeting activities of the Doorn group underscore 
the difficulties of an inter-sectoral approach to transnational coordination. Due to the high 
degree of interest heterogeneity on the inter-industry level unification of interest and collective 
action is impeded. Thus, the Doorn initiative is mainly a forum for information exchange and 
consultation rather than an instrument for bargaining coordination.  
 
What can be inferred now from the arguments laid down above with regard to pattern 
bargaining as a mode for the transnational collective bargaining coordination? First, intra-
sectoral pattern bargaining across countries is one mode of coordination within a multi-layered 
system of industrial relations. Collective bargaining occurs on plant and company, industry and 
inter-industry level within national boundaries of the member countries. The national systems 
of industrial relations are completed by a European structure for social, employment and 
collective bargaining policy. The inter-relatedness of the multiple levels of political action 
reinforces and complements them with each other (see section 1.1). Thus, a European system 
of industrial relations has to incorporate an outstandingly high degree of variety and 
heterogeneity of national industrial relationship structures. The fact that the diversity of 
national industrial relationship systems has proved to persist, and that uniform market 
pressures did not bring about a convergence towards decentralised systems of collective 
bargaining corresponds to the thesis of path-dependency of the actors’ strategies on the 
institutional setting. Market-driven change is thus filtered and processed through national 
institutions and allows therefore for a considerable variety in adjustment strategies. Pattern 
bargaining as a decentralised and non-hierarchical coordination mode is compatible with the 
complexity of Europe-wide coordination structures. Moreover, it is less demanding in terms of 
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 The ‚declaration of Doorn’ was  adopted on 5th September 1998 by the Belgian confederations  ABVV and 
ACV, the German DGB and DAG, the Dutch confederations CNV, FNV and MHP and by CGT-L and LCGB 
from Luxemburg as well as the respective sectoral trade unions in construction, the chemical industry, 
metal/electro-technical industry, private and public services.  
19
 For instance, the Doorn group held its 9th ‚political conference’ on 23 and 24 October 2008 in Utrecht, with 
participating peak-level unions form the Netherlands (i.e. FNV, CNV, MHP), Germany (i.e. DGB), France (i.e. 
CGT, CFDT, FO, CFTC), Belgium (i.e. FGTB, CSC, CGSL) and Luxembourg (i.e. CGT-L, LCGB).  
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institutional prerequisites to guarantee compliance by lower-level members compared to 
centralised, peak-level coordination. Furthermore, collective action might be enhanced by an 
increased number of participants as the ‘critical mass’ to trigger spill-over effects is reached 
more easily. Thus, pattern bargaining does not presuppose the complete following of all 
sectoral bargaining agents. Second, pattern bargaining on the European-level has developed 
in network-form structures whereby the metal sector has taken the lead (see section 7.1.3). 
Within a certain sector the trade union(s) of one country act(s) as the pattern setter. Taking the 
metal sector as an example, it has been the German IG Metall that has been most active. The 
German metal industry is considered as predestined to set a pattern for trade union bargainers 
in other countries (e.g. Traxler 2000, Marginson and Traxler 2005). Despite reductions in 
membership and the general trend to the undermining of collective agreements, IG Metall is 
yet a relatively powerful bargaining party. Third, pattern bargaining embedded in a network 
structure has to rely on the engagement of the sectoral EIF. Referring to the metal sector, the 
EMF adopted various instruments for the coordination and monitoring of collective bargaining 
such as the European Coordination Rule and a database of collective bargaining information 
(see sections 7.1.4 and 7.1.5). The crucial role of the European peak-level organisation with 
respect to its coordination function and the ensuring of compliance among the national 
member organisations is also supported by statements of the interviewed bargaining experts. 
It is important to note that although pattern bargaining is an efficient and feasible mode of 
transnational intra-sectoral coordination it has to be complemented by EIF engagement and by 
other coordination institutions such as European Works Councils on the level of multinational 
companies. This is particularly true in view of the growing importance of plant or company-
level bargaining and the widespread practice of coercive comparisons of labour costs and 
work organisation across MNC locations (Hancké 2000).  
 
However, the crucial question with regard of the feasibility of intra-sectoral pattern bargaining 
on the European level is twofold. First, the pattern setting sectoral trade union organisation 
has to achieve the necessary legitimacy among its partner unions from other countries in order 
to ensure their compliance. In the metal sector, Germany has taken on a leading role that 
however did not yet include the function of setting a pattern for wage bargaining. Second, a 
structural precondition to ensure spill-over effects has to be met: The level of collective 
bargaining coverage has to be so inclusive that the bargaining strategies of a critical mass of 
actors spill over to other bargaining units that are less engaged into bargaining coordination. 
Empirical evidence suggests that coverage rates of 50 per cent and above suffice to produce 
such effects (Marginson and Traxler 2005). According to Traxler et al. (2001) an inclusive 
coverage is contingent on either multi-employer bargaining in combination with extension 
practice or functional equivalents such as compulsory membership in employer associations) 
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or multi-employer bargaining systems in combination with a high organisational density of 
trade unions. The member states clearly diverge with respect to these institutional 
requirements. In the ‘old’ member countries – with the exception of the United Kingdom – 
coverage is inclusive whereas in the central and eastern European member states coverage is 
marginal due to the predominance of single-employer bargaining which renders statutory 
extension provisions – where they exist – ineffective. Thus, two conclusions can be drawn: 
First, the mode of pattern bargaining is only one path for the transnational coordination of 
collective bargaining, and it has to be complemented by centralised, top-down regulatory 
initiatives within a multi-level system of European industrial relations. Second, the institutional 
requirements to ensure the effective functioning of pattern bargaining are met only in certain 
sectors. The sector-based empirical analysis of this study indicates that pattern bargaining can 
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II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
2. Research Questions and Meta-Assumptions 
 
The advanced internationalisation of markets and the completion of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EEMU) gave new impetus to the systematic analysis of the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining policies. Since the countries of the Eurozone have been 
deprived of their instruments for the adaption to asymmetric shocks, the question of the 
efficiency of initiatives aiming at the cross-border coordination of wage policy is of particular 
relevance. The harmonisation of monetary policies in the framework of the EEMU and its 
limiting implications on finance and budget policies in the member countries shifts the burden 
of adjustment to disruptive economic developments within the Eurozone on to wages. The 
enlargement of the EU increased differences in wage levels to a considerable degree and thus 
the danger of wage dumping. Therefore, the wage political actors play a key role in the 
coordination of collectively negotiated wage increases within the EU.  
 
It was however not only the functional and economic necessity for bringing in line collective 
bargaining policies across borders that gained weight; Pronounced processes of diversification 
brought about increasing heterogeneity within and between the national systems of industrial 
relations and determine the conditions and requirements for the functioning of efficient 
transnational coordination mechanisms (Marginson and Sisson 1998). Thus, inferring a 
general trend to convergence in terms of the decentralisation of collective bargaining 
throughout Europe (Lash and Urry 1987) would be a grossly simplistic assessment. Although 
in almost all systems of industrial relations the company and plant level has grown in 
importance with regard to the conclusion of collective agreements since the early 1990ies – 
and further spurred by the completion of the EEMU and the accession of new member 
countries in 2004 and 2007 – a Europe-wide process of ‘disorganised decentralisation’ 
(Traxler 1995) can not be observed. The social partners in the member countries responded to 
the highly heterogeneous requirements by adopting greatly varying strategies on both the 
national and the sectoral level. Since in the majority of EU member countries a multi-level 
system of collective bargaining is in existence, decentralisation has been embedded in 
arrangements for the coordination of wages and collective bargaining on levels higher than the 
individual company or the sector. The reason for the high variety of adaption and reaction 
strategies of collective bargaining actors is the embeddedness of their actions in the 
institutional framework of the national systems of industrial relations. From a historical 
perspective, the paradigm of ‘path-dependence’ according to which the social partners’ 
options and strategies of action are shaped by the structural conditions and peculiarities of the 
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countries’ industrial relations systems (e.g. North 1990) can be invoked in this respect. The 
persistent diversity of national industrial relationship systems despite existing pressures 
originating in the internationalisation of markets gives evidence for path-dependence rather 
than for convergence. Even though in periods of transformation, i.e. during the oil crises of the 
1970ies, a direct market-driven effect on institutional variables cannot be found (Traxler et al. 
2001).  This findings underscore the assumption that market forces only indirectly affect labour 
relationships, and that they are filtered and processed by institutions (Hyman 1999).  
 
The responsiveness of collective bargaining systems, i.e. their capacity to adapt to monetary 
policy requirements by controlling wage developments, has been addressed in a number of 
studies (e.g. Hall and Franzese 1998, Iversen and Soskice 1998, Traxler and Kittel 1999, 
Iversen 1999, Traxler 2000). ‘Wage policy responsiveness’ (Traxler 2000, 4) refers to the 
extent of efficiency of wage policy coordination on the national, intersectoral level by the 
capacity to deliberately bringing in line the wage-setting institution’s decisions with the 
decisions of external actors (Traxler 2000, 7). A high extent of responsiveness is best 
guaranteed by bargaining systems where centralised, intersectoral coordination mechanisms 
are completed by legal-institutional instruments such as a peace obligation for collective 
agreements in force and the legal enforceability of collective agreements which ensure the 
compliance of subordinate levels of actions (i.e. ‘vertical coordination’). However, non-
hierarchical, decentralised mechanisms of wage political governance in the form of patter-
setting of a particular sector characterised by a high degree of vertical macroeconomic 
integration (i.e. the metal sector) may serve as a functional equivalent of centralised 
bargaining coordination when it comes to ensure the intersectoral coordination of wage 
policies aiming at taking differences in sectoral productivity developments into consideration 
(see section 1.5.3.1). A deficient structural responsiveness is inherent in such bargaining 
systems in which the macroeconomic coordination is carried out at the peak-level of 
bargaining parties but the institutional preconditions to ensure a high degree of vertical 
compliance are not provided for (Traxler and Kittel 1999).  
 
The extension of wage and collective bargaining coordination mechanisms to a ‘transnational 
scope’ and the hence changed economic interdependencies and power and interest 
configurations arising from the enlargement of actors involved imply a diversified and multi-
level approach to coordination. On the one hand the need for intersectoral wage restraint 
decreases as within the macroeconomic regime of the EMU the containment of price inflation 
takes precedence over other macroeconomic goals. In return, wage policy actors of the sector 
level gain additional room to manoeuvre to pursue a productivity-orientated wage policy both 
on the national and the transnational level. The importance of sector-level bargaining 
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coordination approaches is further underscored as only decentralised and flexible coordination 
mechanisms guarantee the cross-border concertation of national collective bargaining policies. 
In general, two approaches which take on the form of a ‘twofold model of European ‚pattern-
bargaining’ that potentially can link together national and transnational coordination of wage 
policies and help to accommodate the need for national flexibility and European coherence’ 
(Dolvik 2000a, 45) can be conceived. With regard to the sectoral level these two approaches 
on transnational collective bargaining coordination can be summarised as follows (cf. 
Dufresne and Mermet 2002, see also sections 1.4.1. and 1.4.2): 
 
1) A Europe-wide form of cross-country pattern bargaining by a certain sector whereby 
the unions in the metal sector have been the first to establish structures for the 
transnational coordination of collective bargaining. A typical example of such a 
multilateral union initiative are the transnational collective bargaining networks in the 
European metal sector that centre around several district organisations of the German 
IG Metall and comprise a number of partner unions from neighbouring countries such 
as Poland, the Czech Republic, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Austria 
(Gollbach and Schulten 2000).  
2) A ‘centralised’ cross-border coordination approach to the level of the European 
Industry Federations (EIF) which aims at the Europe-wide harmonisation of intra-
sectoral employment conditions and collective (wage) bargaining through the 
conclusion of joint agreements, declarations and the adoption of European directives.  
 
The fundamental problem inherent in the transnational coordination of collective (wage) 
bargaining policies is the incompatibility of certain goals of the national and the European 
level. The European multi-level system of industrial relations is based on the interplay between 
national and European actors of different level of action. The Europe-wide concertation of 
national bargaining policies obviously requires the involvement of organisations with nationally 
limited organisational domains and mandates for negotiation. This ambiguity with regard to 
actors and institutions and their strategies of action which contribute to the constitution of the 
‘European’ system of industrial and labour relationships determines the course of the 
transnational coordination effect. Thus, the concertation processes and strategies can be 
attributed either to national or supranational European organisations in the sense of ‘upstream’ 
or ‘downstream’ effects of coordination.  Dolvik for instance conceives ‘national cross-sectoral 
coordination of collective bargaining either trough centralised concertation or by industrial 
pattern-bargaining, conditioning (upstream) national participation in European co-ordination 
and transposing (downstream) European margins and parameters into national systems in 
accordance with different national and sectoral conditions’ (Dolvik 2000a, 46) in his model of 
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‘European pattern-bargaining’.  
 
Considering the two alternative forms of inter-sectoral coordination of collective bargaining the 
danger of the centralised national concertation which is opposed to transnational coordination 
goals becomes evident. A competitive relationship between national and cross-border 
coordination mechanisms emerges when a country deliberately pursues a competition-
orientated macroeconomic coordination of wage-setting and collective bargaining. Thus, 
national pacts for competitiveness incorporate the danger to trigger off a downward-spiral of 
wages and may even develop into a ‘beggar-my-neighbour’ policy. In order to counter 
tendencies of wage dumping national trade unions of some sectors have set up co-ordinations 
within bargaining networks aiming at the exchange of information prior to collective wage 
bargaining rounds. A systematic union-led coordination of collective bargaining further 
requires the adoption of joint principles and parameter for wage-setting which are usually 
orientated towards inflation and productivity growth. Such ‘coordination guidelines’ have the 
advantage of providing for sufficient room of manoeuvre for national wage bargainers in order 
consider  national and sectoral differences in productivity growth when formulating their wage 
goals and demands. 
 
This study is based on four general assumptions. First, it has to be pointed out that cross-
border initiatives for the coordination of collective bargaining policies are almost exclusively 
driven by unions. The cross-border coordination of wages and labour standards is clearly not 
in the interest of business in order to make use of wage differentials and different working 
conditions within the EU. Even on the national level, the most important incentive for entering 
into collective bargaining with the unions’ side, i.e. taking wages out of competition, has lost its 
influence with the increasing internationalisation of markets (see section 1.5.2.3.2). Hence, 
this study focuses on the coordination strategies and perceptions of trade unions. Second, 
transnational collective bargaining coordination takes place within a multi-level framework of 
national and European industrial relations. Overlapping areas of action of a multitude of social 
partner organisations emerge on company, national and transnational level and intersect 
between sectoral lines. The hierarchical dimension which is always inherent in collective 
action additionally refers to both national and European bargaining agents. Thus, structures of 
decision-making and action are shaped by top-down and bottom-up effects that co-exist and 
mutually influence each other. The vertical level of transnational action corresponds to the 
concepts of ‘centralised’ and ‘decentralised’ patterns of Europeanisation of collective 
bargaining. As laid out below (cf. sections 1.4.1. and 1.4.2), centralised Europeanisation refers 
to EU-level activities initiated by the European Industry Federations (EIF) and the cross-
sectoral European federations of labour such as the European Trade Union Confederation 
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(ETUC). The decentralised pattern of Europeanisation arises from union action on the national 
and regional levels and thus refers to bottom-up strategies by the members of the European 
peak-level organisations. Thirdly, the focus of this study is the transnational sector level. 
Coordination activities that involve unions on the level of multinational companies are not 
considered although it is undisputed that both levels are complementing each other in a multi-
level system of industrial relations. With regard to the horizontal dimension of collective 
bargaining, i.e. coordination between industries, it is mainly intra-industry coordination that is 
carried out by unions. However, aspects of cross-industry co-operation on the European level 
are considered in the conception of unions’ collective bargaining activities and emerging 
processes of mutual ‘political learning’. Fourth, the scope of this study includes the EU15 
countries. This somehow ‘constrained’ approach is justified in view of the complexity of 
collective bargaining mechanisms on the transnational level. The data-based approach of this 
study contributes to the analytical stringency and comprehensiveness. However, it clearly has 
limits with regard to the incompleteness of comparable data in the new member states. What 
is more important is that empirical evidence underscores the far-reaching variety of bargaining 
structures and practices within the western European member states. Thus, for investigating 
the underlying research question a focus on the ‘old’ member states is fully sufficient in order 
to draw conclusions on the conducive and hindering factors of transnational collective 
bargaining coordination. Coordination mechanisms with a cross-border dimension are still in 
an incipient stage and they are rather informal and fragmented in most sectors. Taking into 
consideration the difficulties that such initiatives have to face even within the relatively strongly 
institutionalised systems of collective bargaining and employee representation in western 
Europe, it is safe to assume that the conditions for the establishment of cross-border initiatives 
are more unfavourable in the CEE countries. In order to limit the ‘western’ bias of the study, 
the question of the integration of the new member countries into coordination activities initiated 
by the EIF is taken into consideration in the qualitative part of the analysis. With regard to 
inter-union co-operation aiming at the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining, it can 
not be avoided that initiatives between CEEC got out of sight since they are beyond the scope 
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3. The dependent variable: Operationalisation of the concepts of 
centralised and decentralised patterns of Europeanisation of collective 
bargaining policies 
 
The operationalisation of a process-based concept such as the Europeanisation of collective 
bargaining has to consider the evolutional aspect of the development of industrial relations 
structures on the European level (cf. section 1.4). For both the decentralised and centralised 
patterns of Europeanisation the operationalisation has to take into account the constantly 
changing nature of the legal-institutional and normative structures that shape the sphere of 
action for European and national social partners. Since the transnational coordination of 
collective bargaining policies is still perceived as a ‘learning experience’ or a learning process 
by social partner actors, their perceptions with regard to the importance and effectiveness of a 
certain coordination approach is subject to change. Purpose and function of a cross-border 
coordination of collective bargaining are assessed differently by relevant bargaining agents of 
the European and national levels. Thus, collective bargaining policy coordination does not 
rank high on the agenda of all EIF. The same holds true for their national affiliates. Their 
inclination to embark on a decentralised approach of Europeanisation depends on their 
perceived interest in coordinating bargaining issues and demands with unions from other 
countries. Thus, the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining is not a well-entrenched 
practice among trade union organisations nor is it perceived as a self-evident task for trade 
union activities. The difficulty of operationalising decentral and central Europeanisation 
patterns stems from this ambiguity of actor perceptions and practices.  
 
Collective bargaining coordination of the European level occurs in various forms including 
strongly institutionalised arrangements such as the approach pursued by the EMF and very 
‘loose’, ad-hoc projects between trade unions from different countries. Likewise, the 
geographical scope as well as the issues subject to coordination efforts varies largely between 
sectors and groups of countries. In this respect, the metal sector’s arrangement is distinct from 
other sectors since it includes all countries in which the EMF has member organisations. The 
topical range of bargaining issues and aspects including wages, working time, vocational 
training, pensions and retirement provisions is outstandingly comprehensive in the metal 
sector and affects collective bargaining on the national level.  
 
Transnational coordination initiatives have become a multi-level and multi-faceted 
phenomenon. The multitude of reciprocal interactions between actors of different levels 
involves both top-down and bottom-up effects. On the one hand, the European Industry 
Federations and the ETUC lay down the basic framework for the Europe-wide coordination of 
collective bargaining, and on the other hand, national unions initiate cross-border projects for 
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the coordination of their bargaining strategies. These two main lines of interest formulation and 
decision-making can be characterised as follows: First, ‘centralised’, top-down processes 
originate from the level of the EIF and second, ‘decentralised’ bottom-up processes are 
launched by the national affiliates of the European sector unions. Bargaining coordination 
patterns vary widely between sectors with the centralised element dominating in some 
industries and the decentralised pattern prevailing in other sectors. In the following two 




3.1 Conceptualisation of the centralised pattern of Europeanisation 
 
A ‘centralised’ approach to transnational collective bargaining coordination is characterised by 
the strong involvement of the respective EIF. The EIF has a pronounced and acknowledged 
role in shaping the policy approach to collective bargaining coordination. The organisation 
determines the normative orientation and the strategic approach to the Europeanisation of 
collective bargaining in the respective sector. The strategic repertoire of the EIF includes the 
formulation of common goals and policy guidelines, the proposition and adoption of an 
instrument for the coordination of collective bargaining such as the metal sector’s European 
Coordination Rule (cf. 7.1.4) and the establishment of a formalised structure for monitoring 
and evaluating the implementation of common goals and criteria. Besides, the EIF has a 
strong coordination and surveillance function by providing a platform for the cross-border 
exchange of collective bargaining information. In addition, the EIF promotes the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining across sectors and actively contributes to further 
Europeanisation in this policy field by the information exchange with representatives from 
other EIFs. Promoting coordination activities is of particular relevance since the 
transnationalisation of collective bargaining is still in an incipient stage and perceived as a 
learning experience by the involved actors. Due to its pioneering role in the field of 
transnational collective bargaining coordination, the EMF has attained some ‘expertise’ 
recognised by EIF of other sectors. Thus, inter-sectoral activities in the field of collective 
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3.2 Conceptualisationof the decentralised pattern of Europeanisation 
 
The decentralised path of Europeanisation of collective bargaining is defined as inter-union 
coordination activities (see section 1.4.2) that – to a more or lesser extent – involve the 
European Industry Federations. However, the EIF does not play an active role in determining 
the political approach to collective bargaining coordination between national affiliates. Rather, 
the member organisations are highly autonomous in entering into co-operations with unions 
form other countries. Scope and issues of coordination are decided upon by the unions 
participating in such cross-border co-operations. Typically, topics that are perceived as 
suitable for the cross-border coordination are vocational training, lifelong learning or work 
organisation-related issues. The low degree of institutionalisation of bi- or multilateral union 
co-operations is underscored by their ad-hoc character. Frequently such co-operations are 
project-based and financed by European Funds. If at all, they are only loosely integrated into 
the formal structures of the EIF.  
 
 
3.2.1 The metal sector as the starting point for the operationalisation of 
the Europeanisation of collective bargaining 
 
In order to set up a framework for the operationalisation of the decentralised pattern of 
Europeanisation, one has to consider particularly the collective bargaining approach in the 
metal sector. The Europeanisation of collective bargaining policy is most developed in this 
sector. The European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) established a ‘collective bargaining 
policy committee’ as a forum for the regular exchange of bargaining information among 
national member organisations as far back as in 1971. The increased cross-border 
coordination efforts of the EMF in the early 1990ies as a response to the completion of the 
Single European Market and the planned European Monetary Union lead to the formulation of 
principles on a coordinated approach of collective bargaining policy. In order to contain wage 
dumping and the undermining of social standards, the EMF promoted a productivity-orientated 
collective bargaining strategy (Schulten 1998). At its first Collective Bargaining Conference in 
1993 the EMF launched a ‘statement of principle on collective bargaining policy’: In order to 
‘guarantee similar wage levels within the Community to the extent that productivity levels draw 
closer together’ (EMF 1993), wage components such as price increases, productivity gains 
and the income redistribution are to be emphasised as coordination goals. In the following 
years the EMF laid down the procedural rules and guidelines for a coordinated approach of 
collective bargaining. On the basis of the Action Programme adopted at the 8th EMF General 
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Assembly in Vienna (1995)20 the EMF promotes the following goals at the 2nd Collective 
Bargaining Conference (1996): a regular, i.e. half-yearly, and comprehensive reporting system 
about developments in collective bargaining in the EU member states, regular meetings of 
national collective bargaining experts, the exchange of foreign trade unionists in national 
collective bargaining, the synchronisation of national collective bargaining rounds and the 
promotion of joint European initiatives and campaigns. Other bargaining goals aim at the 
reduction of working time21, the limitation of atypical employment contracts and the formulation 
of minimum standards for working conditions (EMF 1996). The EMF took on a pioneering role 
in formalising criteria and procedures aiming at the coordination of collective bargaining 
policies on the European level. On the European, inter-sectoral level, a similar approach has 
been formally adopted only in 1999 when the ETUC agreed on a European Coordination Rule 
which also incorporates quantitative wage goals (ETUC 1999). 
 
In 1997, an initiative lead by the IG Metall – with the support of the EMF – aiming at the 
establishment of cross-border collective bargaining partnerships set a cornerstone for the 
transnational coordination of collective bargaining policy (cf. section 9.1.4). In a bottom-up 
process, all IG Metall districts embarked on a common strategy with their respective 
neighbouring union organisations. In so called transnational bargaining ‘networks’ (cf. table 
17), collective bargaining experts from different countries entered into a direct exchange. 
Union officials would be ‘accorded the reciprocal right to participate in all relevant bargaining 
events’ including negotiations (Gollbach and Schulten 2000). One of the most remarkable 
innovations was the participation of foreign trade union representatives as observers in 
collective bargaining negotiations with the employers’ side. The first among these networks 
was the IG Metall district of North Rhine-Westphalia, the Belgian Christian CCMB and the 
socialist confederation CMB, the Dutch social-democratic FNV Bondgenoten and the Dutch 
Christian Bedrijven Bond. In 1999, the cooperation expanded further eastwards with the 
participation of the Slovenian SKEI, the Slovak KOVO, the Czech KOVO and VASzASz from 
Hungary in the bargaining network pertaining to the IG Metall district Munich (Bavaria) that 
already had established co-operational links with the Austrian GMTN (Metalworking, Textiles, 
Agriculture and Food-processing Union) and its successor organisation GMBE (Metalworking, 
Mining and Energy Workers’ Union). The fact that wage bargaining coordination between 
Austria and Germany has been carried out – though on a more informal basis – for a longer 
period of time (Traxler et al. 2008b), has been conducive to the adoption of a Memorandum on 
                                                 
20
 European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) (1995), EMF Action Programme 1995-1999, adopted at the 8th EMF 
General Assembly, Vienna 20-30 June 1995 
21
 The EMF considered working time as a prior collective bargaining goal. In 1998, the EMF Working time 
charter was approved by the EMF General Assembly in Luxembourg, 1st-2nd July 1998.  
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Interregional Collective Bargaining Policy that brought together IG Metall of Bavaria, GMTN, 
and their counterparts from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary (‘Vienna 
Memorandum Group’) in 1999. The district Berlin/Brandenburg-Sachsen set up links to the 
Polish NSZZ Solidarnóc and to KOVO from the Czech Republic. By the end of 1999, cross-
border bargaining networks have been established in all IG Metall districts (Gollbach and 
Schulten 2000).  
 
Despite the fact that the inter-regional bargaining networks in the metal sector vary with regard 
to the regularity of meetings, the intensity of exchange of information and trade union officials, 
they have several characteristics in common. Therefore, they are drawn on to construct a 
model for transnational, union-led collective bargaining co-operations in different sectors. The 
typical elements summarised below served as the basis for the construction of the semi-
structured questionnaire for trade union experts from the EIFs. The following elements can be 
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Tab. 3 – The ‘Archetypical’ Collective Bargaining Coordination Model of the metal 
sector:  
 
1. Centralised, top-down elements  
 
• EIF Bargaining Coordination Strategies: 
 
- Formalised structure of decision-making, e.g. internal committees, working or 
steering groups on collective bargaining 
 
- Common Rules and Guidelines e.g. EMF European Coordination Rule 
 
 
- Coordination instrument for wage bargaining, e.g. bargaining formula,  qualitative 
aspects 
 
- Database on developments in collective bargaining, in particular wage 
developments 
 
- Electronic exchange systems on day-to-day collective bargaining and European 
social policy information 
 
- Monitoring and reporting system 
 
- Cooperation in collective bargaining with other sectors, integrated cross-sectoral 
systems of collective bargaining coordination 
 
- Common demands on qualitative collective bargaining topics, i.e. Common 
Demand on Training (EMF 2004) 
 
2. Decentralised, bottom-up elements 
 
• Inter-union Coordination and Cooperation: 
 
- Form of the most important collective bargaining initiatives: networks, projects, 
co-operations (e.g. Vienna Memorandum Group) 
 
- Most important issues 
 
- Functioning and proceedings of the collective bargaining initiative/s: regularity of 




3. Process of political learning – top-down and bottom-up processes 
• Inter-union decision-making and cooperation: best practice, exchange of information 
and experts from other national union organisations of the same or other sectors; 
• EIF Bargaining Coordination Strategies: best practice, exchange of information and 
experts from other EIFs, formal or informal inter-sectoral co-operations on the 
coordination of collective bargaining;  
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3.3 Alternative, ‘non-collective bargaining’ approaches 
 
Although collective bargaining is the most important instrument of social partners to determine 
wages and working conditions, other policy strategies could be pursued by trade unions – 
either to complement ‘classic’ collective bargaining or as an alternative approach to the 
conclusion of collective agreements. On the European level, two main strategies of social 
partner organisations can be distinguished. First, the targeted lobbying of the Commission and 
other European institutions in the field of European social policy is a common strategy of 
certain EIF. Second, the conclusion of social partner agreements in the framework of 
European social dialogue on the sector level is considered as an alternative or supplementing 
approach in order to safeguard working conditions throughout Europe. Although European 
social dialogue takes place both on the inter-industry and on the sector level, it is the sector 
level and its actors that are focused on in this study. Thus, only the sectoral dialogues are 
considered as a tool to set minimum standards for the regulation of working conditions 
transnationally. In the following sections both ‘alternative’ actors’ strategies are described in 
more detail. 
 
3.3.1 Lobbying the EU legislator  
 
Certain factors – mostly in the economic sphere – are conducive to a ‘legislative’ approach 
pursued by EIF. The hypothesised relationships between certain economic and institutional 
conditions that are prevailing in a particular sector and the probability that sectoral union 
actors embark on an approach to lobby the EU legislator in order to maintain and improve 
working conditions in the EU are summarised in section 4.1. However, since the perceptions 
of relevant EIF representatives are crucial for the adoption of a certain strategic approach, the 
question of an alternative, i.e. ‘non-collective bargaining’ approach, in order to determine 
wages and working conditions transnationally is considered in the expert interviews. Thus, the 
relevance of ESSD as a tool for transnational collective bargaining is addressed in the sector 
analyses.  
 
3.3.2 European social dialogues on the sector level 
 
European social dialogues cannot be left out when addressing the topic of Europeanisation of 
industrial relations in general and collective bargaining in particular (cf. section 1.3.1). In 
contrast to the ‘lobbying’ approach, the European social dialogue on the sector level (ESSD) 
provides for an additional tool for EIFs and the respective employer organisations of the 
European sector level that enables them to enter into collective bargaining in the ‘narrow 
  81  
sense’. However, the results produced in the framework of ESSD are not comparable to 
collective agreements concluded by national social partners. The legal bindingness of social 
partner agreements concluded on the European level is rather limited. Only if the agreement is 
implemented by Council directive the legal enforceability is guaranteed. The implementation of 
‘autonomous’ social partner agreements is carried out in accordance with the procedures and 
parties specific to the social partners in the member states (Article 139(2)), and may therefore 
result in a considerable degree of variation of standards implemented by national law or 
collective bargaining.  
 
It is hypothesised that certain sector-specific conditions increase the probability that trade 
union actors enter into negotiations or deliberations in the framework of European sector 
social dialogue (cf. section 4.1). However, due to the fact that ESSD is an actors-driven 
process that can not be explained alone by quantitatively measurable indicators, the question 
whether and to what extent European sector dialogues do de facto provide a forum for 
transnational collective bargaining to European trade union actors has to be addressed in the 
expert interviews.  The following aspects of the relationship between the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining policies and ESSD as well as the perceived effectiveness 
of procedural characteristics of ESSD and the achieved results are considered in the 
qualitative analysis: 
 
First, are European social dialogues on the sector level considered as an additional tool to 
complement cross-border coordination of collective bargaining and directly create Europe-
wide minimum standards or are ESSD perceived to stand in a competitive relationship with 
collective bargaining coordination arrangements established by European and national trade 
unions? A ‘competitive’ relationship between both instruments arises when resources for 
activities on the European level are scarce or such activities of the EIF are not supported by 
national members.  
 
Second, due to the limited bindingness of texts produced in ESSD the effectiveness of the 
instrument as such could be questioned by trade union actors of both the European and 
national level. In this respect the perceived purpose of results achieved in the framework of 
European sector dialogues have to be considered. Dialogue results include not only joint texts 
but also joint projects and policy instruments such as handbooks and studies. For instance, it 
can be distinguished between social partner agreements negotiated according to Article 
139(2) of the treaty22, recommendations, common positions, declarations, tools and rules of 
                                                 
22
 In its Communication ‘The European social dialogue – a force for innovation and change’, the Commission 
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procedure23 (Pochet et al. 2006). Only ‘agreements’ negotiated between European social 
partners in accordance with Article 139(2) of the Treaty are binding for the signatory partners. 
Further variation with regard to the implementation originates in the fact that agreements are 
implemented either as Council directive or as autonomous agreement implemented in 
accordance with the procedures and practices specific to the social partners and the member 
states.  
 
Third, addressing the aspect of intra-union power relationships, the question of how ESSD are 
perceived by national member organisations is of relevance. Are there certain alliances for or 
against the engagement of the EIF in ESSD? Are such groupings of support or resistance 
following national lines? 
 
Fourth, ESSD are an instrument of transnational collective bargaining in the ‘narrow sense’ as 
they result from negotiations between representatives of labour and business (cf. section I). 
Thus, it touches upon the inter-class dimension of collective bargaining. How is the role of 
European employers’ associations be perceived by trade union actors? Is the co-operation 
with the employers rather constructive – at least on some topics – or is there a general 
resistance to enter into negotiations with workers organisations? Are employers’ intentions to 
take up negotiations determined by strategic motives such as to avoid the Commission to 
legislate (cf. 1.5.2.2)?   
 
Fifth, how is the role of the European Commission in order to foster ESSD and to promote the 
conclusion of binding agreements perceived by European trade union actors? In recent years 
the Commission withdrew from actively initiating European social dialogue and from drafting 
proposals for directives.  Instead it promotes ‘autonomous’ dialogue between the European 
social partners. The influence of the Commission on the agenda of European social partners’ 
dialogue activities is rather indirect but nonetheless considerable (cf. section 1.3.1).  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
calls on the European social partners to clarify and unify their terminology with respect to the results produced in 
the European social dialogues. The term ‘agreement´’ should be reserved for texts implemented in accordance 
with the procedures laid down in Article 139(2) TEC (EC 2002).  
23
 Pochet et al. (2006) on their part refer to the categories defined by the European Commission. In its 
communication (EC 2004), the Commission distinguishes between four main categories, i.e. firstly. „agreements 
implemented in accordance with Article 139(2)’, including the two sub-categories ‘agreements implemented by 
Council decision’ and ‘autonomous agreements’, secondly, ‘process-oriented texts’ differentiated into the sub-
categories of ‘frameworks of action, ‘guidelines and codes of conduct’, and ‘policy orientations’, thirdly, „joint 
opinions and tools’ sub-categorized as ‘joint opinions’, ‘declarations’ and ‘tools’, and fourthly,  „procedural texts’.  
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Since the European Industry Federation’s social dialogue activities vary across-sectors – and 
not necessarily according to certain economic and institutional conditions in the particular 
sector – these questions are considered in the qualitative analytical approach and are 
summarised in the sector analyses.  
 
3.4 The relationship between transnational collective bargaining 
coordination and the ‘legislative’ approach of EIF 
 
This analysis distinguishes between two principal driving forces of ‘Europeanisation’. First, the 
activities of European and national trade unions with the aim of coordinating collective 
bargaining policies across borders, either as a top-down process initiated by the EIF, or 
following the decentralised pattern, as bottom-up process originating in cross-border collective 
bargaining co-operations of national unions. Second, ‘non-collective bargaining’ approaches 
aiming at safeguarding wages and working conditions within the EU in certain sectors by 
lobbying the EU legislator, or, within the framework of European social dialogues on the sector 
level. The underlying concepts for those two types of Europeanisation are, on the one hand, 
the ‘coordination’ of policies as a process driven by trade union actors, and, on the other hand, 
the ‘harmonisation’ of employment and working standards through European regulatory 
initiatives by the European policy institutions and the European social partners. As laid out 
elsewhere (cf. section 1.5.2.1) the harmonisation of labour standards can be conceived as 
‘positive integration’ aiming at confining the market forces from the sphere of labour 
relationships, and juxtaposed against the concept of ‘negative integration’ as a ‘market-
making’ process through the establishment of conditions that ensure the unrestricted exertion 
of the four internal market freedoms. However, the idea of ‘harmonising’ employment 
conditions within the EU has to be put into perspective since the subsidiary principle that is 
enshrined also in the field of European social policy, rather aims at the implementation of 
common norms according to national procedures and practices specific to management and 
labour and the member states (Article 139 (2)). However, not only the ‘voluntary’ route towards 
the Europe-wide regulation of employment conditions within the framework of European social 
dialogues results in a ‘Europe à deux vitesses’ where regulation via minimum standards and 
regulation above the minimum standards are co-existing in the EU27. Moreover, the 
implementation of European directives results in a certain variation of regulation due to 
differences in the legal systems of labour regulation in the member countries (Falkner et al. 
2005).     
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Leaving outcome and implementation of regulatory initiatives aiming at the Europe-wide 
harmonisation and regulation of employment and working conditions aside, the conditions of 
the adoption of a collective bargaining or a ‘legalistic’ approach are analysed. In this respect, 
economic as well as institutional conditions on the one hand, and perceptions and motives for 
action of European and national social policy actors on the other hand are central to the 
analysis. With regard to the route towards Europeanisation, the hypotheses below (cf. section 
3) postulate the relationships between economic and institutional sector-specific factors and 
the form the process of Europeanisation, i.e. centralised, decentralised and alternative 
approaches in the form of European sector social dialogue and lobbying of the EU legislator.  
 
The relationship between Europeanisation through the coordination of collective bargaining – 
either according to the centralised or the decentralised pattern – and alternative ‘legislative’ 
approaches is specified as complementary with regard to most of the factors identified. The 
only exceptions are two factors, i.e. labour mobility and export dependence. The EIF of a 
sector where labour mobility is high, will refrain from top-down approaches on the 
transnational coordination of collective bargaining policies and from investing resources for the 
establishment of centralised systems for the exchange of collective bargaining information and 
the reporting and monitoring of coordination activities by national affiliates. Rather, European 
social partners will pursue a strategy of directly influencing the EU legislator to adopt 
measures which guarantee equal employment and working conditions for all workers within a 
certain sector and a national territory in order to avoid a down-ward race between member 
countries with regard to labour standards.  The opposite relationship between collective 
bargaining and a ‘regulation approach’ of Europeanisation is postulated with regard to the 
export dependence of a sector. Trade union actors in export-orientated sectors favour 
collective bargaining coordination strategies over the Europe-wide harmonisation of wages 
and working conditions as regulation is not perceived as an efficient instrument in highly 
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4. Identifying the independent variables: Guiding Hypotheses on the 
relationship between economic and institutional factors and the pattern of 
Europeanisation 
 
In the following section, the relationshipships between economic, sector-related factors on the 
one hand (see section 4.1.1 to 4.1.4), and institutional (sector-specific) factors on the other 
hand (see section 4.1.5 to 4.1.9), and the distinct form of Europeanisation – both of collective 
bargaining policies and alternative ‘non-collective bargaining’ strategies – will be 
hypothesised. The economic dimension of explaining factors is covered by the following key 
variables: First, labour mobility, second, capital mobility, third, export dependence and fourth, 
product market regulation. The distinctive sector-specific relevance of these factors is taken 
into account by the selection of sectors that are considered in the analysis. The selection of 
sectors was guided by the hypothetical relationships between economic and institutional 
factors and the phenomenon of Europeanisation as laid out in more detail in section 6. Since 
in this analysis the operationalisation of institutional factors requires more demanding 
conceptual considerations than that of the economic factors, a separate section deals with the 
operationalisation of the institutional factors of the national systems of industrial relations (cf. 
section 5.1). Hypotheses under point a. refer to postulated assumptions with regard to the 
centralised pattern of Europeanisation, i.e. top-down approach to transnational collective 
bargaining coordination. Hypotheses b. refer to relationshipships between independent 
variables and decentralised forms of Europeanisation, i.e. cross-border coordination initiatives 
of national unions, and hypotheses under point c. formulise assumptions on relationships 
between the respective factors of influence and alternative, ‘non-collective bargaining’ 
approaches aiming at safeguarding  working standards throughout Europe. Hypotheses are 
postulated only if the factor of influence is of relevance for the occurrence of the dependent 
variable.  
 
It has to be noted that all hypotheses – with the exception of hypothesis 5 (cf. 4.1.5) – aim at 
postulating relationships between purely sector-related variables. Hypothesis 5 specifies the 
effect of trade union density on the dominating approach to transnational collective bargaining 
coordination and also touches upon possibly nationally determined power relationships 
between the affiliates of a certain Industry Federation. With regard to all other factors, 
assumptions on the country dimension of the analysis are left aside. Inter-country differences 
are analysed by sectors – however in a second step by the means of typologies of the 
countries sectoral industrial relations systems (cf. chapters 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, 9.7) for 
the sectors under consideration, i.e. metal, chemicals, food production, telecommunications, 
construction, banking and industrial cleaning.  
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4.1. Guiding Hypotheses 
 
4.1.1 Hypothesis 1 – Labour Mobility 
 
It is hypothesised that the factor of the mobility of labour has a positive effect on decentral 
forms of Europeanisation whereas top-down activities from the EIF are not affected by high 
labour mobility in the sector. From the initial phase of the development of the common market, 
the Community law provided for the regulation of labour mobility in order to guarantee free 
movement of workers (see section 7.1.2). The high degree of European regulation in this field 
requires the – at least consultative – involvement of European social partner organisation. 
Hence, the issue of labour mobility ranks high on the social partners’ agenda. On issues such 
as the posting of workers and migrant workers the social partners have played a major role in 
the legislative process.  
 
H1.a: A high degree of labour mobility is a disincentive for EIF to take on a strong role in 
setting up structures for the transnational coordination of collective bargaining since they 
prefer other strategies than collective bargaining to safeguard wages and working conditions 
of transnationally mobile workers (e.g. lobbying for EU legislation, cf. H1.c).   
 
H1b: A high level of labour mobility in a sector is an incentive for trade unions to initiate cross-
border coordination projects and activities aiming at the protection of national/local labour 
markets and standards. Such autonomous inter-union co-operations are not backed by EIF 
policies and instruments for the Europe-wide coordination of collective bargaining. 
 
H1c: A high degree of labour mobility in a sector is an incentive for the European social 
partners to directly press the EU legislator for legislative initiatives. Thus, lobbying the 
Commission and other EU institutions in order to guarantee legally binding Europe-wide 
minimum standards is an important strategy of the EIF.  
 
 
4.1.2 Hypothesis 2 – Capital Mobility 
 
The increased mobility of capital indicated by the steady increase of foreign direct investments 
is considered as a major threat for the well established labour standards, wages and 
institutions of collective bargaining since it allows investors to embark on a strategy of ‘regime 
shopping’ by relocating production sites to lower-standard countries. The asymmetric 
relationship between the advanced integration of international product, financial and capital 
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markets on the one hand and the undermining of nationally entrenched institutions for the 
regulation of the labour market on the other hand reinforces downward pressures on wages 
and labour conditions (see section 1.5.2). The constant long-term decline in the adjusted wage 
ratio (i.e. the share of wages and salaries in national income) is an undisputable empirical 
evidence for the waning bargaining power of labour (e.g. Schulten 2002). The asymmetric 
power relationship between capital and labour is reflected in the fact that the mere threat to 
relocate puts trade union bargainers and labour representatives in a defensive position that 
often results in concession bargaining, a practice that is widespread within multinational 
corporations (e.g. Hancké 2000, Funk 2004, Dribbusch 2004b). However, with the beginning 
of the 1990ies, trade unions engaged into cross-border initiatives for the coordination of 
collective bargaining to counter the threats resulting from the increased mobility of capital. The 
implementation of the European Monetary Union that further reduced the autonomy of national 
governments and social partners due to the common monetary policy and its implications on 
financial, budget and wage policy was perceived as the most important reason to adopt a 
‘European’ approach to collective bargaining by trade unions. Against the background of the 
EMU, the establishment of a European system of collective bargaining is regarded as a means 
to counteract businesses’ tendency to ‘regime shopping’ and coercive wage comparisons 
across borders (Freyssinet 1996, Jacobi 1996, Sisson at al. 1998). Trade unions in the metal 
sector were among the pioneers in establishing structures and instruments for the 
transnational coordination of collective bargaining (see section 1.2.3). Since the European 
Central bank strictly pursues a stability-oriented monetary policy approach it deprives the 
member states of economic and monetary policy instruments to adjust to economic 
imbalances. Thus, the burden of adjusting to asymmetric shocks is mainly left to the national 
labour markets (Eichengreen 1997). For this reason, the coordination of wage policy is the 
prior goal of cross-border collective bargaining coordination (Gollbach and Schulten 2000). 
However, other topics such as the coordination of working time, vocational training and lifelong 
learning are also gaining in importance. The eastern enlargement of the EU further intensified 
downward pressures on labour standards. Within the boundaries of the Community, two 
distinct labour market regimes can be distinguished. One the one hand, the ‘old’ member 
states have so far proved to widely safeguard their well established labour market institutions, 
pervasive multi-employer collective bargaining, far-reaching employee participation rights, a 
comparably high degree of labour market regulation and high labour standards. On the other 
hand, in the ‘new’ eastern and southern European member countries with dominating single-
employer bargaining arrangements, weakly organised labour market interests on both the 
employees’ and the employers’ side, voluntary and weak employee participation structures 
and a large extent of ‘non-standard’ and ‘clandestine’ work are opposed to the implementation 
of high labour standards. As a consequence, a large number of European Industry 
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Federations consider the adoption of common minimum standards on health and safety, 
workers’ protection, vocational training, equal opportunities, ‘atypical’ employment forms and 
the maintenance of the competitiveness of the sector in the framework of the European social 
dialogue as an option for the regulation of the labour market in an enlarged Europe. However, 
the inclination of the European social partners to enter into deliberations – irrespective of 
‘negations’ – varies along sectoral lines. Despite contrasting interest constellations between 
trade unions and employers’ associations with regard to the regulation of the labour market, 
compromises are easier found on legally non-binding minimum standards, an outcome of 
European social dialogues that is most frequent. Thus, the voluntary nature of common 
agreements reached in the European social dialogue contributes to overcome the employers’ 
reluctance to enter into talks with the trade union side.  
 
H2.a: A high degree of capital mobility sets an incentive for European Industry Federations to 
agree on European minimum standards and thus to adopt top-down elements for collective 
bargaining policy coordination.   
 
H2.b: A high level of capital mobility fosters the establishment of purely decentralised, trade 
union-led initiatives for the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining.  
 
H2.c: A high degree of capital mobility sets an incentive for European Industry Federations to 




4.1.3 Hypothesis 3 – Export dependence 
 
It is assumed that a high degree of integration of a sector into the global economy fosters both 
centralised and decentralised forms of Europeanisation. The issue of enhancing the 
competitiveness of a sector is considered as an incentive for employers to enter into talks on a 
transnational level. Due to the export dependence and the high level of internationalisation of 
markets, topics such as vocational training, research and development as well as innovations 
and industry policies that are tangent to areas such as labour market and employment policy 
are more to a greater extent addressed on the European level. The inter-relatedness of certain 
aspects of competitiveness and social issues allows for log-rolls and package deals between 
social political actors and thus facilitates agreement between the two sides of industry (cf. 
section 1.4.1).  
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From the trade unions’ point of view, intensified efforts to coordinate collective bargaining 
across borders are made in order to counter the international mobility of capital. Competitive 
pressures originating from the export dependence of a sector affect collective action of trade 
unions in two respects. First, in contrast to ‘sheltered’ sectors where production and 
employment are bound to the location of consumption (e.g. most areas of construction and 
services), in exposed sectors production and employment are disconnected from the location 
of consumption and can be relocated on a transnational scale (Marginson and Traxler 2005). 
Hence, for trade unions in exposed sectors which are subject to global competitive pressures, 
the transnationalisation of collective bargaining ranks high on their agenda. Second, producers 
in sectors that are subject to international competition are less able to shift higher wage 
increases to output prices. Price increases in response to pay hikes create negative 
externalities for industries that are less able shift their cost increases to their customers 
(Traxler et al. 2008b). However, the success and effectiveness of transnational coordination 
activities are demanding in terms of the institutional and organisational prerequisites of the 
involved bargaining actors. In order to guarantee the functioning of cross-border coordination 
projects, commonly accepted coordination instruments such as bargaining formulas or 
guidelines and complex monitoring mechanisms are required. Such elaborated arrangements 
for the transnational coordination of collective bargaining rest upon the involvement of the 
higher-ranked European Industry Federations. In addition to the decentralised, network-style 
approach of coordination, the hierarchical mode of coordination is not at all dispensable in 
order to mitigate the collective action problem inherent in trade union action (see sections 
1.5.2.3 and 1.5.2.4).  
 
H3.a: The stronger the export dependence of a sector, the higher the probability that the 
European social partners conclude European (top-down) rules and criteria for the coordination 
of working conditions and the maintenance of the sector’s competitiveness.  
 
H3.b: The stronger the export dependence of a sector, the smaller the probability that trade 
unions engage in a purely decentralised approach to  cross-border coordination of wages and 
working conditions which is not backed by EIF policies and instruments for the Europe-wide 
coordination of collective bargaining.  
 
H3.c: A high degree of export dependence is conducive for the establishment of 
institutionalised structures for the transnational coordination of collective bargaining whereas 
the (statutory) regulation of wages working conditions is not considered as effective by the 
European social partners in the respective sector. Thus, European trade union actors prefer a 
collective bargaining approach over the regulatory ‘harmonisation’ of working conditions.  
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A high export dependence increases the importance of competition-related issues which are of 
general interest for employers. Thus, the conditions for European sector dialogues are 
favourable in export-dependent sectors as employers are more inclined to enter into 
deliberations with the employees’ side. 
 
4.1.4 Hypothesis 4 – Product Market Regulation 
 
In highly regulated industries, European organisations for the representation of labour market 
interests actively lobby the Commission and other EU institutions in order to directly influence 
regulatory initiatives on the EU-level.  
 
Empirical evidence clearly shows that European social dialogues have been more frequent in 
sectors that have recently been subject to liberalisation or privatisation (Keller and Bansbach 
2000). The adoption of Community law is generally considered as a trigger for further 
regulation activities. ‘Soft’ regulation in the form of European social partner agreements, 
guidelines or common texts concluded in the framework of European social dialogues often 
complements European regulation in the field of competition and industry policy. Liberalisation 
initiatives of the European Commission foster the perceived need for action among social 
partners. The pending opening of formerly state-own or state-controlled markets involves new 
players, many of them with similar or overlapping interests. Hence, interest constellations of 
employers and employees’ organisations can be reconciled more easily and an important 
obstacle that often prevents social partner organisations from entering into dialogues can be 
surmounted or does not occur at all.  
 
A similar line of argument is employed with regard to varying strategies in recently liberalised 
and strongly regulated sectors. De-regulation initiatives on the European level may set an 
incentive for national trade unions to engage into cross-border co-operation. However, cross-
border co-operation is not an evident outcome of market liberalisation. National trade unions in 
sectors that have been ‘sheltered’ in the past tend to pursue strategies that are rooted in 
national spheres of action and interest representation. Therefore, the identification of common 
issues with a transnational dimension is not a common practice, structures for cross-border 
communication and information are lacking and joint strategies for action have yet to be built-
up or are in a very initial state. The strategic options are more straightforward in highly 
regulated sectors. EIF rather pursue a lobbying approach than establishing structures for the 
cross-border coordination of collective bargaining policies since collective bargaining is not 
perceived as the prior instrument for safeguarding working conditions within the EU.  
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H4.a: In highly regulated industries EIF pursue a ‘legislation’ approach (H4.c.). Since collective 
bargaining coordination is only a secondary goal, they refrain from establishing top-down 
elements within a formalised framework for transnational collective bargaining coordination.  
 
H4.b: Market deregulation/liberalisation sets an incentive for trade unions to engage in cross-
border coordination initiatives.  
 
H4.c: In recently privatised or liberalised sectors social partners tend to conclude European 
agreements in the framework of European Sector Dialogues. In sectors which are 
characterised by a high degree of product and/or labour market regulation, European social 
partners pursuer a ‘legislative approach’ by lobbying the EU legislator to adopt Europe-wide 
regulation aiming at the harmonisation of working conditions within a certain industrial sector.  
 
4.1.5 Hypothesis 5 – Organisational density of trade unions 
 
The argument underlying Hypothesis H5.a is that sectoral trade union densities are an 
indicator to assess inter-union power relationships and to explain national constellations and 
alliances for the promotion of interests. Since inter-union power relationships can not be 
grasped in a purely quantitative approach, the perceptions and strategies of national member 
organisations are analysed by means of qualitative interviews. Although the national 
institutional setting contributes to explaining inter-union power relationships, the formation of 
alliances is resulting from strategic decisions of the involved actors. For instance, some 
smaller and less powerful unions may join strong and influential organisations in order to affect 
collective action on the level of the EIF.   
 
The organisational density of the involved unions is an important factor for the longer-term 
functioning of transnational coordination arrangements, in particular for the coordination of 
wage bargaining. The involvement of strong, representative trade unions guarantees a critical 
mass of actors that is needed to maintain such initiatives in two respects. First, unions that 
organise a large share of employees pertaining to their organisational and/or sectoral domain 
are better capable of ensuring legitimacy of cross-border coordination activities the effects of 
which go beyond their traditional, nationally-bound membership base but that are in the 
general interest of the sectoral workforce. Second, within the organisational structure of the 
respective EIF, strong trade union organisations tend to take on a leading role and to shape 
the political orientation of the Industry federation. Thus, the existence of strongly organised 
unions in a sector is a necessary – or at least conducive – but not a sufficient condition for the 
establishment of viable transnational coordination arrangements.  
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H5.a: The higher the trade union density of certain national affiliates of the EIF, the more likely 
are these members to influence the pattern of Europeanisation which is adopted by the 
respective EIF.  
H5.b: The higher the organisational density of the largest trade union of a sector, the higher 
the probability for bi- or multilateral cross-border initiatives for the coordination of collective 
bargaining which are not backed by EIF policies and instruments for the Europe-wide 
coordination of collective bargaining. 
 
4.1.6 Hypothesis 6 – Concentration of the associational system of IR 
 
A high degree of associational concentration is generally regarded as a supporting factor for 
policy coordination. The assumptions postulated in hypothesis H6.a can be drawn back to two 
institutional features that directly affect associations’ collective actions. First, the size of 
interest organisations generally decreases with their number. Hence, larger organisations do 
have more encompassing domains than smaller ones. According to theoretical considerations 
laid out elsewhere (see sections 1.5.2.4.1 and 1.5.3.1) the associations’ ability to internalise 
negative externalities of their collective actions increases with their domain 
comprehensiveness. This is particularly true in collective wage bargaining where more 
encompassing, i.e. inter-sectoral, organisations are less able to externalise the negative 
effects of excessive wage rates such as increased unemployment and inflation to other actors 
outside their organisational domain. In contrast, particularistic organisations with small and 
highly specialised domains of interest representation are better able to externalise negative 
externalities to groups of actors outside their restricted organisational domains. Therefore, 
larger and more encompassing organisations tend to consider the interests of other actors for 
their own actions. Thus, it is more likely that they are pursuing strategies that are orientated 
towards super-ordinated, macroeconomic or even transnational interests. Secondly, in 
concentrated associational systems with a limited number of actors coordination becomes less 
difficult. Communicative relationships between actors are less complex and more clearly-cut 
structured. Therefore, exchange of information is easier. With regard to European social 
dialogues social partner organisations embedded into highly centralised associational systems 
on the national level are more likely to engage into the practice of bipartite dialogues on a 
European scale. The influence of large and encompassing national interest organisations is 
decisive in this respect since the European Industry Federations as participants to the 
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A contrasting line of argument applies to national trade union organisations with respect to 
their involvement in transnational initiatives for the coordination of collective bargaining. 
Although it is true that larger and more encompassing organisations are better capable of 
surmounting the coordination problem and are therefore better able to pursue a transnationally 
coordinated approach of collective action (Olson 1965), the coordination problem is attenuated 
in decentralised, ad-hoc co-operation. Moreover, internal decision-making is more intricate 
and protracted in larger organisations which have to unify more heterogeneous interests within 
their organisational domain and therefore inhibits ad-hoc and informal collective action on the 
transnational level.  
 
H6.a: The higher the degree of concentration of the sector’s union system, the more 
favourable are the conditions for the EIF to adopt top-down elements for cross-border 
collective bargaining coordination. 
 
H6.b: The higher the degree of fragmentation of the sector’s trade union system, the higher 
the probability that unions enter into autonomous cross-border initiatives for the coordination 
of collective bargaining policies which are not complemented by EIF policies and instruments 
for the Europe-wide coordination of collective bargaining. 
 
 
H6.c: The higher the degree of concentration of the sector’s associational system, the more 
favourable are the conditions for sector-level regulatory initiatives in the framework of 
European social dialogues. 
 
4.1.7 Hypothesis 7 – Level of collective bargaining  
 
A necessary – but by far no sufficient – precondition for the participation of a sector’s trade 
unions in cross-border coordination of collective bargaining policies is the existence of an 
associational bargaining system (in the form of multi-employer bargaining), where the 
organised interests of the labour market parties collectively negotiate over terms and 
conditions of employment. Multi-employer bargaining, defined as collective bargaining on the 
inter-sectoral and/or sectoral level, proved to be persistent throughout western Europe – with 
the exception of the United Kingdom – despite increased internationalisation of markets and 
competitive pressures in a number of industries. In contrast, in the ‘new’ member states multi-
employer bargaining is less prevalent (Carley 2002). Leaving aside the predominant level of 
collective bargaining – that was subject to fluctuations in several OECD countries during the 
1970ies and 1980ies – the type of the bargaining system, i.e. multi- and single-employer 
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bargaining systems, did change only in the case of the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
(Traxler et al. 2001). Beside national differences, the type of the bargaining system varies 
between sectors. For instance, a low share of multi-employer bargaining in the total of 
collective bargaining coverage is observed in the transport sector whereas multi-employer 
bargaining is widespread in the metal sector or in the food industry and in agriculture (Traxler 
2007b, Traxler and Adam 2008, Adam 2008, Glassner 2008a). The institutionalisation of 
patterns and traditions of bipartite dialogues between social partner organisations are highly 
contingent on the legal and institutional structures of the national systems of industrial 
relations. Thus, a high degree of path-dependence of the social partners’ actions and 
perceptions on the institutional setting of social dialogue structures is assumed with regard to 
the practice of bipartite social dialogue.   
 
Although the coordination mode of collective bargaining is considered as a more determining 
factor for the form of Europeanisation than the bargaining level, inter-sectoral differences arise 
rather with regard to the bargaining level. The same does not hold true for the pre-dominating 
mechanism coordinating collective bargaining between sectors. The mode of coordination 
represents a crucial feature of a member state’s collective bargaining system and is therefore 
not supposed to vary strongly between sectors. Since it is variation with regard to the pre-
dominant level of collective bargaining that occurs between sectors and not the key 
mechanism of bargaining coordination, hypothesis 7 is limited to the degree of centralisation of 
collective bargaining. A more comprehensive analytical overview of the countries’ systems of 
industrial relations that focuses in inter-country differences is presented in the sector chapters 
on the national system of industrial relations (cf. 9.1.3, 9.2.2, 9.3.2, 9.4.2, 9.5.2, 9.6.2, 9.7.2).  
 
The multi-dimensionality of the functioning of collective bargaining is addressed in section 
5.1.2. The construction of an index for measuring the degree of ‘responsiveness’ or efficiency 
of a collective bargaining system to coordinate the bargaining process and its results both 
between sectors and between collective and individual actors on the inter-sectoral, sectoral 
and company levels is also laid out in more detail in section 5.1.2. 
 
H7.a: In sectors where collective bargaining tends to be highly centralised, EIF pursue a top-
down approach to transnational collective bargaining.     
 
H7.b: The more decentralised collective bargaining in the sector, the higher the probability that 
trade unions enter into cross-border coordination partnerships which are not backed by EIF 
policies and instruments for the Europe-wide coordination of collective bargaining. 
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4.1.8 Hypothesis 8 – Mechanisms of collective bargaining  
 
Evidently, the effective coordination of collective bargaining on the national level is a 
precondition for coordinating collective bargaining policies transnationally (Traxler et al. 2008a, 
Traxler and Brandl, 2009 forthcoming). Therefore, the coordination capacity of national 
systems of collective bargaining both across industries and between different groups of 
employees (i.e. blue and white-collar workers) is used as an indicator for the probability of 
trade union-led activities aiming at orchestrating collective bargaining policies across borders.  
 
Two forms of coordination are of relevance in this respect: The national system’s capacity to 
coordination collective bargaining horizontally, i.e. between sectors and different employee 
groups, and vertically, i.e. between bargaining agents of different hierarchical levels. In order 
to guarantee the vertical coordination of collective bargaining, two legal pre-requisites are 
required, i.e. the existence of a peace clause for collective agreements in force and the legal 
enforceability of collective agreements (see section 5.1.2). In contrast to hierarchical modes of 
coordination characterised by top-down coordination of peak-level organisations which rest 
upon the compliance of lower-level member organisations and the rank-and-file, more 
decentralised and less hierarchical forms of coordination carried out at sectoral level 
presuppose less coordination on the vertical dimension. However, fully decentralised 
coordination at company-level without backing of sectoral and/or inter-sectoral mechanisms of 
wage coordination does not suffice to guarantee the effective control of wage development 
(Traxler and Kittel 2000). For reasons which are laid out in more detail elsewhere (cf. section 
5.1.2), the most feasible coordination mode that fulfils the preconditions for an effective 
collective bargaining coordination both horizontally and vertically, and that is equally 
applicable both on the national and the transnational level due to its flexibility and network-like 
functioning mode, is pattern bargaining (Traxler et al. 2008a, Traxler and Brandl, 2009 
forthcoming). Since the concept of pattern bargaining is of prior importance in this study, a 
section in the theory part is dedicated to this form of collective bargaining coordination and its 
implications for the Europeanisation of collective bargaining (cf. section 1.5.3.1). 
 
H8.a: The more non-hierarchical and less centralised mechanisms for the coordination of 
collective bargaining, i.e. in the form of pattern-bargaining, are prevalent in the system of 
collective bargaining, in combination with the existence of legal provisions for the vertical 
coordination of collective bargaining, the more effective is the national system of collective 
bargaining coordination as such, and thus the more conducive are the conditions to adopt EIF-
led top-down elements of transnational collective bargaining coordination. 
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H8.b: The more non-hierarchical and less centralised mechanisms for the coordination of 
collective bargaining, i.e. in the form of pattern-bargaining, are prevalent in the system of 
collective bargaining, in combination with the existence of legal provisions for the vertical 
coordination of collective bargaining, the more effective is the national system of collective 
bargaining coordination as such, and thus the more conducive are the conditions for national 
trade unions to engage in purely decentralised, inter-union cross-border collective bargaining 
coordination initiatives. 
 
4.1.9 Hypothesis 9 – Inclusiveness/Exclusiveness of the system of IR 
 
The collective bargaining coverage rate as the share of employees under a collective 
agreement in the totality of employees (see section 5.1.1) is the key indicator for the degree of 
organisation of industrial relations. The classification of industrial relations in ‘inclusive’ and 
‘exclusive’ systems on the basis of the collective bargaining coverage rate is justified due to 
the paramount importance of collective bargaining coverage as the central element of 
organised labour markets. Furthermore, the relevance of collective bargaining coverage for 
the ‘Europeanisation’ of industrial relations is underscored by the fact that the two main 
institutional determinants of the collective bargaining coverage rate, i.e. the existence of a 
multi-employer bargaining system and the pervasive practice to extend collective agreements 
to employers which are not members to the signatory parties to the agreement, are considered 
as the main constituent properties of most western European collective bargaining systems 
(Traxler et al. 2001). Thus, even in countries where legal provisions to extend collective 
agreements are lacking or extension practice is marginal, ‘functional equivalents’ in the form of 
statutory incentives for union organisation, such as union-administered unemployment 
schemes, are existing. A high degree of collective bargaining coverage is therefore considered 
as one of the most important characteristics of strongly organised and persistent industrial 
relations which can be considered as the pivotal element of a ‘European social model’ (Traxler 
2007a).  
 
It is assumed in hypothesis H9.b that the level of the collective bargaining coverage rate is 
favourable for the decentral pattern of Europeanisation. Two reasons account for the higher 
propensity of trade unions to enter into bi- or multilateral cross-border initiatives to coordinate 
their collective bargaining policies in sectors where collective bargaining coverage is 
comparably high. First, the preconditions for a high collective bargaining coverage can be 
regarded as an indicator for trade union autonomy of action and their political influence on the 
determination of wages and working conditions. In this respect, the existence of legal rules for 
the extension of collective agreements is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an 
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extensive system of collective bargaining. However, the central determinant for the level of the 
collective bargaining coverage rate is the de facto practice to declare collective agreements 
generally binding and thereby extend their scope of regulation (cf. 5.1.1). Second, trade union 
density as an indirect factor for the level of the collective bargaining coverage rate in countries 
where no extension rules are existing or extension practice is limited (Traxler 1998a) can be 
regarded an indicator for trade union strength and therefore directly influences trade unions’ 
capacity for cross-border action according to the pattern of decentral Europeanisation.  
 
This contrasts to relationship of collective bargaining coverage and the likelihood for European 
and national trade unions to embark on a centralised approach to the Europeanisation of 
collective bargaining. It is assumed that collective bargaining coverage has neither a positive 
nor a negative effect on the propensity of European Industry federations to adopt a top-down 
approach to collective bargaining coordination. Since top-down initiatives for the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining originate in the actions of EIF, the legal-institutional 
structures of national collective bargaining systems with regard to extension rules and their 
adoption or other functional equivalents conditions the implementation of measures and 
agreements but cannot be regarded as an incentive or disincentive for action by European 
trade union organisations. Only if collective bargaining coverage is low and indicates the 
ineffectiveness of collective bargaining to guarantee provisions of collective agreements for a 
wide range of sectors and groups of workers, the rationale of social partners is to adopt a 
‘legalistic’ approach in pressuring for legislative regulation of wages and working conditions 
(cf. section 4.1) and to pursue a lobbying approach to influence decision-making of European 
policy institutions (see hypothesis H9.c). 
 
H9.b: The higher the collective bargaining coverage rate in a sector (i.e. > 50 %), the more 
conducive are the conditions to the establishment of transnational networks for the 
coordination of collective bargaining. 
 
H9.c: The lower the collective bargaining coverage in a sector, the more probable it is that 
social partners embark on a strategy to lobby EU legislation in order to safeguard wages and 
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5. The economic, institutional and actor-specific determinants of the 
transnational coordination of collective bargaining: Methodological 
Remarks 
 
The research design of the analysis draws on three sets of variables as it includes economic, 
institutional and actor-specific factors. In addition, several levels of the social partners’ 
decision-making are addressed. In this respect, the core level of analysis is the sectoral one, 
with a focus on both the national and the European scope of union action. However, in the 
background of a multi-level European system of industrial and labour relationships, it is vital to 
include the inter-sectoral and the company-level and its implications and interactions with 
sectoral industrial relations in all stages of the analytical process. Theoretical and 
methodological considerations were challenged by the aim to separate the sector-specific 
influences – originating both from economic differences in degree in internationalisation of the 
market, the integration of the production process, and from structures of sectoral industrial 
relationship systems – from general, macroeconomic and national, institutional characteristics 
of the investigated EU countries. This aim clearly increases the complexity of the study, since 
both types of influences are interdependent. However, the following sector-based analysis 
focuses on deviations of sectoral economic indicators and industrial relationship structures 
from the more general picture at the national macro-level and therefore allows for an 
assessment of pre-dominant forces, might it be sectoral, cross-sectoral or national ones.  
 
With respect to the nature of the analysed data, the fundamental distinction between 
qualitative and quantitative data is drawn. It is evident, that a purely quantitative analysis 
would not empirically grasp the nature of the social partners’ attitudes, perceptions and 
decisions with regard to the transnationalisation of collective bargaining. However, quantitative 
variables on economic conditions in a sector (i.e. export dependence, FDI activities, labour 
mobility, degree of market regulation) exert a decisive influence as bargainers consider them 
in their approach to Europe-wide bargaining coordination. The fact that data – that fulfils the 
requirement of cross-national comparability – on the economic variables considered in this 
study, i.e. FDI, external trade balance, employment figures and the degree of 
regulation/liberalisation of the market, are lacking for some sectors and/or variables or are not 
available on a sufficiently disaggregated level is thus no infringement on the analytical 
performance of the study. Additional and complementary data on economic sector-specific 
factors is derived by qualitative methods of data collection. Both the nature of the data and the 
process of gaining it allow for an – at least – ordinal categorisation of the independent 
variables. Moreover, they are best suited to develop typologies for analysis and evaluation of 
the hypothesised relationship between explanatory factors and dependent variables. The table 
  99  
below (table 4) gives an overview of the explanatory variables, their level of analysis, their 

























Labour mobility (lmob) ‘EU15 foreigners’ + ‘Other 
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Capital mobility (fdi) FDI: ‘Inward Investments from 
abroad: inward position’, + 
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Export dependence (exp) ‘External trade by products’, 
indicator ‘EXPORT Flow’ 
UNCTAD Handbook 






Extent of product market 
regulation (pmr)  
Index of product market 
regulation (cf. Annex 8)  
























(H5) Sectoral trade union 
density (ud) 
Aggregate sector density; if not 
available, density of the 
sector’s most relevant union;  
 
(H6) Representational domain 
concentration/ 
fragmentation (frag) 
- Number of trade union 
organisations in a sector 
(n_unions); 
- Existence of inter-union 
domain-overlap (OD) 
 Index of domain 
fragmentation/centralisation: 
Index value (n_unions x OD); 
 
Studies on the 
representativeness of 
social partners in 
diverse sectors (IST, 
EIRO Dublin-
Foundation), own 




(H8) Extension Practice of 
Sector (incorporated in 
index of bargaining 
coordination, cf. H7)  
Extensive, medium/marginal, 
non-existing 
Studies on the 
representativeness of 
social partners in 
diverse sectors (IST, 
EIRO Dublin-
Foundation), own 
research and expert 
interviews; 
(H8) Collective bargaining 
coverage (sectoral) (cbc) 
Sectoral CBC rate  Studies on the 
representativeness of 
social partners in 
diverse sectors (IST, 
EIRO Dublin-
Foundation), own 
research and expert 
interviews;  
(H7) Sector-level system of 
collective bargaining 
(coord) 
- Dominant level of collective 
bargaining (DL): central/inter-
sectoral, sectoral (national), 
company-level;  
- Existence of covert 
coordination mechanisms in 
the form of pattern bargaining 
(PB): 
- Existence of both peace 
obligation and legal 
enforceability of collective 
agreements (BGOV);  
 Index Bargaining 
Coordination Mechanism:  
DL x PB x BGOV 
 
Studies on the 
representativeness of 
social partners in 
diverse sectors (IST, 
EIRO Dublin-
Foundation), AIW, 
own research and 
expert interviews; 
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Although table 4 aims at giving a clear and self-explanatory overview of the sector-specific 
economic and institutional variables, some of the operational concepts of the institutional 
features of labour organisation and collective bargaining are based on multiple indicators. In 
order to clarify the multi-variable concepts of several key features of the sectoral institutional 
setting, the operationalisation of the important sector-specific factors are summarised and 
briefly described in the following section. 
 
5.1 The operationalisation of sector-specific institutional variables  
 
When it comes to operationalise the key variables of the sectoral industrial relationship 
systems, it has to be noted that some of the indicators exhibit a strong variation on the country 
dimension whereas the inter-sector variation is comparably low. Thus, in order to grasp 
differences between countries, typologies with regard to the most important institutional 
features such as the fragmentation of the sector’s trade union system, trade union density in 
the sector and the institutional design of the collective bargaining system are developed. It is 
assumed that national industrial relations differ largely with regard to certain elements of the 
system of collective bargaining, i.e. the pre-dominant coordination mechanisms and 
existences and applicability of rules for the extension of collective agreements. These 
characteristics constitute the particular national setting of collective bargaining, wage-setting 
and the regulation of working conditions. However, the level of collective bargaining, i.e. the 
degree of centralisation of the collective bargaining system is supposed to vary both between 
countries and sectors. Thus, in order to grasp inter-country differences that are not captured in 
the quantitative analysis, typologies that allow for the classification of countries according to 
their collective bargaining systems are designed. The purpose of these typologies is merely 
heuristic and is aimed to facilitate the interpretation of the empirical findings. The typology of 
the collective bargaining system according to the pre-dominant level of collective bargaining, 
the coordination mechanism and the existence of institutional prerequisites that ensure a high 
degree of vertical co-ordination (cf. section 5.1.2.1) is particularly instructive since these 
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5.1.1 Representational domain, extension practice and collective 
bargaining coverage 
 
• representational domain:  
The delineation of the representational domain of the EIF in terms of NACE codes allows for 
the identification and categorisation of the respective social partner organisation with respect 
to domain overlaps or exclusive domains as described in more detail in section 9.1.2. From 
this categorisation the extent of concentration/fragmentation of the sector-specific 
associational system is derived.  
 
• practice of the extension of collective agreements 
The practice of extending collective agreements in order to increase their purview in terms of 
employees covered is the most important determinant of a sector’s or a country’s collective 
bargaining coverage. In most European countries collective agreements are extended by legal 
mechanisms to those employees and employers not affiliated with the signatory parties24. 
Since it is employers’ interests that are decisive with regard to applying collective agreements, 
only extensions to employers are considered in this study. Referring to the functions of 
collective bargaining and of multi-employer bargaining in particular, the advantages for 
employers of entering into collective bargaining and applying collective agreements are 
increasingly challenged by factors such as the internationalisation of markets, high levels of 
unemployment and decreasing unionisation rates (see section 1.5.2.3.2). There exists a clear 
power asymmetry between capital and labour insofar as the conclusion and implementation of 
collective agreements is contingent exclusively on employers’ action. In a multi-employer 
bargaining system, employers may quit their affiliation to the respective employers’ association 
and thereby circumventing the provisions stated in the collective agreement. However, it has 
to be noted that for employers it is of no advantage not to extend an agreement concluded by 
them even if they are formally not obliged to do so. By refraining from the extension of the 
agreement they would set an incentive for their workforce to unionise. In all countries under 
consideration – with the only exception of the United Kingdom – where multi-employer 
bargaining is the predominating, there is a direct and positive relationship between extension 
practice and collective bargaining coverage (Traxler et al. 2001). The association between 
both variables is however not unidirectional. The specific interest configuration prevailing in a 
                                                 
24
 The outlined concept of extension refers only to the domain covered by the agreements. Contrastingly, in some 
countries (e.g. Spain) legal mechanisms allow for an extension of collective agreements to areas outside its own 
domain. This mechanism corresponds more accurately to the notion of enlargement or extensión (in Spanish 
terminology) of collective agreements.  
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multi-employer bargaining system reinforces the effectiveness of extension procedures and – 
as a consequence – increases collective bargaining coverage rates. On the other hand, the 
existence of extension rules and – more importantly – the practice to extend collective 
agreements on a larger scale strengthens multi-employer bargaining arrangements as it sets 
an incentive for companies to join employers’ associations and to be directly involved in the 
negotiations of collective agreements (Traxler 1998).  
 
It has to be noted that for reasons of practicability an assessment of the extension practice in 
the sector is given on the basis of a qualitative ordinal scale measuring three values 
(extensive/medium/marginal or non-existing) since reliable figures on the employees subject to 
extensions are not available for the sectors covered in this study.  
 
• collective bargaining coverage 
The collective bargaining coverage rate gives the ratio of the number of employees covered by 
a collective agreement in the total number of dependently employed persons. In order to avoid 
double-counting of employees covered by more than one collective agreement due to multi-
level bargaining or issue-specific agreements, this analysis aims at considering the number of 
employees under any type of collective agreement at all. However, data on sectoral collective 
bargaining coverage is scarce and often lacks validity from a methodological point of view. 
Data collected by trade union federations very often does not cover all member organisations. 
Moreover, the data collected by the European Metalworkers’ Federation in their Eucob@n 
system often exhibits a systematic bias since some countries do not report at all to the 
European peak organisation.   
 
 
5.1.2 Collective bargaining level and patterns of collective bargaining 
coordination 
 
With regard to conceptual considerations, the analysis of the transnational dimension of 
collective bargaining relies per definition on the dominant pattern of coordination rather than 
on the level on which collective bargaining predominantly occurs. Since organisational action 
is multi-dimensional insofar as its functions and implications are varying not only between 
capital and labour but also within the two classes, a one dimensional concept of collective 
bargaining that rests merely on the level of collective bargaining does not grasp the complexity 
of collective action (see section 1.5.2.3). According to Traxler (1996), it is distinguished 
between six modes of bargaining coordination, i.e. inter-associational, intra-associational, 
state-sponsored and authoritative coordination as well as pattern bargaining and 
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uncoordinated bargaining (see below).  
 
The occurrence of one particular mechanism, that is, the coordination through pattern 
bargaining, is highly conducive to the establishment trade union-initiated projects aiming at the 
cross-border coordination of collective bargaining. Pattern bargaining carried out by trade 
unions of a certain sector that is exposed to international market competition is a non-
hierarchical form of coordination since it rests on the tacit acquiescence of other industrial 
sectors to orient their bargaining strategies towards those of the pattern setter. The willingness 
of other bargaining agents to follow the pattern setter depends on certain features of the latter. 
First, with regard to the properties of the sector represented by the pattern setting union, the 
sector has to be of macroeconomic relevance, it has to be characterised by a high degree of 
vertical integration in the production chain, and it the sector has to be integrated into 
internationalised markets. The exposedness of the sector to international competition and its 
vertical integration on the national scale demand a bargaining strategy that takes into 
consideration possible side effects of bargaining on wages and working conditions that may be 
harmful to other segments of the economy. In this respect, wage bargaining that results in 
excessive wage rates might entail negative externalities such as the increase of 
unemployment and inflation. Similarly, a high degree of vertical integration requires a 
responsible and rational bargaining strategy since disruptions resulting from the pattern 
setter’s behaviour, e.g. industrial action, is likely to spill-over to other segments of the 
economy. Secondly, with regard to the organisational features of the pattern setting union, it 
has to comprise a high share of members in the totality of trade union members in order to 
make other union organisations to follow. Empirically, the positive relationship between 
organisational density and collective bargaining coverage is observed in several studies 
(Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000, Traxler 1994, Visser 1991).  
 
It can be assumed that the high extent of coordination capacity of pattern bargaining as a non-
hierarchical and relatively decentralised mechanism render it highly feasibly also as an 
instrument for the transnational coordination of collective bargaining. With regard to the 
transnational dimension of pattern bargaining, the same considerations as on the national 
level are of valid. Pattern bargaining is less demanding in terms of the actors participating in 
the coordination process since it requires only a ‘critical mass’ of them in order to be effective 
(cf. section 1.5.3.1).  
 
• collective bargaining level and coordination patterns: 
In order to analyse the determinants of collective bargaining coordination on the transnational 
level, the distinction between the two interrelated features of collective bargaining systems, i.e. 
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bargaining centralisation on the one hand – referring to the predominant bargaining level –, 
and bargaining coordination on the other hand – indicating how collective agreements are 
adjusted between bargaining levels and groups of employees – is fundamental (Soskice 
1990). The analysis of the factors and impacts of collective bargaining as a multi-level 
phenomenon rests upon the more complex and encompassing concept of collective 
bargaining coordination that subsumes the degree of bargaining centralisation.    
 
In general, there exist three levels of collective bargaining on which social partners formally 
negotiate their collective agreements, i.e. the macro- or inter-sectoral level, the meso- or 
sectoral level and the micro- or company/plant level. However, what is more relevant is how 
the collective bargaining process and the outcomes are coordinated across sectors and/or 
employee groups on the one hand, and between the different hierarchical levels of collective 
bargaining on the other hand. The former type coordination can be described as horizontal 
bargaining coordination, the latter is referred to as vertical coordination (Traxler 1996). 
According to Traxler, six main patterns of horizontal coordination of collective bargaining can 
be distinguished: 
 
• inter-associational (i.e. ‘centralised’) coordination by peak-level organisations of 
employees and the employers; 
• intra-associational coordination within the organisational domain of the peak-level 
organisation/s of the employers’ and/or the employees’ side; 
• state-sponsored coordination with the state as third bargaining actor besides the 
employers’ and employees’ peak-level organisations as voluntary form of bargaining 
coordination; 
• pattern bargaining by a certain sector that sets a reference frame for wage bargaining 
or other bargaining issues on which bargainers in other sectors orient themselves in 
their collective bargaining.  
• Authoritative coordination of collective bargaining regulated by the state; 
• Uncoordinated collective bargaining on company/plant level or individual bargaining 
directly between the employer/management and the employee.  
 
The EU countries do not only vary largely with regard to the bargaining levels and the 
coordination patterns. Moreover, in all European countries a combination of two or more 
coordination forms can be observed. The different patterns are summarised in the country 
descriptions of the analysed sectors.  
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The vertical coordination patters refers to the compliance of lower-level bargaining agents to 
follow the agreement negotiated on a higher level. Two legal preconditions have to be met to 
ensure the enforceability of the collective agreement. First, the agreement has to be legally 
binding and second, there has to be a statutory peace clause that ensures the compliance to 
the collective agreement by all parties during its period of validity.  
 
Since the bargaining coordination structures on the sector level are of major interest, it is 
distinguished between the existence of sector level coordination in the form of pattern 
bargaining or intra-associational coordination that enable the sectoral negotiators to 
coordinate their collective bargaining activities and outcomes in a non-hierarchical form since 
guidelines or allegations set up by higher-level associational actors or the state are inexistent 
or of a purely voluntary nature (Traxler 1995). However, only pattern bargaining needs less 
vertical coordination due to its decentralised mode of horizontal coordination.  
 
Bargaining governability is most needed for the bargaining coordination mechanisms that rely 
on voluntary peak-level activities, i.e. inter-associational, intra-associational and state-
sponsored coordination (Traxler et al. 2001). Thus, the operationalisation of the bargaining 
coordination pattern is based on three crucial assumptions. First, the predominance of the 
sector-level in collective bargaining is a necessary but however not sufficient precondition for 
the coordination of collective bargaining across borders. Second, sector-level bargaining has 
to be backed by the specific functional prerequisites of a high bargaining governability, i.e. 
both legal enforceability and the existence of a peace obligation of collective agreements (cf. 
section 1.5.2.4.3). The co-existence of these two elements of procedural labour law 
guarantees the associations’ control over the behaviour of their constituency. The legal 
enforceability of collective agreements makes them binding for the signatory parties. This 
provision is enacted in labour law in most EU countries, with the exception of Italy, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom (Traxler et al. 2001). A peace obligation that prohibits industrial action of 
as long the collective agreement is in force is either automatically inferable from collective 
agreements or it may be optional through the stipulation of an explicit clause that obliges the 
signatory parties to abstain from industrial action. In the United Kingdom, Ireland, France and 
Italy, a notable practice of peace obligation is non-existing. In Belgium, Spain and Portugal the 
effectiveness of peace obligations is rather limited. Under Belgian labour low peace 
obligations are not binding, and in the other two countries they may allow a strike under 
certain circumstances. In the Netherlands, an optional peace obligation clause is included in 
more than 90 % of all collective agreements (Traxler et al. 2001). Third, sector-level collective 
bargaining in combination with pattern bargaining, whereby the bargaining parties of a certain 
sector – mostly the highly internationally integrated metal sector – take the lead in wage 
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bargaining and set reference agreements for other sectors, is particularly conducive for the 
establishment of decentral institutions for a Europe-wide coordination of collective bargaining 
(see section 1.5.3.1).  
 
Since pattern bargaining is characterised as a decentralised and non-hierarchical mode of 
coordination, it allows for a high degree of wage political ‘responsiveness’ (see section 2). The 
concept of responsiveness in the field of wage policy (Traxler 2000) refers to the capacity of a 
collective bargaining system to bring wage policy in line with macroeconomic requirements. 
The implementation of the EMU and the centralisation of monetary policy that came along with 
it challenged the performance of wage bargaining systems in ensuring a high degree of 
coordination with regard to monetary, fiscal, budgetary and wage policy goals. Within Europe, 
the collective bargaining systems in Germany, Austria and Sweden are classified as 
representing cases of pattern bargaining. In contrast to the former two countries25, Sweden 
embarked on a practice of pattern bargaining only since the late 1990ies (Traxler et al. 2001, 
Traxler et al. 2008). Due to its decentralised and non-hierarchical nature, pattern bargaining is 
less demanding in terms of the institutional requirements to be effective. With regard to the 
transnational dimension of pattern bargaining, it presupposes only a ‘critical mass’ of actors 
participating in the coordination process (Traxler 2000). Thus, pattern bargaining is considered 
as a highly feasible mechanism for the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining. 
Besides, empirical evidence indicates that bargaining systems that rest upon the sectoral 
wage leadership are particularly effective in combination with a non-accommodating monetary 
regime (Traxler et al. 2008a). As laid down in the introduction to this study, this implication is 
of great relevance in the European Monetary Union since the European Central bank orients 
its policy decisions towards the prior goal of monetary stability.  
 
 
5.1.2.1 A sector-specific typology of national collective bargaining systems  
 
The complexity of collective bargaining coordination is even multiplied on the transnational 
level and thus renders the conception of a descriptive typology which should not only grasp 
the diversity of national collective bargaining systems but also incorporate the different 
dimension of collective bargaining coordination an especially challenging endeavour. For 
several reasons that have been outlined elsewhere (cf. 1.5.3.1), pattern bargaining is 
                                                 
25
 Germany has the longest tradition of pattern bargaining. For this country it is supposed that pattern bargaining 
lead by the metal industry unions was the sole coordination mechanism that was in force after World War II. In 
Austria, observers assert a transition from central wage bargaining coordination by the ‘Parity Commission for 
Wages and Prices’ to pattern bargaining whereby the metal industry acts as the pattern setter (Traxler 1998b).  
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conceived as the key mechanism to coordinate collective bargaining across-borders. Thus, the 
importance of pattern-bargaining is accounted for in the collective bargaining coordination 
index. The variable measuring the level of collective bargaining that refers to another 
dimension, i.e. the degree of bargaining centralisation, is given comparably less weight in the 
measurement instrument. It has to be noted that the concept of responsiveness conceived for 
sectoral systems of coordination of a transnational scope differs from that of the national 
wage-setting systems. Countries such as Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands are classified 
as being characterised by highly responsive wage-setting arrangements (Traxler 2000, Traxler 
2002) due to their capacity to co-ordinate the wage-formation process both horizontally and 
vertically. Finland and Sweden where wage formation occurred in a rather uncoordinated way 
in the mid-1990s returned to state-sponsored bargaining in the late 1990s. Combined with the 
existence of legal provisions that guarantee an efficient coordination of bargaining outcomes 
with regard to the vertical dimension these countries feature highly responsive collective 
bargaining arrangements. The same holds true for the Netherlands where state involvement in 
the wage-setting process is typically strong. Since the early 1980s, voluntary mechanisms of 
state-sponsored wage-bargaining superseded the authoritative, state-imposed coordination 
pattern that was pre-dominant in the crisis-ridden 1970s. However, on the transnational level 
both voluntary state-sponsored and authoritative, state-imposed bargaining do not have a 
positive impact on the efficiency of the coordination process. Therefore, when constructing an 
index of the capacity of sectoral collective bargaining systems to coordinate collective 
bargaining cross-nationally it is only pattern-bargaining as a decentral and voluntary 
mechanism that is of relevance.  
 
Conceiving patter bargaining as an actors-driven process embedded in distinctive national 
structures of industrial relations (see section 1.4.2.5) two overriding distinctions have to be 
made. First, the scope of pattern bargaining has to be considered, as it may refer to 
bargaining processes within an industry, i.e. intra-industry pattern bargaining, or to bargaining 
coordination between sectors, i.e. inter-industry pattern bargaining. Secondly, it has to be 
distinguished between different bargaining units, i.e. between pattern setters and pattern 
takers (Traxler et al. 2008a). Due to the high degree of product substitutability intra-industry 
pattern bargaining takes place under conditions of strong competition. Since in a highly 
competitive environment wage moderation is the most likely outcome of collective bargaining, 
both pattern-setter and pattern taker on the employees’ side have an interest in preventing 
wage dumping but at the same time they have to consider the goal of ensuring jobs. Two 
crucial implications can be derived from the specific power relationships between collective 
bargaining actors. The first question that has to be addressed in the analysis is whether the 
competitive pressure in a particular sector reaches a level that prevents bargaining units from 
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establishing structures that enable them to coordinate collective bargaining cross-nationally. 
Secondly, Europe-wide coordination within an industry requires the ‘leadership’ of one 
particular country in setting the pattern for other national bargaining units. The second 
question directly refers to the specific constellation of intra-class interests in the sector26. 
Leaving aside the practical implications of transnational co-ordination in collective bargaining 
such as specifying the bargaining goals and outcomes that would set the pattern for other 
bargaining units, the actors’ perceptions and interests have to be investigated in more detail 
by means of a qualitative analysis.  
 
With regard to inter-industry pattern bargaining the issue of competitive pressure is far less 
important due to the limited substitutability of products and services. Rather, the inclination of 
bargaining units to act as a pattern setter is contingent on the ability of an industry to 
externalise the negative effects of wage increases in passing them on to consumers (cf. 
1.5.2.5). Since export-dependent industries (e.g. the metal industry) have an interest in 
preventing the ‘sheltered’ sector employers mainly operating in domestic markets from 
externalizing pay hikes, they have an interest in setting an upper limit for wage-formation. The 
interest positions of bargaining units in less export-dependent or sheltered sectors clearly 
differ with respect to setting the pattern. According to empirical evidence, it is the metal sector 
that acts as a pattern setter in some European countries such as Germany, Austria and 
Sweden (Traxler et al. 2001)27. In the case of intra-industry pattern bargaining on the 
transnational level, a particular country has to act as a pattern-setter. The cross-border 
dimension multiplies the complexity of the bargaining process furthermore. Co-ordination not 
only refers to setting the orientation criteria on a level that is relevant to the pattern-taking units 
but also to the time dimension of the collective bargaining process. In contrast to national 
                                                 
26
 Cross-border co-operation transcends the problem of collective action and thus – indirectly – changes the 
configuration of labour’s intra-class interests. Intra-industry pattern bargaining within one country emerges only in 
a context of single-employer bargaining (Traxler et al. 2008a). Multi-employer bargaining brings about a high 
degree of co-ordination of bargaining outcomes within a sector or industry even though different conditions may 
be concluded for different employee groups. This contrasts to co-operation relations on the transnational level 
where collective action is carried out by associational actors. Since coordination of collective bargaining across 
borders is almost exclusively pursued by unions, the institutional setting of collective bargaining, i.e. single- or 
multi-employer bargaining, is not supposed to be of prior importance.  
27
 The special case of Japan where pattern bargaining takes place in a framework of single-employer bargaining, 
is left aside here. The country’s so called ‘Shunto-coordination’ strongly rests upon the time-dimension of 
coordination. Thus, it is characterised rather by ‘pace-setting’ than by ‘pattern setting’. However, pattern-setting 
with regard to bargaining outcomes is also inherent in Shunto whereby the metal industry operates as a driver in 
the bargaining coordination process (Sisson and Marginson 2002, Traxler et al. 2008a).  
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collective bargaining where the metal sector’s bargaining agents set the pace for bargainers in 
other sectors and are therefore the driving force in synchronising collective bargaining, 
coordination of collective bargaining on the European is a rather reactive process. Since 
negotiations are taking place within the national collective bargaining framework, coordination 
on the European level is a far less inconsistent and fragmented process. One of the major 
obstacles is the large variation in the duration of collective agreements between countries. The 
pattern setters on the European level have far less influence in shaping the bargaining 
processes in other countries. The reasons for pattern takers in other countries to consider the 
pattern are less stringent than in the national context. Pattern takers may derive legitimacy by 
taking over the pattern. Especially if the organisational power of pattern taking unions is rather 
weak, taking the pattern may increase their bargaining power (Traxler et al 2008a). 
Contrastingly, on the transnational level national and European trade unions have to gain 
legitimacy by their members before allocating their resources to cross-border activities. Thus, 
the issue of compliance in a purely voluntary framework of action is pivotal for an efficient 
cross-border coordination of collective bargaining.  
 
Although it is the metal sector that that plays a key role in setting the pattern for wage 
bargaining, pattern bargaining is in principle also a conceivable mode of coordination in other 
industries. Thus, the typology for the categorisation of sectoral collective bargaining systems is 
applied for all sectors considered in this study. The inter-industry dimension on collective 
bargaining coordination is also strengthened by the evolution of the Eucob@n framework that 
includes a number of sectors, i.e. metal, chemicals and textiles.  
 
Turning to the typology of sectoral collective bargaining systems, the overriding characteristic 
is the system’s degree of ‘responsiveness’, i.e. the wage setting institutions’ ability to bring 
wage bargaining in line with monetary policy (cf. 5.1.2). As a precondition for an efficient, 
highly responsive collective bargaining system, both vertical and horizontal co-operation 
between bargaining agents has to be ensured. In addition, pattern bargaining as the 
predominant mode of coordination classifies those national systems that are able to act as 
pattern setters on the cross-national level. Thus, it can be distinguished between three main 
types of collective bargaining systems:  
 
1) Low responsive systems characterised by a lack of vertical and/or horizontal 
coordination capacity.  
2) Highly responsive systems that formally fulfil the preconditions for both vertical 
and horizontal co-operation; 
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3) Highly responsive systems that are based on pattern bargaining as the prime 
mechanism for collective bargaining coordination and that are therefore suited 
to provide bargaining units which may act as pattern setters on a European 
level.  
 
The sector-specific features and national particularities of the collective bargaining systems 
are considered in the sector analyses in more detail in order to account for both cross-country 
and cross-sector diversity. Thus, the three categories summarised above merely serve as a 
heuristic framework to classify countries according to relevant characteristics of their collective 
bargaining systems. Due to the varying set of countries covered by the respective categories, 
the types of collective bargaining systems are supposed to differ between sectors. The sector 
analyses will therefore give a more detailed comparative overview of national collective 




5.1.3 Trade union density  
 
Trade union density can be measured by two indicators. First, the aggregate sectoral density 
based on the membership of all sector-related trade union organisations in relationship to the 
total number of employees in the sector, and secondly, the density of each of the sectoral 
unions as a measure of organisational strength.  
 
The comparability of union densities across countries is burdened with several problems. First, 
membership figures can be derived from various sources. It may be either the unions 
themselves which report membership figures or data is gained from official sources such as 
national statistical agencies or representative survey studies. Reported union membership 
tends to be higher since it usually includes non-active members such as pensioners, 
unemployed and students. In this respect, the distinction between gross and net densities is of 
relevance. On the aggregate, i.e. national, level net densities (cf. Ebbinghaus and Visser 
2000) are the preferred measure in order to increase comparability between countries with 
different organisation traditions. For instance, representativeness measured in terms of 
members is of major political importance for unions in Spain, Portugal and many of the eastern 
European countries since organisations are recognised as social partner organisations and 
collective bargaining agents only when they proof to cover a large part of workers within their 
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organisational domain28. However, according the studies on the representativeness on trade 
unions on the sector level, trade unions are the main source of information about membership 
figures. In the majority of data reported by sector-related unions, membership figures include 
non-active members. From a methodological point of view the tendency to overstated 
membership figures reported by unions is less problematic since it is the levels that are 
considered in the regression analysis. The problem of comparability however remains to a 
certain extent since there exists a certain degree of ambiguity with regard to the (partial) 
inclusion of non-active members. For instance, some organisations include certain groups of 
inactive members, e.g.  students, but leave out others, such as pensioners.  
 
 
1) Trade union density in the sector  
Trade union density in the entire sector under investigation, as defined in terms of NACE 
codes, gives a comparative overview on differences in the representative strength of trade 
unions in certain industries or sectors, i.e. the level of analysis is the sectoral and not the 
associational one (cf. point 2 below). An indicator is the number of trade union members 
pertaining to the respective sector related unions to the totality of dependently employed. This 
measure requires the full coverage of all sector-related unions. Since trade unions are defined 
as sector-related according to the respective NACE classes, it is beyond the scope of the 
sector analyses to give a complete picture of all employee organisations in the countries under 
consideration. The identification of the entirety of workers’ organisations, including small and 
particularistic ones which are not affiliated to the countries’ main confederations goes beyond 
the scope of this study. A guideline of reference are the representativeness studies carried out 
by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions that are of 
relevance for the European Commissions assessment of representative social partner 
                                                 
28
 Union density rates as a measure for union strength in general can be misleading. In countries such as Spain and 
France where (net) union densities, i.e. 16 % and 8 %, respectively, have been below the EU25 average (25 %) in 
2004, the main source of legitimacy is gained through works council elections. The high participation rates in 
elections for company-level employee representation bodies that amount to 57 % of Spanish and almost 75 % of 
French workers contrast with the low unionisation rates in these countries (EC 2006). Traditions in organisation 
behaviour of workers differ between countries. For instance, French unions are typically ‘activist’ organisations 
whereas in Belgium also those workers become members who do not support the political orientation of the union 
but want to profit from social security services provided by the union. The strong political orientation of French 
unions stands in stark contrast to unitary union movements (i.e. Germany and Austria) and union organisations 
that are referred to as ‘intermediary’ organisations due to their mediation function between the state and the 
individual worker. Typically, the potential to mobilize non-members for industrial action is much larger in 
‘activist’ organisations than in those unions whose members are more ‘service-seeking’.  




2) Organisational density of the sector-related trade unions 
The organisational density rate indicates the ratio between number of the respective trade 
union’s (active) members and the number of employed persons in the predefined sector. 
Contrastingly, the organisation’s density in its own organisational domain – that often differs 
from the sector delineation – is based on the number of the organisation’s members in 
relationship to the number of persons employed in the trade union’s entire organisational 
domain. Since the required figures are often available only for one of the two density rates, a 
more encompassing picture of the trade unions’ organisational strength is gained. However, 
the comparability of the two indicators is limited. For the analysis a preference is given to 




6. Selection of the sectors on the basis of a hypothesis-driven conception 
of sector profiles  
 
Following the assumptions hypothesised in section 4.1 the sectors considered in the analysis 
should exhibit a considerable degree of variation with regard to structural characteristics such 
as capital and labour mobility, export dependence, market regulation, 
fragmentation/centralisation of the trade union system, collective bargaining level and 
bargaining coverage in order to analyse the interdependent relationships between 
economic/institutional factors and the emergence of the predominant pattern of 
Europeanisation. It has however to be noted that in particular the institutional factors tend to 
vary stronger between countries than between sectors. For instance, variables such as the 
mechanism of bargaining coordination (cf. 5.1.2) are exclusively determined by the institutional 
features of the national collective bargaining and do generally not vary between sectors. With 
regard to the level of collective bargaining which is prevailing in a sector a certain variation 
between sectors can be assumed (also see 5.1.2). Therefore, the variable of the bargaining 
coordination mechanism is not taken into consideration in the selection of sectors.  
 
The inclusion of variables determined by national institutional factors in a sector-comparative 
analysis is thus burdened with a loss of information. Therefore, country-difference with regard 
to institutional characteristics of the sectoral collective bargaining systems are addressed 
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separately and summarised in the section on ‘national system of industrial relations’ in the 
respective sector chapters.  
 
The selection of industrial sectors is carried out on the basis of a heuristic mapping of the 
following sector-specific variables (depicted in table 4):   
 
• Labour mobility 
• Capital mobility  
• Export dependence 
• Product (labour) market regulation 
• Union density  
• Collective bargaining coverage 
 
Other variables such as the degree of concentration/centralisation of the largest national 
sector union for measuring intra-class power relationships or the organisational density of 
sectoral employer associations in order to grasp inter-class differences with regard to 
organisational strength are not considered in this study for pragmatic reasons. First, intra-class 
differences with regard to interests and influence on shaping policies for the Europe-wide 
coordination of collective bargaining are addressed in the qualitative analysis. Second, data on 
employers’ organisation is generally lacking. This problem is even more virulent for the 
European than for the national level. However, the exclusion of these variables does not 
severely derogate the methodological approach of this study since the variables considered 
are typically characterised by a sufficiently high degree of variation and heterogeneity between 
sectors. The following sectors are considered in the analysis: 
 
• Metal industries 
• Chemical industries 




• Industrial Cleaning 
 
In table 5 the sectors are depicted according to the variation, i.e. high or low extent, in the 
independent institutional and economic variables. 
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7. Sectoral characteristics of the economic factors 
 
In the following sections (7.1 – 7.4) the economic factors, i.e. labour mobility, capital mobility, 
export dependence and product market regulation, are described with regard to their sectoral 
and country-related characteristics. For the institutional factors, sector-specific typologies 
based on the characteristics of the national collective bargaining and trade union systems are 
developed in the sector analyses and summarised in the respective sector chapters in the 
section on ‘the national systems of industrial relations’.  
 
7.1 Labour Mobility 
 
The migration of the factor of labour varies strongly with regard to regions, sectors and 
qualification. In general, the share of foreign workers in the totality of workers is high in sectors 
such as horeca, construction, industrial cleaning as well as in agriculture and textiles (Huber 
and Brücker 2003). According to Eurostat Census data, Census Round 2001 (Eurostat 
2008e), the highest shares of foreign workers, i.e. non-EU15 citizens and other foreigners, in 
the totality of employees in the sector are observed in the construction industry of the EU15 
(with the exception of Belgium and Luxembourg for which no data is available), i.e. 7.7 %, in 
the manufacturing sector (NACE category D), i.e. 6.6 %, and in other non-business services 
(NACE category O: other community, social, personal service activities), i.e. 6.1 %. In sectors 
such as transport, storage and communication (NACE category I) as well as in financial 
intermediation (NACE category J), the shares are considerably lower, i.e. 5.5 % and 4.0 %, 
respectively. It has however to be noted that due to the broad categorisation of Eurostat 
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Census data, only an approximation of labour mobility within the sectors under consideration 
can be made. For instance, employee figures in the sectors of metal, chemicals and food are 
subsumed under NACE category D – manufacturing. For communications, which is subsumed 
under NACE category I, it can be assumed that foreign employment is less widespread than in 
sectors such as transport and storage whereas the share of foreign workers in commercial 
cleaning generally tends to be higher than in other areas subsumed under NACE category J, 
such as community and social services.  
 
When comparing Eurostat data with national data sources, conclusions have to be drawn with 
reservation as figures in some cases clearly differ between national and European sources. It 
can be assumed that the number of non-EU citizens employed in the member states is 
significantly underestimated due to deficient reporting by national statistical agencies and 
national differences with regard to definition of foreign workers. For instance, in the case of 
Germany where data is available from both European and national sources for the same 
period of observation (i.e. the ‘Bundesagentur für Arbeit’ – Federal Agency of Labour), 
Eurostat data on foreign employment are significantly lower than those from national sources.  
 
With regard to the distribution of foreign workers within the sectors under consideration the 
highest shares of foreign workers in manufacturing are observed in Austria (11.8 %), Germany 
(10.7 %) and Greece (9.9 %) whereas labour mobility is low in the Finish (1.2 %), Portuguese 
(1.7 %), Spanish (3.1 %), Dutch (3.5 %) and Danish (3.7 %) manufacturing sectors. In the 
construction sector, the share of foreign workers is outstandingly high in Greece (above 27 %), 
followed by shares in Austria (approximately 15 %) and France (13 %). Foreign employment in 
the building industry is comparably low in Finland (0.9 %), the Netherlands and Denmark (both 
around 1.5 %) as well as in Sweden (2.4 %). A similar pattern with regard to foreign 
employment occurs in the personal services sectors. Shares of foreign workers in the totality 
of sectoral employment is high in Austria (10.7 %), the United Kingdom (8.6 %), Germany (7.7 
%) and Ireland (7.5 %) whereas these foreign employment is low in the Finish (approximately 
1.4 %), the Dutch (2.6 %) and the Danish (around 3 %) personal services sector. With regard 
to the transport and communications sectors, foreign employment is high in the United 
Kingdom (9.4 %), Austria (8.7 %) and Germany (7.9 %). Low shares of foreign employment in 
the transport and communications sector are reported for Finland (above 1 %), Portugal (1.6 
%), Italy (2.2 %) and the Netherlands (2.4 %). A similar pattern with regard to the distribution 
of foreign workers in the EU15 can be observed in the financial services sector. Shares of 
foreign employment are high in the United Kingdom (9.9 %) and Ireland (6 %) and low in 
Finland (0.5 %), Italy (0.7 %) and Portugal (0.9 %).  
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In general, a distinction with regard to the distribution of foreign labour across the EU15 can 
be drawn with respect to services and manufacturing sectors. In manufacturing and 
construction, labour mobility is high in the Germanic countries (Austria, Germany) whereas in 
both the Southern European countries – with the notable exception of Greece where the share 
of foreign workers is outstandingly high in these sectors – and the Nordic countries labour 
mobility is low. In the services sectors (transport/communications, financial services and 
personal services) the labour mobility tends to be high in the Anglo-Saxon (United Kingdom, 
Ireland) and – though to a lesser extent – Germanic countries whereas labour mobility in these 
sectors tends to be low in the Nordic (Finland, Denmark) and the Southern European 
countries (Italy, Portugal) as well as in the Netherlands.  
 
Although data on the extent of foreign employment may serve as an indicator for labour 
mobility other important aspects such as integration and labour market policies aiming at 
promoting the employment of foreign workers are not considered in this analysis.  
 
 
7.1.2  Development of the legislation on mobility of labour 
 
The idea of a Europe without borders is already incorporated in the foundation Treaties of the 
European Communities. However, the freedom of Europe’s citizens is not unlimited:  
 
„Every citizen of the union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this treaty and by the 
measures adopted to give it effect’ (Article 18, paragraph 1 of the consolidated version of the 
foundation Treaty of the European Community, signed in Rome in 1957).  
 
For the regulation of the freedom of persons both primary (European Coal and Steel Treaty 
the European Atomic Energy Treaty and the European Economic Treaty) and secondary law 
(according to Article 249 of the EC Treaty) apply. The four economic freedoms of the common 
market have been introduced through the foundation Treaty of the European Communities. 
The Single European Act (1996) codifies the four basic freedoms of goods, services, capital 
and persons29 as inherent principles of the common internal market.  
                                                 
29
 The free movement of persons entails the right of all member state nationals to travel to another member state in 
order to apply there for a job under the same conditions as nationals of that country and to work either as an 
employee or in a self-employed capacity, or even to remain without gainful employment, and also, when no longer 
of working age, to remain, under certain conditions, in another member state (Dietrich, M. 1995, 138). 
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The economic boom in the member states favoured the opening up of national labour markets, 
and according to the respective regulation based on secondary law the member states have 
been obliged to guarantee the freedom of persons in a step-wise procedure until the end of 
the year 196930 (Article 48 of the EEC Treaty). In 1961 the freedom of establishment (together 
with the freedom of travel) has been complemented by the explicit permission for EU citizens 
to take up an employment in another member state under the condition of shortages of supply 
on the labour market which can not be removed by the employment of domestic employees. 
The provision of the preference of domestic workers has been abolished three years later 
although the community law still provides for clauses for the protection of domestic labour 
markets. Only in 1968 the principle of the free movement of workers31 has been adopted, 
single safety clauses however continued to exist until 1991. The step-by-step ‘southern 
enlargement’ (Greece 1981, Portugal and Spain 1986) was accompanied by long-term 
employment restrictions for citizens of the newly joined member states.  
 
The Treaty for the Foundation of the European Community (Maastricht Treaty, 1992) has not 
brought material changes with regard to the free movement of workers. However, the ‘eastern 
enlargement’ triggered fears of mass migration from the new to the old member countries due 
to the massive differences of GDP per capita and per-capita income within the EU. Therefore, 
‘transition rules’ on the movement of workers between the new and the old member countries 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
30
 The first step (1 January 1958 -23 March 1964) of the implementation of the principle of free movement 
through secondary law provisions provided for regulation of the freedom of persons and their family members to 
move and reside within the territory of the member states. In some cases, however, this freedom was subject to 
certain conditions such as there being no suitable labour force available on the domestic labour market. With the 
second step (25 March 1964 October 1968) this principle whereby the labour market situation could be invoked in 
such cases was abolished due to its discriminatory effects. The third step (in force since 15 October 1968) covers 
the Regulation on freedom of movement for workers within the Community (Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68), the 
directive on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for workers of 
member states and their families (68/360/EEC) and the directive of 18 May 1972 extending to workers exercising 
the right to remain in the territory of a member state after having been employed in that state the scope of the 
directive of 25 February 1964 (64/221/EEC) on coordination of special measures concerning the movement and 
residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 
 
31
 The principle of ‘freedom of movement’ refers to the treaty provisions on the free movement of persons 
(Articles 39-42 TEC). Article 39 (3) TEC gives a definition of the freedom of movement: ‘Such freedom of 
movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the member 
states as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment’. 
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have been adopted. These rules exclusively refer to article 39 TEC. The regulation of the 
access to the labour markets of the EU15 remains within the national competencies of the ‘old’ 
member states even after the 8 central and eastern European as well as the two 
Mediterranean Island countries had acceded to the EU. The Accession Treaties (signed 16 
April 2003 for the accession of the 10 candidate countries and 25 April 2005 for the accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania) provide that for the first two years following accession access to the 
labour markets of the EU15 will depend on the national law and policy of those member 
states. National measures may be extended for a further period of three years. After that, 
member states which applied national measures can be authorised to apply further such 
measures for another two years provided it faces ‘serious disturbances’ in its labour market. 
Measures for the temporary restriction of the free movement of workers are limited to a period 
of a maximum duration of seven years, starting on 1 May 2004. This means that workers from 
the new member states (with the exception of Malta the labour market of which is too small) in 
most cases require a working permit for the access to the labour markets of the EU15.  
 
 
Germany and Austria applied special clauses for certain sectors such as construction and 
commercial cleaning. With regard to the freedom of services Germany and Austria adopted 
special transitional measures for sectors such as construction, commercial cleaning, and 
domestic nursing and welfare services. The posting of workers for the provision of services in 
the EU15 can be restricted if serious damages in the respective services sectors are to be 
experienced (Accession Treaty 2003). There exists however a possibility to circumvent the 
transition rules for the restriction of the freedom of services in that protection clauses are not 
applicable for self-employed persons in the new member states (Huber and Brücker 2003).    
 
7.2 Capital Mobility  
 
The extent of capital mobility within a certain industrial sector is measured by the scope of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the respective sector compared to the totality of a country’s 
FDI. FDI are one of the prime drivers of economic globalisation and market integration. Data 
used in this analysis is based on OECD data (OECD 2004a). The extent of FDI is measured 
by the value of the sum of inward and outward position by industrial sector as a share in the 
nominal GDP (see table 4). Reference is made to direct investment positions instead of FDI 
flows. Flows are covered on the basis of balance of payments statistics and include the totality 
of all investment which have been carried out or dissolved within a certain period. Typically, 
investment flows are characterised by a high degree of fluctuation. The high degree of 
variation of to the value of investment flows may be problematic in a cross-sectional analysis 
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which refers to a certain point of time.  
 
From a sector-comparative perspective, FDI activity (both inwards and outwards) is highest in 
the financial services sectors (excluding insurance and auxiliary services) in the Western 
European countries under consideration. Averaged over all countries for which data is 
available, the relationshipal measure of FDI (i.e. the sum of inwards and outwards position in 
relationship to the GDP) is around 11 % for the financial sector. In the metal (including metal 
and mechanical products, office machinery, computers, radio, TV and communication 
equipment, vehicles and other transport equipment) and chemical sector (including petroleum, 
chemical, rubber and plastic products), levels of FDI are comparably lower and  reach around 
7 and 5 % on average. The average level of FDI positions is lowest in the construction sector 
(i.e. around 0.5 %) and in the sector that comprises services other than financial and 
business-related services (i.e. 1.5 %). FDI positions are rather low in the western European 
food production sector (i.e. 2.7 %) and in the telecommunications sectors (i.e. around 3 %) 
whereby in the latter sector the volume of FDI positions is increasing.  
 
With regard of the countries’ FDI activities in the sectors under consideration, the Netherlands 
exhibit an outstandingly high share of FDI positions in GDP in the financial services sector (i.e. 
around 36 %), followed by the United Kingdom (i.e. 13 %) and Finland (i.e. approximately 12 
%) whereas direct investment activities in the Swedish (i.e. 3.8 %), German and Greek (both 
around 4.7 %) financial sectors are comparably low. In the metal sector, FDI activities are 
highest in Sweden (i.e. 25.5 %), followed by the FDI shares in the Finish and Dutch metal 
sectors (i.e. 15 % and 13 %, respectively). Contrastingly, FDI in the Greek (i.e. 0.8 %), Danish 
(1.4 %) and Portuguese (1.6 %) metal sector are lowest among the countries under 
consideration (i.e. 0.8 %). Strikingly, FDI activities measures as inward and outward positions 
are relatively low in Germany and account only for 3.3 % of the GDP. FDI positions in the 
chemical sector are outstandingly high in the Netherlands and amount to 27 % of the GDP. 
FDI in the chemical sectors of Denmark and the United Kingdom are around 7 % and 6 % of 
nominal GDP. In the Italian, Portuguese and Greek chemical sector, FDI activities are 
comparably limited, i.e. inward and outward positions reach around 1 % of the countries’ GDP. 
In the telecommunication sector, FDI have been high highest in the United Kingdom for which 
the measure of inward and outward positions in relationship to GDP is above 15 %. FDI 
activities in telecommunications are rather limited whereby the highest shares of FDI positions 
in GDP are around 3 % in Denmark, Greece and Finland. In other countries such as Italy, 
Austria and France the respective shares are below 1 % of GDP. FDI in the food sector are 
rather limited, with the exception of the Netherlands where the value of inward and outward 
positions reaches 10 % of the GDP. In Denmark and the United Kingdom the measure for FDI 
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is around 5 and 4 %, respectively. Levels of FDI in the German, Austrian, French, Italian and 
Portuguese food sector reach only a fraction of GDP, i.e. less than 1 %. In the western 
European construction sector capital mobility measured as the value of inward and outward 
direct investment positions in relationship to GDP is the lowest among the sectors considered 
in this study. In all countries with the exception of Denmark (i.e. 1.7 %) the shares of FDI are 
below one % of the GDP, with the lowest shares in Germany (where outward positions exceed 
inward positions, i.e. – 0.03 %) and Austria (i.e. 0.07 %). In the personal services sector, FDI 
tend to be only slightly higher than in construction whereby the smallest value of inward and 
outward positions in relationship to GDP is observed in Portugal (with outward positions 
exceeding inward positions, i.e. – 0.9 %), followed by Finland (i.e. 0.1 %) and Greece (i.e. 0.2 
%). In the Swedish personal services sector where the share of inward and outward positions 
in GDP reaches 7 %, capital mobility is by far the highest, followed by Italy and France where 
the measures for FDI are 3 % and 2.5 %, respectively.  
 
7.3 Export dependence  
 
Export dependence is supposed to be one of the most influential factors directly affecting 
collective bargaining both on the national (Crouch 1993, Traxler et al. 2001) and on the 
transnational level (Traxler et al. 2008b, Traxler and Brandl 2009). Bargaining agents in 
exposed, export-orientated sectors play a key role with regard to the coordination of collective 
bargaining (see section 5.1.3.1). Export dependence is measured by the value of ‘export 
flows’32 indicating the extent of ‘external trade by products’ and of ‘external trade by services’ 
(UNCTAD 2008). As this study aims at analysing cross-sectoral differences, the value of 
export flows from a certain sector is related to the total value of export flows in external trade 
by products (SITC 0 to 9) and the total value of export flows in external trade by services33. 
However, it has to be noted that there exists a principle structural difference with regard to 
external trade pattern between the services and manufacturing sectors that originates in the 
                                                 
32
 Although the measure of ‘export stocks’ is more appropriate for a quantitative cross-sectional analysis referring 
to a certain point of time than the measure of ‘export flows’ which exhibit a much larger degree of variation, no 
such measure was available on the disaggregated sector level (UNCTAD 2008). Export flows of external trade in 
products are measured in US Dollars at current prices in thousands and export flows of external trade in services 
are measured in US Dollars at current prices in millions (UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2008).  
33
 Service categories are defined according to the definition of the IMF Balance of Payments Manual, 5th edition, 
1993. The categories included are transport and travel, communications, construction, computer and information 
services, financial services, insurance, other business services, royalties and licence fees, personal, cultural and 
recreational services and government services (UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2008).  
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fundamental difference between commodities and services. The inseparableness of services 
from the service supplier limits the physical dislocation of services compared to ‘tradeable’ 
commodities. Since though the differences between all sectors considered in this study are 
however more relevant with regard to the research question of the preconditions for the 
emergence of a Europeanisation pattern, the variation  within the group of services sectors 
and the group of manufacturing sectors is not addressed.   
 
The metal sector is the most export-dependent sector, followed by the chemical industry 
where the share of the sector’s export flows in the totality of export flows from both 
manufacturing and services sectors (averaged over all countries under consideration) is 
however not even half as large as in the former sector (i.e. 37 and 13 %, respectively). The 
value of averaged export flows in the food industry in relationship to total exports more than 
doubles that in the chemical sector (i.e. 8 %, see table 77, Annex 10). Averaged export 
dependence is lowest in the cleaning sector (i.e. 0.32 %), and low levels of export flows are 
reported also for the construction (i.e. 0.66 %) and telecommunications (0.8 %) sector.  
 
From a country-perspective shares of metal sector exports in total exports are largest in 
Finland (i.e. 53 %), Germany (i.e. 51 %), France (i.e. 44 %), Sweden (43 %) and Austria (i.e. 
41 %), and comparably low in Ireland (i.e. 19 %) and Greece (i.e. 26 %). This contrasts to the 
country-pattern in the chemical sector, where exports are highest in Ireland (i.e. 32 %) and 
Belgium (i.e. 25 %). Export dependence is comparably low in the Portuguese (i.e. 6 %), 
Austrian (6.5 %) and Finnish (i.e. 7 %) chemical sectors. Export-shares in the food industry 
are highest in Greece (i.e. 18.5 %), followed by export-shares of around 12 % in the Spanish 
and Dutch food sector. A low share of sectoral exports in the totality of exports is reported for 
Finland (i.e. 1.7 %), Sweden (i.e. 3 %) and Germany (i.e. 3.8 %). In the telecommunications 
sector variation between countries with regard to export dependence is considerably low. The 
highest share of telecom sector exports are reported for Greece (1.9 %), followed by those in 
Portugal (1.2 %), the United Kingdom (1.06 %) and the Netherlands (1.02 %). Export 
dependence is lowest in the German and Irish telecom sectors (i.e. 0.3 %). Levels in the value 
of sectoral exports in total sectors are between 0.02 % in Ireland and 0.18 % in the United 
Kingdom and 1.38 % in Greece and 1.13 % in Portugal. In the banking sector a higher 
variation with regard to the levels of export shares can be observed. It varies between 0.1 % in 
Finland, 0.2 % in the Netherlands and 0.3 in France and – on the other end of the spectrum – 
between 3.7 % in Ireland and around 8 % in the United Kingdom. Variation in the level of the 
sector’s shares in total exports is lowest in the non-business related services sector. The 
generally low export dependence of the cleaning sector is underscored by export shares of 
0.02 % in Finland and 0.07 % in Germany and – on the high end of the scale – by export 
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shares of around 0.8 % in Greece and 0.7 % in the United Kingdom. The relatively high level 
of exports in the British services sector may derive from the categorisation of the sector that 
includes personal, cultural and recreational services and government services (UNCTAD 
2008).  
 
7.4 Product Market Regulation 
 
In order to measure the degree of product market regulation (PMR) a three-dimensional index 
which includes both national and sector-related indicators has been developed (cf. Annex 8). 
The PMR-Index covers, first, the dimension of the extent of national market regulation on the 
basis of the OECD indicators for product market regulation 1998 and 2003 (OECD 200834). 
This index includes dimensions such as the degree of state control (i.e. public ownership and 
state involvement in business operation by price controls etc.), barriers to entrepreneurship 
(i.e. regulatory and administrative opacity of licences and permits systems and rules and 
procedures), administrative burdens on start-ups and barriers to competition (i.e. legal 
barriers, antitrust exemptions).  
 
The other two indicators cover the sector-specific dimension of the extent of European and 
national product and labour market regulation with regard to market access for and 
employment of foreign workers35 on the basis of expert assessment gained by means of 
qualitative interviews. Thus, the second indicator measures the degree of product market 
regulation deriving from national and European level regulatory initiatives. The third indicator 
covers the extent of labour market regulation set either on the European or national level. All 
indices measure three levels of regulatory intensity, i.e. high, medium and low36. The total 
                                                 
34
 These indicators are described in: Conway, P., V. Janod, and G. Nicoletti (2005), ‘Product Market Regulation in 
OECD Countries, 1998 to 2003’, OECD Economics Department Working Paper, No 419 
35
 Literature sources refer to a number of indices and instruments for the measurement of labour market regulation. 
Most of them include indicators of employment protection legislation such as rules and provisions in case of 
dismissals (i.e. statutory duration of pay entitlements, restrictions on dismissals of workers with regular and 
temporary employment contracts) (cf. Lazear 1990). However, these indicators do not differentiate between 
sectors and are therefore not supposed to provide an additional explanatory contribution for the research question 
addressed in this study.  
36
 The OECD index for product market regulation (2003) scores between 0.9 and 1.8 points for the OECD 
countries. The single index on a country’s extent of product market regulation is based on a the classification into 
the following three categories: 1= low: PMR values 0.9-1.2; 2= medium: PMR-values 1.3-1.6; and  3= high PMR-
values equal to or higher than 1.7.  
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score is summarised in the total value of the combined PMR index (see Annex 8). With regard 
to cross-country differences in the degree of national production market regulation, the Nordic 
countries (Denmark and Sweden) and the Anglo-Saxon countries (United Kingdom and 
Ireland) feature the lowest scores on PMR. This contrasts to the extent of market regulation in 
the ‘Southern’ countries Italy, Greece and France. The continental-European countries (and 
Portugal) are characterised by a medium extent of PMR.  
 
With regard to cross-sectoral differences in index values, the construction sector exhibits far 
the highest value of market regulation (see table 65, Annex 8). National building codes and 
European regulatory rules on public procurement as well as the posting of workers directive 
which has been transposed into national law by the member states directly affect labour and 
product market regulation in the construction sector account for the high index value (cf. 
section 9.5.1). A medium-level of market regulation is reported for the telecommunications, 
chemical and industrial cleaning sector. The telecommunication sector still remains a strongly 
regulated sector although all member countries have liberalised their telecom services market 
according to the European regulatory framework (cf. section 9.4.1). However, the process of 
liberalisation of various aspects and service operations (i.e. interconnection and access 
regimes, bitstream access, competition in broadband internet access, cost accounting 
systems that ensure tariff transparency) is still ongoing and is monitored (in cooperation with 
the European Commission) by national regulatory authorities. In the chemical sector the 
REACH regulation – without being a genuine market regulatory instrument – on the use and 
proceeding of chemical substances has been reported as indirectly affecting product market 
conditions (cf. section 9.2.5). In the industrial cleaning sector European regulation on posting 
of workers and – to a lesser extent – on services provision, (i.e. the posting of workers 
directive and the services directive), have been reported to have an influence on labour 
market access of foreign workers. A low degree of market regulation is observed in the metal 
and banking sector as well as in the food industry. The latter sector however can be 
considered as a borderline case as some segments of the sector (i.e. meat processing) are 
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8. Thematic focal points of the qualitative and descriptive sector analysis  
 
Three crucial aspects are focused upon in this study. First, a brief description of the economic 
background in the sector with regard to capital and labour mobility, export dependence and 
the extent of foreign investments as well as other relevant, sector-related particularities 
relating to the economic sphere is given. Second, the national systems of industrial relations in 
the particular sectors under consideration are analysed from a comparative cross-country 
perspective. Third, the specific structures of the European-level industrial relations system in 
the respective sectors and the interest positions of European social partners of the respective 
sectors are investigated in a qualitative, actor-specific analysis.  
 
8.1 Sector typologies of the national collective bargaining systems  
 
Whereas the first two focus areas, i.e. the economic and the institutional sets of variables, are 
addressed from two distinctive analytical angles by both quantitative and a qualitative 
analytical tools, this methodological distinction is less clear-cut with regard to the European-
level industrial relations structures and actors’ perceptions. The operationalisation of economic 
and institutional variables as laid down in section 5 aims at investigating them by means of a 
log-linear regression analyses. However, it has to be noted that European-level factors are 
considered indirectly in the operationalisation process of the institutional factors. This is due to 
the fact that the selection of trade union organisations in the respective sectors is based on a 
concept of ‘sector-relatedness’ that strongly accounts for the criterion of ‘representativeness’ 
promoted by the European Commission. In the Commission’s communication from 1993 
(COM(98) 322 final) the criteria and preconditions for employers’ and employees’ 
organisations in order to be recognised as ‘European social partners’ to the European social 
dialogue on the sector-level are specified. Thus, firstly, representative social partner 
organisations have to relate to specific sectors or categories and be organised at European 
level; Secondly, they have to consist of organisations which are themselves an ‘integral and 
recognised’ part of Member States' social partner structures, have the capacity to negotiate 
agreements, and which are representative of all Member States; Thirdly, their structures have 
to be adequate to ensure the effective participation in the consultation process. 
 
In order to take the principle of representativeness into consideration the concept of ‘sector-
relatedness’ is decisive. The question of how to delineate the scope of reference for workers’ 
organisations to be representative in a certain sector could be tackled in two ways. A ‘top-
down’ approach suggests an affiliation of national trade union organisations to a European 
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Industry Federation, i.e. a member organisation of the inter-sectoral ETUC, as a sufficient 
criterion to be representative within a certain sector. The recognition of ‘representative’ and 
thus legitimate labour market organisation by the Commission can be conceived as an 
incremental process that outdates the establishment of the inter-professional European social 
dialogue in the ‘Delors era’ in the 1980s. The restructuring of the organisational structure of 
the ETUC that centred around the ‘European Industry Federations’ strengthened the sectoral 
dimension of European social dialogue (see section 1.3.1). Contrastingly, a ‘bottom-up’ 
process of conceiving representativeness would put stronger emphasis on the structural 
conditions of national trade union systems and thus better account for diversity of industrial 
relations in the member states. However, since only the first approach is of political relevance 
since it determines the evolution of a European system of industrial relations to a great extent, 
this study refers to a criterion of ‘sector-relatedness’ that is also adopted in the recognition 
process of social partner organisations by the European Commission37.  
 
The ‘sector analyses’ carried out for the seven sectors of investigation, i.e. metal, chemical, 
food production, telecommunication, construction, banking and industrial cleaning, consist of 
two parts. The first section summarises descriptions and assessments of sector-specific 
economic structures and conditions derived from expert interviews. In the second part key 
features of the industrial relations systems of the countries under consideration are 
investigated from an empirical point of view.  
 
 
In line with the hypotheses postulated in section 4.1 and the operationalisation of the 
institutional factors (cf. section 5.1), the following crucial variables are considered (see also 
table 4): 
 
• Variable „Representational domain concentration/fragmentation’ 
 
• Variable ‘Extension practice’ 
 
• Variable ‘Collective bargaining coverage’  
 
 
                                                 
37
 The surveys on the ‚representativeness of social partners’ commissioned by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions for the relevant sectors serve as a guide of reference for the 
selection of sectoral trade union organisations considered in this study.  
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• Variable ‘Sector-level collective bargaining’: Index of the following three variables:  
- dominant level of collective bargaining,  
- existence covert coordination mechanisms in the form of pattern bargaining, 
- existence of both peace obligation and legal enforceability of collective agreements; 
 
• Variable ‘Union density of sector-related trade unions’;  
 
In the following sections, the countries considered in this study are analysed from a 
comparative perspective. Finally, a typology of the respective key variables will be derived 
from the cross-country investigation.   
 
 
8.2 Actor-specific factors: How are the different paths of Europeanisation 
of collective bargaining perceived by EIF key actors? 
 
The third focus area of this study is the analysis of perceptions and interest positions of 
European employers’ and employees’ organisations. In semi-structured expert interviews with 
relevant trade union bargainers issues such as the existence and form of cross-border 
collective bargaining initiatives and projects, their decision-making structure, interest 
constellations of national member organisations, problems and difficulties that hinder cross-
border cooperation is investigated. Moreover, the existence and implementation of 
coordination instruments such as coordination rules or wage formulas as well as the 
systematic collection of collective bargaining data, regular reporting and monitoring systems, 
cross-sectoral integration of collective bargaining coordination systems are addressed in the 
qualitative analysis.  
 
Within each of the sector chapters the European Industry Federations’ (EIF) key actors’ 
perceptions and assessments of central and decentral patters and strategies of collective 
bargaining coordination are summarised. The data is gained from semi-structured interviews 
with collective bargaining experts from the EIF in the sectors under consideration. The 
interviews centre around aspects such as the interest constellations of member organisations, 
preferences with regard to structures and practices of cross-border inter-union coordination 
initiatives and the issues discussed in such forums. Issues of priority and the relevance of 
wage bargaining issues compared to other bargaining topics such as training, flexicurity, 
corporate social responsibility should be revealed. Models of best practice that are of 
particular interest for the trade union organisations should be identified. In order to grasp the 
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evolvement of transnational bargaining initiatives in a more dynamic perspective, changes, 
trends and new developments are considered. Normative orientations with respect to the 
‘model’ of transnational coordination and the existence of competing approaches are 
considered in the analysis. Another topic of interest is the relationship between centralised 
coordination approaches in the framework of European social dialogues on the sector level 
and decentral inter-union coordination activities. According to the research questions laid out 
in the introduction chapter (cf. section I), an investigation on the nature of the relationship 
(competitive, mutually complementary or independence) between both forms of 
Europeanisation is carried out. In addition to the description of the sector’s economic 
background, the relevance of factors such as labour and capital mobility, export dependence, 





9. Sector Analyses 
 
In the following chapters (9.1 to 9.7) the sectors under consideration, i.e. metal, chemical, food 
production, telecommunications, construction, banking and cleaning, are analysed in terms of 
their specific institutional structures and conditions affecting the transnationalisation of 
collective bargaining. The sector analyses further focus on perceptions and orientations of the 
most relevant union actors on the European sector level with regard to the adoption of a 
specific approach, i.e. centralised or decentralised, on the transnational coordination of 
collective bargaining policies. In addition, the relationship between the instrument of European 
sector dialogue on the one hand and the transnational coordination of collective bargaining 
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9.1 Metal Sector 
 
The European metal sector has undergone considerable change during the years of 
intensified integration of the European single market spurred on by the legal and institutional 
innovations associated with the Maastricht Treaty and the European Economic and Monetary 
Union. Even tough most privatisation in the industry took place in the 1980ies and 1990ies, 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions aiming at maintaining the competitiveness of the 
European metal and steel industry led to a radical transformation of working conditions and 
practices in the member countries. The number of employees in the European metal and steel 
industry is on a constant decline (Beguin 2005). Besides a number of measures taken at 
Community-level, the European Commission called for the strengthening of social dialogue on 
sectoral level. However, with the exception of shipbuilding, the metal industry has not been 
represented in the European structures of social dialogue until very recently. In shipbuilding 
the EMF on the employees’ side and CEFS (Community of European Shipyards Association) 
on the employers’ side established a sectoral committee in 2003 (also see section 1.3) which 
was followed by the setting up of a committee in the steel sector in 2006. Social partner 
organisations from the automotive industry and the sub-sector of non-ferrous metal have 
submitted a formal request to establish a committee in 2006 and 2007, respectively. In 
contrast to the chemical sector, where a sector-wide committee was established in 2004, it is 
not feasible to establish a sector-encompassing committee for the metal industry that 
comprises sub-branches such as the production of steel, processing iron and steel, the 
production of metal products, machinery and the automotive sector. The high degree of 
diversity with respect to the production process, market structures and conditions as well as 
the strong organisation of the industry’s and employers’ side on the sub-sectoral level led to 
the establishment of separate sector committees in shipbuilding, the automotive industry and 
the production of non-ferrous metals. The Commission recognised CESA (shipbuilding), 
CLEPA (automotive industry) and EUROMETAUX (non-ferrous metals) as social partner 
organisations on the employers’ side. The iron and steel industry traditionally played a major 
role in the process of Europeanisation. The steel industry’s social partner organisations EMF 
and EUROFER have initiated an application process for a sectoral committee in 2002. The 
recognition process of EUROFER as a social partner organisation has been ongoing until the 
year 2006  when the sectoral committee has finally been created.  
 
In the metal sector, the tradition of social dialogues has been deeply anchored through the 
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (1951). With the Consultative Committee as a 
channel of information and consultation for the High Authority that later merged with the 
European Commission, a tripartite body for consultation in the fields of industrial policy and 
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social policy affairs was established. After the expiration of the ECSC Treaty in 2002, the 
activities of the ECSC Consultative Committee were transferred to the European Economic 
and Social Committee (Beguin 2005).  
 
The recent efforts of social partners in the automotive industry and the sub-sector of non-
ferrous metals to establish formal structures for European social dialogue and the 
establishment of a social dialogue committee by the iron and steel industry social partner 
organisations increased the interest in studying the structures of employees’ and employers’ 
interest organisation in the metal sector. The following sections give an overview about 
fundamental economic particularities of the European metal sector and some of its sub-
sectors (cf. section 1.1.1) and the industry’s industrial relations structure (cf. section 9.1.3) with 
a focus on European metal sector unions from 17 EU-member countries affiliated to the 
European Metalworkers’ Federation (cf. section 9.1.2).  
 
9.1.1 Economic background  
 
The European Union (EU25) is the second largest global producer of ferrous metals (see table 
12), only surpassed by China. Whereas in early 2001 the production volume of the EU15 and 
China was on a comparable level, China more than tripled its output of crude steel between 
2000 and 2006 (ISSI 2007). Japan ranks third in the worldwide crude steel production, with an 
upwards trend of 10 % in the time period of 2001 to 2006. This development is also mirrored in 
Europe (+ 12 %). In the same period, US crude steel output stagnated (- 2.8 %). 
 
In Europe crude steel output grew from around 130 to almost 160 million metric tons between 
2001 and 2006. As table 7 shows, Germany is the single largest European crude steel 
producer (i.e. 38.5 million metric tons in December 2006), followed by Italy (24 million metric 
tons), Spain (i.e. 15.5 million metric tons) and the United Kingdom (i.e. 11 million metric tons). 
Among the new member states steel output has been largest in Poland (i.e. 8 million metric 
tons), followed by Slovakia (i.e. 4 million metric tons), Hungary (1.7 million metric tons) and 
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Table 6 – World crude steel production (2000 – 2006) 
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Source: International Iron and Steel Institute, Steel statistic archive, 2007 
 
 
Tab. 7 – Crude steel production in the EU25 (2001-2006) 
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Source: International Iron and Steel Institute, Steel statistic archive, 2007 
 
 
In 2002 and 2004 the EU15 was a net exporter of steel (see tables 8 and 9). Only in 2001, 
Europe’s steel imports exceeded exports. With regard to semi-finished and finished products 
(ingots and semis, hot rolled wide strip in coils, finished and flat products), the EU15 reported 
a positive external trade balance in 2001, 2002 and 2004. On a global scale besides the EU 
only Japan is a net exporter of steel. In the US steel imports largely exceeded exports in the 
period of observation. In 2004, two thirds to three fourths of the EU member state’s output is 
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traded within the European Union, almost 15 % are exported to other European countries (IISI 
2007). Steel imports from the largest global producer, China, to the EU are relatively small 
since the largest share of the country’s exports (14.5 %) are directed to other Asean countries 
including Japan (IISI 2007).  
 
The economic weight of the metal industries becomes apparent from an inter-industry 
perspective. In 2005 the EU25 gross output of the most important metal branches, i.e. basic 
metals, investment goods, machinery and automotive, to the amount of 3,688,600 million € 
(converted in purchasing-power-parity) accounted for more than 17 % of total EU25 output 
(including non-market services such as public administration, education and health) (KLEMS 
2008). Other economically important market-sector industries such as construction, finance, 
chemicals (including rubber and plastic products and other non-metallic mineral products) and 
food account for 7.4 %, 5.9 %, 5.4 % and 3.5 % of total EU25 output in goods and services 
(2005). Within the metal industry (see table 10), gross output is largest in investment goods 
(i.e. more than 1,423,000 million purchasing-power-parity-converted €), basic metals (i.e. 
842.400 million €), automotive (i.e. 820.000 million €) and machinery (i.e. more than 600.000 
million €). However, between 1995 and 2005 gross output grew largest in transport equipment 
(+ 81.5 %), followed by output growth in investment goods (+ 60 %), basic metals (+ 41 %) 
and machinery (+ 37 %).  
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 2001 II. Quartal 2002 II. Quartal 
 EXPORTS (in 1000t) 
Regions/Countries Semifinished and 
finished products 
b) 
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Tab. 9 – World Steel Trade 2004 
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Table 10 – Gross output in the EU metal sectors 1995 – 2005 


















































































Source: KLEMS 2008 
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Furthermore, the metal sectors are highly export-dependent. Exports of the metal sectors 
exceed those of other exposed industries such as chemicals and food production (cf. section 
7.3). In 2006 exports have been largest in machinery and automotive, accounting for 40 % of 
all EU27 exports in goods (UNCTAD 2008). In sub-sectors such as ores and metals and iron 
and steel the shares are comparably lower, i.e. 4 and 3.7 % of total exports in goods. Between 
2000 and 2006 export growth has been largest in raw-materials and semi-finished and finished 
metal and steel products, i.e. + 204 % and + 196 %, respectively (see table 11). In machinery 
and transport equipment, exports grew by 92 % in the same period and thus where slightly 
below total exports in manufactured goods which grew by around 100 %.  
 
 
Table 11 – EU27 Export growth in metal sectors and total manufacturing, 2000-06 









manufactured goods iron&steel ores&metals
 
Source: UNCTAD 2008 
 
 
Export dependence and increased international competition in internationalised markets 
exerted considerable strain on employment in the metal industries. Referring to employment 
data on the steel sector, Europe had to face a constant decline in the number of steel workers 
(Beguin 2005). The presented figures refer to the ECSC definition of the steel sector (NACE 
27.10)38. Between 1993 and 2001 the employment in steel industry decreased in all EU15 
                                                 
38
 With reference to the EIRO study on industrial relations in the steel industry (2005) and the respective  Eurostat 
figures used by the authors, the ECSC definition of the steel industry corresponds to the NACE code 27.10 for 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. Employment data for the other countries 
under investigation (Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom) cover the sub-sectors defined by NACE 27.10, 27.20 and 27.30 that jointly represent the “ferrous 
metal” sector.  
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countries (see table 12). Ireland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece reported the 
largest loss in steel industry jobs in the short period between 1993 and 1995 (-34, -22 %, 
around - 16 % in the latter three countries, respectively). On the longer run (between 1993 and 
2001), steel sector employment in Portugal and Ireland slumped by around 65 and 55 % 
respectively. In other countries, particularly in the United Kingdom (- 35 %), Luxemburg (- 32 
%) and Germany (- 16 %), structural change resulted in considerable decreases in 
employment in the steel and iron sector.  
 
 
Table 12 – Employment change in the EU15’s steel sector 
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Source: EIRO 2005 
 
With regard to employment changes within important metal sector branches of the EU25, most 
workers are employed in the production of investment goods, i.e. 6,350,000 in 2005, basic 
metals, i.e. 4,570,000, machinery, i.e. 3,400,000, and the automotive sector, i.e. 3,000,000 
(KLEMS 2008). From a mid-term perspective, employment in the European metal sectors 
decreased considerably. In the EU25 employment decreased by 8 % in machinery between 
1995 and 2005 (see table 13). This development was in line with contracting employment in 
manufacturing in general. In other sectors job losses have been more moderate, such as 
investment goods (- 2 %) or basic metals (- 1.4 %). In the same period, only in the automotive 
industry employment grew moderately by 5 %.  
 
Technological innovations in steel production requiring less law steel and an increase in 
automation lead to a falling demand of manual labour. Moreover, economic restructuring, 
mergers and acquisitions to increase international competitiveness as well as a withdrawal of 
the state from ownership and control of the steel industry mark a fundamental change in the 
European iron and steel sector that directly affect labour relationships and work organisation. 
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The announcement of the European leading steel producing company, i.e. Arcelor, of planned 
restructuring measures in the group’s European sites prompted the European Parliament to 
adopt a resolution on the crisis in the steel industry and to call on the European Commission 
to take measures on the Community level aiming at supporting vocational training, addressing 
social impacts of restructuring activities, and strengthening social dialogue. In the strongly 
concentrated steel industry the majority of workers in most European countries is employed in 
a few multinational companies that emanated from mergers and acquisitions between 
companies and groups. In 2007, the world largest steel-producing enterprise was ArcelorMittal 
(310,000 worldwide). Europe’s second largest steel company, i.e. Corus (affiliated to the 
multinational Tata Steel Group), employed around 40,000 workers in the EU in 2006, most of 
them in the United Kingdomm and in the Netherlands.   
 
 
Table 13 – Employment in EU25 metal sectors (1995-2005) 
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Source: KLEMS 2008 
 
The impact of the current global economic crisis which resulted in a further contraction of 
employment in Europe, in particular in the automotive (including car component suppliers) and 
metal sector, is however not yet foreseeable, and more recent sector-aggregated employment 
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9.1.2 The national trade unions the metal sector  
 
This section gives an overview of the social partner organisations in the EU15 member states. 
In order to render the carrying out of this study manageable, the analysis is subject to some 
assumptions that limit the number of potential sector-specific social partner organisations. 
Hence, the analysis is guided by two basic assumptions. First, social partner organisations are 
defined as employers’ associations as well as trade unions and employees’ organisations 
disposing of a mandate for collective bargaining. Second, only ‘sector-related’ social partner 
organisations are considered in this study. The concept of ‘sector-relatedness’ is based on two 
dimensions. First, it refers to the area of industrial activity as defined by the NACE 
(Nomenclature générale des activités économiques) classification system. In concrete terms, 
the definition of the metal sector underlying this analysis includes the following codes: NACE 
27 (production and processing of metal), NACE 28 (production of metal products), NACE 29 
(machinery), NACE 30, 31, 32, 33 (production of business machines, IC technology machines, 
electro-technics, fine mechanics and optics), as well as NACE 34 and 35 (motor vehicle 
production). This sector demarcation serves the purpose of ensuring comparability among the 
industrial relations systems in the EU member countries. In essence, it is derived from the 
organisational domain of the European Metalworkers’ Federation. Therefore, it reflects a 
common ‘European interest’ shared by all national member organisations considered in the 
analysis. Second, the concept of sector-relatedness is – in addition to the coverage of one or 
more of the above specified NACE code areas – based on the dimension of collective action. 
That is, the association participates in sector-related collective bargaining that aims at the 
conclusion of a collective agreement covering either the entire metal sector or – what is more 
common – one or more of the specified sub-branches that are part of the metal sector.   
 
Starting point of the analysis are the national trade unions affiliated to the European 
Metalworkers’ Federation EMF on the employees’ side and to CEEMET (Council of European 
Employers of the Metal, Engineering and Technology-based Industries39) affiliates on the 
employers’ side. However, in many member countries, the organisational domain of EMF-
member organisations does not correspond exactly to the metal sector as it is defined above. 
For instance, the production of silver- and goldwork jewellery, garages and repair shops for 
motor vehicles are not pertaining to the metal sector as delineated above. Consequently, there 
is a high incidence of considering unions and employer associations in the study the 
organisational domains of which are not congruent with the above NACE demarcation of the 
                                                 
39
 CEEMET originates from the former Western European Metal Trades Employers' Organisation (WEM) 
founded on an ad-hoc basis in 1962 and formalised in 1970 (Bercusson 2007) in order to set up a European-level 
organisation that also represents employers’ associations in the CEEC.  
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metal sector. The concept of sector-relatedness therefore requires further specification that 
allows for a distinction between organisations according to their sector-specific organisational 
scope. The following patterns can be distinguished (Traxler 2008): 
 
(1) Congruence: the domain of the association is identical with the NACE demarcation, as 
specified above. 
(2) sectionalism: the domain/purview covers only a certain part of the sector, as demarcated 
by the above NACE demarcation, while no group outside the sector is covered. 
(3) Overlap: the domain/purview covers the entire sector plus (parts of) one or more other 
sectors. However, it is important to note that general (i.e. sector-unspecific) associations which 
do not deal with sector-specific matters are not included in this analysis. 
(4) sectional overlap: the domain/purview covers part of the sector plus (parts of) one or 
more other sector. 
 
With regard to the data, membership figures are provided either by the associations 
themselves or they are estimates. An inherent problem in membership data reported by trade 
unions and employers associations is that they are often inflated (or deflated) for political 
reasons. To obtain figures that correspond to the scientific standards of objectivity and 
comparability, reported data is often subject to corrections. In particular, trade unions tend to 
provide figures on the gross membership including inactive members such as pensioners and 
students. This study aims at presenting net membership figures (i.e. active members), 
provided reliable data on shares of inactive members in the totality of members is available.  
 
An important source of information is the European Metalworkers’ Federation since it is the 
first European Industry Federation that systematically collected data on collective bargaining 
(see section 3.2.1). However, since this system is in principle based on the voluntary 
commitment of the member organisations to report data on a regular basis, the obtained data 
is very often incomplete as entire countries or single organisations are staying out.  
 
In the following sections, the industrial relations systems in the member countries’ metal 
sectors are described with respect to the sectoral social partner organisations on the 
employees’ and the employers’ side engaged in collective bargaining, recent results in 
collective bargaining (2005 and 2006), collective bargaining level, the sectoral collective 
bargaining coverage and the existence of tripartite bodies for the consultation and participation 
of the social partners in industry policy and labour market and industrial relations issues. Data 
on trade union memberships and participation in sectoral public policy concertation and/or 
consultation of the social partners by the state or governmental agencies is summarised in the 
country sections below. However, for most trade unions, recent membership data is not 
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available (Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000). In the country summaries below, only more current 
membership figures are stated. Mostly, these figures reflect the reported membership that 
generally includes inactive trade union members such as pensioners and students. Moreover, 
the existence of tripartite consultatitve bodies and tripartite sector-specific boards of public 
policy in economic and social policy matters concerning the metal industry are examined. 
Parties on the employers’ side are multi-employer organisations or business associations 
consulting on public policy affairs but though not exclusively industrial policies such as 
restructuring. Public policy consultation with firms is excluded from such tripartite 
consultations. Finally, the formal or informal nature of the sectoral social partner consultation 




In Austria, the GMT40 (Gewerkschaft Metall-Textil) with a reported membership of 277,015 
blue-collar workers and the GPA41 (Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten) organising 202,477 
white-collar workers in 2006 are the metal sectors’ social partner organisations on the 
employees’ side.  On the employers’ side, the Economic Chamber of Austria (WKÖ), section 
industry, organises 100 % of the metal sectors’ employers since its public-law status as 
chamber rests upon obligatory membership. With the Slovenian chamber GZS abolishing 
obligatory membership until 2009, the WKÖ is the only employers’ association in the 
European Union that is not based on the principle of voluntary organisation.   
 
The trade union density (net density) among blue-collar workers in the Austrian metal sector is 
around 75 % (Beguin 2005) and ranks among the highest in the industrial manufacturing 
sector. The collective bargaining coverage rate is close to 100 % due to the compulsory 
membership of the employers’ association WKÖ. Three separate national agreements for the 
metal industry, the small trade-crafts industry and the electrical/electronic industry cover a 
totality of 325.210 blue and white-collar workers (2006).   
 
Since the privatisation of the largest parts of the metal and steel industry in the mid-1980ies, 
no formal or informal relationships between the sectoral social partner organisation and the 
state exist. A second wave of privatisation in the sector started in 1993, when a law was 
                                                 
40
 In 2007, the GMT merged with the Union for Agriculture and Food (Gewerkschaft Agrar-Nahrung-Genuss) 
under the new name of ‘Gewerkschaft Metall-Textil-Nahrung – GMTN’.  
41
 The GPA merged with the Union of Graphical Workers, Journalists and Paper Workers – GDJP (‚Gewerkschaft 
Druck, Journalismus, Papier’) in January 2007 to form GPA-DJP.  
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passed that obliged the Austrian state holding company ÖIAG to sell its shareholding in the 
metal sector by the end of 2003 (Beguin 2005). The metalworkers’ union GMT has not been 
consulted during the years of the right-conservative government coalition (1999-2006).  
 
9.1.2.2 Belgium  
 
Belgian trade union members are represented either by the socialist FGTB/ABVV, the 
Christian CSC/ACV or the liberal CGSLB/ACLVB. Each of the organisations is sectionalized 
along the countries language divide between the francophone and the Flemish organisation. 
The FTGB/ABVV’s affiliates in the metal sector are SETCa/BBTK for white-collar workers (i.e. 
employees, technicians and managerial staff) whereas blue-collar workers are organised in 
ABVV-Metaal/CMB-FGTB. Metal-sector related affiliates to the CSC/ACV are CSC 
Metal/ACV-Metaal, with approximately 220,000 reported blue-collar members in 2007 (gross 
membership), CNE-CSC which is organising white-collar employees and LBC-NVK with a 
white-collar Flemish membership (both affiliated to the Christian CSC/ACV). CGSLB Métal is 
the sector organisation of the liberal federation CGSLB/ACLVB.  
 
The trade union density is around 90 to 95 % in the steel industry (Beguin 2005). Collective 
bargaining takes place at three levels: At the inter-sectoral level, all employees bargain jointly 
in order to conclude a framework agreement for industry workers in general. Additionally, on 
the industry level, different crafts bargain separately with separate bargaining for blue- and 
white-collar workers. On the company/plant level all employees bargain jointly. This level 
though is less important than the higher bargaining levels. In the steel industry sectoral level 
bargaining is carried out in two joint committees that negotiate separate collective agreements 
for blue- and white-collar workers. With regard to bargaining issues, the sectoral agreements 
function as framework agreements on certain matters such as early retirement, minimum 
provisions on pay and working conditions. These sectoral agreements are implemented and 
completed by company-agreements. The collective bargaining coverage rate is approximately 
100 % in the Belgian steel industry.  
 
On the employers’ side, the multi-sectoral federation VBO/FEB represents members in the 
Flemish and the Wallonian regions of the country and reports to represent 1.5 million workers 
in total.  
 
In Belgium tripartite negotiation structures exist at the regional level although negotiations take 
place rather on an ad-hoc than at regular basis, e.g. in 2001 and 2003 (Beguin 2005).  
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9.1.2.3 Czech Republic  
 
The metal sector federation OS KOVO reported to organise around 350,000 members in 2003 
(Kohl and Platzer 2004). Aggregated on the sub-sectoral levels, in 2005 OS KOVO Aircraft 
Production reports 1,467 members, OS KOVO Electro-technical industry had 4,176 members 
and OS KOVO Foundries reported 2,125 members. The organisational densities of the three 
trade union organisations (2005) are 32.5 % in aircraft production, 27 % in the electro-
technical industry and 43.5 % in foundries (EMF 2006). The employers’ peak organisation is 
the Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic – SP CR with the Czech and Moravian 
Electrical and Electronic Association and the Foundry Association of the Czech Republic.  
 
If the three agreements (aircraft production, electro-technical industry and foundries) are 
extended to the entirety of the employees of the respective sub-sectors that fall into the 
domain of the agreements, than approximately 23 % of all employees in the three most 




The Danish bargaining cartel CO-industri42 Metal reports to represent 101,852 blue-collar 
workers (2003). IDA – representing the engineering professions – reports to have 61,000 
members whereby 16,000 pertain to the metal sector. The trade union density in the steel 
industry is around 85 % (Beguin 2005). The inter-sectoral organisation structure is also found 
on the employers’ side. The Confederation of Danish employers (DA – Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening) bargains directly with CO industri Metal.  
 
Collective bargaining takes place on the inter-industry level whereby blue- and white-collar 
workers bargain separately, on industry level where different crafts bargaining separately and 
on company/plant level whereby different employee groups bargain separately. Sector level-
bargaining, as part of the overall private sector industry settlement, provides a basic 
framework for company and plant level bargaining. The collective bargaining coverage rate in 
the metal industry is close to 100 %.  
 
With regard to tripartite consultative bodies, no formal, permanent bodies exist in the Danish 
metal sector. However, social partner organisations participate in national and European 
                                                 
42
 CO-industri is a bargaining cartel founded by the largest trade union federation LO (Landsorganisationen i 
Danmark) in 1992.  
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Finnish employees organise along sectoral and professional lines with separate organisations 
for blue- and white-collar workers. Workers in the metal sector are represented either by 
Metalli, an affiliate of the peak level federation SAK, or by the Finnish Electrical Workers’ 
Union (also a SAK affiliate). White-collar employees and higher-rank staff are organised in 
TEK (representing graduate engineers) and IL ry (professional engineers) as well as the Union 
of Salaried Employees TU ry43 that reports to represent 125,000 members (2006). The 
bargaining partner on the employers’ side is the cross-sectoral TT (Teknologia Toellisuus), 
Technology Industries of Finland. Trade union density in the metal sector is close to 90 % 
(Beguin 2005).  
 
Finland is characterised by a multi-level bargaining system whereby the inter-industry level, 
with white and blue-collar workers bargaining separately – is the most important one. On 
industry level different crafts negotiate separately, and on company/plant level collective 
bargaining is carried out for distinct employee groups. Sector-level collective agreements are 
part of the overall metalworking industry agreement whereas more detailed regulations are 
concluded in additional negotiations on enterprise and plant level. The collective bargaining 
coverage of almost 100 % is among the highest in the European Union.  
 
Since in Finland the metal sector is less important in terms of production volume (see section 
5.1.1), and its relative importance is low compared to the chemical sector (paper/pulp industry, 
pharmaceutical industry), neither are any formal tripartite structures of policy consultation and 






                                                 
43
 TU was founded in 2001 as a merger of TL – The Union of Technical Employees, STL – Union of Salaried 
Employees in Industry in Finland, RAL – Federation of Private Building Employees and STAF – Swedish 
Association of Technicians and Foremen in Finland. 
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9.1.2.6 France 
 
In France, FGMM (Fédération Générale des Mines et da la Métallurgie), the metal sector’s 
organisation of the leftist CFDT (Confédération Française Démocratique du travail), FO 
Métaux, the Force Ouvrière’s (FO) metal sector federation, CFTC Métallurgie, the sector’s 
division of the Christian confederation (Confédération Français des Travailleurs Chrétiens) as 
well as the FTM/CGT (Fédération des Travailleurs de la Métallurgie de la Confédération 
Générale du Travail) that was formerly closely related to the Communist Party, are 
participating in collective bargaining on a regular basis. On the employers’ side, UIMM (l’Union 
des Industries et Métiers de la Métallurgie) bargains on the industry level. Figures on the 
unionisation rate in the metal sector are not available at present. Since the trade union density 
in France ranks among the lowest in Europe – in 2003 it was over 8 % - and since the metal 
sector traditionally is one of the stronger organised industries, trade union density in the metal 
sector is estimated to be around 12 %44. Sectoral collective agreements are completed by 
regional and (large) company agreements. Despite the fact that the company and the plant 
level are the predominant collective bargaining levels, the bargaining coverage rate 
approximates 100 % of the employees working in the metal sector. On the national level, a 
common agreement for both blue and white-collar workers has been negotiated by the 
sectoral social partners. Another one has been concluded for blue-collar workers on the 
regional level, and one national agreement for white-collar employees provides for specific 
guarantees (e.g. minimum wage). The multi-tier collective bargaining process accounts for the 
exceptionally high coverage rate in the metal sector. Recently (2006), several company-level 
agreements, with or without the participation of FGMM-CFDT, FTM-CGT and CFTC 
Métallurgie – depending on the company presence of the trade unions – have been 
concluded. The collective bargaining coverage rate is almost 100 %.  
 
In France, the state maintains close relationshipships with the metal industry’s social partners, 




The sector’s social partner are IG Metall that reports to organise 1,350,000 members in 2006, 
and the employers’ association Gesamtmetall (Gesamtverband der metallindustriellen 
Arbeitgeberverbände) concluded three regional steel industry agreements 
                                                 
44
 Trade unionisation is highest in the public sector, where in 2003 approximately 15 % of all employees have 
been union members (EC 2006).  
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(‘Flächentarifverträge’) for the regions ‘West’ (covering the western German states of Bremen, 
Lower Saxony and North Rhine Westphalia), ‘Saarland’ and ‘Eastern Germany’. Companies in 
other western federal states are covered by the collective agreements for the metalworking 
industry (Beguin 2005). In the bargaining round 2003/04 only one company, the Italian based 
Riva, left the sectoral agreement in order to engage in company-level bargaining (Beguin 
2005). Although collective bargaining predominantly takes place on the industry-level whereby 
blue and white-collar workers bargain jointly, company and plant-level bargaining (also with 
white and blue-collar employees bargaining jointly) becomes increasingly important. The trade 
union density rate in the steel industry is around 70 % in the western part of the country 
whereas in the eastern federal states it is above 60 % (Beguin 2005). According to the 
membership data reported by IG Metall, trade union density in the more encompassing metal 
sector is about 42 % (EMF 2006).  
 
With regard to public policy consultation and concertation, no such formal structures exist in 
the metal sector. After the privatisation of the eastern German steel industry in the aftermath 
of the country’s reunification, such tripartite bodies have been dissolved. However, cross-
industry consultations of the social partners on social policy, industrial policy and industrial 




For the Greek metal sector only limited data is available. The Panhellenic Federation of Metal 
Workers (POEM) reports to represent 100,000 members in 200545. Since figures on 
employees working in the entire metal industry are not available, the trade union density can 
not be estimated. The same holds true for estimates on the sector’s collective bargaining rate. 
However, collective bargaining in the steel industry takes place on the sector-level, as a part of 
the overall settlement for metal production and processing.  
 
Despite the Greek state still controls a considerable number of large steel companies, there 
exist no formal tripartite policy concertation and consultation structures on industry-level 
(Beguin 2005).  
 
                                                 
45
 The membership figure seems to be largely inflated, since according to Eurostat figures only 2,240 workers 
have been employed in the Greek steel industry in 2001(Eurostat 2008e) although the underlying sector 
delineation is wider than the ECSC definition of the steel industry (NACE 27.10).  
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9.1.2.9 Italy 
 
In the Italian metal sector, three trade unions affiliated to the three main trade union peak-
federations CGIL (the General Confederation of Italian Workers) which unifies members from 
the socialist, communist and christian-democratic spectrum and is the largest confederation, 
CISL (Italian Confederation of Workers’ Union) which declares to be non-partisan and non-
ideological in its orientation is second largest, and the third-largest peak federation UIL (Union 
of Italian Workers), bargain together with FEDERMECCANICA, the industry’s employers’ 
association. UILM (UIL), FIM (CISL) and FIOM (CGIL) report to organise 363,942 members 
(2004), contribute to a union density rate of 90 % in the steel industry (Beguin 2005). 
Collective bargaining takes place on the industry level whereby either all workers bargain 
jointly or different crafts negotiate separately. On company or plant level, distinct employee 
groups bargain separately.  
 
In general, in Italy all collective bargaining levels (i.e. inter-sectoral, sectoral and company-
level) are existing but they are considered to be not very important (Traxler et al. 2001). In the 
bargaining round 2006, the three main union confederations negotiated a national sectoral 
collective agreement for overall metalworking (blue and white-collar workers) which is 
supplanted by company and territorial agreements, whereby the lower levels are dealing with 
more specific issues. In the metal sector the coverage rate of the national agreement 
approximates 100 %.   
 
In Italy where the privatisation of metal industry companies has been completed in 1996, 
tripartite consultative or monitoring bodies are existing (e.g. Steel Industry Observatory) 




Collective bargaining in the metal sector is carried out by cross-sectoral social partner 
organisations. The bargaining party on the employees’ side in the Irish metal sector is the 
cross-sectoral SIPTU (The Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union) that reports 
a membership of 2,468 solely in the metal industry (EMF 2006). On the employers’ side, the 
Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation (IBEC) takes place in negotiations on pay and 
non-pay issues. Negotiations are usually occurring on a 3-year basis. The inter-sectoral 
bargaining level is the most dominant one. Nevertheless, collective bargaining is carried out 
also on the industry level, with all workers bargaining jointly, although not in the metal industry. 
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Additionally, negotiations are also taking place at company or plant level. This level however is 
not important since individual negotiations between employees or company-based employee 
representatives and the management prevail. The collective bargaining coverage in the metal 
sector is 16.5 % (EMF 2006). The share of white-collar workers in the metal sector as a 
percentage of SIPTU’s total number of members is around 10 %.  
 
Tripartite talks and governmental consultations with the cross-industry employees’ and 
employers’ organisations Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and IBEC, the farming 
organisations and organisations representing the community and voluntary sector are taking 




On the employees’ side, VHP Metalektro, organising senior and middle-ranking staff, and the 
inter-sectoral organisations FNV-Bondgenoten46, De Unie and CNV Bedrijven Bond are 
participating in collective bargaining in the metal sector. Aggregated data on the sector’s trade 
union density is not available, only for the largest metal sector company – Corus – a union 
density rate of 42 % is reported (Beguin 2005). According to membership figures reported by 
the trade union federations FNV-Bondgenoten, De Unie and CNV Bedrijven Bond, the sectoral 
density rates for these organisations are 18 %, 28.5 % and 26 %. For the white-collar union 
VHP Metalektro the sectoral density rate is estimated to be around 15 %.  
 
The employers are represented by the Vereniging FME-CWM which organises companies in 
the technological industry, such as metals automotive and engineering. In the last years, no 
inter-industrial collective bargaining has taken place in the Netherlands. In general, collective 
bargaining is carried out on the industry level, either all workers bargain jointly, different crafts 
bargain separately or white and blue-collar workers bargain separately. SME are represented 
by a separate association of employers in the metal and technical sector, which bargains for 
branches such as car bodywork, gold and silver smiths, isolation, metal, garages/bikes and 
technical installation. Moreover, collective agreements are resulting from a combination of 
industry and company bargaining whereby all employers bargain jointly (Traxler et al. 2001). 
Since there exists a sectoral collective agreement for the entire metalworking industry (for blue 
and white-collar workers) with the exception of only two companies – Corus/Hoogovens and 
Philips – which have their own agreements, the collective bargaining coverage rate is 
                                                 
46
 FNV Bondenoten – by far the largest union of the Netherlands – is a merger of Industriebond FNV (industrial 
workers’ union) with three other FNV unions in 1999. 
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approximately 100 %.  
 
With respect to tripartite consultative bodies, no such structures – either formally or informally 
– exist in the Dutch metal sector. However, on cross-sectoral level formal consultative 
institutions such as the Social Economic Council (SER) where peak trade union organisations 
are represented in talks with the Ministries of Social Affairs and of Economic Affairs are 
existing. Official meetings of the social partners and the government in the Foundation of 




The three most important metal sector unions in Poland are the Metalworkers’ Secretariat of 
NSZZ Solidarnosc,  OPZZ – Trade Unions Federation Metalowcy and FHZZ-OPZZ. Trade 
union density in the steel industry is estimated to be around 90 % (Beguin 2005). Metal sector 
employers are organised in the Association of Iron and Steel Industry, the Association of 
companies of the defence industry, the Shipbuilding Forum and the employers’ association 
MZP which organises mainly SME. Two separate agreements have been concluded for the 
metal and steel industry and the defence, air and space industry, in 2004 and 1997 
respectively (EMF 2005). Both multi-employer agreements cover blue and white-collar workers 
and have been concluded with unlimited validity. Most metal-processing employers also have 
in-house collective agreements (Beguin 2005). The coverage rate of the collective agreement 
for the steel industry is lower than 10 % (Traxler and Behrens 2002), provided it is assumed 
that it has not been extended to non-members of the signatory trade unions.  
 
In general, collective bargaining in Poland is carried out on the inter-sectoral, the industry and 
the enterprise level, whereby the latter is most important.  
 
In Poland, where the state is holding shares in one large company (Beguin 2005) until the end 
of 2009, legislation provides for a ‘tripartite sector team’ for the sector’s restructuring and as a 
forum for the negotiation of collective agreements. Currently, three tripartite bodies for 
consultation are existing in the metal sector. In the Tripartite Team for the Social Condition of 
Steel restructuring the Federation of steel trade unions in Poland and the Employers' 
Association of the Iron and Steel Industry are represented, in the Tripartite team for 
companies of the defence industry the Trade Union Federation ‘Metalowcy’ and the 
Employers' Association of companies of the defence industry are participating, and the 
Tripartite team for the shipbuilding industry is made up again by ‘Metalowcy’ on the 
employees' side and by the Shipbuilding Forum on the employers' side.  
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9.1.2.13 Portugal 
 
The three multi-sector trade union confederations SINDEL (UGT), FEQUIMETAL (CGTP) and 
SIMA (UGT) represent blue and white-collar workers in the metal industry and are affiliated to 
the county’s largest peak federations (i.e. UGT – General Workers Union and CGTP – 
General Portuguese Workers’ Confederation). However, more recently several collective 
agreements in metallurgy have been concluded with the participation of only FEQUIMETAL 
and the employers’ associations FENAME (The National Federation of the Metal Industry) and 
AIMMAP (Association of Metallurgy, Mechanical Engineering and Allied Industries of Portugal) 
respectively. Company agreements have been negotiated for the automotive industry, mining, 
garages and car repair and other sectors that fall not into the coverage of the metal sector as 
defined above but pertain to the organisational domains of FEQUIMETAL (jewellers, oil 
processing industry). Despite the fact that no data on trade union density in the Portuguese 
steel industry is available, it can be concluded that the unionisation rate in the metal sector is 
higher than the country’s overall net union density of 24 % (Traxler et al. 2001). In Portugal, 
collective bargaining takes place on industry-level, whereby different crafts bargain separately. 
However, the company/plant-level is by far the most dominant bargaining level.  
 
The Portuguese social partners of the metal sector are not consulted on a formal basis nor are 




KOVO, the Slovak Metalworkers’ Federation, reported to organise 90,000 blue and white-
collar workers in 2001 (Carley 2002). The largest employers’ association participating in 
collective bargaining is AZZZ SR. Traditionally, the metal sector is a strongly organised sector. 
However, figures on the sectoral trade union density are not available. Hence, there is 
reasonable evidence that the unionisation rate in the metal sector is higher then the inter-
sectoral union density rate of approximately 30 - 40 % (Carley 2002). In 2006 collective 
agreements have been concluded for the electro-technical industry, for metallurgy and for 
engineering, for blue and white-collar workers. Additionally, for IS Divident a company-
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9.1.2.15 Spain 
 
The Spanish metal sector employees are represented by MCA-UGT, FTM-ELA (for the 
Basque Country) and FM/CC.OO. In the largest trade union confederation CC.OO’s (Trade 
Union Confederation of Workers’ Commissions) metal sector organisation FM 157.000 
members (2007) are reported to be organised. Sector-aggregated data on membership of the 
second largest union confederation UGT (General Workers’ Confederation) is not available. 
Trade union density in the Spanish steel industry is between 70 and 80 % (Beguin 2005). On 
the employers’ side the National Employers’ Organisation of the Metal Sector – 
CONFEMETAL – participates in collective bargaining. Bargaining is carried out on the industry 
level, either all workers bargaining jointly or different crafts bargaining separately. On company 
and plant-level, distinct employee groups bargain separately. In general, collective bargaining 
is reported to be not very important since individual bargaining with direct negotiations 
between employers and employees or their representatives on company/plant level prevails 
(Traxler et al. 2001). However, due to the pervasive practice of extension procedures the 
collective bargaining coverage rate in the steel sector approximates 100 %.  
 
By far the largest part of the Spanish steel sector has been privatised by the late 1990ies. With 
regard to policy concertation and social partner participation in public policy-making, no such 




On the employees’ side, the Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers – Sveriges Ingenjör 
(formerly known as the SACO-affiliate CF) and SIF which organises white-collar employees in 
technology, knowledge-based and allied sectors as well as the blue-collar workers trade union 
IF Metall are negotiating collective agreements with the Association of Swedish Engineering 
Industries – TEKNIKFÖRETAGEN on the employers’ side. IF Metall, that results from a 
merger between the Swedish Industrial Workers’ Union (IF) and the Swedish Metalworkers’ 
Union (Svenska Metall) in 200647, reports to represent 450,000 members in the metal sector. 
The trade union density rate in the steel sector is around 90 %. Since in the steel and metal-
processing industry three sectoral agreements have been concluded by the three trade unions 
in 2006 (for blue and white-collar workers separately), the collective bargaining coverage rate 
                                                 
47
 Until 2006 the Swedish Metalworkers’ Union – Svenska Metallindustriarbetareförbundet – affiliated to the 
national trade union confederation LO (Landesorganisationen i Sverige) – represented blue-collar workers in the 
metal sector.   
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is approximately 90 %. Though, in general, collective bargaining takes place predominantly on 
the company/plant level, whereby distinct employee groups bargain separately (Traxler et al. 
2001).  
 
In Sweden, where private ownership in the metal and steel sector is traditionally very far-
reaching, no formal or informal structures for tripartite consultation and policy concertation are 
existing (Beguin 2005). 
 
9.1.2.17 United Kingdom  
 
The four main trade unions organising employees in the metal sector are all cross-sectoral 
organisations. GMB (National Union of Gasworkers and General Labourers), T&G (Transport 
and General Workers’ Union), Amicus48 – a cross-industry organisation with an encompassing 
membership domain that reports to represent 15,000 members (2007) in the steel industry – 
and Community49, that organises – amongst others – workers in the steel industry, are 
negotiating collective agreements on the company level. The trade union density in the British 
metal sector is estimated to be around 60 % (Beguin 2005). According to the survey ‘Pay and 
Conditions in Engineering 2005/06’ carried out by Amicus on the basis of the Incomes Data 
Service (IDS) the collective bargaining coverage rate in the metal sector is approximately 66 
%. Hence the metal industry is the most extensively covered sector with regard to collective 
bargaining.  
 
In Great Britain, where the entire metal and steel sector has been privatised by 1990, no 
formal or informal structures for tripartite policy consultation and concertation are existing 
(Beguin 2005).  
 
 
                                                 
48
 In May 2007 the Transport and General Workers’ Union (G&T) and the inter-sectoral union Amicus merged to 
form Unite. Amicus itself resulted from a merger between AEEU (Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical 
Union) and MSF (Manufacturing, Science and Finance) as well as the finance sector union UNIFI  and GPMU 
(The Graphical, Paper and Media Union) in 2001. 
49
 Community results from the merger between the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) and the National 
Union of Knitwear, Footwear & Apparel Trades (KFAT) in 2004 and organises workers in sectors such as 
clothing, textiles, footwear, steel, social services as well as workers with disabilities. 
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9.1.3 The National Systems of Industrial relations in the metal sector 
 
This section aims at categorising the national industrial relations systems in the European 
metal sector on the basis of the core institutional variables, i.e. the degree of 
concentration/fragmentation of the trade union system, extension practice and collective 
bargaining coverage, characteristics of the sector-level collective bargaining system and 
density of sector-related unions (see section 9.1.3). In order to define the scope of industrial 
activities that constitute the metal sector, the NACE classification system is referred to. The 
‘sector-related’ trade unions that are an indicator for the degree of domain 
concentration/fragmentation of the union system, the sector delineations have already been 
specified in section 9.1.2 and include NACE 27 (production and processing of metal), NACE 
28 (production of metal products), NACE 29 (machinery), NACE 30, 31, 32, 33 (production of 
business machines, IC technology machines, electro-technics, fine mechanics and optics), as 
well as NACE 34 and 35 (motor vehicle production). The criteria of ‘representativeness’ 
specified by the European Commission (EC 1998) have been assessed for several sectors in 
so called ‘representativeness studies’ of social partner organisations. However, although EMF 
and the respective European employers’ associations are represented in European sector 
social dialogue committees for shipbuilding and the steel sector both of which are considered 
as part of the broader ‘metal sector’, no such studies have yet been carried out for the 
respective sub-sectors. The same holds true for those sectors (i.e. the automotive and the 
non-ferrous metals sector) for which the establishment of a European sector dialogue 
committee has been applied for by the respective European social partner organisations. 
Therefore, in order to identify sector-related unions reference is made to the member 
organisations of EMF (EMF 2005 and 2006). With regard to union density it has to be noted 
that figures refer for certain countries to the narrow segment of the steel industry according to 
NACE 17.10, or to the more encompassing sub-sector of ‘ferrous metals’, i.e. NACE 17.10, 
17.20 and 17.30 for other countries (Beguin 2005).  
 
 
9.1.3.1 Organisational domain concentration/fragmentation of the union system 
 
The typology below (table 14) aims at classifying the trade union systems which are described 
in more detail in section 7.1.2. As laid out in section 5.1.1 the degree of domain fragmentation 
is measured by two indicators, i.e. the number of sector-related trade unions and the existence 
of a domain-overlap between two or more of the sectoral unions.  
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In the metal sector domain fragmentation is low compared to that in the other sectors under 
consideration. This is particularly true since only the member organisations of the European 
Metalworkers’ Federation have been considered. This contrasts with the methodological 
approach for the analysis of the other sectors under consideration and for which all sector-
related employee organisations entitled to participate in collective bargaining have been 
reported by respondents (e.g. IST 2000, IST 2004, Traxler 2007b,  Glassner 2008a) In more 
than one third of the countries under consideration, i.e. Austria, Germany, Greece, Ireland and 
Denmark, the sectoral trade union system is highly centralised and can be conceived as 
‘quasi’-single union system. Inter-union competition and rivalry is assumed to be in-existent or 
marginal due to distinct organisational domains. In Austria and Denmark workers in the sector 
are organised along their employment status, i.e. blue- and white-collar workers, and along 
occupational/professional lines. In the case of Austria, no domain overlap occurs between the 
Austrian GPA (Union of the White-collar workers of the Private Sector) and GMTN 
(Metalworking, Textiles, Agriculture and Food-processing Union). Likewise, no domain 
overlaps occur in the Danish metal sector, where workers are organised by Danish Metal, a 
blue-collar union, and IDA (The Danish Society of Engineers).  A fully-fledged single-union 
system exists in the German, Greek and Irish metal sector. The German IG Metall, the Greek 
POEM and the Irish SIPTU are the sole representative unions in the countries’ metal 
industries which are affiliated to the EMF. 
 
Tab. 14 – Typology trade union system in the metal sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of trade union system Countries (index sum) 




Category 1: Single union system, 
‘Quasi’-Single union system 
AT (0), DE (0), DK (0), GR (0), 
IR (0) 




Category 2: Functional diversity 
and moderate union competition 
United Kingdom (3), ES (3), IT 
(3), PT (3), SW (3), FR (4), NL 
(4) 





cleavages and high degree of 
union competition  
FI (5), BE (6)  
Source: see table 42, Annex 1 
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A certain degree of trade union fragmentation occurs in Sweden, where organisational domain 
overlaps between SIF (Swedish Union of Technical and Clerical Employees) and Sveriges 
Ingenjörer (Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers) are existing to a certain degree. 
However, no union-competition with regard to organisational issues between those two 
organisations has been reported by trade union respondents. In Italy, Spain and Portugal 
three trade union organisations, respectively, are co-existing in the metal sector whereby 
domain overlaps are relatively pronounced. A moderate degree of inter-union competition with 
regard to member recruitment is reported to occur between the Portuguese organisations 
SIMA, FEQUIMETAL and SINDEL, between the three Italian federations FIOM, UILM and FIM 
as well as between the sector-related Spanish federations MCA-UGT and FM/CC.OO. In the 
United Kingdom the two of the most important sector-related unions responded to large 
domain overlaps by merging: The Transport and General Workers’ Union – T&G and the inter-
sectoral union Amicus merged in May 2007 to form Unite. Still, there exists some domain 
overlap with GMB, the other remaining general union which organises workers in the metal 
sector. In the Netherlands overlapping domains are reported to exist between the blue-collar 
worker unions FNV-Bondgenoten Metalindustry, VHP Metalektro and CNV Bedrijvenbond, as 
well as for FTM-CGT, CFTC Métallurgie, FGMM-CFDT and FOM of France which organise 
both blue- and white-collar workers in the metal sector. Far-reaching domain overlaps are 
occurring in the multi-union systems of Belgium and Finland. Overlapping domains exist 
between the Finish blue-collar unions Metalliliitto and Finnish Electrical Workers' Union, and, 
to a larger extent, between the white-collar-unions TU (Union of Salaried Employees), TEK 
(The Finnish Association of Graduate Engineers) and UIL (Union of Professional Engineers in 
Finland). In Belgium the organisational pattern is even more complex due to the differentiation 
along political/confessional as well as regional lines. Domain overlaps are existing between 
the white-collar worker organisations CNE-LBC, the Christian LBC-NVK which organises 
managerial staff, SETCa-BBTK organising employees, technicians and managerial personnel 
and ACLVB/CGSLB, the liberal union federation organising both blue- and white-collar 
workers. Likewise, with regard to industrial workers, organisational domains overlap between 
the socialist, Flemish ABVV Metaal, the socialist, regional (Brussels, Wallonia) MWB-FGTB 
and ACLVB/CGSLB.  
 
Union fragmentation in the metal sector tends to be low compared to other industries, however 
in countries such as Belgium a considerable degree of fragmentation can be observed. 
Although it can be assumed that coordination of collective bargaining is less burdened with co-
operation problems in centralised union system, this does not necessarily hold true for the 
case of Belgium, a country that is particularly active in initiatives for the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining as laid out in more detail in sections 9.1.4 to 9.1.6. 
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9.1.3.2 Extension practice and collective bargaining coverage 
 
In the following the sectoral collective bargaining systems in the countries under consideration 
are analysed on the basis of their inclusiveness/exclusiveness. In line with theoretical 
reasoning, inclusive systems are characterised by a collective bargaining coverage rate of 
more than 50 %, i.e. more than half of the employees pertaining to the metal sector are 
covered by collective agreements whereas in exclusive systems, typically those where single-
employer bargaining is prevailing or growing, less the 50 % of the sector’s employees are 
covered by collective agreements (cf. section 3.8). Thus, the efficiency and extensiveness of 
collective bargaining outcomes is the yardstick for assessment. The most important 
determinant of collective bargaining coverage is the existence of extension rules, and in 
particular, the practice to declare collective agreements generally binding for employers which 
are not affiliated to the respective employers’ association which signed the collective 
agreement. In most of the countries under consideration labour law provides for such 
extensions (see table 43, Annex 1). However, in some of the countries, such as Austria and 
Italy, functional equivalents that guarantee an encompassing coverage of collective 
agreements are in existence (Traxler and Behrens 2002).  
 
Since no data on the collective bargaining coverage of the entire metal sector as defined in 
section 9.1.2 are available, figures referring to the steel industry serve as an approximation 
(Beguin 2005). The metal sector stands out from other sectors with regard to the low 
applicability of extension rules. Only in two countries, i.e. Belgium, Finland and France, the 
practice of extending collective agreements is pervasive. The outstandingly high rates of 
collective bargaining coverage in the steel sector are opposed to general reasoning according 
to that collective bargaining coverage rates are high in countries where the extension of 
collective agreements is a widespread practice. Thus, it is supposed that another important 
determinant that directly affects collective bargaining, i.e. employer density, is to be high in the 
steel sector. Even in these countries where sectoral collective agreements are not declared 
generally binding for the entire sector, virtually all employers (with some few exceptions of 
multinational companies which do not adopt the sector agreement but rather negotiate their 
own company-agreements in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands) fall under the 
purview of the industry’s agreement (Beguin 2005). Thus, it can be assumed that employer 
density is comparably high in the metal sector. However, no empirically founded conclusions 
can be drawn since data on employer densities in the metal sector are lacking. With regard to 
trade union density as a rather indirect factor for collective bargaining coverage, empirical 
evidence suggests that trade union density affects collective bargaining coverage when 
extension rules are lacking or not applied, or alternatively, when functional equivalents are not 
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existing (Traxler 1998a). In the metal sector, both union density (cf. section 9.1.3.4 below) and 
collective bargaining coverage generally are above inter-industry levels. In all countries under 
consideration for which data is available collective bargaining coverage rates exceed those in 
the manufacturing industries or those on the aggregate level (Beguin 2005, Traxler and 
Behrens 2002, EC 2004b). Collective bargaining rates in the steel industry exceed those on 
the aggregate level to a large extent in Germany, i.e. almost 100 % compared to around 67 % 
on the inter-industry level, in the United Kingdom (i.e. 66 % compared to 36 %), Italy (i.e. 
around 100 % compared to 70 %). In Denmark, the difference between coverage in the steel 
sector and manufacturing as such is approximately 25-%-points (i.e. almost 100 % compared 
to around 75 %). In 9 countries out of 15, collective bargaining coverage in the steel industry is 
around 100 % (i.e. Austria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the 
Netherlands), and in two further it is more than 90 % (i.e. Belgium and Sweden). Rates are 
lowest in the British and Irish steel sector, i.e. 66 % and 16.5 %, respectively. For one country, 
i.e. Portugal, no data is available. However, since the estimated collective bargaining 
coverage in the Portuguese manufacturing sector (Traxler and Behrens 2002) is up to 94 %, it 
can be assumed that collective bargaining coverage in the metal sector is equally high and 
thus follows the general pattern of outstandingly high coverage rates in the western European 
steel sector (Beguin 2005) despite a generally limited practice of extending collective 
agreements. 
 
9.1.3.3 Characteristics of the sector-level collective bargaining system 
 
The typology below aims at providing a classificatory scheme for the collective bargaining 
systems in the metal sectors of the countries under consideration. On the basis of the 
‘Collective Bargaining Coordination Index’ (cf. section 5.1.2) which includes three indicators, 
i.e. the pre-dominant level of collective bargaining in the metal sector, the existence of a covert 
inter-sectoral coordination mechanism in the form of pattern bargaining and the existence of 
both a peace obligation for collective agreements in force and the legal enforceability of 
collective agreements. Since the latter two indicators, i.e. coordination via pattern bargaining 
and the legal pre-requisites for an effective vertical coordination of collective bargaining, are 
features of the national systems of industrial relations and therefore vary between countries, it 
is the coordination level that is regarded from a sector-related comparative view.  
 
The metal sector exhibits a relatively low degree of centralisation compared to the other 
sectors under consideration. Three reasons account for the relatively de-centralised pattern of 
collective bargaining coordination in the metal sector. First, within a multi-level system of 
collective bargaining which prevails in the majority of western European countries, sectoral 
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collective bargaining is more important in the metal industry than collective bargaining on the 
central, inter-sectoral level. Organised labour and business are outstandingly strong in the 
metal sector compared to other manufacturing industries and services and are therefore able 
to negotiate sector-related agreements. Thus, central agreements which often function as 
‘supplementary’ level of regulation with the aim of guaranteeing a basic level of wages and 
working conditions are of less relevance for industries in which sector-specific agreements are 
in force. Second, in the metal industry as a highly export-dependent sector productivity 
reaches high levels and exceeds that of the aggregate level (KLEMS 200850). Therefore, 
strong collective wage bargaining agents have an incentive to guarantee their members a 
participation in productivity growth to the largest possible extent. When formulating their 
demands, wage bargainers in the metal industry thus pursue rather individualistic strategies 
and orient their bargaining strategies towards economic indicators rather than on strategic or 
solidaristic considerations with bargaining units from other sectors. The strong focus on 
macroeconomic developments and indicators of sectoral performance of wage bargaining 
agents in the metal sector pre-destines them for a leading role in the inter-industry wage-
setting process (cf. section 1.5.1.3). Third, in a number of countries the metal sector is 
characterised by the presence of large, multinational companies which negotiate their own 
agreements. Thus, the process of sectoral collective bargaining is accompanied and 
supplemented by de-centralised company-negotiations.  
 
The sector-level is the single most important level of setting wages and working conditions in 
the metal industry in almost one third of the countries under consideration, i.e. in Austria, 
Finland, Germany, Greece and Sweden (see table 44, Annex 1). German collective 
agreements for the metal sector are differentiated by regions. In Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Portugal sector agreements are complemented by company-agreements. In 
Spain, for instance, several collective agreements for the metal sector are concluded on the 
provincial level and are supplemented by a large number of company-agreements (EMF 
2005). This contrasts to the situation in Ireland where collective bargaining takes place mainly 
at the company level. Since no data exists on the degree of centralisation of collective 
bargaining in the Irish metal industry, it is assumed that both the inter-sectoral level which is 
the pre-dominant one in the country (EC 2006), and the company-level are of more of less 
equal importance in the metal sector. In the United Kingdom, wages and working conditions 
are set exclusively on the company level. A differentiation has to be made between single-
employer bargaining where the firm’s management negotiates with a representative of a 
recognised trade union on the one hand, and between individual negotiations between the 
                                                 
50
 For a description of the data used in the KLEMS database project, see O'Mahony, M. (2008), EU KLEMS 
Linked Data, Sources and Methods, University of Birmingham, November 2008. 
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management and the individual employee on the other hand. In most of the larger companies 
(e.g. companies belonging to the Corus-group) wages and working conditions are determined 
by single-employer bargaining whereas in smaller companies in which union recognition is 
less widespread pay and conditions tend to be negotiated individually (Beguin 2005).  
 
 
Tab. 15 – Typology collective bargaining system metal sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of collective bargaining 
system Countries (index sum) 
0-1 Low responsive collective 
bargaining systems: lack of 
institutional prerequisites to ensure 
vertical co-ordination  
United Kingdom(0), FR(0), 
BE(0,5), ES(0,5), IT(0,5), 
PT(0,5), DK(1), IR(1), NL(1) 
2-3 High formal responsiveness of 
collective bargaining system: 
supportive legal prerequisites to 
ensure vertical co-ordination                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
FI(2), GR(2), SW(2) 
<= 4 Highly responsive systems 
dominated by pattern bargaining  
AT(4), DE(4) 
Source: see table 44, Annex 1 
 
 
Referring to the typology above (see table 15), it has to be noted that the categorisation of 
collective bargaining systems in the metal sector is different from classificatory schemes of 
national collective bargaining systems with regard to the structural responsiveness (cf. section 
5.1.2.1). Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands are classified as countries with highly 
responsive systems due to the involvement of the state in the process of wage formation, 
either in the form of voluntary state-sponsored bargaining (i.e. in the Netherlands), or, as in the 
case of Finland and Sweden a generally high bargaining governability is ensured by state-
licenced51 bargaining (Traxler 2002). However, since no positive effects are expected by state-
sponsored mechanisms of collective bargaining coordination with regard to the cross-border 
                                                 
51
 The degree of state involvement in wage bargaining in Finland occurs in the form of state imposed wage rates 
for certain industries and crafts whereby the state’s decision is non-binding for lower-level bargaining units. 
Also, state arbitration is an institutional feature of the collective bargaining system in Finland and Sweden 
whereby state agencies authoritatively impose an agreement for important industries (i.e. in the case of Sweden) 
or for central-level agreements (i.e. in Finland) after collective bargaining became deadlocked (Traxler 2002, 
Traxler et al. 2001). 
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coordination of collective bargaining policies, it is the existence of pattern bargaining as the 
sole mechanism that is of relevance for the efficient coordination of wage bargaining on the 
transnational level. Since pattern-bargaining is not practiced in Finland, Sweden as well as in 
Greece, these countries are categorised as featuring systems with a high ‘formal’ 
responsiveness due to the existence of legal pre-requisites for the vertical co-ordination of 
collective bargaining. In the Netherlands wage-setting arrangements in the metal sector are 
categorised as exhibiting a comparably  low degree of structural responsiveness due to the 
dominance of de-central bargaining in the sector. Thus, it can be assumed that when 
collective bargaining takes place to a large extent on the company-level, the cross-border 
coordination of wage bargaining is inhibited. As the decentral mode of wage-formation which 
is – besides in the United Kingdom and in France – also predominant in Belgium, Spain, 
Portugal as well as in Italy, and, to a lesser extent, in Denmark and Ireland, these countries’ 
collective bargaining systems of the metal sector bear a low wage-political responsiveness on 
the transnational level.  
 
 
9.1.3.4 Density of the sector-related trade unions 
 
The collection of data on organisational densities of sector-related unions proved to be a 
difficult endeavour. Data provided by EMF member organisations have been very fragmented 
and largely incomplete. Thus, in order to estimate trade union density the level of the sector is 
preferred over the level of the organisation (cf. section 5.1.3). Since data for the metalworking 
sector as such52 is not available, sector-related union densities in the countries under 
consideration should be approximated by figures referring to the steel sector (Beguin 2005, 
see table 16). In general, the metal sector tends to be a stronghold of trade union 
organisation. Union densities exceed those in the other sectors under consideration. In the 
countries for which data is available union densities in the steel sector exceed those in total 
manufacturing to a large extent (EC 2006). Differences between steel sector density and union 
density in the manufacturing industries as such are considerably large in Spain (i.e. 
approximately 75 % compared to 14 %), in Italy (i.e. 90 % compared to 37 %), Belgium (i.e. 
90-95 % compared to 55 %) and Germany (i.e. above 70 % compared to 29 %). In Finland the 
difference between steel industry density (i.e. above 90 %) and total manufacturing (i.e. 78 %) 
is less pronounced, and in Denmark as well as Sweden figures for both measures are more or 
                                                 
52
 As laid down in section 7.1.3 the metal sector is defined as including NACE classes NACE 27 (production and 
processing of metal), NACE 28 (production of metal products), NACE 29 (machinery), NACE 30, 31, 32, 33 
(production of business machines, IC technology machines, electro-techniques, fine mechanics and optics), as well 
as NACE 34 and 35 (motor vehicle production). 
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less equal (i.e. around 85 % and 90 %, respectively). In the case of the Netherlands, no data 
on union density in the steel sector is available. The estimate included in table 16 refers to the 
density in the country’s largest steel-processing company, i.e. Corus. It is assumed that the 
general density in the steel industry is lower and thus reaches density levels of that in total 
manufacturing (i.e. 32 %).  
 
Tab. 16 – Density of sector-related unions – steel sector 
 
Density rates  (aggregate a) sector density 
< 50 
 
NL (40 % at Corus) 
51-80 
 
United Kingdom (60 %), DE b (> 70 %), ES (70-80 
%), AT (75 %) 
> 81 
 
DK (85 %), IT (90 %), SW (90 %), FI (>90 %), BE 
(90-95 %) 
a
 sectoral definitions: ‘steel sector’ = NACE code 27.20 : Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain; ‘ferrous metal sector’ = NACE 27.10, 27.20 and 27.30: Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
b In Germany the steel sector density for the western federal countries is estimated to rank between 70 and 80 %, 
for eastern Germany the union density in the steel industry is estimated to be around 60 % (Beguin 2005). 
Source: Beguin (2005), Industrial relations in the Steel Industry. 
 
9.1.4 Transnational inter-union networks in the metal sector 
 
The metal sector has been at the forefront of the transnational coordination of collective 
bargaining (see sections 1.4.2 and 3.2.1). The European Metalworkers’ Federation embarked 
on a coordinated and productivity-oriented collective bargaining policy in the early 1990ies 
with the formulation of the ‘statement of principle on collective bargaining policy’ adopted at 
the EMF Collective Bargaining Conference in 1993. Further, the first and decisive step for the 
institutionalisation of the EMF’s collective bargaining policy has been set by the establishment 
of the ‘Collective Bargaining Policy Conference’ that takes place in three-year intervals starting 
from 1993 onwards. Later on, with the EMF Action Programme 1995-1999 adopted at the 
EMF general assembly in 1996, a comprehensive and elaborated framework for the cross-
border coordination of collective bargaining was laid down (see section 3.2.1). The EMF and 
its member organisations agreed on a ‘regular annual compensation for price increases in 
order to protect real wages’, and ‘workers haven a share in productivity gains’ (EMF 1993). 
Only some years later, a next cornerstone in the realisation of bargaining goals was set by 
some of EMF’s member organisations. In a so far unparalleled initiative, the IG Metall set up 
cross-border networks for the exchange of collective bargaining information and trade union 
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officials in 1997 (Schulten 1998, Gollbach and Schulten 2000). Although the IG Metall took a 
leading role in the network-based approach of collective bargaining coordination, the Dutch 
and Belgian trade unions played an active role in this initiative. Hence, the IG Metall district 
North Rhine-Westphalia and the Dutch trade union federations FNV Bondgenoten and CNV 
Bedrijven Bond as well as the Belgian federations CCMB and CMB were among the first 
members to exchange bargaining experts during negotiation rounds in the three countries. 
Within only two years, all IG Metall districts have linked up with their neighbouring sister 
organisations (see table 17).  
 
Tab. 17  – Transnational Collective Bargaining Networks of IG-Metall districts:  
 
IG Metall collective bargaining district Partner trade unions 
Berlin/Brandenburg-Saxony NSZZ Solidarnósc (Poland) 
KOVO (Czech Republic) 
Düsseldorf (North Rhine-Westphalia) FNV Bondgenoten (Netherlands) 




Hamburg (Coastal District)  CO-Industrie (Denmark) 
Svenska Metall (Sweden) 
Munich (Bavaria) GMTN (Austria) 
SKEI (Slovenia) 
KOVO (Slovakia) 
KOVO (Czech Republic) 
VASzASz (Hungary) 
 
Stuttgart (Baden-Württemberg) FIOM-CGIL (Italy) 
SMUV (Switzerland) 
 






Hannover (Lower Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt) AEEU (United Kingdom) 
 
Source: Gollbach/Schulten (2000) 
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Tab. 18 – The most active transnational collective bargaining networks in the European 
metal sector 
Regions/Countries Participating Partner trade unions 
Scandinavia (Sweden, Norway, Finland, 
Denmark, Iceland) 
IF Metal, Sveriges Ingenjörer, UNIONEN 
(Sweden); Fellesforbundet, TEKNA, NITO 
(Norway); Metalityöväen Liitto, TU ry, UIL ry, 
Sähköliitto, Sähköliitto (Finland); CO-industri, 
IDA (Denmark); 
Sweden, Denmark and Coastal District 
(Hamburg) of IG Metall 
IF Metal, Sveriges Ingenjörer, UNIONEN 
(Sweden); CO-industri, IDA (Denmark); 
IG Metal Coastal District; 
Austria, IG Metall district of Bavaria, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary 
GMTN (Austria), Odborovy SVAZ KOVO (Czech 
Republic), OZ KOVO (Slovakia), SKEI 
(Slovenia), VASAV (Hungary); IG Metal district 
of Bavaria; 
Belgium, Netherlands and IG Metall district 
of North-Rhine Westphalia 
 
FNV Bondgenoten (Netherlands) 
CNV Bedrijven Bond (Netherlands) 
CCMB (Belgium) 
CMB (Belgium) 
Source: Interview EMF 2007 
 
 
Although the fast development of interregional bargaining networks prompted considerable 
enthusiasm among some trade union observers, it has to be stated that not all of the initially 
set up co-operations have functioned on a regular and continued basis. Some of the trans-
regional partnerships slowly tapered off or have been continued on an informal and ad-hoc 
basis. Longstanding cross-border structures for the coordination of collective bargaining have 
been existing in other regions outside the sphere of the German IG Metall as well. The 
Scandinavian region (Norway, Sweden, Denmark. Finland and Iceland) has traditionally been 
a core arena of transnational collective bargaining coordination. A broader coordination 
approach with a more extensive ‘European’ dimension is therefore applied through the overlap 
and the linkage of interregional coordination initiatives such as those between Sweden, 
Denmark and the IG Metall’s coastal district of Hamburg and between Scandinavian trade 
unions of the metal sector on the other hand (see table 18). 
 
According to expert interviews, the coordination partnership between Austria, Bavaria, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary can be regarded as another example for an 
active transnational network approach. Trade unions from these countries make up the so 
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called ‘Vienna Memorandum Group’ that agreed on a coordinated approach to collective 
bargaining in 1999 (see section 3.2.1). Within this framework special seminars and 
conferences are organised, and trade union officials and members from the collective 
bargaining working groups meet twice a year in order to discuss their bargaining policy in 
consideration of the EMF coordination rule for wage bargaining.  
 
The Scandinavian network relies on highly advanced structures. With Nordic IN53, a bargaining 
cartel of trade unions from Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Island, a transnational 
forum for the cross-border coordination has been established in the metal sector. Collective 
bargaining coordination in the Scandinavian metal sector dates back to 1970 when Nordiska 
Metall – Nordic Metall has been established as a forum for the exchange of information. With 
the accession of Sweden and Finland to the EU in the 1990ies, Nordiska Metall has become a 
regional body for the coordination of European policies within the EMF. By formulating an 
annual action programme for collective bargaining and establishing a select working party on 
collective bargaining issues which meets approximately four times a year, the Nordic 
cooperation exhibits a high degree of institutionalisation. Besides, representatives of Nordic 
metalworkers’ unions meet frequently on a more informal basis (Andersen 2006). Ex ante 
information exchange and mutual participation in key meetings have begun to take place on a 
regular basis in the last years.  
 
The Scandinavian network has to be considered as one of the most active ones. According to 
trade union officials, initiatives between the IG Metall Coastal district and the unions in 
Denmark even include the involvement of employers associations in cross-border projects 
aiming at strengthen employment in the region (Interview 1 EMCEF 2007). Moreover, the 
usually disputed topic of cross-border support in strike actions has been taken up by Danish 
and German trade unions. Recently, the ties with non-Scandinavian metalworkers’ unions 
become stronger and more elaborated: ‘[O]ver the winter of 2003/04 there were more of less 
parallel sequences of bargaining in Denmark, Sweden Norway and Germany. This triggered a 
number of meetings’ (Andersen 2006, 37). This finding is confirmed by trade union bargaining 
experts (Interview 1 EMCEF 2007).  
 
Still, the bargaining cooperation within the German-Belgian-Dutch network is quite active and 
strongly institutionalised. Trade union representatives from the three countries meet two times 
per year in order to exchange data on collective bargaining. Additionally, they meet on an ad-
hoc basis for annual theme-specific seminars on other important issues such as vocational 
                                                 
53
 Nordic IN results from a merger of Nordic Metal and NIF (The Nordic Industrial Workers’ Federation which 
represents employees in the chemical, paper and textiles industries) in January 2006. 
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training. Occasionally, even the EMF as European Industry Federation takes part in collective 
bargaining negotiations in these three countries. On a wider scope, coordination across the 
different regional networks takes place through the EMF steering group two or three times a 
year to deal with more practical aspects of collective bargaining coordination such as the 
transnational mobility of workers and cross-border relocations. The so called ‘big groups’, i.e. 
collective bargaining workings groups which comprise around 50 to 60 people, usually come 
together once a year. Big groups deal with broader issues such as flexicurity. An important 
function of these meetings within the formal structures of big groups is to enhance the visibility 
of collective bargaining activities among the EMF member organisations.  
 
With regard to the topics discussed in collective bargaining coordination initiatives, training is 
considered as being most important in all European regions. Agreements exists also on the 
importance of flexicurity issues though there is no common consensus on how to deal with it. 
According to expert interviews, in the Northern region the scope of topics goes beyond pure 
collective bargaining issues and comprises social and economic policy. With respect to the 
geographical scope, transnational cooperation activities of the Scandinavian countries extend 
to information exchange with representatives from the Baltic countries.  
 
As inter-union decision-making is concerned, national interest constellations among members 
do not necessarily correspond to the regional structure of the EMF. In general, the member’s 
interests depend on the economic situation in their country. Consequently, the better the 
economic development in the metal sector, the more solidaristic and cross-border oriented are 
the bargaining strategies of the member organisations. Hence, the identification and 
formulation of common interest is much easier. The member’s interests differ also according to 
the levels of collective bargaining. In contrast to collective bargaining on the sector level, the 
agreement of interests is more difficult on company-level since top-down coordination and 
control mechanisms can be applied only to a very limited extent. Moreover, the question of 
securing jobs is of particular relevance on the company-level so that solidaristic bargaining 
goals tend to be abandoned for the sake of a compromise with the local management. The 
most virulent problem that hinders inter-union cooperation and decision-making is the growing 
importance of company-level negotiations that undermine a coordinated cross-border 
approach of collective bargaining. An example is the spreading of concession bargaining in 
Germany that reverberates back on the collective bargaining situation in Belgium where 
negotiators of the employers’ side attempted to take advantage from this situation (Interview 
EMF 2007).  
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The growing competitive pressures arising from the internationalisation of markets in general 
and from the eastern enlargement of the EU in particular are reported not to be a particular 
problem for collective bargaining in the metal sector. The intensity of competition varies 
between sub-sectors and branches. In the automotive industry for instance competitive 
pressures are reported to be relatively limited since different models are produced in western 
and eastern European locations. The eastern-enlargement of the Community though was not 
without influence on the issue of relocations. However, the markets in the new member 
countries are growing and so are wage levels. Though, the lack of working time regulations 
and the weak labour legislation in the central and eastern European countries (CEECs) are 
considered as difficult issues with respect to the coordination of collective bargaining policies. 
Whereas the new member countries seem to be relatively well integrated into transnational 
bargaining coordination approaches in the metal sector, the real danger emanates from the 
lack of integration of countries outside the European Union – and outside of the organisational 
structure of the European Metalworkers’ Federation – such as China, Russia and the Ukraine.   
 
Institutional differences between national systems of industrial relations are a problem inherent 
to the transnational coordination of collective bargaining. Even within the more strongly 
established networks such as the bargaining partnership between Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, structural differences limit the coordination efforts of trade union bargainers. Of 
particular relevance are differences in the dominant level of collective bargaining. In contrast 
to Germany where collective agreements are concluded on the regional sector level, in 
Belgium and the Netherlands multi-sectoral agreements set a framework for bargaining in the 
metal sector. Coordination is particularly inhibited in networks that include countries with 
predominant company and plant level bargaining such as it is the case in the vast majority of 
the new member countries. Moreover, different traditions and normative orientations, e.g. the 
inclination to go on strike, hinder joint cross-border actions and campaigns. Varying bargaining 
priorities among national trade unionists also limit the capacity for unifying the members’ 
interests. However, it is not only the lacking knowledge about collective bargaining systems in 
foreign countries but rather the problem of language that is most virulent and protracted 
among trade union bargainers from different member states. The lack of foreign language 
skills remains a major problem despite attempts of the European Metalworkers Federation and 
some of its member organisations to increase language competencies of trade union 
representatives.  
 
According to expert interviews, the coordination partnership between Austria, Bavaria, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary can be regarded as another example for an 
active transnational network approach. Trade unions from these countries make up the so 
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called ‘Vienna Memorandum Group’ that agreed on a coordinated approach to collective 
bargaining in 1999 (see section 3.2.1). Within this framework special seminars and 
conferences are organised, and trade union officials and members from the collective 
bargaining working groups meet twice a year in order to discuss their bargaining policy in 
consideration of the EMF coordination rule for wage bargaining.  
 
The Scandinavian network relies on highly advanced structures. With Nordic IN54, a bargaining 
cartel of trade unions from Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Island, a transnational 
forum for the cross-border coordination has been established in the metal sector. Collective 
bargaining coordination in the Scandinavian metal sector dates back to 1970 when Nordiska 
Metall – Nordic Metall has been established as a forum for the exchange of information. With 
the accession of Sweden and Finland to the EU in the 1990ies, Nordiska Metall has become a 
regional body for the coordination of European policies within the EMF. By formulating an 
annual action programme for collective bargaining and establishing a select working party on 
collective bargaining issues which meets approximately four times a year, the Nordic 
cooperation exhibits a high degree of institutionalisation. Besides, representatives of Nordic 
metalworkers’ unions meet frequently on a more informal basis (Andersen 2006). Ex ante 
information exchange and mutual participation in key meetings have begun to take place on a 
regular basis in the last years.  
 
The Scandinavian network has to be considered as one of the most active ones. According to 
trade union officials, initiatives between the IG Metall Coastal district and the unions in 
Denmark even include the involvement of employers associations in cross-border projects 
aiming at strengthen employment in the region (Interview 1 EMCEF 2007). Moreover, the 
usually disputed topic of cross-border support in strike actions has been taken up by Danish 
and German trade unions. Recently, the ties with non-Scandinavian metalworkers’ unions 
become stronger and more elaborated: ‘[O]ver the winter of 2003/04 there were more of less 
parallel sequences of bargaining in Denmark, Sweden Norway and Germany. This triggered a 
number of meetings’ (Andersen 2006, 37). This finding is confirmed by trade union bargaining 
experts (Interview 1 EMCEF 2007).  
 
Still, the bargaining cooperation within the German-Belgian-Dutch network is quite active and 
strongly institutionalised. Trade union representatives from the three countries meet two times 
per year in order to exchange data on collective bargaining. Additionally, they meet on an ad-
hoc basis for annual theme-specific seminars on other important issues such as vocational 
                                                 
54
 Nordic IN results from a merger of Nordic Metal and NIF (The Nordic Industrial Workers’ Federation which 
represents employees in the chemical, paper and textiles industries) in January 2006. 
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training. Occasionally, even the EMF as European Industry Federation takes part in collective 
bargaining negotiations in these three countries. On a wider scope, coordination across the 
different regional networks takes place through the EMF steering group two or three times a 
year to deal with more practical aspects of collective bargaining coordination such as the 
transnational mobility of workers and cross-border relocations. The so called ‘big groups’, i.e. 
collective bargaining workings groups which comprise around 50 to 60 people, usually come 
together once a year. Big groups deal with broader issues such as flexicurity. An important 
function of these meetings within the formal structures of big groups is to enhance the visibility 
of collective bargaining activities among the EMF member organisations.  
 
With regard to the topics discussed in collective bargaining coordination initiatives, training is 
considered as being most important in all European regions. Agreements exists also on the 
importance of flexicurity issues though there is no common consensus on how to deal with it. 
According to expert interviews, in the Northern region the scope of topics goes beyond pure 
collective bargaining issues and comprises social and economic policy. With respect to the 
geographical scope, transnational cooperation activities of the Scandinavian countries extend 
to information exchange with representatives from the Baltic countries.  
 
As inter-union decision-making is concerned, national interest constellations among members 
do not necessarily correspond to the regional structure of the EMF. In general, the member’s 
interests depend on the economic situation in their country. Consequently, the better the 
economic development in the metal sector, the more solidaristic and cross-border oriented are 
the bargaining strategies of the member organisations. Hence, the identification and 
formulation of common interest is much easier. The member’s interests differ also according to 
the levels of collective bargaining. In contrast to collective bargaining on the sector level, the 
agreement of interests is more difficult on company-level since top-down coordination and 
control mechanisms can be applied only to a very limited extent. Moreover, the question of 
securing jobs is of particular relevance on the company-level so that solidaristic bargaining 
goals tend to be abandoned for the sake of a compromise with the local management. The 
most virulent problem that hinders inter-union cooperation and decision-making is the growing 
importance of company-level negotiations that undermine a coordinated cross-border 
approach of collective bargaining. An example is the spreading of concession bargaining in 
Germany that reverberates back on the collective bargaining situation in Belgium where 
negotiators of the employers’ side attempted to take advantage from this situation (Interview 
EMF 2007).  
 
 
  168  
The growing competitive pressures arising from the internationalisation of markets in general 
and from the eastern enlargement of the EU in particular are reported not to be a particular 
problem for collective bargaining in the metal sector. The intensity of competition varies 
between sub-sectors and branches. In the automotive industry for instance competitive 
pressures are reported to be relatively limited since different models are produced in western 
and eastern European locations. The eastern-enlargement of the Community though was not 
without influence on the issue of relocations. However, the markets in the new member 
countries are growing and so are wage levels. Though, the lack of working time regulations 
and the weak labour legislation in the central and eastern European countries (CEECs) are 
considered as difficult issues with respect to the coordination of collective bargaining policies. 
Whereas the new member countries seem to be relatively well integrated into transnational 
bargaining coordination approaches in the metal sector, the real danger emanates from the 
lack of integration of countries outside the European Union – and outside of the organisational 
structure of the European Metalworkers’ Federation – such as China, Russia and the Ukraine.   
 
Institutional differences between national systems of industrial relations are a problem inherent 
to the transnational coordination of collective bargaining. Even within the more strongly 
established networks such as the bargaining partnership between Germany, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, structural differences limit the coordination efforts of trade union bargainers. Of 
particular relevance are differences in the dominant level of collective bargaining. In contrast 
to Germany where collective agreements are concluded on the regional sector level, in 
Belgium and the Netherlands multi-sectoral agreements set a framework for bargaining in the 
metal sector. Coordination is particularly inhibited in networks that include countries with 
predominant company and plant level bargaining such as it is the case in the vast majority of 
the new member countries. Moreover, different traditions and normative orientations, e.g. the 
inclination to go on strike, hinder joint cross-border actions and campaigns. Varying bargaining 
priorities among national trade unionists also limit the capacity for unifying the members’ 
interests. However, it is not only the lacking knowledge about collective bargaining systems in 
foreign countries but rather the problem of language that is most virulent and protracted 
among trade union bargainers from different member states. The lack of foreign language 
skills remains a major problem despite attempts of the European Metalworkers Federation and 
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9.1.5 Wage bargaining coordination in the metal sector: The European 
Coordination Rule 
 
The coordination of wage bargaining has been a long-standing goal within the collective 
bargaining policy of the European Metalworkers’ Federation (see section 3.2.1). As a 
response to the completion of the Single Market and the forthcoming European Monetary 
Union the EMF officially declared to pursue a common and transnationally coordinated 
approach to collective bargaining. The promotion of a productivity-orientated wage policy was 
at the centre of the EMF’s ‘statement of principle on collective bargaining policy’ (1993). In 
order to combat national competition over wages resulting from moderate wage strategies of 
national wage bargainers, the EMF aimed at the return to a ‘productivity-orientated’ wage 
policy (Schulten 1998). The following targets for wage and income distribution policy have 
been laid down in the EMF’s statement of principle: Firstly, ‘regular annual compensation for 
price increases in order to protect real wages’, secondly, guaranteeing workers a ‘share in 
productivity gains to ensure the balanced developments of incomes’ and, thirdly, ‘the 
redistribution of unjustifiably high income from capital investment to the workers’ (EMF 1993).  
The EMF and other observers warned of the danger of a deflationary spiral triggered off by a 
cross-country policy of strict wage restraint in the background of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union with its primacy on stability (Schulten 1998, Traxler 2000, Traxler 2003).  
 
A Europe-wide coordination approach that accommodates the heterogeneity of national 
industrial relationship systems and guarantees the implementation of common wage norms 
according to the specific conditions in the sector or industry has to focus strongly on sectoral 
collective bargaining arrangements (Marginson and Traxler 2005). The EMF clearly underlines 
the importance of a coordinated multi-level bargaining approach with a focus on the sector 
level: ‘Bargaining policy must be constituted at the grass roots level and must be properly 
organised at company, regional and national levels, as well as being co-ordinated in a 
politically effective manner across the whole of Europe. Branches and sectors shall retain their 
sovereignty with regard to collective bargaining’ (EMF 1993). With its ‘guidelines and basic 
issues of the collective bargaining policy’ (1996), the EMF set a further step in substantiating 
its bargaining principles. An even more pronounced focus of the coordination of wage 
bargaining marked the adoption of a resolution entitled ‘Collective Bargaining with the Euro’ 
(EMF 1998b) that included clear-cut criteria for wage bargaining. A basic principle is that the 
‘key point of reference and criterion for trade union wage policy in all countries must be to 
offset the rate of inflation and to ensure that workers’ incomes retain a balanced participation 
in productivity gains. The commitment to safeguard purchasing power and to reach a balanced 
participation in productivity gains is the new European coordination rule for coordinated 
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collective bargaining in the metal sector all over Europe’ (EMF 1998b).  
 
The ‘new European Coordination Rule’ evidently left the wage autonomy to national social 
partners. The margin for a ‘balanced participation’ in productivity gains has to be negotiated by 
national bargaining agents. This distributional space has however been utilised by national 
trade union bargainers to a varying extent. In a first assessment of the Coordination Rule – 
three years after its adoption – the EMF (EMF 2001a) systematically compared wage 
agreements in the member countries (see table 11). The result of the national wage 
negotiations is defined as ‘value of the whole agreement’ (VowA)55. The assessment is based 
on a twofold quantitative goal; The minimum target, i.e. the compensation of the inflation rate, 
has been reached in all countries – with the exception of Italy – for the entire period under 
consideration (1999-2001). However, the results with regard to the combined wage goal of 
setting off inflation plus a ‘balanced participation’ in the productivity increase show a less clear 
picture. Whereas in 1999 in more than half of the considered countries agreements with a 
value as equal to or higher than the sum of the rates of inflation and productivity have been 
negotiated, the situation changed in the following year. In 2000 collective wage agreements in 
the vast majority of countries – with the exception of Belgium and France – did not guarantee 
a full compensation of both inflation and productivity. However, the term of the ‘balanced 
participation’ is debatable since it involves a wide interpretational scope with regard to the 
bargaining results. In the case of Ireland (1999) for instance, the VowA lies only slightly below 
the sum of inflation and productivity whereas in other countries the results show a much 













                                                 
55
 The concept of the „value of the whole agreement’ aims at giving a quantitative measure for the negotiated 
result by quantifying qualitative, i.e. non-wage, aspects of the collective agreement (i.e. pension entitlements, 
training), according to a standardized procedure.  
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Tab. 19 – Assessment of the EMF Coordination Rule 1999 – 2001 
 
Country Organisation  
(Data reported by 
industry federations, if 
not stated other source) 
 
Year  Value of the 
whole 
agreement d 
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Country Organisation  
(Data reported by 
industry federations, if 
not stated other source) 
Year  Value of the 
whole 
agreement d 
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 BE, ES: all data from Eurostat     
b
 NL, IR, IT, PO, FR und SE: Inflation and productivity Eurostat-data 
c DE: Inflation and productivity 2000 and 2001 Eurostat-data  
d
 annual growth rates in % 
 
Source: EMF Collective Bargaining Conference, Report on the European Coordination Rule, June 2001. 
 
 
Regarding the years 2004 and 2005, wage agreements seem to guarantee a full 
compensation of inflation and productivity growth to a lesser extent (see table 20). However, 
the comparability of the two tables is limited by the fact that trade unions adapted their own 
figures to the statistical criteria used for Eurostat data. Consequently, the difference between 
the data sources (union figures and Eurostat-data) diminished in the second period of 
observation (EMF 2005). Hence, there is a more rigorous measure underlying the assessment 
of the Coordination Rule in 2004 and 2005. Moreover, the number of countries that is not 
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Tab. 20 – Assessment of the EMF Coordination Rule 2004 – 2005 
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 Union figures 
b
 IT: Eurostat-data for productivity 
c FR, IR, United Kingdom, PO, GR: reported no data reported  
 
Source: EMF 2005 
 
 
The previous bargaining results suggest that the goal of a productivity and inflation-based 
coordination approach has been widely and successfully adopted in the European 
metalworking industry. In the second period of observation (2004-2005) the minimum target of 
off-setting the inflation rate has been achieved in all countries except Denmark where the 
framework collective agreement of 2005 is below the inflation target. In the case of Denmark 
this result does however not suggest a general trend to wage dumping as wages are set in a 
two-tier system whereby final wages are set on the company-level.  
 
From a mid-term perspective, i.e. from 2000 to 2005, the bargaining results exceed the rate of 
inflation over the entire period (EMF 2005). Surprisingly, in Germany the goal of a ‘balanced 
participation’ in the productivity growth has been regularly achieved during the entire period 
between 2000 and 2005 (see table 22). In all years of observation the value of the agreement 
in the metal sector was higher than the sum of inflation and productivity rate. Nevertheless, 
Austrian bargainers report a growing pressure on wages resulting from the wide use of 
opening clauses and contractual agreements that allow the undercutting of wage rates 
stipulated in collective agreements (Traxler et al. 2007). The discrepancy between reported 
wage agreements on the sector level and the effective implementation of wage policy on the 
regional or company level has also been reported by EMF officials. It is though not only the 
situation in Germany where collective bargaining arrangements are endangered to be eroded 
by opening and ‘hardship’ clauses (Bispinck and Schulten 1999, Dribbusch 2004a) but also 
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Tab. 21 – Comparison of the wage bargaining results by countries, 1999 and 2000  
 
Year Minimum target not reached:  
Value of the whole 
agreement (VowA) < (i) 
Off-set of inflation 
+ participation in 
productivity 
growth:  
VowA < (p) + (i) 
Off-set of inflation + full 
participation in 
productivity growth:  
 
VowA > or = (p) + (i) 
Coordination Rule 
1999 a) 
Italy  Denmark, 
(Greece) c), 
















a) Missing: France 
b) Missing: Spain 
c)
 country in parenthesis: VowA = (i) 
Source: see table above 
 
 
Tab. 22 – Comparison of the wage bargaining results by countries, 2004 and 2005  
 
Year Minimum target not reached:  
Value of the whole 
agreement (VowA) < (i) 
Off-set of inflation 
+ participation in 
productivity 
growth:  
VowA < (p) + (i) 
Off-set of inflation + full 
participation in 
productivity growth:  
 
VowA > or = (p) + (i) 
Coordination Rule 
2004 a) 







Denmark Belgium, Finland, 
(Spain) c), Sweden 
Germany, Netherlands 
a) Missing: Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom 
b) Missing: Austria, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, United Kingdom 
c) country in parenthesis: VowA = (i) 
Source: see table above 
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Another study of the collective bargaining results of 2001 and 2001 (Dufresne and Mermet 
2002) indicates that different data sets used for the evaluation yield contradictory results for 
several countries. However, a global assessment of the implementation of the Coordination 
Rule justifies the conclusion that the principles of wage coordination are widely accepted and 
adopted by EMF’s member organisations. At the first evaluation of the coordination rule at the 
Collective Bargaining Conference in 2001, the EMF pointed to manifold problems with 
associated with the European-wide implementation of the Coordination Rule (EMF 2001b). For 
instance, the quantification of non-wage elements, such as improved guaranteed employee 
rights, has been criticised particularly by Scandinavian trade unionist. Differences in the scope 
of bargaining competencies of union bargainers56 and the varying extent of wage drift in 
different member countries inhibit the comparability of collective agreements. Given the 
manifold problems in connection with the implementation of the Coordination Rule, the EMF 
interprets it as a ‘political’ concept rather than a ‘mathematical’ one (EMF 2001b). 
Consequently, from a political perspective the coordinated approach to collective bargaining is 
regarded as political success, since it has established ‘a moral claim, that no negotiation is a 
national issue alone’ (EMF 2002). The importance of the Coordination Rule’s function in giving 
a political signal for both the member organisations and the employers’ side is confirmed in 
expert interviews.  
 
With regard of the scope of implementation of the coordination rule, union experts underline 
the cross-country application of the bargaining principles. Even in some of the new member 
states that sometimes give the impression of not reaching the bargaining targets (EMF 2006), 
the overall assessment of EMF officials is positive (Interview 1 EMF 2007). The moderate 
wage agreements in Slovakia for instance have to be regarded in the light of the relatively 
weak economic position the country held within the Visegrad group. Hence, the country’s 
moderate wage strategy can be considered as a means to catch up with other CEEC and was 
therefore not surprising. However, the relatively low wage level in Slovakia is less a factor for 
attracting investments than the low corporate taxes. Moreover, the high productivity increases 
in the new member countries are generally reflected by correspondingly high wage increases. 
Thus, there is no difference with regard to the implementation of the Coordination Rule 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states since both groups of countries are facing the same 
difficulties and challenges. 
 
 
                                                 
56
 In countries such as Italy, Denmark and Great Britain company-specific negotiation elements are not subject to 
negotiations with trade unionists (EMF 2001b).  
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9.1.6 Information and collective bargaining coordination in the metal 
sector – the Eucob@n Information and Reporting System of the European 
Metalworkers’ Federation 
 
As early as 1993 the EMF’s select working party of the Collective Bargaining (collective 
bargaining) Committee initiated an attempt to collect collective bargaining information of the 
member organisations in a centralised approach. However, initial problems with coordinating 
the information exchange across Europe prompted the decision that a systematic reporting 
system was needed. The German, Belgian and Dutch member organisations actively 
supported the establishment of the information exchange system. With the technological 
progress and the spreading use of information and communication technology, the information 
exchange became more formally institutionalised. In 1997/8 the European Collective 
Bargaining Information and Reporting System, succinctly entitled Eucob@ had developed into 
a well functioning and recognised forum. The first Eucob@ Report has been compiled in 1998. 
From then onwards, the idea of a centralised approach to information exchange was put into 
practice. In this respect, the central function of the Eucob@ System is to monitor the 
implementation of the wage bargaining criteria laid down in the European Coordination Rule 
(see point 7.1.5). Thus, the implementation of the Coordination Rule by the means of the 
Eucob@-System was carried out from 1999 onwards. 
 
The Eucob@ monitoring and reporting system is characterised by a high degree of 
institutionalisation. The basis of the Eucob@ information system is the „network of 
correspondents’ organised within the EMF secretariat of the federation’s collective bargaining 
policy department. The correspondents come from 26 European countries (EMF 2005). The 
functions of the Eucob@-system go beyond the pure exchange of information and the 
documentation of collective bargaining data. Rather the system developed into a platform for 
the support of transnational trade union action and solidarity. In order to increase the 
countries’ participation, the Eucob@ questionnaires are adopted according to the conditions in 
countries with de-central collective bargaining structures, such as the United Kingdom and 
France (EMF 2005).   
 
However, the purely voluntary reporting system is burdened with the problem of slack 
reporting efforts of some member organisations. Despite the fact that the peer-review element 
inherent to the Eucob@ system exerts some control on members to deliver information, the 
‘failure rate’ of countries that have to be completely left out in the report due to not delivering 
any data at all is quite high (see 9.1.5). Although the majority of member organisations reports 
to the EMF on a regular basis, countries such as Ireland, Portugal, France and the United 
Kingdom often fail to deliver collective bargaining data. The EU eastern enlargement 
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increased the number of actors participating in the Eucob@ system. However, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Turkey and south-eastern European countries such as Yugoslavia have not yet 
been included within the scope of the EMF’s reporting system (EMF 2005). Although EMF 
officials do not state particular difficulties with regard to the reporting situation in the new 
member states, Poland is considered as a ‘problematic case’ (Interview EMF 2007) since in 
this country the process of decentralisation has been exceptionally fast and sustained. 
Collective bargaining actors at the sector level are particularly weak since negotiations take 
place almost exclusively on the company level.  
 
With regard to the main function of the Eucob@ Information and Reporting System, that is, the 
monitoring of the implementation of the coordination rule, considerable differences are 
remaining with regard to scope, quality, regularity and completeness of the reported data. 
However, union officials do not state a pronounced gap between eastern and western or 
northern and southern countries (Interview EMF 2007, Interview GMTN 2007). According to 
the expert interviews, the reports delivered by trade unions of the Scandinavian and Germanic 
countries as well of Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are of good quality whereas 
those of trade unions in Italy and Hungary are of more fluctuant quality, and some countries 
such as Greece, Romania and Bulgaria are not considered at all or only to a very limited 
degree (Interview GMTN 2007). A certain ‘turning point’ can be observed with regard to the 
participation of the British member organisations. After years of absence, the industry 
federation Amicus57, which has grown into the largest organisation of its kind in the United 
Kingdom, has delivered data for the first time in 2006. 
 
The advantages of the Eucob@ network such as the comprehensive set of data, the actuality 
of data and the high acceptance among member organisations stand in contrast to several 
problems resulting from the heterogeneity of national collective bargaining systems.  Thus, the 
system’s adoption to the conditions in countries with decentral systems of collective bargaining 
is severely limited. This is the case for the United Kingdom where collective bargaining is 
exclusively carried out on the company-level, as well as for countries in which collective 
bargaining predominantly taking place on the company level, e.g. Czech Republic, the Baltic 
countries, Poland and France (Carley 2002). The same holds true for the temporal validity of 
collective agreements. In a number of countries collective agreements are valid for two years 
                                                 
57
 Amicus – resulting from a merger of AEEU (electricians, electro-technology and construction engineers) and 
MSF (draughtsmen and engineers as well as technical, administrative and managerial staff) in 2002 – became the 
largest trade union of the United Kingdom after the merger with the banking trade union UNIFI and GPMU 
(printing and paper industry, journalism and media) in 2004. In May 2007, Amicus and TGWU formed Unite, an 
inter-union cooperation that consolidates the organisation structures of both trade unions.  
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or longer (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland) (EMF 2005). The comparability of the results of collective 
agreements is therefore limited.  
 
The reported success of the Eucob@ system is underlined by the extension of its scope. Yet 
very soon after its establishment in the metal sector, the system was applied in the textile 
sector. In the light of the planned integration of the reporting system of the chemical sector, 
the system was renamed into ‘Eucob@n’, that is, ‘European Collective Bargaining Network’58. 
However, EMF members already now have complete access to the three respective reports 
pertaining to the textile and the chemical industry. The deepening of the inter-sectoral 
cooperation that dates back to December 2006 is yet on the way and will be intensified in the 
near future.  
 
 
9.1.7 European Social Dialogue in the metal sector 
 
According to the criteria of representativeness for European social partner organisations 
defined by the Commission59, they have to be a) cross-industry, or relate to specific sectors or 
categories and be organised at European level; (b) consist of organisations which are 
themselves an integral and recognised part of member states' social partner structures and 
with capacity to negotiate agreements, and which are representative of all member states, as 
far as possible; and (c) have adequate structures to ensure the effective participation in the 
consultation process. In its approach to promote social dialogue at the Community level60 the 
Commission approved a number of newly applying social partner organisations with cross-
country membership domains in the first years after the legal framework of the new 
institutional setting for social dialogues on the sectoral level had been adopted in 1998 (see 
table 1). However, the metal sector has been represented only by the shipbuilding industry, 
since the main European-level employers’ organisation WEM (Western European Metal 
Trades Employers' Organisation) – that was renamed into CEEMET (Council of European 
Employers of the Metal, Engineering and Technology-based Industries) after the eastern 
enlargement of the Community – openly refused to participate in European Social Dialogues. 
According to the expert interview with a representative of the European Metalworkers’ 
Federation, WEM (and later CEEMET) favour informal talks with the employees’ side over 
                                                 
58
 The name „Eucoban’ combines the metal sector’s „Eucoba’ and the chemical industry’s „Coban’ Systems.  
59
 EC (1993), COM (93) 600 final. 
60
 EC (1998), COM(98) 322 final. 
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formal dialogue structures. CEEMET continuously insisted on refusing the establishment of an 
‘official’ sector dialogue committee (Interview EMF, 2007).  
 
The exceptional case of shipbuilding is attributed to the outstandingly high degree of 
internationalisation in this sub-sector. Not only the construction of ships but also their 
maintenance and repair services have been outsourced or relocated to far-eastern countries, 
in particular to South Korea since the early 1990ies. The intense international competition 
prompted the European-level employers’ association of the shipbuilding sector CESA 
(Community of European Shipyards Associations) to enter into negotiations with the EMF. 
CESA’s main interest was to strengthen its position on the European-level to counter extra-EU 
competitors through a common approach aiming at enhancing their competitiveness. CESA, 
which is a mixed organisation concerned with social and labour market issues as well as with 
industrial lobbying, pinned its hopes on the political support of the European Commission. The 
interest of the shipbuilding employers in establishing social dialogue structures resulted in the 
departure from their peak-organisation’s position. CESA entered into European social dialogue 
with EMF on its own initiative.  
 
The heterogeneity of interest within the metal sector is reflected by the subsequent process of 
building-up dialogue structures. One of Europe’s most export-orientated industries, the 
automotive sector, was admitted to sector dialogues only in 2006, also represented by a sub-
sectoral employers’ association (i.e. CLEPA – European Association of Automotive Suppliers). 
A similar path was followed by the non-ferrous metal sector and the steel industry. The former 
established a sectoral dialogue committee in 2007. For the latter, the application procedure 
has been still ongoing in 2007. CLEPA and EUROMETAUX (European Association of Metals) 
have their roots in the European Coal and Steel Community, when they were founded as 
‘liaison committees’ to channel industry interests to the European authorities and international 
or intergovernmental bodies. In the 1980ies and 1990ies, when the European social dialogue 
gained in importance on the Community-level by the Commission led by Jacques Delors, 
these associations acquired new competencies with regard to social issues and enlarged their 
memberships. The steel sector organisation EUROFER (European Confederation of Iron and 
Steel Industries) was founded in 1976, aiming also at the representation of industry interests 
vis-à-vis European institutions and international organisations.  
 
In the machinery sector – the largest industrial branch represented by CEEMET – social 
dialogue structures are still lacking, mostly due to the dominance of small and medium 
companies in this sector, in particular in Germany. The second largest organisational 
constituency in CEEMET is the electronics and electro-technical industry, which is 
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characterised by the co-existence of large multinational companies and a huge number of 
SME whereby the latter ones are not interested in a close cooperation on the European level. 
The third largest sub-sector in CEEMET’s organisational domain is car manufacturing. This 
sector is divided into car manufacturers on the one hand, and sub-contractors and suppliers 
on the other hand, whereby only for the latter sub-sector the committee for the automotive 
supply industry has been established. The cooperation with the foundry industry associations 
has been traditionally good. The European Foundry Association CAEF (Comité des 
associations européennes de la fonderie) – established in 1953 – was a signatory party to the 
social dialogue Agreement on Respirable Crystalline Silica (RCS) in 2006.  
 
The final acceptance of the European social partner Agreement on Respirable Crystalline 
Silica (RCS) by the European employers’ association CEEMET can be perceived as a change 
towards a more supportive attitude on European social dialogues. Currently, an informal 
committee with the participation of CEEMET representatives exists on European level in the 
form of a ‘high level group’ presided by the IG Metall president. According to the assessment 
of leading trade union representatives, this high level group – consisting of two continuous 
working groups on training and lifelong learning and on competition and employment 
respectively – will be transformed into an official sector committee in the near future.  
 
 
9.1.8 – Trade Union Actors’ perceptions in the metal sector 
 
The most salient perceptions of trade unionists from both the national and the European level 
are summarised according to two broad thematic aspects: 
 
3) Inter-union cross-border coordination initiatives (see section 9.1.4) 
4) European social dialogue on the sector level (see section 9.1.7); 
 
 
9.1.8.1 Trade union actors’ perceptions with regard to union-led cross-border 
coordination initiatives 
 
As cross-border initiatives for the coordination of collective bargaining are concerned, the 
German, Belgian and Dutch trade unions of the metalworking sector have been exceptionally 
active. The establishment of inter-regional bargaining networks results mainly from the 
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initiatives of the member organisations in these three countries (cf. section 9.1.4). However, 
according to an EMF official the German-Belgian-Dutch bargaining network has lost some of 
its initial dynamic in the last years and needs therefore some new impetus – either in a top-
down process from the level of the European Industry Federation EMF or from the members 
themselves. An at least equally active role is ascribed to the Austrian, Slovenian, Slovakian, 
Czech and Hungarian EMF affiliates that deepened their bargaining cooperation. In particular, 
the Czech confederation OS KOVO is strongly committed to the European coordination of 
collective bargaining and has carried out an active role in promoting this topic among other 
trade unions in the CEEC (Interview 1 EMCEF 2007). 
 
The most virulent lines of conflict are rooted not so much in structural differences of the 
industrial relationship systems across member states but rather from varying normative 
notions and practices. ‘Warning strikes’ for instance are conceived as a legitimate means by 
German union bargainers but are strongly opposed by Belgian unionists (Interview EMF 
2007). With respect to the problem of wage competition, the new member states are well 
integrated in the EMF’s collective bargaining coordination approach. Competitive pressures 
are not considered as very strong in key sectors of the metalworking industry. In car 
manufacturing for example the vast majority of investments are long-term and market-seeking. 
In general, investments in this sector do not predominantly aim at cost reductions. Markets 
and therefore wage levels are growing in most of the new member countries. In other 
industries such as the lift production and shipbuilding, relocations due to cost considerations 
have been carried out on a large scale. Whereas the production of elevators has been 
transferred to China and other far-eastern Asian countries, in shipbuilding it is also 
maintenance and repair services that have been outsourced into Asian countries such as 
South-Korea.  
 
As the coordination of wage bargaining is concerned, the developments of collective 
bargaining in Germany are considered as problematic by both national and European union 
representatives (Interview EMF 2007, Interview GTMN 2007). The spreading practice of 
concession bargaining not only in the eastern but also in western regions that formerly 
constituted strongholds of trade union organisation is regarded as a danger for multi-employer 
bargaining in Germany. Trade unionists fear that opening and ‘hardship’ clauses that allow for 
deviations from collective wage norms could undermine established sector-level bargaining 
structures and unleash an inexorable de-centralisation process. The discrepancy between 
‘officially’ negotiated wage rates reported to the EMF Eucob@n system and the ‘real’ wage 
development on the company level constitutes a major obstacle to the cross-country 
implementation of the European coordination rule (see section 9.1.5).  
  183  
The EMF member organisations exert a high degree of autonomy when it comes to defining 
their bargaining agenda. The issue of training is considered as one of the most important 
topics by all member organisations. Best practice and cross-country comparison of training 
and apprentice systems are a considered to be a common practice, in particular among trade 
unions in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. An almost equally important topic is 
flexicurity although there is no agreement on the measures to deal with it. The Northern 
members tend to address broader issues such as social and economic policy that go beyond 
‘classical’ collective bargaining topics. Besides, the cooperation among Scandinavian and 
Baltic member organisations is well developed. Due to the advanced economic integration of 
Scandinavia and Northern German regions, the interregional networks between these two 
areas are overlapping. Co-operational relationships between trade unions from these 
countries are traditionally well established. Structures for the cross-border coordination of 
collective bargaining are developed to a more limited extent in the south-western European 
region of France, Spain and Portugal. These countries do not dispose of an official forum for 
collective bargaining policy on their own although they are meeting several times per year in 
more general organisational bodies of the EMF.  
 
When it comes to define a common model for a ‘European’ system of industrial relations, trade 
unionists in unison state that it has to integrate elements of different systems, such as the 
Scandinavian, the German and the Franco-Belgian model. A European system of collective 
bargaining that constitutes a framework for the negotiation of ‘European’ collective 
agreements is not regarded as a realistic option for the near future for several reasons. The 
fierce opposition of employers’ associations is considered as one of the most important 
obstacles. Another major problem is the legal reinforcement of the implementation of such 
agreements. A cross-country implementation of common agreements would presuppose a 
fully-fledged European labour court. However, the contours of such an arrangement are 
discussed controversially among European trade unionists.  
 
9.1.8.2 Trade union actors’ perceptions with regard to central and de-central 
coordination approaches 
 
Both instruments of Europeanisation, that is, European sector dialogues and transnational 
inter-union initiatives for the coordination of collective bargaining, are considered as 
complementing each other (Interview EMF 2007). However, the two mechanisms constitute 
instruments of their own and are included both in strategic considerations of European trade 
union actors. Consequently, both central and de-central mechanisms are not influencing each 
other directly. A rather indirect influence can be observed insofar, as the European employers’ 
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organisation CEEMET changed its position with regard to the participation in European social 
dialogues due to the intensified cross-border coordination activities among trade unions. A 
decisive factor is the ‘visibility’ of coordination practices, for instance when trade union 
bargainers from sister unions are invited to participate in national negotiations with employers 
and present economic or wage data of their countries as it happened in the German-Belgian-
Dutch network (Interview EMF 2007).  
 
Although the inclination of employers’ organisations to enter into dialogues on the European 
level cannot be causally linked to cross-border inter-union activities aiming at the coordination 
of collective bargaining, the changing attitude of CEEMET coincides with an increased 
transnational cooperation on the employees’ side. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that influencial 
members of CEEMET press for a common approach to social policy issues. The analysis of 
intra-organisational structures of employers’ organisations however is beyond the scope of this 
study. In fact, when it comes to European social dialogues, the EMF’s strategy of ‘step-by-
step’ negotiations with employers’ associations of the sub-sectoral level has proved to be 
successful. With some of the sub-sectoral employers’ associations the EMF has concluded 
common agreements, for instance in the foundry sector (Agreement on Workers Health 
Protection through the good handling and use of crystalline silica, 2006) with CAEF before 
CEEMET decided to join the negotiations and sign the agreement as well (Interview EMF 
2007).  
 
A decisive issue perceived by trade union actors is the implementation of social partner 
agreements. Even with bargaining ‘in the shadow of the law’, that is, on the initiative of the 
European Commission, the Europe-wide implementation has not been without any problems 
due to differences in the industrial relationship systems of the member countries and 
heterogeneous practices of national social partners. As voluntary or ‘autonomous’ agreements 
are concerned, the implementation depends on the commitment and willingness of the 
member organisations. The compliance of some member organisations is considered as a 
problem even on the trade unions’ side, and on the employers’ side it is a fundamental 
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9.2 Chemical Sector 
 
9.2.1 Economic background 
 
The European chemical sector is characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity with regard 
to economic activity (e.g. according to the NACE classification scheme), comprising (sub)-
sectors such as pharmaceuticals, paper and pulp, wood and wood products, glass and other 
non-metallic mineral products and chemical products (i.e. base chemicals such as 
petrochemicals and basic inorganics, i.e. synthetic rubber and plastics) and specialty 
chemicals, i.e. auxiliaries for industry such as paints and inks and crop protection)61. Base 
chemicals such as plastics and rubber and petrochemicals represent the largest part of total 
EU chemical sales, i.e. 43 % in 2006, followed by sales in pharmaceuticals which account for 
28 % and specialty chemicals which amount to 19 % of total sales (CEFIC 2007).  
 
The European chemical sector is strongly export-dependent (see section 7.3) whereby 
between 1996 and 2006 the share of intra-European exports has increased stronger than that 
of extra-EU exports, i.e. from 32 to 50 % and from 19 to 25 % of total EU sales, respectively 
(CEFIC 2007). In the same period, domestic sales decreased from 49 to 25 % of total EU 
sales (ibid). chemical sector exports represent a particularly large part of a country’s total 
exports in Ireland and Belgium where the shares of the chemicals sector’s exports in the 
totality of exports (measured as the summarised value of both manufacturing and services 
sectors export flows) are 32 % and 25 %, respectively (see section 7.3). On a global scale, the 
export-strength of the European chemical sector becomes apparent: In 2006 EU exports 
amounting to 55.3 % of world exports exceed EU imports (i.e. 46 % of word imports), whereas 
in the rest of the world chemical sector imports exceed exports. For instance, Asia (including 
                                                 
61
 The heterogeneity of economic activities related to the chemical sector is mirrored in the (sub-)sectoral diversity 
of the intra-organisational domain of the European employees’ organisation EMCEF (European Mine-, 
Chemical- and Energy Workers’ Federation) which covers branches such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, rubber 
and plastics, pulp and paper, wood, but also energy and mining. This sharply contrasts to the organisational pattern 
on the employers’ side where – beside ECEG (European Chemical Employers Group) – a number of specialised 
organisations are existing. For instance, European employers’ associations which are formally recognised as 
European social partner organisations for the European sector dialogue (see ‘sectoral dialogue committees’ in 
table 1 in section 1.3.1) are existing in the mining and extractive industries (i.e. APEP – European Association of 
Potash Producers, Euracoal – European Association for Coal and Lignite, Euromines - European Association of 
Mining Industries and IMA - European Industrial Minerals Association) and the energy sector (e.g. Eurogas, 
Eurelectric - Union of the Electricity Industry).   
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China and Japan) accounts for 24 % of world imports and for 21 % of world exports, and in the 
NAFTA the relationship between the share of exports in total world exports and the share of 
imports in world imports of chemicals is 14.3 and 16 %, respectively (CEFIC 2007).  
 
With regard to output, Germany is the largest producer in the EU25, whereby the country’s 
share of sales in chemicals in the total EU25 chemical sales amounts to 26 %, followed by 
France (i.e. 13 %), the United Kingdom (i.e. 12 %), Italy (i.e. 11.5 %), the Netherlands (i.e. 7.6 
%), Spain (i.e. 7.2 %), Belgium (i.e. 6.8 %) and Ireland (i.e. 5 %) (CEFIC 2007).  
 
The chemical industry represents a vertically highly integrated sector. Based on an input-
output analysis covering the EU25, a large share of chemical output (around 55 % of total 
output) is further processed or used as pre-products in sectors such as metal, machinery and 
ICT (approximately 9 % of chemical sector output), automotive (i.e. 5.3 %), construction (5.4 
%), textiles (i.e. 6.3) and paper and printing products (i.e. 4.5 %). Around 30 % of chemical 
output is consumed by end users (i.e. private households, governments and non-profit 
organisations), and more than 16 % of chemical sector output represent services sector 
consumption (CEFIC 2007).  
 
In the European chemical sector (mainly defined by NACE class 24, manufacture of chemicals 
and chemical products) small and medium-sized companies (SME) are dominating (cf. IST 
2006). For instance, more than 50 % of companies in the chemical sector employ less than 10 
salaried workers in Estonia (i.e. 50 %), Portugal (i.e. 52 %), Latvia (i.e. 55 %), Lithuania (i.e. 
58 %), Belgium (i.e. 59 %), Greece (76 %) and Poland (77 %), and in Hungary 92 % of 
chemical sector enterprises employ less than 20 employees. In Germany, the largest share 
(i.e. 54 %) of companies in the chemical sectors comprises medium-sized and large 
enterprises with 50 to 499 salaried workers. In Ireland, more than 54 % of the total of chemical 
sector companies are medium-sized and employ between 10 and 100 employees. In Slovenia, 
large companies with more than 100 salaried workers are predominating (i.e. 32 of all 
companies in the chemical sector). However, in terms of employees, the largest part of 
chemical sector workers is employed in large companies (IST 2006). For instance, in a large 
number of EU25 countries for which data is available more than 70 % of chemical sector 
workers are employed in companies with more than 100 salaried workers, i.e. in Sweden (73 
%), Belgium (73.5 %), Finland (76.6 %), Ireland (78 %) and Slovenia (82 %). In France, 66 % 
of employees in the chemical sector are working in companies with more than 199 employees, 
and in Germany 63 % of sectoral employees are working in companies falling into the 
category of enterprises with more than 499 salaried workers.  
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Mid-term employment developments in the European chemical sector give evidence to the 
general trend of ‘de-industrialisation’. However, in the pharmaceutical sector employment 
tended to increase in the EU27 between 2000 and 2005 (Eurostat 2008d). The largest 
increase in employment in is evidenced in Denmark (+ 51 %), followed by Ireland (+ 31 %), 
Belgium (+ 14 %), Germany (+ 10 %), Sweden and the Netherlands (approximately + 8 %), 
Hungary (+ 7 %), Latvia (+ 6 %), Spain and France (approximately + 5 %) and the United 
Kingdom (+ 4 %). In Lithuania and Slovakia, employment shrunk to the largest extent between 
2000 and 2005, i.e. by 38 and 36 %, respectively. Decreases in employment have also been 
reported for Finland (- 32 %) and Romania (- 22 %) and – to a lesser extent – for Austria (- 9.5 
%), Bulgaria and Portugal (- 9 %), and Italy (- 4 %). In line with the general trend of the 
shrinking employment base in the manufacturing sectors, in the chemical industry (excluding 
pharmaceuticals) a steady and considerable decline of employment can be observed in the 
EU27 between 2000 and 2005 (Eurostat 2008d). Employment shrunk strongest in Slovakia (- 
37 %), Romania (- 32 %), Bulgaria (- 31 %), Hungary (- 23 %) and the United Kingdom (- 20 
%). Likewise, employment decreased in western European countries such as Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Germany (approximately – 15 %), Belgium (- 9 %), Ireland (- 8 %) and 
France (- 7 %). In Italy (approximately – 4 %), Portugal and Lithuania (approximately – 5 %) 
losses in chemical sector employment have been less pronounced.  
 
 
9.2.2 The national systems of industrial relations in the chemical sector 
 
The following section aims at categorising the countries considered in this study with respect 
to core features of the industrial relations systems, i.e. the degree of 
concentration/fragmentation of the trade union system, extension of collective agreements and 
collective bargaining coverage, characteristics of the collective bargaining system and trade 
union density in the chemical sector. In order to specify the range of ‘sector-related’ union 
organisations NACE class 24 serves as a reference (IST 2006). Due to the complexity of intra-
sectoral structures of the chemical industry, sector definitions vary slightly among countries62. 
                                                 
62
 Industrial activity in the chemical industry corresponds to NACE class 24 (manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products) in all EU25 (IST 2006). However, in a number of countries the domains of EMCEF affiliates 
extend to NACE 23 (manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel) and NACE 25 
(manufacture of rubber and plastic products). Likewise, collective agreements concluded by EMCEF member 
organisations may cover sub-sectors such as NACE 19 (manufacture of leather and leather products), 26 
(manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products), 31 (manufacture of electrical machinery and appliances) 
and 90 (sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities) as it is the case in Italy.  
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The high degree of intra-sectoral heterogeneity of the chemical industry is also reflected in the 
comprehensive domain of EMCEF, the sector’s representative social partner organisation on 
the employees’ side. In addition to NACE class 24, EMCEF affiliate’s domains fully or partly 
include industrial activities according to NACE codes 25 (manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products), 26.1 (glass and glass products), 26.2 (ceramics), 26.5 (cement), 10 (mines and 
quarrying), 21 (paper, pulp and paper products), 40 (Electricity, gas, steam and hot water 
supply), 11.1 (extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas) and 23.2 (processing of nuclear 
fuel).  
 
9.2.2.1 Representative domain concentration/fragmentation of the union system  
 
Trade union fragmentation is an important factor for collective action (cf. section 1.5.2.4) and 
thus for the coordination of collective bargaining activities. According to hypothesis 6 (cf. 
section 4.1.6) two features of the associational system are of relevance, i.e. the number of 
sector-related union organisations and the degree of domain overlap between them as an 
indicator for inter-union competition and rivalry. The chemical sector is characterised by an 
outstandingly high level of union fragmentation compared to the other sector under 
consideration due to the heterogeneous structure of the sector that comprises industries such 
as pharmaceuticals, paper and energy. Although in all countries – with the exception of 
Greece where a separate workers organisation is existing for pharmacists – sector-related 
unions organise workers in the entire or in most parts of the chemical sector according to 
NACE class 24. This contrasts to organisation patterns on the employers’ side where a large 
number of specialised associations, in particular for the pharmaceutical industry, are existing 
(IST 2006).  
 
With regard to union fragmentation the chemical sector does not differ fundamentally from 
other sectors. Only in a minority of countries, i.e. Austria and Ireland, a (quasi) ‘single-union’ is 
existing (see table 23) Although two union organisations are organising workers in the 
chemical sector, the Austrian GdC (Union of Chemical Workers) organising blue-collar 
workers and the GPA-DJP (Union Salaried Private Sector Employees, Graphical Workers, 
Journalists and Paper Workers) representing white-collar workers, no domain overlaps are 
emerging due to the organisational domain differentiation according to the status of workers. 
In Ireland, in contrast, only one inter-sectoral union organisation is reported to organise 
workers in the chemical sectors. SIPTU - The Services, Industrial and Technical Union 
comprises both blue- and white-collar workers of different sectors including chemical 
processing and production, healthcares and the distribution of chemical and pharmaceutical 
products.  
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Trade union systems in all other countries are classified as ‘multi-union’ systems with varying 
degrees of fragmentation. The number of sector-related unions is highest in Denmark for 
which 11 sector-related unions have been reported (IST 2006). Employee organisation is 
highly diversified between blue and white-collar workers, whereby further specifications in 
organisational patters are along professional and occupational lines (e.g. engineers, 
technicians, managerial staff), qualification levels (i.e. DM – The Danish Association of 
Masters and PHDs), and sectors (e.g. metalworkers, electricians). Trade union systems in 
Italy, Belgium, France, Greece and the United Kingdom are characterised by a comparably 
high degree of fragmentation and inter-union competition. For instance, in Italy conflicts with 
regard to collective bargaining arose in 2004 between the three most representative union 
federations, i.e. FILCEM, on the one side, FEMCA and UILCEM (IST 2006). In the United 
Kingdom, the considerable domain overlap brings about union rivalry with regard to 
organisation and recruitment issues. A certain degree of inter-union competition can also be 
expected in Spain and Portugal where only those organisations are entitled to collective 
bargaining which fulfil the representativeness criteria set up by governmental agencies such 
as the Ministry of Labour. However, for the last years no such rivalries or conflicts have been 
reported (IST 2006). This contrasts to the highly specified organisational patterns of 
Scandinavians employees and workers organisations where inter-union competition is low or 
not existing since domain overlaps are relatively small. Reported conflicts between some 
employee organisations in Sweden have been settled in the meantime and mainly concern 
organisational issues, i.e. the separation of the Swedish Association for Managerial and 
Professional Staff (LEDARNA) from TCO – The Confederation of Professional Employees 
which occurred in 1997 (IST 2006). Likewise, no inter-union conflicts have been reported from 
countries where worker organisation is split along political or confessional lines as it is the 
case in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. Thus, a high degree of union fragmentation 
cannot be interpreted straightforwardly as being associated with a high level of union rivalry. 
According to expert interviews it is however undisputed that collective action and cross-border 
coordination of collective bargaining in particular are inhibited by a large degree of 










  190  
Tab. 23 – Typology trade union system in the chemical sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of trade union system Countries (index sum) 




Category 1: Single union system, 
‘Quasi’-Single union system 
AT (0), IR (0) 




Category 2: Functional diversity 
and moderate union competition 
ES (4), FI (3), DE (3), NL (4), 
PT (3), SW (4) 
5 – 11 points:  





cleavages and high degree of 
union competition 
FR (5), GR (5), United 
Kingdom (5), BE (6), IT (7), DK 
(11) 
Source: see Table 46, Annex 2  
 
 
9.2.2.2 Extension practice and collective bargaining coverage 
 
The following categorisation aims at classifying the collective bargaining systems of the 
chemical sector in the countries whereby the crucial distinction is made between inclusive and 
exclusive systems of industrial relations. According to hypothesis 9 (section 4.1.9), the rate of 
collective bargaining coverage is the decisive indicator for measuring the 
inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the industrial relations system, whereby rates below 50 % are 
assumed as to be the threshold for exclusive, fragmented systems. Due to the inherent 
dynamic of collective bargaining, a decay of multi-employer bargaining is spurred not only by 
external pressure on the collective bargaining systems such as the internationalisation of 
markets which marginalises the coordination function of collective bargaining (cf. section 
1.5.2.3.2) but also by the erosion of multi-employer bargaining due to the extension of single-
employer bargaining and individual bargaining between management representatives and 
employers. One of the most influential determinants of the level of collective bargaining 
coverage is the practice to extend collective agreements to other employees in the sector or 
companies which were not members of the signatory party to the agreement. Although legal 
rules for the extension of collective agreements are existing in most of the EU member 
countries, the de facto practice to apply these rules is less widespread and varies not only 
between countries but also between sectors.  
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Extension practice in the chemical sector tends to be in line with that on the aggregate country 
level (Marginson and Traxler 1995). Extending collective agreements to other employers in the 
chemical sector that are not members of the association(s) that signed the agreement is a 
widespread practice in Belgium, Spain, Finland, France and Portugal. Thus, collective 
bargaining coverage in the sector is comparably high in these countries, ranging from 
approximately 85 % (i.e. Spain and Portugal) to almost 100 % (i.e. Belgium). In the German 
and Dutch chemical industry collective agreements are not or only rarely extended although 
labour law provided for rules to make agreements binding for employers which are not 
member to the signatory party. The high collective bargaining coverage in the chemical 
industry of these two countries, i.e. around 85 % in the Netherlands and more than 90 % in 
Germany, is supposed to result from the organisational strength of employers. Employer 
densities of the most relevant sector related associations are estimated to be around 80 % 
(the German BAVC) and 95 %, i.e. VNCI of the Netherlands (IST 2006). In Austria and Italy 
functional equivalents of extension rules which guarantee the collective bargaining coverage 
are existing. In Austria, the membership in the Chamber of Economy, the country’s sole inter-
sectoral employers’ association, is obligatory. In Italy the entitlement to collectively negotiated 
minimum pay is based on the constitutionally guaranteed principle of ‘fair pay’ (Schulten 2006, 
Funk and Lesch 2005; Traxler and Behrens 2002). However, there is no information available 
on the adoption of this functional equivalent by labour courts with regard to collective 
agreements in the chemical sector. Similarly, no data on the sectoral collective bargaining 
coverage is available in the case of Italy. In Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom no 
extension rules are provided for by labour law. However, collective bargaining coverage is 
estimated to be around 75 to 80 % (cf. table 47, Annex 2) in the Danish chemical sector due to 
the organisational strength of both the employers’ associations63. Since collective bargaining 
in Denmark takes place on different levels whereby an inter-industry agreement concluded by 
DI (The Confederation of Danish Industries) and CO-industri, the country’s largest cross-
sectoral trade union is complemented by several company-agreements which further specify 
wages and working conditions, estimates of the total sectoral collective bargaining coverage 
should be interpreted with caution. Based on figures for 2007 it is estimated that the DI-CO 
industri agreement covers around 70 % of workers in manufacturing industries. For the 
chemical sector that includes branches with comparably high collective bargaining coverage 
rates such as energy (Traxler 2008, IST 2001), it can be assumed that collective bargaining 
coverage in the chemical sector more or less corresponds with that in manufacturing in 
general, i.e. 76 % (Traxler and Behrens 2002). It has however to be noted that large single 
employers in the chemical sector (e.g. Novo Nordisk) are not members in DI and therefore 
                                                 
63
 The Danish DI – Confederation of Danish Industries as the most important employers’ association for which 
data is available organises more than 60 % of companies in the chemical sector (IST 2006). 
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negotiating single-employer agreements. In Ireland where no extension rules are provided for 
by labour law collective bargaining coverage in the chemical sector is estimated to be lower, 
i.e. approximately 22 %, than in manufacturing as such, i.e. approximately 36 % (Traxler and 
Behrens 2002).  
 
In the United Kingdom in contrast, collective bargaining coverage in the chemical sector that 
includes branches such as electricity, gas and water supply where collective bargaining 
coverage is comparably high (Grainger and Growther 2007), is estimated to exceed that in 
manufacturing in general, i.e. 30,7 % (Traxler and Behrens 2002). It is thus not very surprising 
that in Ireland and the United Kingdom collective bargaining coverage is lowest among the 
countries under consideration since in both countries employer associations which are entitled 
to carry out collective bargaining are not existing in the chemical sector. For instance, the Irish 
IBEC (The Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation) affiliate ‘Pharmaceutical Ireland’ 
does not conclude collective agreements. A rather indirect coordination function of collective 
bargaining can however be observed since Pharmaceutical Ireland’s members often take the 
national, inter-sectoral collective agreement in consideration in their rounds of single-employer 
bargaining (IST 2006). In the United Kingdom the most important sectoral employer 
organisation CIA - Chemical Industries Associations covers around 60 % of employees in the 
chemical sector. Collective bargaining takes place in a single-employer bargaining system 
since CIA does not participate in collective negotiations. Social partners in the chemical sector 
are participating in two tripartite forms, i.e. The Chemicals Innovation and Growth Team 
(CIGT), founded in 2002, and Cogent, the chemical industries skills council (IST 2006). Social 
partners in the British chemical sector are less concerned with collective bargaining but rather 
with supply-side issues such as skill formation, the increase of the sector’s competitiveness 
and topics related with the REACH legislation, e.g. environment protection issues. The 
‘Charter for Industry-wide relationshipship between Chemical Employers and the Trade 
Unions’ signed by CIA, Amicus, GMB, T&G (Transport & General Workers’ Union) and 
USDAW (Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers) in 2004 as a bipartite consultative 
forum mainly addresses this the issues mentioned above (IST 2006).  
 
 
9.2.2.3 Characteristics of the sector-level collective bargaining system 
 
The categorisation of the sectoral systems of collective bargaining is based on three principal 
elements: First, the level at which collective bargaining is carried out, second, the existence of 
covert mechanisms for the horizontal coordination of collective bargaining and, third, the co-
existence of a peace obligation and the legal enforceability of collective agreements (cf. 
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section 5.1.2). The classificatory framework aims at a categorisation of countries according to 
the structural responsiveness of the sectoral collective bargaining systems. The capability of a 
collective bargaining system to ensure coordination of wage bargaining between and within 
sectors as a precondition in line with super-ordinate macroeconomic political goals is mainly 
determined by the pre-dominant coordination mechanism (cf. section 5.1.2). Two sets of 
factors for the categorisation of the countries’ collective bargaining system (see table 24) are 
considered in this typology: First, the prevalent mode for the horizontal coordination – as well 
as the institutional pre-requisites for the vertical co-ordination of collective bargaining 
outcomes – is a characteristic that varies between countries, and second, the level as the only 
source of sectoral variation. Thus, the interpretation of results from a perspective which aims 
at analysing sectoral differences is focused on the degree of centralisation of collective 
bargaining.  
 
Collective bargaining in the chemical sector is relatively de-centralised compared to other 
manufacturing sectors such as food production (cf. 9.3.2.2) or the construction sector (cf. 
section 9.4.2.2). The importance of single-employer bargaining stems from the pre-dominance 
of large MNC in the chemical and pharmaceutical sector in most of the countries. In general, 
large and international companies tend to refrain from membership in employers’ associations 
and, if they are members, their inclination disembark from collective action in the form of multi-
employer bargaining is higher than those of SME. Smaller companies which are operating 
mainly in national markets benefit from the functions of multi-employer bargaining (cf. section 
1.5.2.3.2).  
 
In countries where collective bargaining on the industry-level is prevailing, such as Denmark, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, the wage-setting pattern in the chemical sector is 
more de-centralised. Thus, collective bargaining in the chemical industries of these countries 
is carried out to a more or less equal extent both on the sector and on the company level. Only 
in France wage bargaining tends to be in line with the general, inter-sectoral pattern of 
collective bargaining coordination whereby both levels are equally important (EC 2006). A 
similar pattern can be observed in Ireland where collective bargaining in the chemical sector 
occurs mainly on the company level although national, inter-sectoral Social Partner 
Agreements include workers in the chemical sector. However, their de facto relevance for the 
sector’s employees is limited since most issues are determined in company-level agreements.   
 
Wage-setting in the chemical industry takes place mostly on the industry level in Austria, 
Belgium, Germany and Sweden and thus is in line with the pre-dominant pattern that is 
identified on the national level (e.g. EC 2006). In Greece, wage bargaining is reported to be 
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carried out in a more centralised fashion, with the inter-sectoral and the sector levels 
dominating (IST 2006). However the difference between country-classifications and a more 
sector-related analysis seems to be a gradual one: Although the industry-level is the dominant, 
the company level is considered as an import additional level of collective bargaining (EC 
2006).  
 
With regard to the capacity for the vertical coordination of collective bargaining provisions that 
guarantee the compliance of lower-rank bargaining agents are provided for in Finland, Greece, 
the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. The same holds true for Austria and Germany, where 
both the legal enforceability and a peace clause is guaranteed for collective agreements 
negotiated by recognised employer and worker organisations. However, due to the existence 
of pattern-bargaining, whereby the wage agreements of the metal sector serve as a basis for 
orientation for bargaining agents in other sectors, Germany and Austria exhibit the highest 
values with regard to the responsiveness of the system of collective bargaining. For the 
chemical sector the pattern-setting function of the metal industry is of particular relevance 
since both sectors share communalities in terms of their export dependence. Thus, the wage 
agreement in the metal sector sets an upper limit to that in the chemical industry towards 
which trade union bargainers strongly orient their demand vis-à-vis the employers’ side. The 
same holds true for collective bargaining coordination on the transnational level. Within the 
multi-sectoral framework of the Eucb@n network aiming at the cross-border coordination of 
collective bargaining policies in the metal, chemical and textile sector, the respective industry 
federations, i.e. the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) and the European Mines, 
Chemicals and Energy Workers’ Federation (EMCEF) have established close ties with regard 
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Tab. 24 – Typology collective bargaining system chemical sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of collective bargaining 
system Countries (index sum) 
0-1 Low responsive collective 
bargaining systems: lack of 
institutional prerequisites to ensure 
vertical co-ordination  
United Kingdom(0), IR (0), 
FR(0,5), IT(0,5), ES(0,5), 
PT(0,5) 
2-3 High formal responsiveness of 
collective bargaining system: 
supportive legal prerequisites to 
ensure vertical co-ordination                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
BE(1), DK(1), SW(2), FI(3), 
GR(3), NL(3) 
<= 4 Highly responsive systems 
dominated by pattern bargaining  
AT(4), DE(4) 
Source: Table 48, Annex 2 
 
 
9.2.2.4 Density of the sector-related trade unions 
 
Trade union densities in the chemical sectors of the EU15 tend to be in line with the aggregate 
density rate of the manufacturing industries (EC 2006). Only in Germany and Greece the 
unionisation in the chemical sector is remarkably higher than in manufacturing in general. The 
German IG BCE’s density in the chemical sector is around 40 % and clearly exceeds the 
unionisation rate of 30 % in the manufacturing industries. The high union density in the Greek 
chemical sector is based on reported density figures of the largest and most representative 
sector-related employees’ organisations, i.e. OEFSEE – Federation of Employed 
Pharmaceutical and United Occupations of Greece and OECVE – Employee Federation of the 
Chemicals’ Industry of Greece, which are above 60 % (IST 2006).  
 
With regard to the concept of ‘sector density’ is has to be noted that it may imply some room 
for interpretation by trade union respondents. Inconsistencies may arise from the fact that 
some countries deliver density rates that are based on the relationship between the number of 
actual members to the number of potential members in the sector according to their 
membership domain. This is of relevance for those trade unions that organise along 
professional, occupational and educational lines such as those in the Nordic countries, or for 
organisations that are present solely in one company. Contrastingly, for general unions that 
organise both blue and white-collar workers, the reference criterion is the total number of 
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employees in the sector.  
 
As table 25 shows, the level of trade union density rates in the chemical sectors of the 
countries considered is characterised by an even dispersion. Trade union densities between 
25 and 50 % are most frequent. In 6 out of 14 countries densities are above 50 %, whereof the 
highest densities are reported from sector-related unions of the Scandinavian countries 
considered in this study, i.e. Finland, Sweden and Denmark.  
 
Tab. 25 – Density of sector-related unions – chemical sector 
 
Density rates  (aggregate a) sector density 
< 25 
 
FR (< 10 %), ES (15-20 %), PT (20 %)  
< 50 
 
IT (25-30 %), United Kingdom (25-30 %), NL 
(30-40 %), DE (40 %), IR (40-50 %) 
51-69 
 
BE (50-55 %), AT (50-60 %), GR (60 %),   
> 70 
 
FI (80-90 %), SW (85 %), DK (90 %)  
Source: Table 49, Annex 2 
a in case of multi-union systems a weighted average based on the union’s share of members in the total 
of members of sector-related trade unions;  
 
 
9.2.3 The chemical sectors’ bottom-up approach: Union-led networks for 
information exchange on collective bargaining issues  
 
The issue of the transnationalisation of collective bargaining has been discussed among trade 
unionists in the chemical sector since the early 1990ies. However, it was not before the late 
1990ies that it was decided to set a basis for a more continuous form of cross-border 
collective bargaining coordination. Against the background of the forthcoming EMU, the 
collective bargaining committee of EMCEF (European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers’ 
Federation) formed the so called ‘Euro Working Group’ aiming at the collection of collective 
bargaining data whereby the focus was on Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and Italy (Le 
Queux and Fajertag 2001). The structure of the Euro Working Group mirrors inter-country 
interest positions in so far as the five participating countries have been particularly engaged in 
launching a Europe-wide approach to the coordination of collective bargaining. Still, these 
countries are among the most active ones as far as the cross-border collective bargaining 
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coordination is concerned.  
 
In contrast to the metal industry, a formal network structure embedded in the organisational 
structure of the industry federation has never been established in the chemical sector. The co-
operational structures are much more informal, such as the existing networks between 
Scandinavian countries and Germany and the Benelux region (Interview 2 EMCEF 2007). In 
pursuing a bottom-up approach to coordination, trade unionists from these countries meet on 
a regular – but however less frequent – basis than in the metal sector – and organise joint 
seminars and bi- or multilateral meetings. Interestingly, contacts among German and Danish 
trade unionists are on a more formal basis, resting on contacts with the union’s headquarter 
and the collective bargaining committee. Despite the different bargaining structure – that is 
even more pronounced than in the metal sector – the exchange of information on the 
bargaining situation in the neighbour country is vital (Interview 1 EMCEF 2007). In general, 
differences in national industrial relations systems are one of the major hindering forces for the 
transnational coordination of collective bargaining. Among the Nordic countries, the structural 
differences in industrial relations across countries and sectors are relatively small. Whereas in 
the Nordic countries, collective bargaining structure is comparably homogenous with one 
agreement for the entire sector, collective bargaining in the German chemical is much more 
differentiated along sub-sectoral lines, e.g. paper, glass. In other countries such as the 
neighbouring Netherlands, agreements are negotiated at company-level as the sector is 
dominated by large multinationals. The high concentration and internationalisation of the 
chemical sector – in particular the paper and pulp industry – inhibits trade union’s efforts in 
coordinating collective bargaining across borders. In contrast to MNC where standardised 
wage and HRM-policies are easily coordinated internally across different locations, the 
decision-making process of nationally embedded network actors such as trade unions 
presupposes the identification and unification of – often varying – interests (see 1.5.2.4.1).  
 
Another indicator of the advanced state of development of cross-border coordination 
structures in the Scandinavian countries is the high degree of cross-sectoral integration. The 
transnational bargaining cartel of the metal sector, Nordic IN (see 9.1.4) that includes trade 
unions from Sweden, Denmark, Norway Finland and Iceland, has been extended to the 
chemical sector in 2007. Yet, chemical sector trade union representatives from Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and Finland met in a joint annual bargaining conference even before the 
federations from the chemical and the metal industry merged within the framework of Nordic 
IN (Interview 1 EMCEF 2007). The exchange of collective bargaining information is described 
as ‘increasingly important and increasingly concrete’ (Interview 1 EMCEF 2007) and has been 
extended to areas such as the IG BCE Coastal district.  
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The most important topics discussed in collective bargaining networks are the basic 
development of labour costs – especially in the Nordic area and Germany – as well as training 
and health and safety. Although there exists common agreement on the importance of these 
topics, the method of how to coordinate wage across borders is highly disputed among trade 
unionists of different countries. The high disagreement is mostly due to structural differences 
within the chemical sector that includes branches such as the paper industry, the 
pharmaceutical industry and mining. Since the overall productivity – that is relevant for the 
wage developments in the metal sector – is not considered as a useful indicator for the 
chemical industry by trade unionists from the Nordic countries, a common benchmark for the 
comparison of wage increases across countries is lacking. The ‘German model’ of wage 
determination that rests upon a ‘wage formula’ based on the rates of inflation and overall 
productivity and leaving some ‘negotiation space’ for wage bargainers, which has been 
established as a common bargaining principle in the metal industry (see section 9.1.5), is not 
applied in the chemical sector. Even within the IG BCE no consensus exists among trade 
unionists with regard to the question of the applicability of a wage formula such as the 
European Coordination Rule of the metal sector (Interview 1 EMCEF 2007). In general, a 
wage formula is considered as too ‘rigid” to correspond to the sectoral heterogeneity.  
 
9.2.4 A coordinated cross-border approach to collective bargaining: The 
Ecob@n information and reporting system of the European Mine, 
Chemical and Energy Workers’ Federation (EMCEF) 
 
It is clear that despite the practical imponderability that comes along with the adoption of 
common bargaining criteria in the chemical sector, the exchange of information on wage 
developments and collective bargaining topics is perceived as increasingly important by trade 
unionists (Interview 1 EMCEF 2007, Interview 2 EMCEF 2007). On the part of the European 
Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers’ Federation (EMCEF), the idea of integrating the 
collective bargaining information and reporting system from the metal sector with the one 
established in the chemical sector, has found growing support. The chemical sector’s Cob@n 
System, that dates back to the year 2000 and aims at the regular exchange of collective 
bargaining information among member organisations, has been integrated into the Eucob@ 
System established by the European Metalworkers’ Federation. The extended system, entitled 
‘Eucob@n”, includes three sectors, i.e. the metal, chemicals and textile sector and provides 
access to bargaining information for member organisations from all sectors. Additionally, 
annual reports are compiled separately for each of the sectors. The information system is a 
tool to improve the co-ordination of collective bargaining and strengthen collective bargaining 
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among member organisations across Europe by a structured and permanent information 
exchange and consultation process. 
 
However, the chemical sector’s information and reporting system has never attained the same 
degree of institutionalisation and formality of its counterpart in the metal industry. It was not 
before 2003 that bargaining information has been collected on a regular basis and annual 
reports have been compiled. However, the effectiveness of the reporting system is 
questionable since the quality of data varies among member countries. Besides, the number 
of member organisations that report on a regular basis to EMCEF is rather small. 
Nevertheless, EMCEF invested some resources to improve the quality of the reported 
information and to extend their net of national correspondents.  
With regard to the exchange of collective bargaining information, the Cob@n system is 
considered as a valuable tool. Its potential lies not so much in the exchange of ex-post 
bargaining information such as the sectoral and geographical scope of collective agreements 
and the negotiated wage increases, but more on ‘spotting the collective bargaining trends and 
tendencies’ and helping to identify important bargaining issues and models of best practice 
(Interview 1 EMCEF 2007). 
 
9.2.5 European Social Dialogue in the Chemical Sector 
 
So far, four European sector committees pertaining to the organisational domain of the 
European Mining, Chemical and Energy Workers’ Federation (EMCEF) have been 
established. The mining sector has the longest tradition of social dialogues. Under the 
auspices of the ECSC Treaty, a joint committee on coal was established in 1952. With the 
expiration of the ECSC in 2002 it has been replaced by a sector social dialogue committee for 
mining64. On the workers’ side, the European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers’ Federation 
(EMCEF) is recognised as a European social partner organisation. The employers are 
represented through four organisations that are recognised as European social partners, i.e. 
the European Association for Coal and Lignite (EUROCOAL), the European Association of 
extractive industry Industries, Metal Ores and Industrial Minerals (EUROMINES), the 
European Association of Potash Producers (APEP), and the European Industrial Minerals 
Association (IMA-Europe). The mining sector’s downturn has been accompanied by 
government subsidies for production. The decline in production has been particularly 
pronounced in France, Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany. However, state subsidies 
have been considerably cut down during the last years. The sector is the target of a wide 
                                                 
64
 The committee’s name was changed into ‚extractive industries’ by the social partners in 2005. 
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range of Community policies such as the anti-dumping regulation65. The majority of joint texts 
agreed on in social dialogues refer to health and safety issues, the impact of enlargement and 
the implications of sustainable development (Pochet et al. 2006). The second sector pertaining 
to the domain of EMCEF that officially established a dialogue committee was electricity. After 
establishing an informal working group in 1995, an ‘official’ sector committee has been set up 
in 2000. The social partner organisations recognised by the Commission are EMCEF and the 
European Federation of Public Sector Unions (EPSU) on the employees’ side and 
EURELECTRIC on the employers’ side. The major issues in European social dialogue are 
linked to the restructuring of the electricity sector as a consequence of the EU liberalisation of 
network industries since the second half of the 1990ies. The step-wise opening of the market 
occurred on the basis of the adoption of a directive in 199666 the provisions of which came into 
force in 1999 and that was followed by further directives stipulating the full market 
liberalisation by 2007 (EC 2005). Other topics of the social dialogue are lifelong learning, 
work-related stress and equal opportunities. In December 2004, EMCEF succeeded in finally 
establishing a sector committee for the chemical industry against employer reluctance and 
their organisational weakness with regard the representation of social and labour market 
interests. Since the industry has long been represented only through the European Chemical 
Industry Council (CEFIC) that preferred informal dialogue structures and lacked any mandate 
to conclude social agreements on behalf of its members, the European Chemical Employers’ 
Group (ECEG) was founded as an off-spring of this organisation in 2003. In contrast to CEFIC 
that also represents MNC headquartered outside of Europe and that most fervently opposed 
European social dialogues, ECEG obtained a social mandate. Since the chemical sector is a 
high-tech and R&D-intensive industry, qualification and lifelong learning rank high on the 
social partners’ agenda. However, the strongest impulse for European social dialogue 
originates from the regulatory offensive of the Commission, the so called REACH system 
(Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemical substances) adopted in 2006. The 
implementation of the REACH legislation aims at enhancing the international competitiveness 
and innovation capacity of the sector as well as improving worker protection and health and 
safety standards. European social dialogue has been currently spurred by the Commission’s 
proposal (COM  2008a) on the amendment of the directive on greenhouse gas emissions 
(Directive 2003/87/EC) and resulted in the adoption of a joint statement by the chemical 
sector’s social partners.  
 
The most recent sectoral committee was established in the gas sector (2007) with EMCEF 
                                                 
65
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 284/96.  
66
 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity 
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and EPSU representing the sector’s interests of the employees’ side and Eurogas as the 
social partner organisation of the employers. Correspondingly to the electricity sector, the gas 
industry was subject to EU liberalisation since the second half of the 1990s. The full opening 
of the energy market is set by 1 July 2004 for business customers and 1 July 2007 for 
households (EC 2005). Although there have not yet any texts been produced in the gas sector 
social dialogue so far, it is supposed that addressing the social consequences of the market 
liberalisation is an important topic on the social partner’s agenda. This process has a profound 
impact on employment. Statistics on in the gas sector point towards a decline of 12-13% of 
jobs between 2001 and 2005 as the result of the ongoing restructuring, privatisation (EU12) 
and liberalisation of the gas market (EC 2007).  
 
 
Despite pronounced differences between these sectors, the chemical industry, the electricity 
and gas sector are subject to far-reaching Community regulation on the step-wise 
liberalisation of markets. Employers associations and trade unions share common interest with 
regard to the REACH legislation, such as managing restructuring and enhancing the sector’s 
international competitiveness, improving qualification and R&D as well as health and safety 
standards. Moreover, the development of a new energy policy is considered as a common 
topic of both sides of the industry. The adoption of the agreement on Respirable Crystalline 
Silica that was signed by social partner organisations of the extractive (i.e. EUROMINES — 
European Association of Mining Industries), chemical67 and metal industries (i.e. CEEMET — 
Council of European Employers of the Metal, Engineering and Technology-Based Industries, 
CAEF — The European Foundry Association and, on the employees’ side, the European 
Metalworkers’ Federation EMF) in 2006 is mentioned as an innovative step towards the 
conclusion of cross-sectoral social dialogue agreements. However, chemical sector 
representatives criticised that the building industry was not a signatory party to the Silica 
agreement despite the significance of the agreement’s provisions for this sector. They point 
out that social partners in the construction sector prefer legislation over European social 
dialogue agreements (see section 9.4.3). The consultative role of the social partners is 
                                                 
67
 A number of sector-specific employers’ organisations (whereby some of them are no pure employer 
organisations but ‘mixed’ associations representing both employers’ labour market and product market interests) 
representing companies in different branches such as the glass industry (i.e. APFE — European Glass Fibre 
Producers Association, ESGA — European Special Glass Association, FEVE — European Container Glass 
Federation, GEPVP — European Association of Flat Glass Manufacturers, IMA-Europe — The Industrial 
Minerals Association, UEPG — European Aggregates Association), the cement (i.e. CEMBUREAU — The 
European Cement Association, BIBM — International Bureau for Precast Concrete) and ceramics sectors 
(CERAME-UNIE — The European Ceramics Industries).      
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reported to be particularly important in the extractive industry where the Commission regularly 
carries out social partner consultations. In general, trade union respondents point out that 
European social dialogues are an instrument to adress non-conflictual topics and that the 
implementation of joint texts can not be guaranteed. Thus, interviewees underscore that for 
the future of European sector-level social dialogues the production of binding outcomes such 
the Silica agreement is vital.  
 
 
9.2.6 Trade union actors’ perceptions in the chemical sector 
 
In the following two sections, the perceptions of the trade union actors with regard to internal 
interest constellations among EMCEF’s member organisations and the assessment of 
collective bargaining coordination strategies and tools are summarised. The relatively high 
degree of integration of cross-border collective bargaining policies in the metal and the 
chemical sector is reflected by the fact that the respondents often referred to the metal 
sector’s coordination approach when stating their assessments. Nevertheless, actors from 
both the chemical and the metal industry ascertained the autonomy of their approaches and 
pointed to the structural and institutional differences in both sectors.  
 
9.2.6.1 Trade union actors’ perceptions with regard to union-led cross-border 
coordination initiatives  
 
The idea of the transnationalisation of collective bargaining policies is supported in particular 
by the Scandinavian and German trade unionists as well by trade unions in the Benelux 
countries. In the last years, countries from central and eastern Europe have taken an active 
role in promoting the Europeanisation of collective bargaining. Despite the far-reaching 
agreement on the importance of cross-border coordination, there are two opposing groups 
concerning the method and means of coordination. Whereas the southern European countries 
hope for a strengthening of the general collective bargaining position vis-à-vis the employers’ 
associations through a joint approach together with the northern countries, the latter ones fear 
a weakening of their own bargaining power when embarking on a common strategies with the 
Southerners. Surprisingly, it have been the Italian unions that developed into active supporters 
of a European approach to collective bargaining within EMCEF. The strong identification and 
sense of solidarity among workers in the Italian chemical industry with their colleagues from 
other countries are regarded as factors that improve cross-border initiatives (Interview 1 
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EMCEF 2007). Nordic trade unionists in turn are particularly reluctant to adopt elements of 
other industrial relations models, be it the German or the Franco-Belgian one. In addition, a 
line of conflict can be found between countries with highly centralised collective bargaining 
and interest representation structures and those where negotiations predominantly take place 
on company level and the representation of employee interests is fragmented. However, the 
national diversity of industrial relations structures and traditions as the fundamental problem 
inherent to transnational coordination approaches can be tackled only through efforts to 
increase the mutual understanding of the functioning and the similarities of national industrial 
relations systems. Thereby, the key position of certain member organisations in acting as 
mediators between different groups of actors (such as the Czech OS KOVO in the metal 
sector) is of utmost importance.  
 
With regard to the learning process in collective bargaining coordination, the initial opposition 
of trade unionists in the chemical sectors towards the EMF’s approach to the 
transnationalisation of collective bargaining policy has lost much of its intensity. However, on 
the national level there exists a considerable degree of competition between collective 
bargaining strategies of trade union organisations in the metal industry and in the chemical 
sector. The perceived need of trade union bargainers to strengthen their autonomous position 
in collective bargaining can be altered sometimes only through top-down decisions within a 
hierarchical organisation structure. The decision of the both EMF and EMCEF to embark on a 
closer cooperation in cross-border collective bargaining coordination projects such as the 
Eucob@n System has contributed to a changed stance among national member 
organisations.  
 
9.2.6.2  Trade union actors’ perceptions with regard to central and de-central 
coordination approaches  
 
Trade union representatives from both the European and the national level underscore the 
different principles that are underlying central and de-central forms of transnational policy 
coordination. Collective bargaining is referred to as an instrument ‘that has to be capable of 
facing conflicts and be backed by the option to collective action’ (Interview 2 EMCEF 2007). In 
contrast, the function of the European social dialogue is to ‘enter into talks with the employers’ 
side’ (Interview 2 EMCEF 2007) to demonstrate points of view and positions on several ‘soft’ 
topics that are less conflict-ridden. The aim of social dialogues is rather to find a common 
ground for deliberations. The topics addressed in the European social dialogue are more 
general and encompassing that those addressed in collective bargaining and center around 
health and safety, social and environmental policy goals as well as the issue of 
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competitiveness of the sector. Hence, the function of European social dialogue is rather 
political-normative than substantive-functional. In this respect, the involvement of the 
European Commission is regarded as particularly important. It is important to note that the 
consultation of the social partners by the Commission follows a dialogical pattern of 
communication since social partners are not only the addressees in the consultation process. 
Rather, the identification of the Commission’s priority goals and positions are considered as 
important by the social partners. Findings from the expert interviews underline the 
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9.3 Food Sector 
 
9.3.1 Economic background 
 
The European food industry, comprising the production of food products and beverages, has 
been the single largest manufacturing sector in terms of turnover, value added and 
employment in 2006 (CIAA 2007)68. With regard to the sub-sectors of the food industry, the 
segment of ‘various food products’ accounts for the largest share in terms of the sector’s total 
turnover (i.e. 27 %) and workforce (i.e. 42 %), followed by meat production, (i.e. 22 % and 23 
%, respectively), beverages, (i.e. 15 % and 10 %, respectively), and dairy products (i.e. 14 % 
and 9 %, respectively). The EU’s largest food and drink producing countries (in terms of 
turnover) are France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain (CIAA 2007). With regard 
to exports, the food industry ranks third behind the metal sector, including the automotive, 
metal and steel production sectors, and the chemical industry (UNCTAD 2007). Despite 
considerable export volumes of the food and beverage industry, in sub-sectors such as meat 
and dairy production a large part of the output is produced for local markets. In general, the 
increasingly favourable conditions for long-distance transport of food products and the 
integration of the European Common Market have contributed to a growing standardisation of 
food products and markets.  
 
Labour productivity in the food industry is considerably lower than in the manufacturing 
industry as a whole (CIAA 2007)69. Correspondingly, indicators for innovation (ibid)70 and 
investment (OECD 2004) are lower than in most manufacturing sectors. Despite the existence 
of a number of MNC operating in the European food industry, the sector is highly fragmented. 
The share of small and medium enterprises in the total number of companies in the food and 
                                                 
68
 These figures correspond to a sector classification that provides for separate categories for automobile industry, 
fabricated metal products, machinery equipment, and chemical products. Export figures according to UNCTAD 
data (2008) are based on a different classification, i.e. the metal sector includes machinery and transport 
equipment (SITC 7), iron and steel (SITC 67), ores and metal (SITC 27 + 28 + 68) and non-ferrous metals (SITC 
68).  
69
 In 2004 labour productivity (as value added per employee, in 1000 € ) in the manufacturing industry exhibits a 
value of 45.5, the respective figure for food and drink products is 39.9. Labour productivity is highest in the 
chemical industry (i.e. 87), the automotive industry (i.e. 59), followed by pulp and paper production (56) and 
machinery and equipment (46.8) (CIAA 2007).  
70
 For instance, average innovation performance in the food industry is below that in the chemical sector, the 
automotive industry, machinery and metal production (CIAA 2007).  
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drink industry is around 99 % (CIAA 2007). In general, concentration processes, i.e. cross-
border investments by food companies, can also be observed in the European food sector.  
The sugar sector in particular has been subject to far-reaching restructuring and consolidation. 
The European Commission announced market reforms in the European sugar production 
sector that was followed by a Council agreement on the reform of the common market 
organisation in the sugar sector (the sugar ‘regime’). Measures such as the reduction of 
guaranteed prices and production quotas contributed to the decrease in output and 
employment in the European sugar sector (Glassner 2008a). From 2005 to 2007, the social 
partners expected a reduction of 25% in the number of companies and a reduction of direct 
employment by 25,000 people. The member states that are expected to be most affected are 
Italy, Ireland, Greece and Portugal but also the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain 
 
Labour mobility in the European food industry is supposed to be outstandingly high, in 
particularly in sub-branches such as the meat processing sector. Migrant workers account for 
a large share of the workforce in the food processing sector in Germany, Denmark and the 
Netherlands (Interview EFFAT 2007). With regard to the type of employment, temporary 
agency work is widespread in a part of the countries such as in the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Spain (ibid).  
 
9.3.2 The national systems of industrial relations in the food sector 
 
In the following sections key variables of the industrial relations systems (see section 5.1) in 
the food sector are summarised for the countries under consideration. In order to specify the 
range of union organisations that are ‘sector-related’ NACE class 15 serves as a reference. All 
organisations’ the organisational domain of which fully or partly includes workers employed in 
the ‘manufacture of food products and beverages’ are considered as sector related. The 
sector definition is of relevance for measuring the degree of domain 
concentration/fragmentation of the union system and the density of sector-related trade 
unions. In order to identify employees’ and employers’ organisations which fulfil the criteria of 
‘representativeness’ and are therefore recognised as European social partner organisations 
eligible to participate in the European social dialogue, reference is made to the 
‘representativeness studies’ commissioned by the European Commission that have been 
carried out for several sectors. However, for the food production sector no such study has 
been conducted. This is due to the fact that the respective European Industry Federation, i.e. 
EFFAT (European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions), is represented 
in European social dialogue only for agriculture, the sugar production sector, horeca and 
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catering but not for the food production sector as such. Since the largest overlaps with regard 
to the organisational domain consist between trade unions in the sugar sector and those 
organising workers in the food production sector, the study ‘The social partners and their 
representativeness: manufacture of sugar’ (Glassner 2008a) is referred to as an important 
guideline of reference71.  
 
9.3.2.1 Representative domain concentration/fragmentation of the union system  
 
As hypothesised (see section 4.1.6), trade union action is facilitated in associational systems 
which exhibit a high degree of concentration. In order to measure the degree of 
concentration/fragmentation of national trade union systems in the food production sector, an 
index including two variables, i.e. the number of sector-related trade unions and the domain 
comprehensiveness. Thus, the index incorporates the type of the associational system in 
terms of a single- or multi-union system and, in addition, a measure to grasp inter-union 
competition for members due to overlapping or congruent organisational domains of the 
respective sector-related unions. The index aims at measuring an institutional characteristic 
that directly affects trade union action and co-operation both on the national and on the 
European level. Based on the data summarised in table 50 (Annex 3), the typology depicted 













                                                 
71
 The sector delineation is based on the NACE classification code, whereby the manufacture of sugar (NACE 
code 15.83) is a sub-class of food production as such, i.e. NACE 15. Thus, for all workers’ organisations under 
consideration (with the exception of the one in Greece), domain overlap between organisations considered in the 
sugar sector representativeness study and those trade unions which are supposed to organise members in the food 
production sector.  
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Tab. 26 – Typology trade union system food production sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of trade union system Countries (index sum) 




Category 1: Single union system, 
‘Quasi’-Single union system 
GER (0), AT (0) 




Category 2: Functional diversity 
and moderate union competition 
ES (2), IR (2), FI (3), IT (3), NL 
(3), DK (4),  SW (4), United 
Kingdom (4) 





cleavages and high degree of 
union competition  
FR (5), BE (5), PT (8) 
Source: Table 50, Annex 3 
 
With the exception of Germany, in all countries under consideration a multi-union system with 
two or more sector-related trade unions is prevailing in the food production sector. However, 
Austria’s low degree of fragmentation is due to the fact that the membership domains of the 
two unions organising members in the food production sector, i.e. GPA-DJP (Union of Salaried 
Private Sector Employees – Union of Printers, Journalists and Paper Workers) and GMTN 
(Metalworking, Textiles, Agriculture and Food-processing Union) do not overlap. The 
organisational domains of both unions are clear-cut with regards to the differentiation between 
blue (GMTN) and white-collar workers (GPA-DJP). Thus, the country’s associational system is 
labelled as a ‘quasi’-single union system. This contrasts to union systems in other countries 
where demarcations focus on certain categories of employees which are then organised 
across several or all sectors. Employee categories are specified by various parameters such 
as distinct occupations (e.g. electricians organised in the Danish DEF or engineers organised 
in Sveriges Ingenjörer of Sweden, or Ledarna from Sweden, an organisation for managerial 
and professional staff) and employment status (e.g. blue-collar workers, as is the case of 3F of 
Denmark, or white-collar employees, as is the case of TU of Finland and Denmark’s HK). 
Despite these differentiations with regard to membership, domains exhibit a large degree of 
overlap in Finland and Sweden whereas in Denmark overlaps exist to a more limited extent 
between Metal, 3F and DEF (see table 50,  Annex 3). In countries without any distinction in 
employment status and occupation, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, France, Italy, 
Portugal, Ireland and the United Kingdom domain overlap is endemic.  
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Considering both the number of unions in the sector and the existence of domain overlap, 
Germany (single-union system) and Austria (‘quasi’-single union system) build one category of 
highly concentrated associational systems. The second category covers countries which are 
predominately characterised by union systems differentiating in functional terms between 
member’s occupations or employment status, or, as in Spain, Ireland, Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, countries where two or more general, i.e. inter-sectoral, union organisations 
co-exist in the sector. With the exception of Spain where union rivalry typically exists in the 
dual structure dominated by the two large representative union federations CC.OO and UGT, 
inter-union action in general – leaving aside the competition with regard to the recruitment of 
members – is not hindered by rivalries in rest of the countries subsumed in this category.   
 
The third category covers those union systems which exhibit a high degree of fragmentation 
due to political (France), religious/political (Belgium) or regional/territorial (Portugal) cleavages 
of trade union organisation. The high degree of fragmentation of the associational system 
often brings about a lack of representativeness of the numerous but rather small union 
organisations, as it is the case in Portugal. Here, the co-existence of several unions with 
congruent or largely overlapping domains has produced a multiplied structure of trade union 
organisation that results in a high degree of inter-union competition not only in recruiting 
members but also in collective bargaining. The high level of fragmentation results in a constant 
challenge of collective action of the sector-related unions that goes even beyond sectoral 
lines. For instance, trade unions not considered as sector-related such as FEQUIMETAL 
(Chemical and Metalworkers’ Federation) and FESTRU (Road Transport Workers’ Federation) 
are signing collective agreements in the Portuguese food production sector.  
 
9.3.2.2 Extension Practice and collective bargaining coverage 
 
Leaving aside the mere existence of rules for the extension of collective agreements to 
employers and employees in the sector that are not affiliated to the agreement’s signatory 
parties, the de facto practice of extending collective agreements is of interest. It is important to 
note that only such extension schemes designed to extend the purview of a collective 
agreement to the employers not affiliated to the signatory employer association are considered 
in this study. Extension regulations targeting the employees are not dealt with since it are the 
employers’ – often ambiguous – interests in applying a collective agreement or retreating from 
multi-employer  bargaining which are decisive in this respect.  
 
In the food industry, the extension of collective agreements is a common practice in countries 
such as Belgium, Finland, France, Spain and Portugal. In Austria and Italy the existence of 
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functional equivalents of extension rules results in a de facto extension of collective 
agreements concluded by the sector-related social partners to all employers in the sector. Due 
to the obligatory membership of the sector’s companies in the Austrian WKÖ and due to the 
encompassing purview of the sector’s collective agreements the practice of extending multi-
employer agreements to employers who are not affiliated to the signatory employer 
association is obsolete. Another functional equivalent of statutory extension schemes aiming 
at making collective agreements universally binding can be found in Italy. According to the 
country’s constitution minimum conditions of employment must apply to all employees. 
According to the labour court rulings, multi-employers agreements concluded by 
‘representative trade unions’ and employers’ associations are related tp the principle of 
general minimum conditions. Thus, these collective agreements are considered as generally 
binding (EC 2004, Traxler and Behrens 2002).  
 
In a number of countries (see table 51, Annex 3) extension of collective agreements to all 
employers in the food production sector is rather marginal (Germany, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland) or non-existing (Sweden, United Kingdom). While in general, 
the full range of provisions stipulated in the collective agreement are declared as generally 
binding, only certain – often pre-specified – provisions are subject to extension in Germany, 
Denmark and Ireland. For instance in Ireland, extension refers solely to minimum pay and 
working conditions and in Denmark extension is a means to transpose EU directives72. Thus, 
extension practice in these countries is generally limited (Traxler and Behrens 2002). In the 
Netherlands and in Greece – as in the majority of countries – the extension of collective 
agreements presupposes the fulfilment of minimum requirements with respect to the signatory 
parties’ representativeness and thus, with respect to the coverage of the agreement in the 
respective sector. Statutory extension provisions usually allow for extending a collective 
agreement to unaffiliated employers only when the signatory union and employer association 
represent (i.e. organise) 50% or more of the employees within the agreement’s domain as it is 
the case in Finland, Germany, Greece and the Netherlands (EC 2004).  
 
Turning to the coverage rate of collective agreements in the food production sector, a 
generally high level of collective bargaining coverage can be inferred from empirical findings 
(see table 51, Annex 3). With the exception of the United Kingdom, in all countries for which 
data are available a coverage rate of more than 90 % can be observed73. Hence, collective 
                                                 
72
 For instance, EU Council Directive 91/533/EEC on the employer’s obligation to inform employees of the 
conditions applicable to the employment relation. 
73
 A closer look into the intra-sectoral collective bargaining structures confirms high coverage rates for the sub-
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bargaining structures in the food industry are comparably strong and encompassing as in the 
manufacturing sector in general that traditionally represents a trade union stronghold. 
However, it has to be noted that wages and working conditions stipulated in the sector’s 
collective agreements are generally lower than those in industrial sectors such as the metal or 
chemical industry. Compared to the levels of collective bargaining coverage rates in the entire 
manufacturing sector ranging between 80 to 90 % and 70 to 80 % in countries such as 
Finland, Italy and Germany (EC 2004), coverage rates are particularly high in the food 
industries of these countries. In Finland a full coverage is reached by the co-existence and 
complementary nature of several collective agreements concluded by TU, SEL and Metalliliitto 
that cover a variety of different types of employees in the sector. To a somehow lesser extent, 
the relatively high coverage rates in Italy and Germany is due to the co-existence of collective 
agreements in a number of sub-sectors such as bakeries, meat and dairy production that are 
applicable to all employees in the respective branch (EFFAT 2006). Typically, the United 
Kingdom stands out in terms of collective bargaining coverage which is estimated to be less 
than 20 % in the food production sector74 (see table 51, Annex 3).  
 
9.3.2.3 Characteristics of the sector-level collective bargaining system 
 
Considering the index-values for the countries under investigation, the following typology 
based on variables such as the predominant level of collective bargaining, the existence of a 
covert collective bargaining coordination mechanism in the form of pattern bargaining and the 
existence of both a peace obligation and the legal enforceability of collective agreements can 
be derived (see table 52, Annex 3). The typology aims at categorising countries according to 
their transnational responsiveness, i.e. the capacity of their collective bargaining systems for 
the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining policies.  
 
In accordance with table 52 in Annex 3 the countries are grouped into three categories (see 
table 27). The first category comprises countries characterised by industrial relationship 
structures where collective bargaining takes place predominantly on the sector level or 
exclusively on the company level as in the United Kingdom. It has to be noted that Ireland is 
                                                                                                                                                           
sector of sugar production (see Glassner 2008a). It can be inferred that collective bargaining coverage in the food 
production sector reaches levels comparable with the manufacturing industry as such. This may be due to the fact 
that food production has been subject to public policy intervention and regulation not only on the level of the EU 
but also on the level of nation states.  
74
 Due to the lack of sector-specific data, UK collective bargaining coverage is estimated on the basis of collective 
bargaining coverage in the entire manufacturing sector (cf. Grainger and Growther 2007). 
  212  
the only exception with regard to the collective bargaining level since in this country 
negotiations are taking place to a similar extent on both the inter-industry and the company 
level. The operationalisation procedure of averaging values for collective bargaining levels 
results in an impreciseness in order to categorise Ireland with regard to the predominant 
collective bargaining level as a special case that is distinguishable from the other countries 
summarised in the first category. In the countries subsumed in category 1, a medium-range 
degree of centralisation, i.e. a predominance of sectoral collective bargaining, is combined 
with a low degree of vertical and horizontal governability that ensures the coordination of 
collective bargaining results between sectors/employee groups and compliance of lower-rank 
members with collective agreements negotiated by trade union organisations (see section 
5.1.2). The existence of pattern bargaining in the form of the leading role of a particular sector 
in wage-formation which sets the guideline for other sectors (see section 1.5.3.1) is absent in 
all of these countries and additionally, both institutional prerequisites which guarantee vertical 
governability are lacking. Thus, the integral part of a highly responsive collective bargaining 
system is clearly missing in all countries summarised in the first category.  
 
The second category covers countries which do not systematically differ from the countries 
summarised in the first category with regard to the level of collective bargaining. In all 
countries under consideration the sector is the focal point for collective bargaining activities by 
the social partners. Denmark may represent a special case insofar as national-level multi-
employer wage agreements cover workers in various sectors such as manufacturing (including 
the food production sector), the service industry and telecommunications. In contrast to the 
countries subsumed under the first category, both a peace obligation of collective agreements 
and their legal enforceability are enshrined in the collective bargaining systems in the 
countries of the second category. Thus, the vertical dimension of collective bargaining 
coordination is accounted for (see sections 5.1.2 and 1.5.2.4.3).  
 
Although covered within one category, there are gradual differences between national systems 
of collective bargaining coordination. Leaving aside countries being classified as exhibiting a 
low degree of responsiveness due to the lack of institutional preconditions for high vertical 
coordination, the differences between collective bargaining systems classified as being 
characterised by a high extent of formal responsiveness will be analysed in more detailed. The 
collective bargaining systems of Finland and the Netherlands are typically classified as highly 
responsive (Traxler 2000 and 2002). In both countries state sponsored coordination (cf. 
section 5.1.2) in the form of tripartite bargaining whereby state actors (i.e. the government) 
directly participate in peak-level bargaining without authoritatively imposing an agreement is in 
existence (Traxler 2002). In contrast to state-sponsered coordination, the authoritative 
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coordination pattern whereby state agencies impose a wage rate on peak-level unions and 
employers’ organisations which is binding for lower-level bargaining units, is too rigid to ensure 
an effective coordination on the macroeconomic level. Although in both countries sector-level 
agreements are existing in the food production sector, authoritative coordination plays an 
important role in the process of wage-setting in Belgium and France (Traxler 2003). With 
regard to Denmark and Greece the classification is less clear-cut. Denmark’s system of 
collective bargaining is categorised by state-sponsered coordination mechanism whereby 
mediation and conciliation plays an important role in the process of wage-formation on the 
industry-level. Less information is available on collective bargaining in the Greek food industry. 
On the national level, collective agreements are negotiated on inter-industry, industry and 
company level whereby sectoral collective bargaining is predominant (EC 2006). However, 
since the country did not report to the collective bargaining coordination system on the 
European level organised by EFFAT, information can be obtained only from empirical 
evidence gained by means of interviews with collective bargaining experts who however claim 
not to have direct insight in sector-related collective bargaining in the country. Thus, it can be 
assumed that collective bargaining in the Geek food industry is in line with the general finding 
insofar as there are a few collective agreements (both on sector and company level) existing 
in this sector.  
 
Tab. 27 – Typology collective bargaining system food production sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of collective bargaining 
system Countries (index sum) 
0-1 Low responsiveness of the 
collective bargaining system: 
lack of institutional prerequisites to 
ensure vertical co-ordination  
United Kingdom(0), BE(1), 
ES(1), FR(1), IR(1), IT(1), 
PT(1) 
2-3 High formal responsiveness of 
collective bargaining system: 
supportive legal prerequisites to 
ensure vertical co-ordination                                                                     
DK(2), FI(2), GR(2), NL(2), 
SW(2) 
<= 4 Highly responsive systems 
dominated by pattern bargaining  
AT(4), DE(4) 
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9.3.2.4 Density of the sector-related trade unions 
 
In all countries under consideration trade union density rates in the food production sector are 
lower than aggregated density for the manufacturing sector as such (see table 53, Annex 3). It 
has to be noted that only in the case of Belgium domain densities are considered since 
estimates on sector densities according to membership data in Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) 
which have been referred to the number of dependently employed workers in the food 
production industry (Eurostat 2008d) seemed to be much to high, i.e. around 70 %. Cross-
checking estimates on union density by empirical evidence found in expert interviews 
(Interview EFFAT 2007) supports density rates which are lower in the food production sector 
than in manufacturing in general. The recourse to domain density is not burdened with major 
problems of bias since it is based on two representative organisations (i.e. CSC alimentation 
et services/ACV voeding en diensten and Horval) the domains of which are relatively narrowly 
delineated whereby the majority of members are employed in the food production and 
agriculture sectors. The estimate on the domain union density in the Belgian food industry may 
imply a down-ward bias since the density of unions for which data was available is lower in 
sectors such as horeca and agriculture. For countries with multi-union systems the aggregate 
sector density (see table 28) is based on an average weighted by the membership shares of 
the respective organisations in the total of members of sector-related unions for which data 
was available, i.e. the Netherlands, France, Portugal and Italy.  
 
 
Tab. 28 – Density of sector-related unions – food production sector 
Density rates  (aggregate a) domain 
density 
(aggregate a) sector density 
< 25 
 
 PT (5 %), United Kingdom (6 
%), FR (7 %), ES (8 %) NL (13 
%), IT (18 %), DE (23 %) 
< 50 BE b (47 %) AT (31 %), DK (49 %) 
51-69  FI (65 %) 
> 70  SW (72 %) 
a in case of multi-union systems a weighted average based on the union’s share of members in the total 
of members of sector-related trade unions;  
b
 In order to pursue a conservative approach to density estimates, only in the case of Belgium the 
domain density is considered since estimates based on the sector density (Ebbinghaus/Visser 2000) did 
not seem to be plausible when related to the number of employees in the food production sector 
according to Eurostat annual enterprise statistics for 1998;  
 
Source: Table 53, Annex 3 
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Table 28 shows that almost two-thirds of the countries considered are summarised in the first 
category where union density in the food production sector is lower than 25 %. One fourth of 
the countries considered are categorised as exhibiting a sector-related union density between 
25 and 50 % whereas only in the two Nordic countries union densities in the food production 
sector are above 50 % (i.e. in Finland) and above 70 % (i.e. Sweden). Compared to national 
aggregate figures (EC 2004, Marginson and Traxler 2005) union density in the food industry is 
particularly low in Portugal (aggregate net union density of 24 % in 2001), the United Kingdom 
(30.7 %), the Netherlands (22.5 %), Italy (34.8 %) and Denmark (73.8 %).   
 
 
9.3.3 The food sectors’ decentralised approach: Union-led networks for 
information exchange on collective bargaining issues  
 
Within EFFAT, two levels of collective bargaining policy coordination are co-existing. First, like 
all EIF, EFFAT’s engagement in Europe-wide collective bargaining coordination is based on a 
respective policy statement. However, the formal declaration to carry out coordination 
initiatives has not had notable effects on the practice of cross-border coordination. Second, 
‘network meetings’ are held within the seven sub-sectors of EFFAT, i.e. brewery, bakers, 
dairy, meat, sugar, hotels and tobacco. Within these meetings, collective bargaining is though 
only one item on the agenda that often is not of priority. The meat sector is considered as one 
of the most active sectors with regard to bargaining coordination. The most important 
coordination activity is the exchange of collective bargaining information among member 
organisations in the sub-branches. On the European peak-level, EFFAT collects collective 
bargaining data for all sub-branches which im made accessible for members. Although there 
exists a network of correspondents – however only one representative per country – the 
bargaining expert from EFFAT states that ‘we are not in a position to coordinate anything in 
collective bargaining’ (Interview EFFAT 2007). Thus, coordination activities are exclusively 
limited to the exchange of information. This rather restricted approach to collective bargaining 
coordination is justified by the lack of interest expressed by national member organisations. 
However, even inter-union coordination initiatives take place without full surveillance of the 
sector’s EIF and are thus in some cases not embedded in the organisational framework of 
EFFAT. Collective bargaining coordination is not addressed on a regular basis. Rather, 
coordination structures in the food sector are ad-hoc and informal. Topics of transnational 
interest such as migration which is of particular importance in the agriculture, meat and 
tourism sectors are tackled in an issue-per-issue approach. Also, EFFAT has established a 
database that provides information on collective agreements in the member states for the 
seven sub-branches pertaining to the EIF’s organisational domain. However, in this database 
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information is merely gathered ex-post. This contrasts to the more inter-active reporting 
systems in the metal and the chemical sector that provide for more recent and day-to-day 
information. Consequently, the utility of the collective bargaining database in the food industry 
is assessed as low by national member organisations.  
 
 
9.3.4 European Social Dialogue in the Sugar Sector 
 
Within the organisational domain of EFFAT three social dialogue committees, i.e. for 
agriculture, sugar and hotels/restaurants/catering (‘horeca’) have been established in 1999. 
However, social dialogue on the European level started earlier in all of these sectors with the 
establishment of informal working groups or informal committees75. The qualitative analysis is 
restricted to the sugar sector since it is shares more communalities with the food industry as 
such as with the agricultural and horeca sectors. Despite the similarity that both the 
agricultural and the sugar sector have been subject to market intervention by the Community 
in terms of production quota and common price-setting mechanisms, the agricultural sector 
can be clearly separated from the manufacturing sector that comprises the production of food, 
foodstuffs including sugar. The same argument is employed for horeca which is part of the 
service sector.  
 
Due to market regulation, the competitive situation of companies in the sugar sector has been 
comparably favourable in the past. The generally high profits have been shifted over into wage 
increases that were above the average pay rates in the food industry (Interview EFFAT 2007). 
This situation changed with the restructuring and re-organisation of the sugar sector that 
resulted in closures of unprofitable sugar production plants. For instance, in Latvia and 
Slovenia, the last remaining companies have been closed in spring 2007 (Glassner 2008a). 
Coping with the consequences of job reductions and company closures is thus one of the 
most important issues in European social dialogue in the sugar industry. For employers 
entering into social dialogue on the European level76 has been strongly motivated by their 
                                                 
75
 The agricultural sector has a long tradition of social dialogue on the European level. This sector has been subject 
to the common agricultural policy from the onset of the Community. European social dialogue on a rather 
informal basis dates back to the 1950s, and in 1974 the first ‘joint commission’ has been set up. Likewise, in the 
sugar sector an informal working group has been established as early as 1969. In the horeca sector, an informal 
working group has been established in 1983.  
76
 Employers from the sugar sector are represented by CEFS – The European Committee of Sugar Manufacturers 
in the sector dialogue committee.  
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perception of social dialogue as a tool to demonstrate their commitment with regard to social 
responsibility vis-à-vis the European institutions (Interview EFFAT 2007). Besides, the 
European social dialogue is considered as a forum to address market-related issues such as 
the opening of the market for workers from Third Countries or other, more technical topics, 
e.g. rules for preferential origin.  
 
Restructuring is considered as the most controversial topic by the sugar sector’s social 
partners. The issue of corporate social responsibility (CRS) has been addressed repeatedly 
and systematically. In terms of the typology of produced texts on social corporate 
responsibility a gradual evolution can be observed. Social partners prepared the ground for 
the topic with their joint declaration on social responsibility in 2001. Two years later this was 
followed by a code of conduct and a brochure (2004) on CSR and Social dialogue in the sugar 
sector. Moreover, the European social partners agreed on follow-up procedures and issued 
the ‘Third Implementation Report on CSR’ in 2006. However, the implementation of joint texts 
is regarded as one of the most difficult aspects of European social dialogue. Due to their 
limited bindingness, joint texts produced in the European social dialogue have no direct impact 
on EFFAT’s member organisations. The implementation on the side of the employers is even 
more difficult. Other topics that are of relevance in European social dialogue are training and 
health and safety whereas more controversial topics are not addressed within this framework. 
As in other sectors, the provision of inforamtion services for member organisations is 
considered as an important function of European social dialogues. The setting-up of a 
webpage for the sugar industry  (2004) providing information on European policy measures 
and access to structural funds in the sugar industry underlines the service-orientation of 
EFFAT in order to ensure legitimacy of European social dialogue among its national members. 
Although the perspectives of the sugar sector’s dialogue are not perceived as bleak as in other 
sectors, e.g. banking, construction (see sections 9.6.4 and 9.5.4), it is not expected that 
European social dialogue will develop into a forum for the conclusion of binding agreements 
(interview EFFAT 2007).  
 
9.3.4.1 Informal European social dialogue in the food sectors 
 
Despite the inexistence of a formal dialogue committee for the food industry, ‘informal’ 
European dialogue takes place in several sub-branches of the sector. Social partners in the 
meat sector, the largest single-product sub-sector of the entire food industry, are particularly 
active in this regard. EFFAT and the respective employers’ association, CLITRAVI, signed a 
joint declaration on the sustainability and quality of jobs and the banishment of illegal 
employment practices (Interview EFFAT 2007). The social partner organisation’s proposal of a 
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certification system for temporary work agencies and self-employed workers constitutes a 
rather concrete measure to improve working conditions of precariously employed groups of 
the workforce. Trade unionists regard this declaration as a first and decisive step towards 
more commitment by the meat industry’s employers. However, the internal dispersions within 
CLITRAVI – in particular with their German member organisation – are perceived as critical 
factors that might inhibit future cooperation. The recentness of the relationships of mutual 
cooperation between both sides of the industry and the – so far – limited amount of joint 
results do not allow definite conclusions on future prospects of the in-official social dialogue in 
the meat processing sector. It is however undisputed that the conclusion of further 
‘agreements’ will increase the commitment of both social partner organisations and will thus 
contribute to the development of stable, high-trust relationships between the organisations of 
both sides of the industry.  
 
As far as the perspectives for the establishment of a ‘formal’ sector committee for the entire 
food industry is concerned, this option does not to be very probable in the near future. The 
heterogeneity of the food industry is reflected by the outstandingly high number of European-
level interest organisations. The industry’s European peak-level organisation CIAA organises 
approximately one third of the totality of food industry-related interest associations, i.e. 30 
European sector organisations in 2008. However, CIAA does not have a social policy 
mandate. Since it is primarily concerned with product market issues it is a business 
association rather than an employer organisation that fulfills the Commission’s criteria to 
qualify as a European social partner organisation. Also, the dual structure of both 
associational members and member companies – many of them multinationals – complicates 
intra-organisational decision-making and mandating procedures. In accordance with Business 
Europe’s opposition against the conclusion of joint agreements with a European scope, CIAA 
and its members are not willing to establish formal dialogue structures on the European sector 
level. Even with the support of the European Commission, that is considered to be in favor of a 
social dialogue in the food industry, the chances for the establishment of a sectoral dialogue 
committee are minimal.  
 
9.3.4 Trade union actors’ perceptions in the food sector 
9.3.4.1 Trade union actors’ perceptions with regard to union-led cross-border 
coordination initiatives  
 
National differences with regard to industrial relationship structures and collective bargaining 
practices are perceived as the main obstacle to cross-border collective bargaining 
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coordination initiatives. The heterogeneity of the food industry as described in the sections 
above is not limited to the employers’ side of the industry. Correspondingly, the number of 
trade unions and thus the degree of fragmentation of the associational system of labour 
representation is higher than in other industries of the manufacturing sector (see table 41, 
Annex 3). Besides structural conditions also actor-specific factors play for the cross-border 
coordination of collective bargaining policies. According to trade union representatives of the 
European peak-organisation, a general North-South divide with regard to the reporting and 
providing accurate collective bargaining information on a regular basis can be observed. The 
trade unions for the United Kingdom from some of the central and eastern European 
countries, e.g. the Baltic countries, Romania and Bulgaria as well as Hungary, have previously 
not provided information and are therefore not considered in EFFAT’s report on collective 
bargaining in Europe (EFFAT 2006). Typically, in these countries collective bargaining takes 
place on the company-level. This clearly hampers collective bargaining coordination – even 
more so on the transnational level.  
 
The coordination of collective bargaining policies across borders is still in an incipient stage. 
By the involved actors is it perceived as a ‘learning experience’ rather than as an established 
practice. This is particularly true in the food industry, where transnational coordination 
activities started relatively late compared with other industries of the manufacturing sector. 
Despite the particularities of the food industry, EFFAT has established some form of 
information exchange with other sectors such as the chemical and the metal industries, and 
the textile sector (Interview EFFAT 2007). Since the system for the exchange of collective 
bargaining information in the food sector is not assessed as very effective by both the EIF and 
its national affiliates, EFFAT considers coordination structures and instruments adopted in 
other sectors, in particular those sectors integrated in the Eucob@n system (i.e. metal, 
chemicals and textiles) in its attempt to improve their own system. However, despite EFFAT’s 
general openness concerning a possible participation in existing inter-sectoral coordination 
arrangements such as the Eucob@n network, it remains to be seen if an industry that differs 
to a comparably large extent from other sectors such as the metal and the chemical industry in 
terms of economic and institutional structures can be integrated in such a system. Besides, 
from a political point of view it is questionable that further efforts of the cross-industry 
integration of EFFAT’s collective bargaining coordination activities are supported by national 
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9.3.4.2 Trade union actors’ perceptions with regard to central and de-central 
coordination approaches  
 
Both central coordination in the form of European sectoral social dialogues and de-central 
collective bargaining coordination initiatives between trade unions from different countries 
have so far been regarded as mutually complementary. However, the future relationship of 
both instruments of collective bargaining policy coordination depends on the position of the 
Commission to further promote transnational company agreements (Interview EFFAT 2007). 
From the trade union’s point of view, these transnational company agreements are regarded 
rather sceptical due to their lack of legal bindingness. Moreover, the material content of these 
agreements is often the outcome of a compromise on the level of the ‘smallest common 
denominator’ (Interview EFFAT 2007). Within the currently existing European system of 
industrial relations, transnational company agreements are neither integrated into national 
systems of labour law and collective bargaining nor is there a proper transnational legal 
framework existing which provides the bargaining parties with clear rights and obligations as 
well as efficient enforcement mechanisms (Keune and Warneck 2006, Ales et al. 2006). A 
more competitive relationship between joint agreements negotiated by the EIF within the 
framework of European social dialogue and transnational company agreements may arise if 
both maintain their largely voluntary nature. To the present point of time the potential for 
reaching a more binding result is larger with regard to joint texts concluded in the European 
social dialogue (Interview EFFAT 2007). This however presupposes that the social partner 
agreement is implemented by Council decision, e.g. such as in the case of the European 
diver’s licence (2004).  
 
In general, the importance of both central and de-central forms of transnational collective 
bargaining policy coordination is undisputed among trade union representatives of the 
European and the national level. Pressing issues that affect the food industry in all of the 
member countries such as the increased mobility of workers can not be tackled on the national 
level alone. Both cross-border trade union coordination initiatives and European social 
dialogue represent a potentially powerful platform for pressurising employers in order to ban 
illegal employment practices and to initiate campaigns with other social actors such as non-
governmental and consumer organisations. Most importantly, in the food industry which is 
characterised by a more ad-hoc and informal approach to transnational collective bargaining, 
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9.4 Telecommunications Sector 
 
9.4.1 Economic Background 
 
Since the early 1980s the western European telecommunications sector has undergone major 
restructuring in the wake of the privatisation of state-owned companies and the opening up to 
market to competition. Furthermore, technological change such as the expansion of internet 
services, data transmission and mobile data services brought about a fundamental 
transformation of the sector and increased the demand for high-skilled labour force. 
Technological progress has been accompanied by changes with regard to the composition of 
the sector’s labour force. The share of professional and highly educated staff in the total 
labour force increased as fields as communication and information technologies, electronic 
engineering as well as market-related services such as marketing and finance gained in 
importance for the provision of telecom services (EC 2005b). Throughout Europe, around 96 
% of dependently employed persons in the sector have employee status (EC 2005b).  
 
The liberalisation of the European telecom sector resulted in the creation of new jobs in the 
vast majority of member countries. Employment in the European telecommunications sector 
increased strongest in Slovenia, i.e. by more than 180 % between 1995 and 2005, 
Luxembourg where employment more than doubled in the period from 1995 to 2002, and 
Denmark where employment grew by almost 60 % between 1993 and 2004 (Traxler 2007c). 
Decreases in employment have been reported for Romania (around – 40 % between 1993 
and 2004), Slovakia (approximately – 30 % between 1996 and 2005), the Czech Republic (- 
14 % between 1995 and 2000) and – to a lesser extent – for Germany (- 11 % between 1995 
and 2003). Figures on the number of employees in the sector, i.e. excluding self-employed, 
agency workers and those employed on contracts other than standard employment contracts, 
show a similar development as for total employment, thus suggesting that standard forms of 
employment are predominant in the telecom sector (EC 2005b). The comparably pronounced 
congruence of total employment and the number of employees in the sector implies the pre-
dominance of large companies, in many cases of the former state monopolist, in terms of 
employment and market share. However, the generally steep increase of the number of 
companies in the sector between the early 1990s and the mid-2000s underscores the dynamic 
development with regard to new market entrants, mostly small companies providing internet 
services (Traxler 2007c, EC 2005b).  
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The regulatory process in the European telecom sector dates back to a first phase of 
community policy aiming at the restructuring and the partly liberalisation of the sector. The 
establishment of a common telecommunications market as incorporated in the broader 
political framework of the Maastricht Treaty (1993) required the progressive removal of 
barriers to pan-European operation, service provision and equipment supply across the EU. 
Two sets of instruments have been applied in order to liberalise the EU telecommunications 
market. First, the adoption of directives aiming at the liberalisation of the sector, initiated by  
the 1990 Framework Directive establishing the principle of Open Network Provision, i.e. open 
access to publicly available telecommunications networks and services, and thus providing a 
basis for further harmonisation directives and recommendations. The path towards further 
liberalisation has been laid out in the Commission's Green Paper on liberalisation of 
infrastructure (1995), resulting in the adoption of the so-called ‘1998 package’ of legislation 
measures for the opening of the EU telecoms market on 1 January 1998. Second, competition 
rules have been formalised in ‘Guidelines’ within the ‘1998 package’ on the application of EC 
competition law in the telecoms sector. These guidelines mainly address the issue of new 
entrant operators’ access to incumbent's networks in order to reach end-users.  
 
Whereas the ‘old’ legislative framework of the ‘1998 package’ aimed at regulating the 
transition from monopoly to competition in the telecom sector, the ‘new regulatory framework’ 
is more strongly aimed at modernising and increasing competitiveness of the European 
telecommunications sector. In this respect, the Commission proposed in its Communication of 
the 1999 Review of the Electronic Communications Sector and the principles and orientations 
for the new Regulatory Framework’ (COM(2000)239) a package of measures for a new 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services laid out in the 
respective directive (2002/21/EC). Besides this directive, the regulatory framework consists of 
four other specific directives under Article 95 aiming at the regulation of issues such as access 
to and authorisation of networks, consumers’ and users’ rights and data protection77. In 
addition, one Commission Directive to be adopted under Article 86, i.e. Directive on 
Competition in the markets for electronic communications services (2002/77/EC), 
complements the legislative framework for the liberalisation of the European 
telecommunications sector.  
                                                 
77
 Directive 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation 
Directive), Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities (Access Directive), Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) and Directive 97/66/EC of 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector.  
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9.4.2 The National Systems of Industrial relations in the Telecom Sector 
 
In the following sections, the national systems of industrial relations in the telecommunications 
sector will be analysed with regard to the institutional features identified in section 5.1. The 
relevant ‘sector-related’ trade union organisations are defined as such organisations the 
domain of which is related to telecommunications activities as defined by NACE class 64.20, 
with the exception of cable TV and radio activities. Identifying the sectoral domain is of 
relevance with regard to measuring the degree of domain concentration/fragmentation of the 
union system and the density of sector-related trade unions. The domain of sector-related 
union organisations is related in one of four possible ways to the telecom sector, i.e. 
sectionalism, overlap, sectional overlap or congruence (cf. section 9.1.2). The study on the 
representativeness of social partners in the telecommunications sector (Traxler 2007c) 
provides criteria and concepts for the identification and classification of sector-related 
employee organisations. Combining both a top-down and a bottom-up procedure to identify 
relevant organisations, the representativeness study aims at giving a complete picture of 
employee interest organisation in the sector. A top-down screening of national social partner 
organisations is achieved by referring to the national associations‘ affiliation/s to European 
social partner organisations. Conversely, considering those national associations involved in 
collective bargaining and their affiliation to any sector-related European association represents 
a bottom-up screening of the European associations.  
 
9.4.2.1 Representative domain concentration/fragmentation of the union system  
 
The degree of domain fragmentation of the sectoral union system determines trade union 
action on both the national and the transnational levels. As hypothesised in section 4.1.6, 
cross-border coordination activities in collective bargaining are directly influenced by the 
national configuration of inter-union power relationships. The degree of 
fragmentation/centralisation of the trade union system is referred to as the overiding  factor 
that determines inter-union relationships of power and action. In order to measure the extent 
of domain fragmentation an index that incorporates two variables: First, the number of trade 
union organisations represents a quantitative measure of domain fragmentation, and 
secondly, the existence of domain overlaps between the sector-related trade unions. Inter-
union domain overlap arises if the organisational domain of a union overlaps with the domain 
of all the other unions (Traxler 2007c).   
 
The index of domain fragmentation allows for the differentiation between single- and multi-
union systems. Furthermore, it is a measure for inter-union competition with regard to 
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organising and recruiting member or with regard to the entitlement to collective bargaining.  
Table 29 summarises the classification of the countries under consideration according to their 
trade union systems in the telecom sector.   
 
Tab. 29 – Typology trade union system telecommunications sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of trade union system Countries (index sum) 
0 – 1 points :  
low degree of 
fragmentation 
 
Category 1: Single union system, 
‘Quasi’-Single union system 
BE (0), GR (0) 




Category 2: Functional diversity 
and moderate union competition 
AT (2), UK (2), FI (4), IR (4), IT 
(4) 
> 5 points:  




cleavages and high degree of 
union competition  
DK (5), DE (5), SE (5),  FR (7), 
NL (7), ES (8), PT (15) 
Source: Table 54, Annex 4 
 
A single-union system exists only in the Greek telecommunications sector where OME-OTE, 
the Greek Telecom Employees’ Federation, organises both blue and white-collar workers in 
the sector. However, there is no information available whether this organisation covers only 
workers in telecommunication companies, i.e. the formerly monopolist main provider OTE, or 
also in those workers in other sector-related companies such as internet service providers. In 
Belgium a number of different unions are organising workers in the telecom sector. Despite 
the high number of sector-related unions, the country’s industrial relations system of the 
telecom sector is classified as a ‘quasi-single’ union system. Due to the narrow and 
differentiated membership domains of the unions no overlaps are arising between the domain 
of one of the unions with the domains of all other unions. The membership domains of the 
seven sector-related unions in Belgium are differentiated along sectoral lines, i.e. telecom and 
aviation sector workers organised by CGSP Telecom-Aviation or CSC Transcom-Telecoms 
which also organises workers in the transport sector. Furthermore, union domains are 
differentiated between the public and the private segment of the sector, i.e. CGSP Telecom-
Aviation which exclusively organises public sector workers. On the level of peak-organisations, 
the Belgian telecom-sector unions are affiliated either to the socialist ABVV-FGTB, the 
christian CSC-ACV or the liberal ACLVB-CGSLB whereby all of those federations have 
separate organisations on the regional levels, i.e. Flanders and Wallonia. Furthermore, a 
domain differentiation along professional lines, i.e. SETCa which organises white-collar staff, 
technicians and managers, and more generally between blue and white-collar workers (i.e. 
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CNE-CSC and CSC-ACV both covering white-collar workers) is also a widespread 
organisational pattern among Belgian unions.  
 
A medium level of union fragmentation can be observed in Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy and 
the United Kingdom. In Austria and the United Kingdom two unions are reported to organise 
workers in the telecom sector. The Austrian GPA organises private sector employees whereby 
GPF - The Post and telecommunications workers’ union covers both blue and white-collar 
workers with civil servant status. In some of the countries under consideration such as Austria, 
Belgium and France both public and private employment regulation applies in the telecom 
sector. This dual structure of employment relationships originates in the civil servant status of 
employees of the formerly public main telecom provider which maintained their status after the 
privatisation and restructuring of the incumbent companies. In the United Kingdom the domain 
of the Communication Workers Union – CWU is largely overlapping with that of CONNECT – 
Union for Professionals in Communications. In Finland, sectoral overlap is arising between the 
four sector-related unions the domains of which are differentiated along professional lines (i.e. 
YTN - Federation of Professional and Managerial Staff), blue- and white-collar workers (TU - 
Union of Salaried Employees) and sectors (i.e. the Metalworkers’ Union and the Electrical 
Workers’ Union). The predominant organisation pattern among Italian unions is overlap 
whereby unions organise workers in the entire telecom sector plus workers in one or more 
other sectors such as communication (SLC-CGIL, UILCOM-UIL, UGL-COM), information 
technology and entertainment (FISTEL-CGIL). In Ireland a union for private sector 
communications union (CWU) is co-existing with three public sector unions which organise 
blue and white-collar workers (i.e. CPSU, IMPACT) or executive staff (i.e. PSEU) in the 
telecom sector.  
 
A high degree of union fragmentation can be observed in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, 
France, the Netherlands, Spain and, in particular, in Portugal. The membership domain of 
Danish unions is differentiated along occupational/qualification lines (i.e. AC-Tele, 
Lederforening en i TDC), and private sector blue- (i.e. National Union of Metalworkers, Danish 
Electricians’ Union) and white-collar workers in general (HK Privat - Union of Commercial and 
Clerical Employees in Denmark).  
 
The organisation pattern of all sector-related unions in France (cf. table 54, Annex 4) is 
classified as ‘overlap’. Thus, unions organise workers in the entire telecom sector and in one 
or more other sectors such as communications in general (i.e. CGT-FO-COM), the postal 
sector (i.e. CGT-PTT, CFTC-PTT, SUD-PTT), and consulting and cultural workers (i.e. F3C-
CFDT). With the exception of two union organisations (i.e. SUD-PTT and UNSA-Télécom), the 
telecom sector unions are affiliated to one of the five representative peak-federations,  most of 
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them differentiated along political/ideological lines, i.e. the CGT with closed links to the 
communist movement, the republican CGT-FO, and the two christian federations CFDT and 
CFTC. The only federation with a membership domain based on occupation is CGC-CFE, 
organising professional and managerial staff. An even more differentiated, multi-dimensional 
organisation pattern along ideological/religious orientations, blue- and white-collar workers and 
public-private sector employees characterises employee organisation in the Netherlands. The 
multi-dimensionality of employee organisation results in a high degree of fragmentation of the 
union system. Thus, sectoral overlap is the predominant pattern of domain demarcation 
among telecom sector unions such as the FNV-affiliate AbvaKabo and the Christian CNV 
Publieke Zaak organising public sector employees, CNV Diensten organising private sector 
white-collar workers, or VPP organising professional staff. Trade union organisation in the 
Spanish and Portuguese telecom sector is highly fragmented. In Spain, a high number of 
unions organising employees in the telecom sector though only the sector-related affiliates of 
the two representative main confederations CC.OO and UGT (i.e. FCT CC.OO and FTCM-
UGT) are equipped with collective bargaining rights. The same situation applies in Portugal 
where the number of sector-related trade unions is highest among the countries under 
consideration, and – among those unions for which information is available – only the affiliates 
of the two main peak-level organisations UGT (SINDETELCO) and CGTP (i.e. SINTTAV, 
SNTCT and STT) which are representative at the national level are participating in collective 
bargaining (see table 57, Annex 4).  
  
Due to the comparably high degree of trade union fragmentation in the telecom sector, inter-
union competition with regard to bargaining rights is reported to arise among unions in France, 
Germany, Portugal and Spain. In Austria, a country classified as being characterised by a 
medium extent of union fragmentation, a conflict arose in the wake of the liberalisation and 
restructuring of the telecom sector when the GPA which organises private sector white-collar 
workers entered the telecom sector. However, the conflict was settled by an agreement 
between the incumbent blue-collar telecom-sector union GPF and the newly entered GPA to 
jointly negotiate the sector-level collective agreement (Traxler 2007).  
 
9.4.2.2 Extension Practice and collective bargaining coverage 
 
Although legal provisions for the extension of collective agreements are existent in the majority 
of EU countries, it is the de facto practice of declaring collective agreements generally binding 
that is of interest with regard to the question of the Europeanisation of collective bargaining. 
This is due to the fact that the extension of collective agreements to employers which are not 
affiliated to the signatory party is the most important determinant of collective bargaining 
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coverage as postulated in hypothesis 9 (see section 4.1.9). The collective bargaining coverage 
rate again is the most relevant measure for the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of industrial 
relations and the labour market regime as such (Traxler et al. 2001).  
 
In the telecom sector the extension of collective agreements is rather limited. Only in three 
countries, i.e. Belgium, Finland and France, sector-related agreements are declared as 
generally binding for all employers in the sector (cf. table 55, Annex 4). In two countries, i.e. 
Austria and Italy, functional equivalents that equally guarantee a high collective bargaining 
coverage are in function. In the case of Austria, the obligatory membership of employers in the 
Austrian Economic Chamber (WKÖ) results in a bargaining coverage of almost 100 % in the 
telecom sector. In Italy the constitution includes a provision according to that minimum 
conditions of employment must apply to all employees. In the five countries where extension 
practices are pervasive in the telecom sector or functional equivalents are provided for, 
collective bargaining coverage comes close to 100 % (i.e. in Austria, Belgium and France) or 
reaches considerably high levels around 90 % (i.e. Finland) or 80 % (i.e. Italy). Equally high 
level of bargaining coverage are reached in the Spanish (i.e. 97 %), Danish and Swedish 
telecom sector (i.e. both around 90 %). In the case of Spain this is due to the encompassing 
scope of the Telefónica agreement which covers around 97 % of employees in the entire 
telecom sector (see table 55, Annex 4). In Sweden and Denmark high level of collective 
bargaining coverage is the result of the high employer densities in the sector. For instance, the 
sectoral density rate of Dansk Industri (DI) is around 90 % in terms of employees. Likewise, in 
Sweden collective bargaining coverage is estimated to be around 90 % due to the centralised 
enterprise structure in the telecom sector, with the largest share of employees being employed 
in companies with more than 50 employees. Since the propensity of large enterprises to join 
an employer association is higher compared to that of small companies, it can be assumed 
that collective bargaining coverage rate in terms of employees is higher than that in terms of 
companies.  
 
The lowest collective bargaining coverage rate in the telecom sector is reported for Portugal 
where only 23 % of employees in the sector are covered by collective agreements. This is due 
to the fact that collective bargaining is exclusively carried out in the form single-employer or 
individual bargaining extension practice is absent the sector. The same situation applies to the 
United Kingdom, where neither multi-employer bargaining nor legal extension mechanisms are 
existing, and the coverage rate in the telecom sector is only slightly higher, i.e. around 39 %, 
as that in the Portuguese telecom sector. No data on collective bargaining coverage in the 
telecom sector is available for Germany, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands (Traxler 2007c).  
The generally very moderate practice of extending collective agreements in the telecom sector 
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in the countries under consideration is due to the prevalence of single-employer bargaining, 
carried out most frequently by the former monopoly service provider. According to legal 
extension rules in the countries under consideration, single-employer collective agreements 
negotiated by the main supplier of telecom services are per definition not extendable to other 
companies in the sector as they are not concluded by a collective bargaining agent, i.e. a 
representative employer organisation equipped with collective bargaining rights. Apart from 
that, it may be possible that other companies in the sector consider the collective agreement 
concluded by the main provider as a ‘guideline’ for their own bargaining. However, such 
‘implicit’ or ‘latent’ mechanisms of coordination are not the object of this study. 
 
9.4.2.3 Characteristics of the sector-level collective bargaining system 
 
The table below (table 30) provides for a classification of the collective bargaining systems in 
the countries under consideration with regard to their capacity for the cross-border 
coordination of collective bargaining, or, the degree of the systems’ responsiveness (see 
sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.2.1). The classificatory scheme is based on three principal 
characteristics that ensure an effective coordination of collective bargaining policies across 
countries. These three dimensions of collective bargaining capacity are reflected in the value 
of the index sum and comprise the following indicators: First, the predominant level/s where 
collective agreements are negotiated; second, the existence of the coordination mechanism of 
pattern bargaining; and third, the provision of both a peace obligation for collective 
agreements in force and the legal enforceability of collective agreements.   
 
All countries where the two legal pre-requisites which ensure a high degree of vertical 
coordination of collective bargaining, i.e. the compliance of lower-level constituencies and the 
rank-and-file of the signatory parties to agreements negotiated at the sector and/or inter-
sectoral level (see section 5.1.2), are lacking, such as in Belgium, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and the United Kingdom, are summarised in category 1 (see table 30). The only 
exceptions are Germany and the Netherlands, two countries which are usually considered as 
disposing of highly responsive collective bargaining systems due to the existence of the two 
legal guarantees which ensure an effective coordination of collective bargaining on the vertical 
dimension (Traxler 2002).  
 
 
In contrast to the general pattern of collective bargaining, no sectoral multi-employer 
bargaining is existent in the German telecommunication sector. Rather, collective bargaining is 
carried out exclusively or predominantly on company-level. The same situation applies for the 
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Netherlands where no sector-related collective agreement is in force, and the majority of 
collective agreements are concluded at company-level. Although it is hypothesised (cf. section 
3.7) that collective bargaining within a multi-employer bargaining system is a necessary 
precondition for the coordination of collective bargaining on the national – and consequently 
on the international – scope, the high extent of formal de-centralisation of collective bargaining 
in the German and Dutch telecom sector has generally not to be considered as a hindrance for 
the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining. This is due to the fact that in the 
telecom sector the principal bargaining agent on the employers’ side is the former monopolist 
service provider. Thus, although single-employer bargaining is predominant, a large part of the 
labour force in the telecom sector is covered by the agreement concluded by the formerly 
public main provider. The same holds true for the cases of Spain and Greece where no multi-
employer bargaining is existent in the telecom sector, and collective bargaining takes place 
exclusively or pre-dominantly on company level. The case of Portugal stands out in this 
respect to a certain extent since there a central agreement on the national-level that is also 
applied in the telecom sector is reported to be existent. However, as company-level bargaining 
is predominant, and the collective bargaining coverage rate in the sector is low, i.e. 23 % (see 
table 55, Annex 4), the country’s collective bargaining system in the telecom sector is 
classified as de-centralised.  
 
However, the coverage of workers employed in the mostly smaller and newly established 
companies by collective agreements is rather fragmented. This gives rise to the polarisation of 
collective bargaining between the segment of labour force employed at the former monopoly 
supplier which is covered by collective agreement and those employed in the liberalised 
segment of the market, i.e. in the often newly established service providers, where collective 
bargaining is limited or non-existing (see section above). With regard to the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining policies a corresponding polarisation between one 
segment of the telecom sector where an effective cross-border coordination level is feasible, 
and another segment which has to remain uncoordinated transnationally due to its deficient 
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Tab. 30 – Typology collective bargaining system telecommunications sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of collective bargaining 
system Countries (index sum) 
0-1 Low responsive collective 
bargaining systems: lack of 
institutional prerequisites to ensure 
vertical co-ordination  
United Kingdom(0), GR (0), 
DE (0), ES (0), NL (0), PT (0), 
IR (1), IT (1), BE (1.5), FR 
(1.5) 
2-3 High formal responsiveness of 
collective bargaining system: 
supportive legal prerequisites to 
ensure vertical co-ordination                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
DK (2), SE (2), FI (3) 
<= 4 Highly responsive systems 
dominated by pattern bargaining  
AT(4) 
Source: see Table 56, Annex 4 
 
 
Collective bargaining systems in the Italian and Irish telecom sector exhibit a medium level of 
centralisation. In the case of Ireland, a national-level central agreement also covering the 
telecom sector is complemented by agreements on the company-level whereas in Italy an 
encompassing sectoral agreement is in force. In Belgium both industry-level collective 
bargaining as well as multi-employer bargaining on the cross-industry level is existent in the 
telecom sector. In France centralised bargaining covering the public sector as a whole covers 
those telecommunication sector’s employees still employed under public law terms. This refers 
to the majority of employees in France Telecom who have civil servant status.   
 
Collective bargaining systems in the telecom sectors of the countries summarised in category 
2 feature a high degree of formal responsiveness due to the co-existence of the two legal 
mechanisms that ensure a high vertical co-ordination capacity, i.e. a peace obligation of 
collective agreements and their legal enforceability. The difference with regard to the index 
value among the three Nordic countries though derives from slight variation with regard to the 
level of collective bargaining in the sector. In Sweden and Denmark multi-employer bargaining 
on the sector-level is prevailing. For instance, the major telecom companies in Denmark are 
members of Dansk Industri (DI), the country’s principal inter-sectoral employers’ association 
carrying out collective bargaining. In Finland, a number of sector-related agreements are in 
force though their scope goes beyond the telecom sector and includes industries such as 
information technologies.  
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Austria is the only country that is categorised as being characterised by a high de facto 
responsiveness of its collective bargaining system. There are three factors accounting for the 
high coordination capacity of the country’s collective bargaining system (see section 5.1.2.1). 
Two fundamental country-specific features of the collective bargaining system, i.e. pattern 
bargaining as the most relevant mechanism for the coordination of collective bargaining and 
second, the co-existence of a peace obligation for collective agreements in force and their 
legal enforceability, guarantee the effective coordination of collective bargaining on both the 
horizontal and the vertical dimension (cf. section 5.1.2). The relevance of pattern bargaining 
as a mechanism for the coordination of collective bargaining on the transnational level has 
been set out elsewhere (cf. section 1.5.3.1). Furthermore, with industry-level bargaining 
prevailing, the bargaining level as a sector-specific characteristic is sufficiently centralised to 
ensure an intra-sectoral coordination of collective bargaining across countries. It has however 
to be noted that Germany, the other country where pattern bargaining is the most important 
coordination mechanism, is better suited to take a lead in cross-border collective bargaining 
coordination initiatives simply due to its size and economic importance within the EU. Thus, 
the classification of collective bargaining structures in the telecom sector derives from the 
comparably high degree of de-centralisation of collective bargaining in this sector and has 
therefore to be regarded with some caution.  
 
9.4.2.4 Density of the sector-related trade unions 
 
In general sector-density is the more appropriate measure of the organisations’ membership 
strength than domain density. However, due to the lack of recent data, membership figures of 
sector-related employee organisations have been derived from a study carried out by the 
University of Louvain in 1999 (IST 1999b). The authors of this study refer to membership 
figures with regard to the entire organisational domain of the considered trade unions. Usually 
sector densities tend to be lower than those referring to the entire membership domain of the 
organisation (Traxler 2007c) with the partly exception of Austria and Denmark where sector 
density of some of the sector-related unions exceeds domain density. For some countries 
such as Italy and Denmark differences between domain and sector densities are rather minor. 
Furthermore, in the majority of cases, it can be assumed that unionisation in other domains 
such as communication or postal services does not largely deviate from that in the 
telecommunications sector (Traxler 2007c, Glassner 2008b). Data on both domain and sector 
density is lacking for Greece, Ireland and Sweden. 
 
 
  232  
Tab. 31 – Density of sector-related unions – telecommunications sector 
 
Density rates  (aggregate a) domain 
density 
(aggregate a) sector density 
< 25 
 
NL (< 20), FR (~ 20-25 
%), 
 




United Kingdom (~ 25-30 




DE (~ 50-60 %), ES (57 
%) 
FI (~65-70 %), 
> 70 
 
 DK (~ 80 %), AT (~ 70-85 %) 
a In case of multi-union systems, aggregate domain densities are estimated on the basis of unweighted 
averages of density rates of organisations for which data are available. For union systems characterised 
by a high degree of fragmentation (see Tab. 29) aggregate domain density is estimated on the basis of 
the most representative sector-related organisations for which data are available, as it is the case in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
b
 In case of multi-union systems, aggregate sector densities are estimated on the basis of unweighted 
averages of density rates of organisations for which data are available. For union systems characterised 
by a high degree of fragmentation (see Tab. 29) aggregate sector density is estimated on the basis of 
the most representative sector-related organisations for which data are available, as it is the case in 
Portugal. 
Source: see table 57, Annex 4 
 
 
Trade union density in the telecom sector is largely polarised both between countries and – 
within countries – between the (formerly) public main provider and the companies founded 
after the liberalisation of the sector (see table 31). Furthermore, domain densities tend to be 
higher than sector densities in those countries for which data on both indicators is available. 
This implies that the telecom sector as such is usually not the stronghold of organisation of 
trade unions with overlapping or sectionalistically overlapping domains (Traxler 2007c). This is 
underscored by the finding that in four out of 11 countries for which data are available, 
aggregate density rates in the telecom sector are lower than 25 %. This is particularly striking 
in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands, where the aggregate domain density of sector-
related union organisations is considerably lower than union density on the national aggregate 
level (i.e. 47 % in Belgium and 28 % in the Netherlands, see table 57, Annex 4). The low level 
of sector density rates in Portugal and Italy suggests that employee organisation was not 
particularly strong even in the former monopolistic main providers of telecommunication 
services. Contrastingly, aggregate domain densities are comparably high in France and Spain. 
It has however to be noted that data on domain density is available only for a small number of 
sector-related unions. In the case of Spain an upward bias of domain density may result from 
the fact that data is available only for the two most representative unions in the sector. In 
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Spain, unionisation is around 60 % in the main provider, i.e. Telefónica, a company that clearly 
dominates the telecom market in terms of employment and market share, whereas union 
density in the rest of the telecom sector is estimated to be around 20 % (Traxler 2007). Also in 
Germany, aggregate domain density clearly exceeds the rate of the national aggregate union 
density, i.e. 22 % (EC 2006). In Finland and Denmark aggregate sector densities correspond 
to the levels of national aggregate union densities. In Finland, sector density is below the 
national aggregate union density of around 76 % (EC 2006).  
 
Union density in the telecom sector exceeds unionisation in both the services as well as in the 
public sector in general only in Spain. In Austria and – to a lesser extent – in Germany, the 
aggregate sector or domain density, respectively, of unions in the telecom sector is higher 
than that in the services and the public sector. The outstandingly high unionisation in the 
Austrian telecom sector originates from the dominance of the formerly main provider, Telekom 
Austria, with regard to employment in the sector and the high affiliation of employees to the 
incumbent sector-related union GPF (Post- and Telecommunications Workers’ Union). In eight 
out of 11 countries for which data is available, domain (i.e. Austria, Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom) and/or sector density rates (i.e. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Spain) exceed 
unionisation in the services sector. However, when compared to union density in the public 
sector, unionisation in the telecom sector in terms of domain and/or sector density is weaker in 
the majority of countries under consideration, with the exceptions of Austria, Germany and 
Spain (see table 57, Annex 4).  
 
 
9.4.3 The telecommunications sectors’ MNC-level approach: ‘MNC-
alliances’ as a means for the transnational organisation of employees’ 
interests? 
 
The transnational coordination strategy of UNI Europa Telecom, the recognised social partner 
organisation on the employees’ side, clearly deviates from coordination initiatives in other 
sectors. The coordination of collective bargaining, which was not a prior goal in other UNI 
Europa sectors such as Finance and Property Services, is even less developed in the telecom 
branch of UNI. Three main areas of action of UNI Europa Telecom can be distinguished: First, 
social dialogue on the level of multinational companies, second, a network of collective action 
in individual companies, and third, issue-based and horizontal activities such as market 
regulation, outsourcing and off-shoring of telecommunication services. A focus of UNI 
Telecom is to become more representative in the companies affiliated to the network and in 
creating alliances between them (Interview UNI Telecommunications 2007).  
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In contrast to the finance sector however, European Works Councils (EWCs) do not play a 
major role within the company-based UNI Telecom network. This is due to the fact that union 
density in the sector’s EWCs is rarely more than 25 %. Moreover, only a small number of 
EWCs – currently eight – is  existing in the sector (Interview UNI Telecommunications 2007). 
This is particularly problematic in cases of mergers and takeovers when one of the companies 
does not dispose of a EWC. Another striking feature of UNI Telecom’s approach to 
transnational policy coordination is the organisation’s global focus of action. This derives from 
the strongly internationalised structure of telecommunication services market which is 
dominated by a small number of large former monopoly service providers, many of them 
employing between 150,000 and 200,000 employees. Coordination among these MNC is quite 
widespread and well developed. The high degree of internationalisation is also reflected in UNI 
Telecom’s membership structure which includes a large number of members outside of 
Europe. This contrasts to market and organisation structures in other UNI sectors, for instance 
the graphical sector, where a clear distinction between the European and the international 
level can be made.  
 
In the telecom sector, the ‘transnational dimension’ of collective bargaining becomes apparent. 
In this respect, is has to be distinguished between the ‘classical’ notion of collective bargaining 
as a competence clearly attributed to the national bargaining actors. Negotiations on the level 
of multinational companies are therefore considered as a distinct but related phenomenon to 
collective bargaining due to its distinctive character such as the limited scope of issues, i.e. 
work organisation, employment and work conditions, and training, that can be settled in 
company-negotiations (EC 2005a, EC 2008b) and the lacking legal base for such 
transnational company agreements. However, in a strongly internationalised market, the 
regulatory power of the European framework of industrial relations and the governing influence 
of the ‘European social model’ is surely limited and has to put into perspective. UNI Telecom 
aims at concluding transnational agreements in cooperation with its national member 
organisations, for instance the agreement in Greek Telecoms (2002) which has been co-
negotiated by the Greek affiliate OME-OTE, the far most representative employee 
organisation in the country’s telecom sector. Other global agreements have been concluded 
with the Spanish Telefónica (2001) and Portugal Telecom (2006) on the reaffirmation of ILO 
conventions and core labour standards as well as union rights. 
 
The activities of MNC-alliances are described as issue-based (Interview UNI Europa 
Telecommunications 2007). In general, alliances are a means to address union- and labour-
related problems with the company in a decentralised fashion, wherever the company’s or 
group’s of companies headquarters is located. Cross-border action within MNC-alliances is 
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predominantly global due to international corporate integration of large telecom service 
providers. The most important topics with regard to transnational coordination of workers’ 
interests are the organisation of labour force in MNC, strengthening employee organisation in 
call centres, the conclusion of Global Framework Agreements in MNC such as France 
Telecom, Portugal Telecom, or the ongoing negotiations in companies such as Deutsche 
Telekom, Telenor, British Telecom, the African-based communication services provider MTN 
or the Nordic operator TeliaSonera (Interview UNI Europa Telecommunications 2007).  
 
Despite the existence of a collective bargaining database providing bargaining information for 
member organisations, the coordination of collective bargaining policies across countries is 
not a prior goal of UNI Telecom. It is not perceived as being feasible since business units – 
and thus working and employment conditions – of large telecom providers are highly 
differentiated, such as for instance telecom, internet services, and mobile communication 
services. Instead of ‘classical’ collective bargaining coordination, joint campaigning activities 
are initiated and coordinated by UNI Telecom on a global scope.  
 
 
9.4.4 European Social Dialogue in the Telecommunications Sector 
 
European social dialogue in the telecom sector was formalised comparably late. The joint 
committee on telecommunications was established in 1990, and was transformed into a social 
dialogue committee in 1999. The main driving force for the strengthening and 
institutionalisation of European social dialogue was the liberalisation of the telecom market. 
The regulation of competition and technical organisation of the telecom sector are the main 
incentives for the European social partner organisation of the employers’ side, ETNO, to enter 
into dialogues with UNI Europa Telecommunications. Certain issues with regard to user and 
consumer rights, e.g. the protection of personal data, tariff transparency and dispute 
resolution, are more controversial (Interview UNI Europa Telecommunications 2007). 
Common interests between UNI Europa Telecom and ETNO, which mainly organises 
incumbent service providers, refer to training and the modernisation of work organisation, e.g. 
telework, the Commission’s regulatory policy on issues such as user and consumer rights, and 
competition. The most recent results of European social dialogue have been achieved in the 
fields of health and safety, such as a study on musculoskeletal disorders and a code of 
conduct for the prevention of them, and in the area of corporate social responsibility, such as 
the adoption of ‘good corporate practices in the telecom sector’ promoting equal opportunities 
and diversity in telecom companies.  
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With regard to the implementation of the results of European social dialogue on the sector 
level, such as joint texts and positions as well as recommendations, a divergence of interests 
between UNI Europa Telecommunications and ETNO is notable. Whereas UNI Europa is 
strongly promoting follow up procedures for the implementation of guidelines (i.e. on telework 
and customer contact centres) in order to stronger oblige the employers to apply the rules, 
ETNO’s position vis-à-vis monitoring and follow-up procedures is much more reserved and 
they prefer the purely voluntary implementation of joint texts.  
 
9.4.5 Trade Union Actors’ Perceptions in the Telecommunications Sector 
 
According to trade union respondents, UNI Telecom’s approach to the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining policies is limited to the exchange of bargaining 
information. A more active approach to coordination is surely not supported by the majority of 
members and therefore a political decision of establishing and extending existing structures 
and activities for the transnational coordination of collective bargaining is not going to be taken 
in the near future (Interview UNI Europa Telecommunications 2007). Likewise, policy 
coordination within MNC-alliances is still in a very nascent stage and strongly determined by 
market structures such as the type of service, e.g. call centre operations, fixed line telephone 
service, internet services, which is provided in a certain regional area by the respective 
company. Cross-border initiatives via representation in MNC is considered as much more 
effective by UNI Telecom since it is ‘closer to the members’ and it is therefore ‘much easier to 
establish a trustful and mutually sustainable relationships between union representatives and 
management’ (Interview UNI Europa Telecommunications 2007). UNI Telecommunications 
pursues a de-central approach to promoting employment and working conditions in MNC by 
encouraging local and national unions to bring up issues and to take action which is then 
coordinated and supported by UNI Telecommunications on a transnational scope.  
 
As far as interest constellations of UNI Telecommunications’s member organisations is 
concerned, the German trade union ver.di (Unified Service Sector Union) has a leading role in 
shaping the policy approach of the European industry federation. This is mainly due to the fact 
that the Deutsche Telekom is one of the  largest employers in the European telecom market. 
UNI Telecommunications’s membership share is generally high in Europe in the segment of 
the formerly state-owned telecom sector. Thus, another factor conducive to the strength of the 
German member organisation is the large share of employees in the sector who are employed 
under civil service contracts and – as a result of this – the high unionisation rate in the sector. 
In general, it depends on the issue under consideration which national member organisation is 
taking the leading role and strongly pushing for transnational action. With respect to the issue 
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of regulation, the Danish and the British organisations as well as the German member union 
which are playing a particularly active role. On a global level the Japanese, US-American and 
Australian members have an increased interest in regulatory initiatives of the European 
Commission since they are operating in the European market.  
 
9.4.5.1 Trade union actors’ perceptions with regard to ESSD and union-led 
coordination approaches  
 
In general, European social dialogue is perceived as an institution to strengthen mutual trust 
and understanding between the employers’ and employees’ side and is therefore assessed as 
having rather a normative, political function than being an instrument for the conclusion of 
substantive collective agreements on the European level. European social dialogue in the 
telecom sector is exclusively a forum for the deliberation of consensual topics, for spreading 
best practice and for providing an official and institutionalised framework for talks between the 
two sides of the industry. However, both European social partners of the employers’ and the 
employees’ side agree in preferring direct lobbying strategies to promote their interests with 
regard to Commission policies on legislation and regulation in the telecom sector. Against this 
interest constellation of organised labour and capital, the function of European sector dialogue 
becomes rather symbolic and has to be put into perspective with regard to the determination 
of working conditions in the European telecom sector.  
 
Although cross-border initiatives on the basis of MNC representation are perceived as being 
much more effective and feasible by UNI Telecommunications, and major efforts in terms of 
resources and personnel are invested into this kind of activity, European social dialogue in the 
telecom sector is regarded as an important complement to global policy coordination. Thus, 
the relationship between issue-based MNC-based alliances and the policy goal of concluding 
Global Framework Agreements as UNI Telecom’s core activities on the one hand, and 
European social dialogue on the sector level on the other hand, is not perceived as being 
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9.5 Construction Sector 
 
9.5.1 Economic background 
 
The construction sector exhibits a range of particularities. First, it ranks among the most labour 
intensive industries in Europe. 50 % of production costs are labour-related. The high share of 
labour cost in production cost put a strain on the labour factor by imposing stict requirements 
with regard to flexibility. Working time regulations, the timely framework for the completion of 
construction projects, seasonal, weekend and overtime work are all characterised by a high 
degree of flexibility. As a general trend, processes of outsourcing, sub-contracting and down-
sizing have been widespread in labour intensive industries. For instance, in the Netherlands 
around 60 % of construction services have been carried out by sub-contractors and only 40 % 
by the main contractors in the year 2005 (Cremers 2008).  
 
Thus, secondly, ‘atypical’ forms of employment such as self-employed persons and agency 
worker account for a comparably high percentage in the sector’s total workforce. The diffusion 
of ‘new’ employment relationships is considered as a response of employers to increased 
competitive pressures ensuing from the completion of the European Single Market and the 
enlargement of the EU. Prior to the step-by-step implementation of the Common Market 
principle from the 1980s onwards, the construction sector was dominated by large national 
companies and an array of small and medium-sized supplier and sub-contracting firms. The 
company structure in the sector often resembled a ‘quasi’ or a ‘factual’ cartel of large building 
companies in a large number of member countries. The procurement of public building works 
has often been associated with illegal practices such as collusions with regard to pricing. 
Although the liberalisation of the market in the course of the implementation of the European 
Single Market contributed to the containment of such practices, the implementation of EU 
procurement rules such as the directive on public works contracts, public supply contracts and 
public service contracts (Directive 2004/18/EC) is still incomplete. Another factor for the rise of 
outsourcing and subcontracting is rooted in the heterogeneous production system that takes 
the form of a multiple chain of production. Thus, single tasks are often ‘externalised’ to 
specialised – and mostly smaller – firms or self-employed workers. However, this has not lead 
to the emergence of independent firms. The sub-contracting companies located at a lower 
level of the value chain are in a rather defensive position vis-à-vis the main contractors that 
are able to exert a considerable degree of market power (Cremers 2008). Although sub-
contracting did not lead ‘to a deterioration of working conditions, it certainly has resulted in a 
decrease of the direct social responsibility of the main contractor’ (Cremers 2008, 6). The 
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problem is rooted in particular in the employment of unskilled labour force that has become an 
integral part of the employment strategy of lower level subcontracting firms. Thus, sub-
contracting often produces relationships between employer firm and worker that lay outside 
the legal framework of the regular labour market. It is of little surprise that these practices 
foster undeclared labour.    
 
Third, labour mobility in the construction sector is outstandingly high (cf. section 7.1). Although 
labour mobility has always been high, the eastern enlargement had the strongest effect on 
labour relationships in the sector. It can be assumed that there exists a considerable number 
of unregistered employees due the reported incidence of illegal employment in the sector 
(Interview EFBBW 2007) and thus official figures understate the extent of migrant employment 
in constructions. Estimates on the share of migrant workers in western Europe given by labour 
representatives rank between 10 and 15 % (Interview EFBBW 2007).  
 
Fourth, despite a wave of mergers and acquisitions since the 1990s (Cremers 2008, Interview 
EFBWW 2007) the construction and building sector is largely dominated by SME. Due to the 
factors described above, small and medium-sized construction companies have to face fierce 
competition. This often leads to the adoption of illegal practices. Hence, bogus employment 
and undeclared work is a widespread phenomenon in the European construction industry 
(Cremers and Janssen 2006) which has also been addressed by the European Commission 
(COM (2007).  
 
Finally, the European construction sector is to a large extent subject to Community policies. 
The adoption of the posted workers directive (Directive 96/71/EC) is one of the most important 
sector-relevant regulatory initiatives of the Commission. The aforementioned EU regulation on 
public procurement procedures strongly affects the construction sector. Additionally, the 
building and construction sector is highly regulated on the level of the member states. In all 
member states a legal framework regulates employment and working conditions in the sector, 
in particular with regard to health and safety. Market regulation in terms of rules for the 
procurement by tenders, national building codes and rules on technical standards have since 
long been a common feature in the construction industries of the member countries. The 
degree of legislative harmonisation within the European building industry is supposed to be 
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9.5.2 The national systems of industrial relations in the construction 
sector 
 
The aim of the following section is the categorisation of the national industrial relations 
systems in the construction sector with regard to the most important institutional variables, i.e. 
the degree of centralisation/fragmentation of the trade union system, the pertinence of 
extension of collective agreements, the level/s of collective bargaining and mechanisms of 
collective bargaining coordination, as well as the density of sector-related trade unions (see 
section 5.1). In order to define the economic activities that pertain to the construction sector, 
the delineation is comparably clear as is corresponds to NACE class 45. In order to identify 
employees’ organisations which fulfil the criteria of ‘representativeness’ and are therefore 
recognised as European social partner organisations in the European social dialogue in the 
construction sector, reference is made to the study on the representativeness of social partner 




9.5.2.1 Representative domain concentration/fragmentation of the union system  
 
In this section, the union systems in the construction sector in the countries under 
consideration are categorised on the basis of two crucial indicators, i.e. the number of sector-
related unions and the existence of domain overlap between these organisations. Sector-
related trade unions are those which are affiliated to EFBWW – The European Federation of 
Building and Wood Workers – and several other sectoral unions which have been reported in 
the study on the representativeness on social partner organisations in the construction sector 
that served as a guideline for the European Commission’s decision with regard to the 
recognition of European social partners in the European social dialogue in the construction 
sector (IST 1999a). As hypothesised in section 4.1.6 a high level of fragmentation of the trade 
union system inhibits collective action and thus a coordinated approach to collective 
bargaining policies by different national union organisations.  
 
Union fragmentation reaches medium levels in the construction sector compared to those in 
the other sectors under consideration. A fully-fledged single union system exists only in the 
Greek construction sector (see table 32). In Austria and Germany, two sector-related unions 
are organising workers in the construction sector. Whereas in Austria, separate organisations 
exists for blue- and white-collar workers, in Germany the domains of the two blue-collar worker 
unions of the construction sector IG Bau and of the metal sector IG Metall are overlapping to a 
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minor extent. Medium extents of domain overlap are arising in Portugal, Belgium, Spain, 
Finland and the United Kingdom. In Portugal, domain overlaps are existing between the two 
sector-related blue-collar unions whereas in Belgium overlaps are arising between 
organisations differentiated along political lines, i.e. the three sector-related unions of the 
socialist, christian and liberal peak-organisations. In Spain, domain overlaps are largest 
between the sector related organisations of the two main confederations MCA-UGT and 
FECOMA-CC.OO. In the United Kingdom overlaps are arising among all unions, i.e. the only 
sector-specialised organisation UCATT and the two general unions GMB and Unite78. A 
considerable degree of domain overlap is existing between all of the French sector-related 
unions (see table 58, Annex 5) whereas in Italy domain overlaps are arising in particular 
between the three largest sector related unions affiliated to the country’s main peak 
federations, i.e. FeNEAL-UIL, FILCA-CISL and FILLEA-CGIL. In the Netherlands the 
organisational domains of the three sector-related blue-collar workers unions (i.e. FNV Bouw, 
Hout- en Bouwbond CNV and Het Zwarte Corps) and – to a lesser extent – of the two sector-
related white-collar workers unions (i.e. De Unie and VHP) are overlapping. In Denmark and 
Sweden domain overlaps are arising mostly among blue-collar worker unions, i.e. between the 
Danish multi-sectoral union 3F - Fagligt Faelles Forbund and several specialised unions which 
also organise workers in the building industries such as electricians, metalworkers and 
painters, and between several Swedish sector unions with a rather narrow and specialised 
membership domain such as forest and woodworkers, building workers and electricians (see 
table 58, Annex 5). The largest number of sector-related unions is reported for Ireland. The 
most relevant union in the construction sector is the multi-industry federation SIPTU79 which 
co-exists with several – mostly smaller - sectoral unions. The largest domain overlaps are 
existing between SIPTU on the one hand, and the larger ICTU80-affiliates which organise 
workers in the construction and allied sectors such as BATU, UCATT and OPATSI, on the 
other hand (cf. table 58, Annex 5).   
                                                 
78
 In the UK the number of sector-related employee organisations decreased due to the general trend towards 
mergers among unions. For instance, the formerly existing organisations AEEU (Amalgamated Engineering and 
Electrical Union) and MSF (Manufacturing, Science and Finance) have amalgamated in order to create Amicus, an 
inter-sectoral trade union founded in 2001. AEEU itself resulted from a merger of EETPU (Electrical, Electronic, 
Telecommunications and Plumbers Unions) and PTU (Plumbing Trades Union) in 1992. Later on, Amicus and 
T&G (The Transport & General Workers Union) merged to form Britain’s largest union Unite in May 2007.  
79
 Two building sector unions, i.e. AGEMO (The General Automobile Engineering and Mechanical Operatives) 
and INPDTG (the Irish National Painters and Decorators Trade Group), joined SIPTU in the late 1990s (IST 
1999a).  
80
 The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) is the umbrella organisation for trade unions from the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
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Tab. 32 – Typology trade union system in the construction sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of trade union system Countries (index sum) 
0 – 1 points :  
low degree of 
fragmentation 
 
Category 1: Single union system, 
‘Quasi’-Single union system 
AT (0), DE (0), GR (0) 




Category 2: Functional diversity 
and moderate union competition 
PT (2), BE (3), ES (4), FI (4), 
United Kingdom (4) 
> 4 points:  




cleavages and high degree of 
union competition  
FR (5), IT (5), NL (5), SW (6), 
DK (7), IR (9)a  
a Unions in Ireland have also been affected by the merger activities of British unions. With regard to the 
construction sector, this applies to two organisations; ATGWU (The Amalgamated Transport and 
General Workers’ Union of Northern Ireland) joined T&G and later merged into Unite (2007) through the 
merger of T&G and Amicus and AEEU (The Amalgamated Engineering & Electrical Union) which 
organised workers both in the United Kingdom and Ireland and merged into Amicus in 2001 and later 
into Unite.  
Source: see table 58, Annex 5 
 
 
9.5.2.2 Extension Practice and collective bargaining coverage 
 
This section aims at analysing the system of collective bargaining in the western European 
construction sector. As hypothesised in section 4.1.9, the ‘inclusiveness’ or ‘exclusiveness’ of 
the collective bargaining system is the underlying criterion of assessment. In accordance with 
Traxler (1998a), in an inclusive collective bargaining system more than 50 % of workers who 
fall under the domain of the collective agreement are covered. With regard to the construction 
sector, this condition applies to all countries for which data is available – with the exception of 
the United Kingdom and Greece (see table 59, Annex 5). The most influential factor that 
determines collective bargaining coverage is the practice to declare collective agreements 
generally binding within their field of application by including all those employees and 
employers which are not members of the signatory parties to the agreements (i.e. according to 
the ‘erga omnes’ principle). In general, extension mechanisms apply to all sectors81. However, 
                                                 
81
 In Norway, legal mechanisms for the extension of collective agreements are applicable exclusively in the 
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in some countries certain categories of workers who are excluded from the right to collective 
bargaining, e.g. in the public sector, are not subject to extension rules. What is of relevance in 
this respect is not the legal provision of mechanisms for extension but the de facto practice of 
extending collective agreements which varies between sectors. In addition, functional 
equivalents that provide for an extensive application of collective agreements such as the 
compulsory membership in employers’ association or the legal guarantee of collectively 
negotiated minimum wages and working standards directly affect the level of collective 
bargaining coverage.  
 
In the construction sector the extension of collective agreements is pervasive in the majority of 
the countries under consideration, i.e. Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Portugal. In Austria, the obligatory membership for companies in the 
Chamber of Economy as the exclusively existing organisation which is entitled to conclude 
collective agreements ensures an outstandingly high level of collective bargaining coverage on 
both the inter-industry level and in the construction sector. In Italy, collective bargaining 
coverage in the construction sector more or less corresponds to the general collective 
bargaining coverage rate, i.e. around 70 %. In Italy, the entitlement of dependently employed 
workers to ‘fair pay’ is based on constitutional law. Labour courts and public authorities 
explicitly take collectively agreed wage levels into consideration in order to identify 'abnormally 
low' bids in public contracts (Traxler and Behrens 2002). This provision is of particular 
relevance in the building sector where public procurement is widespread.  
 
Collective bargaining coverage is clearly lower in countries where extension practices are 
adopted only to a limited extent or non-existing at all. For instance, in the Greek construction 
sector collective agreements are rarely extended and thus the rate of collective bargaining 
coverage is low, i.e. 29 %. The same holds true for the United Kingdom where labour law does 
not provide for the extension of collective agreements. The Scandinavian countries stand out 
with regard to the positive relationship between the existence of extension mechanisms and 
high collective bargaining coverage. In Sweden and Denmark high levels of collective 
bargaining coverage (i.e. over 90 %) are reached despite the fact that labour law does not 
provide for rules for the extension of collective agreements. Only in Finland, extension 
mechanisms have been introduced in the 1970s which further contributed to the high level of 
collective bargaining coverage in this country.  
 
With regard to the level of collective bargaining coverage in the construction sector, coverage 
rates are largely above 70 % in all countries where the practice of collective agreements in 
                                                                                                                                                           
construction sector (Dolvik 2007).  
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widespread or where functional equivalents are existing (see table 59, Annex 5). Only in 
Germany, considerable divergence exists between the eastern and the western part of the 
country. Collective bargaining coverage in the eastern German construction industry is 
considerably lower, i.e. 51 %, than in the western federal countries (i.e. approximately 84 %) 
since opening clauses in collective agreements which allow an undercutting of collectively 
negotiates pay rates are adopted to a large extent. Wage pressures are particularly vigorous 
in the eastern German construction sector, with a high percentage of undeclared work, 
migrant workers and atypical forms of employment such as agency work (cf. sections 9.5.1 
and 9.5.3). The trend towards the erosion of collective bargaining in Germany, in particular in 
the eastern part of the country, is evidenced by low rates of collective bargaining coverage 
which indicate a development from an inclusive to an exclusive system of collective 
bargaining. The dynamic of the process of de-centralisation of collective bargaining is spurred 
not only by the circumvention of collectively agreed on wage norms and labour standards 
through opening and ‘hardship’ clauses but even more by the evasion of companies from their 
membership to employers’ associations and their increased room to manoeuvre in order to 
choose the collective agreement the field of application (e.g. sector, sub-sector, branch) of 
which is considered as more favourable. In Greece and the United Kingdom, collective 
bargaining in the construction sector is fragmented with only a minority of employees covered 
by collective agreements. No conclusions can be drawn on the situation of collective 
bargaining coverage in Ireland since data on both the inter-sectoral and the construction 
sector is lacking.  
 
9.5.2.3 Characteristics of the sector-level collective bargaining system  
 
This section aims at categorising the collective bargaining systems of the countries under 
consideration according to their responsiveness. The capability of the collective bargaining 
system to bring wage developments in line with the macroeconomic goal of monetary stability 
differs between countries. The degree of wage political responsiveness is determined by the 
capacity of the collective bargaining system to coordinate wages between sectors and 
different groups of employees (i.e. ‘horizontal co-ordination’) and to guarantee the compliance 
of lower level bargaining units to general pay norms  and working conditions set at industry 
and/or inter-industry level (i.e. ‘vertical co-ordination’). The coordination capacity of collective 
bargaining is contingent on several factors, i.e. the degree of centralisation of collective 
bargaining and the mechanism for the coordination of the collective bargaining process and its 
outcomes (cf. section 5.1.2). In order to conceive a sector-specific typology of collective 
bargaining systems according to the capacity to coordinate collective bargaining policies 
transnationally three variables are of relevance (cf. section 5.1.2.1); First, the pre-dominant 
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level of collective bargaining in the sector, second, the existence of a covert bargaining 
coordination mechanism in form of pattern-bargaining and, third, the co-existence of a peace 
obligation and provisions that ensure the legal enforceability of collective agreements. The 
former two variables, i.e. the coordination mechanism and the pre-requisites that guarantee 
the vertical co-ordination of collective bargaining, are national characteristics of the collective 
bargaining systems. Thus, variation with regard to these indicators exists between countries. 
In contrast, the pre-dominant level of collective bargaining is supposed also to vary between 
sectors. Therefore, the focus of a sector-based analysis is on the centralisation of collective 
bargaining, i.e. the predominant level on which collective agreements are concluded in the 
construction sector.  
 
Collective bargaining in the construction sector is relatively centralised and takes place 
predominantly on the industry level (see table 60, Annex 5). The industry level is the sole level 
for the determination of wages and working conditions in the building sector in Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. Industry-level bargaining is 
complemented to a large extent by company-negotiations in Spain, Greece and Portugal. In all 
of these three Southern European countries industry-agreements are further specified on the 
regional level or – as in Greece – for certain crafts or groups of employees (IST 1999a). In 
France, in the construction sector – as one of the few sectors which are covered by industry 
agreements – collective agreements for both blue- and white-collar workers have been 
concluded by sectoral social partners (IST 1999a). In addition, collective bargaining to a large 
extent takes place on the company-level where wages and working conditions are specified in 
more detail. In Finland and – to a lesser extent – in Belgium centralised collective agreements 
on the inter-industry level are of relevance also for workers in the construction industry. In 
Finland for instance, the ‘Employment Contracts Act’ (2001) concluded on the inter-industry 
level aims at expanding all guarantees specified in the collective agreements to agency 
workers (EC 2006). The inclusion of atypically employed persons such as agency workers in 
the systems for the determination of wages and working conditions is of particular relevance in 
sectors with a highly mobile labour force as it is the case in the construction industry.  
 
The highest degree of bargaining centralisation is reported to exist in the Irish construction 
industry. Wages and working conditions of the sector’s of workers are to a large extent 
determined by inter-industry social partner agreements concluded in the ‘National Joint 
Industrial Committee’ whereby the sector-related bargaining units are the Construction 
Industry Federation (CIF) on the employers’ side and the sector-related ICTU-affiliates on the 
employees’ side (IST 1999a). Moreover, posted workers in the Irish construction industry are 
covered by the multi-employers industry-level ‘Registered Employment Agreement’ (Dobbins 
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2003) concluded by several sector-related trade unions and the CIF within the ‘Construction 
Industry Committee’.  
 
In the United Kingdom wages and working conditions of workers in the construction industry 
are settled mainly on the company level mirroring a general trend towards the decentralisation 
of collective bargaining in this country. Minimum conditions for workers in the sector are 
negotiated on a purely voluntary basis in the ‘Construction Industry Joint Council’ in the form 
of a ‘working rule’. In addition, a wide range of other multi-employer agreements covering 
specific groups in the construction and engineering industry as well as related industries have 
been concluded. However, the terms of collective agreements are not binding for employers 
that do not belong to the employers’ associations which are party to the agreement (Hall 
2003). Thus, the collective bargaining coverage rate in the British construction sector is the 
lowest of the Western European countries, i.e. 24 %.  
 
With regard to the capacity for wage political responsiveness the countries under 
consideration are summarised in three categories (cf. table 33). A low degree of 
responsiveness is characteristic for collective bargaining systems in the British, Spanish, 
French, Portuguese, Greek and Italian construction sectors. Since in none of these countries a 
covert mechanism for the coordination of collective bargaining in the form of pattern 
bargaining is existing, differences with regard to wage political responsiveness arise mainly 
from variation with regard of the prevailing level of collective bargaining and the existence of 
both the legal pre-requisites for the legal enforceability of collective agreements and a peace 
obligation for collective agreements during their duration of validity. Slightly higher levels of 
responsiveness are observed in Greece and Italy. In Greece where collective bargaining is 
relatively decentralised both of the legal guarantees are provided for in labour law whereas in 
Italy, both pre-requisites for a high degree of vertical coordination are lacking but collective 
bargaining is dominated by more centralised industry-wide negotiations.  
 
In the countries subsumed under category two, i.e. Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Ireland, the collective bargaining system in the construction sector exhibits a 
high degree of formal responsiveness. In the case of the three Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands this is due the existence of legal guarantees for the effective implementation of 
collective agreements. This differs to the situation in Ireland where collective bargaining takes 
place predominantly on the inter-sectoral level but provisions for the coordination of collective 
bargaining on the vertical dimension are lacking. Thus, it has to be noted that the de facto 
responsiveness of the collective bargaining system in the Irish construction industry is rather 
low since the crucial elements for an effective implementation of centrally negotiated collective 
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agreements is missing (cf. 5.1.2.1).  
In Austria and Germany highly responsive systems of collective bargaining coordination are 
existing due to the relatively de-centralised and flexible coordination mechanism of pattern 
bargaining in combination with the legal prerequisites that ensure the effective implementation 
of collective agreements concluded on the industry-level.  
 
Tab. 33 – Typology collective bargaining system construction sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of collective bargaining 
system 
Countries (index sum) 
0-1 Low responsive collective 
bargaining systems: lack of 
institutional prerequisites to ensure 
vertical co-ordination  
UK (0), ES (0,5), FR (0,5), PT 
(0,5), GR (1), IT (1) 
2-3 High formal responsiveness of 
collective bargaining system: 
supportive legal prerequisites to 
ensure vertical co-ordination                     
DK (2), IR (2), NL (2), SW (2), 
FI (3) 
<= 4 Highly responsive systems 
dominated by pattern bargaining  
AT(4), DE(4) 
Source: see table 60, Annex 5 
 
 
9.5.2.4 Density of the sector-related trade unions 
 
Union organisation in the construction sector is characterised by the existence of a multi-union 
system in the all of the countries considered – with the only exception of Greece where only 
one union is reported to exist (see 9.5.2.1). Since an aggregate measure for union density in 
the building industry is lacking and only density rates by organisation are available (IST 
1999a), an sector aggregate has been estimated according to membership and sector 
employment figures stated in the representativeness study (IST 1999a). Unionisation seems to 
be relatively high when compared to density rates in manufacturing in general (EC 2006). The 
differences are particularly pronounced in Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands. The high 
union density in the Belgian construction sector (see table 34) can be explained by the 
organisational strength of trade unions among unskilled blue-collar workers in this country, 
whereas the high union density in the Dutch construction sector does not correspond to the 
general sector- or occupation-specific organisation pattern since in the Netherlands the 
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highest unionisation rates are among skilled blue-collar workers (EC 2006), an employee 
group that does not constitute the majority of workers in the building sector. With regard to the 
strikingly high union density in the Greek construction sector, an up-ward bias due to inflated 
reported membership figures can be assumed. Trade union density in the construction sector 
is particularly low in Spain, i.e. 8 % compared to the density in manufacturing that ranks above 
14 % (EC 2006).  
 
Tab. 34 – Density of sector-related unions – construction sector 
 
Density rates  (aggregate a) sector density 
< 25 
 
ES (8 %), FR (9,5 %), PT (15 %), United 
Kingdom (21 %) 
< 50 
 
DE (26 %), IT (32 %), AT (38 %) 
51-69 
 
IR (52 %), NL (53 %), GR (54 %) 
> 70 
 
FI (85 %), SW (86 %), DK (90 %), BE (95 %) 
Source: Table 61, Annex 5 
a in case of multi-union systems a weighted average based on the union’s share of members in the total 
of members of sector-related trade unions;  
 
 
From a cross-country perspective, the levels of union density rates in the construction sectors 
of the considered countries are evenly distributed. However, a considerable dispersion can be 
observed between density rates in two groups where densities are highest and lowest. The 
estimates in table 61 (Annex 5) largely correspond to organisation patters on the national 
level, with the notable exceptions of sectoral densities largely exceeding aggregated density 
rates in Belgium, Greece as well as the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom where union 
organisation in the building industry is considerably lower than the national aggregate union 
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9.5.3 The Construction Sectors’ ‘alternative’ approach: Decentralised 
collective bargaining coordination or lobbying for European regulation? 
 
The path towards the Europeanisation of collective bargaining policies has already been 
stroke in 1988 at the general assembly of EFBWW, the sector’s European industry federation. 
From this event a number of coordinated initiatives have emerged. In the early 1990s 
demands for a European regulation on the posting of foreign workers have finally been 
realised through the adoption of the ‘posting of workers’ directive (Directive 96/71/EC). In 
parallel to the continued lobbying process of EU political actors in connection with the posting 
of workers directive, EFBWW promoted its approach to the cross-border coordination of 
national collective bargaining policies which intensified in the years from 1991 to 1994 
(Interview IG BAU 2008).  
 
In the construction sector coordination initiatives have been established almost exclusively 
between member unions of the European Federation of Building and Woodworkers (EFBWW) 
on a bi- or multilateral basis. For instance, the first project aiming at the cross-border 
comparison of collective bargaining structures, practices and outcomes in countries such as 
Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland and 
resulted in the first report on collective bargaining in the construction sector in 1996. Two 
years later a final report including all EU member countries (plus Norway and Switzerland) has 
been compiled. Most frequently cross-border union co-operations aiming at the coordination of 
collective bargaining are organised within the framework of European social funds that have 
been created to deal with some of the social political implications of the posted workers 
directive. Thus, they typically address topics related to the high cross-border mobility of 
workers, such as the cross-border recognition of pension insurance entitlements. Furthermore, 
on a more general level, these inter-union co-operations provide a basis for information 
exchange on national industrial relations and social security systems. The member 
organisations are encouraged to consider the most favourable system when concluding 
collective agreements, for instance with regard to the mutual recognition of pension funds. 
Inter-trade union coordination initiatives carried out with the involvement of social funds are 
more structured than ‘autonomous’ inter-union co-operations that are rather organised on an 
‘ad-hoc’ basis. This is the case in particular with co-operation projects between German and 
Dutch building workers’ unions (Interview EFBWW 2007).  
 
With regard to topics that related to the classic notion of collective bargaining, such as working 
time, worker protection and safety or pay-related issues, the position of EFBWW is clear; 
Collective bargaining clearly is a competency of the national social partners. In contrast to the 
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metal sector, the EFBWW respondent claims that ‘it’s not even possible to streamline 
negotiation procedures’ on the European level. Although the construction sector is relatively 
homogenous across countries, the production process is described as a ‘multiple chain of 
production’. Numerous supplier companies – often highly specialised – are linked together in a 
process of outsourcing and sub-contracting. Thus, bargaining agents have to consider the 
special conditions that are predominating in a particular segment of the production chain. 
Other factors that impede the application of common wage norms are the sector’s 
dependence on the business cycle and the dominance of small and medium companies with 
their very traditional employee-employer relationships. Personal relationships between 
negation partners are of great relevance. This conflicts with the exchange of trade union 
bargainers across countries. Although union officials from other countries are usually not 
participating in negotiations with employers, an exchange of union representatives takes place 
in coordination projects financed by social funds.  
 
 
This contrasts to other sectors in which the driving force of transnational coordination of 
collective bargaining policies derives from the European regulation of the building industry, in 
particular by the adoption of the posted workers directive in 1996.  
 
Arrangements for the transnational coordination of collective bargaining policies are 
comparably less formalised in the construction sector. There is exists no common formula for 
wage bargaining. However, EFBWW is working on a database on collective agreements on 
minimum wages, working time and work organisation in all 27 member countries. So far, a 
database on the various national legal regulations of the building industry for members has 
been set up. The building-up of the collective bargaining database also involves the 
employers’ federation FIEC (European Construction Industry Federation). Furthermore, an 
electronic system for the exchange of collective bargaining information in the member states 
as well as collective bargaining conferences between member organisation from neighbouring 
countries are elements of EBWW’s approach. However, with regard to the setting-up of a 
Europe-wide inter-industry coordination framework, EFBWW takes a distinct stance which 
differs from that in other sectors. According to a EFBWW respondent, the EIF does not want to 
participate in the Eucob@n system that has been established in the metal, chemical and 
textile industries (see section 9.1.6) at the current point of time.  
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9.5.4 European social dialogue in the construction sector 
 
The European social partner organisations in the construction sector, i.e. EFBWW and FIEC, 
have been among the first to establish a sectoral social dialogue committee in 1999. The 
posted workers directive also was a topic of relevance in the sector’s social dialogue. Other 
issues that have been addressed are health and safety, training and lifelong learning, 
occupational diseases and industrial accidents, migration as well as undeclared work in the 
enlarged of the Community. From a trade union’s point of view, all the topics discussed in the 
European social dialogue are contested by employers. Companies that are located on the 
lower end of the chain of subcontracting have to face strong competition in terms of costs and 
therefore, labour and employment standards are particularly low. Although in several countries 
such as Italy, Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, Finland and Spain national regulation in 
order to contain such practices is existing, these legal instruments are not considered as 
efficient instruments by EFBWW. Although the European employers federation of the 
construction industry declares its will and efforts to fight undeclared labour, concrete measures 
such as the increase of labour inspectors or ID cards for regular workers, have not been 
applied yet. The trade union respondent rather criticises that the European social dialogue is 
used by employers ‘for image building’. Despite the fact that European social dialogues in the 
construction industry evidence a considerable degree of activity in terms of the produced 
results, it is perceived rather critically be trade unionists (see below).  
 
9.5.5 Trade union actors’ perceptions in the construction sector 
 
In the following two sections, the most relevant perceptions of trade union bargaining agents 
with regard to inter-union cross-border coordination initiatives and with regard to European 
social dialogues in the construction sector will be described. Identifying contrasting interest 
positions – that may correspond to national boundaries – as well as areas of common 
interests and joint actions are pivotal to the qualitative analysis.  
 
9.5.5.1 Trade union actors’ perceptions with regard to union-led cross-border 
coordination initiatives  
 
The engagement of EFBWW’s member organisations in transnational collective bargaining 
activities differs widely. As in the other sector under consideration, regional clusters of activity 
can also be observed in the construction sector. The three member unions from Italy, i.e. 
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FENEAL-UIL, FILCA-CISL and FILLEA-CGIL, are particularly active as well as the German IG 
Bau and the Austrian Union of Building and Woodworkers GBH. Likewise, the Scandinavian 
member organisations are working closely together with regard to the coordination of 
collective bargaining policies and, in addition, with the Northern district organisations of IG 
Bau. Most of these initiatives are inter-regional bilateral co-operations between trade unions, 
e.g. of France and Germany, Italy and Spain. The main driving force to enter into cross-border 
co-operation is the movement of workers that is outstandingly within the region of Germany, 
Belgium and France. Due to their organisational strength and internal organisation capacity 
the German and the Italian building sector unions are taking on a leading role with regard to 
the transnational coordination of collective bargaining. Besides, among trade union 
representatives of these two countries pro-European attitudes are predominating. This may 
contrast to a certain extent to Scandinavian unions that prefer co-operation among themselves 
than within a broader European scope. With regard to interest constellation along national 
lines, the Nordic countries stand somehow apart in the sense that they have ‘a more 
protectionist system and are more or less isolated’ (Interview EFBWW 2007). Compared to the 
central European countries, labour migration is less widespread in the Nordic countries. Thus, 
the need to co-operate across border is less stringent. The sector’s union from the new 
member countries are forming another group of their own. Building sector unions in these 
countries are rather weak or inexistent. From the European peak-level organisation’s point of 
view, the member organisations in the central and eastern European countries are perceived 
ambiguously. On the one hand, they have been supported over the last years in terms of 
financial aid and the transfer of know-how. On the other hand, building sector unions in the 
new member countries have to a certain extent receded from the view of the EIF that is 
dominated by western European member organisations due to their lack of capacity for action 
on the national and – even more so – on the transnational level.  
 
9.5.5.2 Trade union actors’ perceptions with regard to central and de-central 
coordination approaches  
 
The lack of support by the Commission with regard to European social dialogue is also 
brought up by trade unions in the building sector. This perception of trade union 
representatives can be observed in all sectors. Thus, it gives evidence to a perceived 
fundamental inter-class difference between the ‘market-minded’ Commission with its aim for 
unrestricted cross-border mobility of factors and the side of organised labour that struggles to 
mitigate the social consequences of market integration. What is however striking is that the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the European social dialogue in the construction industry is 
regarded as particularly poor. The support of European social dialogue by EFBWW’s member 
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organisations is reported to have weakened over the last years.  
 
The relationship between the two instruments for a European-wide coordination of collective 
bargaining policies, i.e. European social sector dialogues and cross-border coordination 
initiatives among trade unions, is generally regarded as a mutually complementary one. 
However, it is stated that ‘it is difficult to find a common European approach’ to tackle the most 
pressing problem, namely the integration of migrant workers in the national industrial 
relationship structures. This issue is best dealt with on a bilateral level between trade unions. 
In this respect, good and bad examples can be observed. Joint Initiatives of the Austrian and 
Hungarian building sector unions are reported to be a model of ‘best practice’ whereas other 
bilateral approaches such those between Germany and Poland and some of the Nordic and 
the Baltic countries have proved to be less successful.  
 
Perceptions with regard to European social dialogue as an efficient and relevant coordination 
instruments strongly diverge between British and Irish trade unions on the one hand, and the 
Northern countries’ unions on the other hand. Whereas the former unions hope to enhance 
their organisational weakness through European social dialogues, the latter ones are sceptic 
or rather opposed to joint action in the framework of the European sector dialogue since their 
fear a down-ward pressure on their own high national standards by European agreements. 
However, Finland and Denmark depart from the path of opposition in certain issues. The 
leading role in initiating European social dialogue is taken by the German, Belgian and Italian 
trade unions. For unions of the new member states European social dialogues are not 
considered as a priority since they are primarily concerned with creating the preconditions for 
social dialogue on the national level.  
 
The relationship to the employers’ side is described as ‘having deteriorated’ in the last years 
(Interview EFBWW 2007). In the past, trade unions frequently entered into co-operational 
relationships with employers rather than with other sister organisations. This situation has 
sharply changed. Increased competitive pressures are the main hindering factor for European 
employers to participate in social dialogue. Employers enter into dialogue only when it is to 
their own advantage or when there is put pressure on them by the Commission. Another 
serious problem is the lack of representative employer organisations in some countries, in 
particular in the new member states (Interview EFBWW 2007). Regulatory initiatives by the 
Commission such as the posted workers directive are considered as the main driving force 
that prompts employers to participate in social dialogues with labour representatives. What is 
however stated by trade union bargainers is that joint agreements with the European 
employers are ‘very solid’. As soon as the initial opposition of employers is overcome, the 
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ensuing agreements – described as ‘pacts’ – are usually of high mutual liability (Interview 
EFBWW 2007). For employers the most important topic is to contain unfair competition. Illegal 
practices are considered as a problem but only a minority of employers is prepared to take 
concrete action against it due to the increase of competition, in particular among small and 
medium-sized companies. Trade union representatives noticed a change of employers’ 
attitudes towards a openly critical position vis-à-vis a legal-based system of labour market 
regulation and instead support a more voluntary system. In many of the new member 
countries the Anglo-Saxon legal system with a focus on self-employment and 
‘entrepreneurship’ has been implanted in labour relationships.  
 
In general, the current situation is perceived as not too favourable for European social 
dialogue. Employer’s reluctance and the lacking support for substantial agreements by the 
Commission have rendered European social dialogue a highly disputed and heavily criticised 
instrument by national trade unions. Thus, the future perspective of European social dialogue 
in the building industry is assessed to be bleak. Since the chances for solid agreements are 
decreasing and trade unions’ support is fading, it can not be ruled out that the social dialogue 
in the sector will not survive. In the face of the weakness of the instrument trade unions are 
seriously considering other policy strategies on the European level. Following the model of the 
employers, they also may embark on a strategy of individual lobbying for European regulation 
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9.6 The Banking Sector 
 
9.6.1 Economic background 
 
In the banking sector the repercussions from the EMU have been particularly strong. The 
integration of financial markets unleashed a wave of restructuring in the European banking 
sector. Although the most significant changes in the sector have been the automation and 
rationalisation through the introduction of information and communication technologies in the 
1980ies which lead to a significant reduction of employment in the sector, the trend to mergers 
and acquisitions with an increasingly cross-national dimension in the wake of the EMU did not 
result in a comparably steep decline in employees. Rather, it has been working conditions and 
work organisation that have largely changed in the financial sector (Sisson and Marginson 
2000). However, it has to be noted that the company structure in terms of ownership and 
subsidiaries of European banking companies is dominated by enterprises with a national 
scope. Cross-border mergers such as the takeover of the German Hypovereinsbank by the 
Italian Unicredit and the proposed takeover of AB AMRO by a consortium around the Royal 
Bank of Scotland have not been numerous in the banking sector. For instance, according to a 
study about one third of all bank mergers in Europe   between 1978 and 2001 included 
companies from different countries, with 20 percent of all cross-border mergers involved two 
European enterprises (Buch and Delong 2001). One important factor for the predominance of 
nationally operating companies is information costs that tend to be higher between than within 
countries. Besides, barriers resulting from regulation that still remain in the Common Market 
also account for the relative rareness of cross-border mergers in the banking sector. This 
finding clearly contrasts with the dominance of MNC in other sectors such as the chemical 
sector and the food industry. Internal restructuring in the banking sector involved the 
outsourcing of certain services to call centres. Additionally, the increasing integration of 
financial services such as banking and insurance and the enlarged range of activities carried 
out by single enterprises such as retail, corporate and investment banking, as well as 
insurance and savings blurred the boundaries of conventional collective agreements at 
national and sectoral level and left a void for MNC to escape multi-employer agreements. 
Thus, the shift from sector to company-level bargaining was particularly pronounced in the 
financial services sector.  
 
Capital mobility in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks is outstandingly high in the 
financial sector (cf. section 7.2) and mirror pervasive external restructuring on a global scale. 
However, FDI in the banking sector do not imply pressures increased international competition 
as they do occur in the manufacturing sector. In contrast to cost-minimising investments that 
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exploit labour cost differentials between countries and world regions and may thus spur 
‘regime competition’, investments in the banking sector are rather ‘market-seeking’. This is 
due to the nature of financial services, some of them – such as retail banking – remains 
largely entrenched in national markets but is increasingly influenced by global developments 
(Sisson and Marginson 2000). Labour mobility is typically low in the financial services sector. 
This is partly due to large-scale technology-induced reorganisation of work required an highly-
skilled workforce in domestic operations and ‚high-end’ business fields such as investment 
banking, whereas standardised tasks that involve less specialised knowledge and 
qualifications have been outsourced on a global scale. These changes in work organisation 
require the revision of traditional job descriptions. For trade union and employee 
representatives the changes in work organisation are – together with qualification and lifelong 
learning – among the most important issues to be dealt with in the financial services sector.  
 
9.6.2 The national systems of industrial relations in the banking sector 
 
In the following sections the national systems of industrial relations in the western European 
Banking sector are categorised on the basis of the most important features of industrial 
relations, i.e. the degree of domain fragmentation of the sector related trade union system, the 
prevalence of extension practice and the sectoral collective bargaining coverage rate, 
characteristics of sector-level collective bargaining coordination and the density of sector-
related unions (cf. section 5.1). The sector delineation corresponds to NACE class 65, i.e. 
financial intermediation without insurance services and covers activities of commercial banks, 
savings banks and co-operative banks (IST 2000).   
 
9.6.2.1 Representative domain concentration/fragmentation of the union system  
 
As specified in hypothesis 6 (section 4.1.6), a highly fragmented union system is an inhibiting 
factor to the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining policies since collective action 
is impeded by a large number of actors. In order to categorise the trade union system of the 
banking sector in the countries under consideration, two principal factors are considered, i.e. 
the number of sector-related unions and the existence of overlaps of the organisational 
domains of these unions.  
 
Union fragmentation in the western European banking sector is comparably low. In three out 
of 14 countries, a single-union system or a ‘quasi’-single union system is existing (table 35). In 
Austria, Denmark and Greece, only one sector-related representative union is existing in the 
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banking sector. A moderate degree of inter-union competition with regard to the recruitment of 
members is reported for Germany, and to a larger extent for Ireland and the Netherlands. In 
Belgium and the Netherlands workers are organised along political/confessional lines. Domain 
overlaps exist therefore between the three white-collar worker unions in Belgium, i.e. the 
socialist SETCa and the Christian and CNE – CSC (Wallonian) and LBC – CSC (Flemish) and 
between the Dutch white-collar unions CNV Dienstenbond and de Unie (see table 62, Annex 
6). In the case of Portugal the three most representative unions which are organising 
employees in the banking sector are affiliated to UGT. The inter-union competition is low or 
almost in-existent since there are no overlaps between the UGT-affiliates and the remaining 
sector-related union for managerial personnel (i.e. SNQTB).  
 
A highly fragmented multi-union system exists in the banking sector of Spain, France, the 
United Kingdom, Italy and Sweden and – to a lesser extent – between Belgian banking sector 
unions. In Spain inter-union competition arises mainly between the two largest sectoral unions, 
that is, the CC.OO-affiliate COMFIA and the UGT-affiliate FES, which both organise 
employees in all banking sub-branches, i.e. commercial banks, savings banks and co-
operative banks. Overlaps are also existing between the two largest unions and several 
smaller organisations which are not affiliated to UNI-Europa Finance, i.e. CSICA, organising 
employees in savings banks and FITC, covering all banking branches (see table 65, Annex 6). 
In France, organisational overlaps exist between all sector-related unions. The same held true 
for the two main inter-sectoral trade unions in the United Kingdom involved in collective 
bargaining, i.e. MSF (Manufacturing, Science and Finance) and UNIFI whereby the latter has 
been represented in all major banks82. However, with the merger of these two major financial 
sector unions in order to create Amicus together with two other unions (i.e. AEEU – 
Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union and GPMU – The Graphical, Paper and Media 
Union) in 2001 the intensity of inter-union competition has been diminished.  Besides, a 
number of company-unions is existing in the British banking sector. In Italy domain overlaps 
are arising between the CGIL-affiliate FISAC, the CISL-affiliate FIBA and the UIL-affiliate 
UILCA as well as between those three largest sector-related unions and several smaller 
employee organisations not affiliated to one of the main confederations (see table 65, Annex 
6). For Sweden, a considerable extent of domain overlap exists between a number of white-
collar worker unions differentiated along occupational lines such as for employees in the 
finance sector (i.e. Finansförbundat), economists and lawyers (JUSEK) and civil servants 
(ST).  
 
                                                 
82
 HSBC, Royal Bank Group, Lloyd/TSB, Barclays, Bank of Scotland, Co-operative Bank, National Australia 
Group (IST 2000). 
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In general, domain fragmentation in the European banking sector reaches medium-levels. In 
some countries such as in Italy a large number of sector-related unions are existing. Although 
the fragmentation of the union system is considered as a hindering factor to the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining, this does not hold true in the case of Italy. The Italian 
affiliates of UNI-Europa Finance are reported to be among the most active member 
organisations with regard to cross-border projects aiming at the coordination of collective 
bargaining. Likewise, UNI-Europa affiliates from Spain and the United Kingdom are active in 
cross-border co-operations, including such on collective bargaining issues (cf. section 9.6.3).  
 
 
Tab. 35 – Typology trade union system in the banking sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of trade union system Countries (index sum) 
0 – 1 points : 
low degree of 
fragmentation 
 
Category 1: Single union system, 
‘Quasi’-Single union system 
AT (0), DK (0), GR (0) 




Category 2: Functional diversity 
and moderate union competition 
FI (2), DE (2), IR(3), NL (3), 
PT (4)  





cleavages and high degree of 
union competition  
BE (5), ES (6), SW (6), UK 
(5),IT (7), FR (8) 
Source: see table 62, Annex 6 
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9.6.2.2 Extension practice and collective bargaining coverage 
 
In the following the analytical focus is on the ‘inclusiveness’ or ‘exclusiveness’ of the sectoral 
collective bargaining system as it is hypothesised in section 4.1.9. The main indicator to 
determine the exclusiveness/inclusiveness of the collective bargaining system is the level of 
the collective bargaining rate whereby the threshold is set according to theoretical reasoning. 
According to Traxler (1998a) an inclusive system is indicated by a collective bargaining 
coverage rate of more than 50 % whereas in exclusive systems less than 50 % of workers 
who fall in the domain of the respective agreement are covered.  
 
Collective bargaining coverage tends to be outstandingly high in the western European 
banking sector with coverage rates of above 60 % in all countries under consideration with the 
exception of the United Kingdom where the collective bargaining coverage rate is around 40 % 
(see table 63, Annex 6). One of the most important determinants of the level of collective 
bargaining coverage is the existence of legally provided mechanisms for the extension of 
collective agreements. In this respect, provisions for the extension of collective agreements in 
the ‘narrow sense’ (‘erga omnes’ principle), i.e. to declare collective agreements generally 
binding within their fields of application by including all those employees and employers which 
are not members of the parties to the agreement (Traxler and Behrens 2002), are of 
relevance. However, in order to analyse the sectoral collective bargaining systems according 
to their ‘inclusiveness’/’exclusiveness’ it is not the existence of legally provided extension 
mechanism which are existing in the vast majority of EU countries but rather the de facto 
application of rules for the extension of collective agreements. Legal extension mechanisms 
are guaranteed on the inter-industry level in the vast majority of European countries83 whereby 
in some countries certain groups of employees which are not entitled to the right of collective 
bargaining (e.g. in Austria, Spain) are excluded. This contrasts to the de facto practice to 
extend collective agreements which differs not only between countries but also between 
sectors. In some countries functional equivalents of legal extension rules are existing (see 
table 63, Annex 6), i.e. in Austria the compulsory membership in the Chamber of Economy as 
the only employers’ association that participates in collective bargaining and in Italy the 
constitutionally guaranteed entitlement of dependently employed persons to ‘fair’ wages that 
renders collectively negotiated wage rates as a yardstick in labour court decisions.  
 
 
                                                 
83
 In Norway extension of collective agreements according to the erga-omnes principle is limited to the 
construction sector (Dolvik 2007).  
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In all countries where the practice to extend collective agreements in the banking sector is 
pervasive, collective bargaining coverage rates tend to be strikingly high, i.e. above 80 %. The 
same holds true for those countries where functional equivalents are existing, i.e. Austria and 
Italy. In Spain where the extension of collective agreements is not a common practice in the 
banking sector, collective bargaining coverage approaches 100 % due to the outstandingly 
high density rates of sector related employer associations84. Thus, provided a high level of 
employer density the extension of collective agreements is a redundant practice. Likewise, 
employer density in Greece is supposed to be high although data is not available for the entire 
sector85. Despite the limited practice to extend collective agreements in the banking sector, the 
collective bargaining coverage rate in the Greek banking sector reaches 70 %. In the German 
and Dutch banking sector the extension of collective agreements is not a common practice. 
Despite the lack of extension practice the sector-related collective bargaining coverage rate 
exceeds 90 % in the Netherlands whereas in Germany collective bargaining coverage in the 
banking sector is considerably lower, i.e. above 65 %. However, in both countries the sectoral 
collective bargaining coverage is in line with the rates for the total economy, i.e. 88 % in the 
Netherlands and 67 % in Germany (Marginson and Traxler 2005). No legal provisions for the 
extension of collective bargaining are existing in Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
In the two Scandinavian countries collective bargaining coverage in the banking sector is 
comparably high (i.e. 100 % in Denmark and above 90 % in Sweden). Although in the United 
Kingdom the collective bargaining coverage rate in the banking sector (i.e. 41 %) is the lowest 
of the countries considered in this study, it exceeds the aggregate collective bargaining 
coverage rate of 36 % (Marginson and Traxler 2005) to a considerable extent. The tendency 
of banking sector collective bargaining coverage rates to exceed those on the aggregate, i.e. 
inter-industry, level can also be observed in Denmark (i.e. 100 % in the banking sector 
compared to the aggregate coverage rate of 83 %), Spain (i.e. 98 % compared to 86 %), 
Finland (i.e. more than 97 % compared to 81 %) and Italy (i.e. approximately 80 % to around 
70 %). Only in France the collective bargaining coverage rate in the banking sector tends to be 




                                                 
84
 For instance, approximately 100 % of private banks are affiliated to the respective sectoral employers’ 
association AEB. Likewise, employer density in the sub-sector of savings banks is equally high ( i.e. the 
organisational density of 98 % of ACARL) (cf. IST 2000).  
85
 More than 80 % of those companies active in the segment of private and state-owned banks are affiliated to the 
respective employer association OTOE (IST 2000).  
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9.6.2.3 Characteristics of the sector-level collective bargaining system 
 
As laid down in section 5.1.2.1, the typology below (cf. table 36) aims at classifying the 
countries under consideration according to the degree of wage-political responsiveness of 
their sectoral collective bargaining system. Three indicators are of relevance in this respect; 
First, the pre-dominant level of collective bargaining, second, the existence of a covert 
coordination mechanisms in the form of pattern-bargaining, and third, the existence of both a 
peace obligation for valid collective agreements and their legal enforceability. The latter two 
variables are features of the national arrangements of collective bargaining and differ therefore 
between countries and not between sectors. Inter-sectoral variation emerges from the 
differences with regard to the prevailing bargaining level in the respective sector. What is 
important to note is that the capacity of the sectoral collective bargaining system to coordinate 
the bargaining process as well as its outcomes across borders is under investigation here. 
Pattern-bargaining is conceived as the most effective mechanism to coordinate collective 
bargaining on the transnational intra-sectoral level (cf. section 1.5.3.1). Therefore, the indicator 
for the existence of pattern-bargaining on the national level has a particularly strong weight in 
the analysis.  
 
Turning to the prevailing level of collective bargaining, the banking sector is characterised by 
comparably centralised bargaining with the sector level as the predominant one (cf. table 64, 
Annex 6). Sectoral collective bargaining is predominant in the banking industry in Austria, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Sweden. In Italy and Portugal collective 
bargaining is carried out for the entire banking sector, i.e. commercial, savings and co-
operative banks, for both blue- and white-collar workers, whereas in Austria separate 
agreements are negotiated for distinct employee groups, i.e. blue- and white-collar workers. In 
Belgium inter-sectoral social partner agreements which complement collective agreements for 
savings and commercial banks are of relevance also for workers in the banking sector. Sector 
agreements are complemented by company-agreements in Germany, Spain, Finland, Greece 
and the Netherlands. Sector-level bargaining is prevailing in Spain, Finland and Greece. In 
Finland the vast majority of employees in the banking sector is covered by sectoral 
agreements, i.e. 97 % of employees in the sector are covered by the central agreement, and 
around 70 % of banking sector employees are covered by sectoral agreements negotiated by 
the most representative employers association86 in Greece. Collective bargaining is 
comparably de-centralised in the banking sectors of France, Germany and the Netherlands 
                                                 
86
 The most representative employers’ association in the Greek banking sector is HBA – Hellenic Banks 
Association with a density rate of 69 % (IST 2000).  
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where industry agreements and company-agreements are complementing each other and 
cover a comparable share of employees in the sector. Decentralised collective bargaining with 
the company as the sole bargaining level is existing in Ireland and the United Kingdom. In both 
countries no employers’ association which is entitled to participate in collective bargaining is 
existing in the banking sector.  
 
Turning to the indicator of collective bargaining coordination capacity, half of the countries 
under consideration are categorised as collective bargaining systems with a low degree of 
responsiveness. This applies to those countries with de-centralised systems of collective 
bargaining in the banking sector such as the United Kingdom, Ireland and France. In all of 
these three countries the institutional pre-requisites for the vertical co-ordination of collective 
bargaining outcomes is lacking (see table 64, Annex 6). Spain, Italy and Portugal share 
communalities with regard to the bargaining level whereby the sector level is predominant and 
the lack of legal guarantees to ensure the compliance of lower level bargaining units and their 
members to more centrally negotiated provisions. The Netherlands stand out from the group of 
‘Southerners’ since the country is typically classified as being characterised by a highly 
responsive collective bargaining system (Traxler 2002). With collective bargaining taking place 
at a relatively de-centralised level, i.e. on both the industry and company level, and the 
existence of both legal preconditions for a high degree of vertical co-ordination capacity, it can 
be assumed that the country’s collective bargaining system in the banking sector disposes of a 
higher formal degree of wage political responsiveness. The empirical findings have however to 
be put into perspective when it comes to the transnational coordination of collective 
bargaining. Bargaining experts point out that de-centralised collective bargaining on the 
national level hinders cross-border coordination on a transnational scope, in particular when a 
sector is dominated by large multinationals. This seems to be the case in the Dutch banking 
sector where collective bargaining is to a large extent influenced by negations on the level of 
MNC (cf. section 9.6.3).  
 
The second category which summarises countries characterised by collective bargaining 
systems with a high degree of formal responsiveness covers a highly heterogeneous group of 
countries with regard to their industrial relations systems. The ‘Nordics’, i.e. Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden, are subsumed under the same category as Greece and Belgium. With the 
exception of Belgium, the collective bargaining systems of all of these countries dispose of the 
legal pre-requisites that guarantee an effective implementation of collective agreements. 
Belgium has to be perceived from a different angle since it falls into this category only due to 
the comparably high degree of centralisation of collective bargaining in the banking sector. 
Thus, the de facto coordination capacity of the collective bargaining system in the Belgian 
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banking sector is clearly reduced since the vertical co-ordination of collective bargaining is not 
ensured. With regard to the level of collective bargaining, a higher degree of centralisation is 
conducive to the transnational coordination of collective bargaining.  
 
A high degree of transnational wage political responsiveness is evidenced in the German and 
Austrian banking sector due to the existence of legal guarantees for the vertical coordination 
of collective bargaining outcomes and pattern-bargaining as the principle mechanism to 
coordinate collective bargaining between sectors. It has to be noted that other mechanisms 
than pattern-bargaining are equally suited to guarantee the efficient coordination of collective 
bargaining on the horizontal dimension. For instance, in Finland and the Netherlands, a high 
degree of inter-sectoral coordination capacity is ensured by                                                                                                                    
state-sponsored wage bargaining, i.e. in the form of tripartite bargaining whereby state 
agencies (e.g. the government) directly participate in peak-level wage bargaining without 
authoritatively imposing an agreement (Traxler 2002). State-sponsored bargaining was the 
pre-dominant coordination mode in these two countries in the 1990s (cf. Traxler and Kittel 
2000, Traxler et al. 2001). The same holds true for wage bargaining coordination in Sweden. A 
short period of uncoordinated, de-centralised bargaining took place under employers’ 
pressures in the mid-1990s. During this conflict-ridded period, the principle of state mediation 
and conciliation in important industries in the case of a deadlock of social partner negotiations 
came into fore. Later on, industry bargaining was re-established with the conclusion of the 
Industrial Agreement on common principles for future wage negotiations in 1997 which 
however provides for a rather unstable framework since ‘cooperation with business has been 
formalised across the domains of the union confederations’ (Traxler et al. 2001, 157). The 
problem of incompatible interest representation domains and organisation patterns between 
business and unions which burdens collective bargaining on the sector level lead to the 
emergence of pattern-bargaining as a supplementary coordination mode whereby 
manufacturing or one of its branches set the pace for wage negotiations in other sectors. 
Thus, the de facto responsiveness of the collective bargaining system in Sweden is higher 
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Tab. 36 – Typology collective bargaining system banking sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of collective bargaining 
system Countries (index sum) 
0-1 Low responsive collective 
bargaining systems: lack of 
institutional prerequisites to ensure 
vertical co-ordination  
United Kingdom(0), 
industrial relations (0), FR 
(0,5), ES (1), IT (1), NL (1), 
PT (1) 
2-3 High formal responsiveness of 
collective bargaining system: 
supportive legal prerequisites to 
ensure vertical co-ordination                                                                                                                                                                            
BE (1,5), DK (2), FI (2), 
GR (2), SW (2) 
<= 4 Highly responsive systems 
dominated by pattern bargaining  
AT (4), DE (4) 
Source: see table 64, Annex 6 
 
9.6.2.4 Density of the sector-related trade unions 
 
Trade union densities in the banking sector of the countries under consideration are strikingly 
high (see table 37). In all countries with the exception of France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom union densities in banking are considerably higher than in the 
services sectors in general (EC 2006). Union densities in the banking sector even clearly 
exceed unionisation rates in manufacturing which tend to be higher than in the services 
sectors, with the exceptions of Spain, Italy and Portugal where the service sector density is 
equal to that in manufacturing (EC 2006). Differences between union density rates of banking 
sector and the services sector in general are particularly pronounced in Portugal and Greece, 
i.e. around 90 % compared to 13 % and 84 % compared to 14 % (EC 2006). The 
outstandingly high level of reported banking sector densities in the latter two countries seems 
to imply an upward-bias. Considerable differences between the two density measures can 
also be observed in Italy, i.e. 51 % compared to 26 %, Finland, i.e. 88 % compared to 64 %, 
and Denmark, i.e. approximately 98 % compared to 77 %.  
 
The low density rates in the German and British banking sector, i.e. below 15 % and below 10 
%, respectively, is in line with union organisation patterns according to distinct occupational 
groups. In Germany, union organisation is highest among (skilled) blue-collar workers and in 
the United Kingdom density rates are high among professional and managerial staff, followed 
by unskilled blue and white-collar workers. Thus, the predominantly high-skilled labour force in 
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the banking sector tends to be among the less organised employee groups (EC 2006).     
 
Tab. 37 – Density of sector-related unions – banking sector 
 
Density rates  (aggregate a) sector density 
< 25 
 
United Kingdom (< 10 %), FR (11 %), DE (< 15 
%), NL (20 %) 
< 50 
 




IT (51 %), BE (60 %)  
> 70 
 
SW (80 %), GR (84 %), FI (88 %), PT (90 %), 
DK (98 %) 
Source: Table 65, Annex 6 
a in case of multi-union systems a weighted average based on the union’s share of members in the total 




9.6.3 Decentralised coordination in the banking sector: The UNI-Finance 
Collective Bargaining Network 
 
Although the Europe-wide coordination of collective bargaining has been an important topic 
before, structures on the European peak-level have been established not earlier than in 2000. 
The European Industry Federation UNI-Finance established a web-page and a database 
serving as a platform for the exchange of information on several important topics such as 
restructuring. However, collective bargaining information was included only since 2002, when 
the first data-based project on benchmarking pay and working time was initiated (Dufresne 
2002). The collection of collective bargaining information was further elaborated with the 
foundation of the UNI-Finance Collective Bargaining Network in 2000 and the setting-up of a 
database which documents the results of sector-level agreements in banking and insurance. 
EIF representatives point out that wage policy coordination is not a goal within the Collective 
Bargaining Network since it is exclusively dealt with by national unions. However, the 
network’s database does include information on wage increases. In contrast to earlier findings 
(Dufresne 2002), union respondents underscore that there exists no instrument for the 
transnational wage bargaining coordination that is based on quantitative orientation criteria 
such as inflation and productivity growth (Interview 2 UNI-Europa Finance 2007, Interview 
ver.di 2008). Such a quantitative ‘coordination rule’ for wage bargaining is not considered as 
being useful in the banking sector, since wages depend on a variety of factors and are 
therefore not easily comparable between countries. Besides, despite the existence of 
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collective agreements in the banking and insurance sector wages are frequently settled at 
company-level. A high wage-drift resulting from differences between collectively negotiated 
and effective pay increases renders an efficient implementation of a wage rule doubtful.  
 
Within the organisational structures of the UNI-Finance Collective Bargaining Network 
participating unions meet on an annual basis. Although meetings are scheduled on a regular 
basis, trade unions participation is characterised by a certain degree of discontinuity. One of 
the trade union bargainers describes the voluntary character of these meetings as follows: ‘… 
who wants to participate participates, who doesn’t want, doesn’t’ (Interview 2 UNI-Europa 
Finance 2007). According to European-level trade union representatives, a distinct leading 
trade union organisation that plays an active role in pushing coordination initiatives is not 
discernible in the finance sector. This finding contrasts with that of other sectors, particularly 
the metal industry where the German IG Metall acted as a pioneer with regard to the 
establishment of collective bargaining coordination networks (see section 9.1.4). The German 
union counterpart in the banking sector, i.e. the multi-sector white-collar union ver.di (Vereinte 
Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft – Unified Service Sector Union), is characterised by a high 
degree of organisational heterogeneity with regard to the sectoral scope of its organisational 
domain. Within ver.di 13 sectoral units are existing as the union organises employees in 
sectors such as finance, telecommunications, postal services, media and arts as well as public 
services such as healthcare, social services, education and transport. 
 
However, within the UNI-Finance Collective Bargaining Coordination Network the group of 
non-German and non-British western European unions in the finance sector are described as 
the most active ones (Interview 2 UNI-Europa Finance 2007). This assessment is though 
attenuated since German and British unions have autonomously set up multilateral 
coordination initiatives that are often joined by unions from other countries (Interview ver.di 
2008). The bargaining coordination network within the framework of UNI-Finance exhibits a 
high degree of de-centralisation. Top-down coordination by the EIF is comparably limited 
whereas the member organisations enjoy a high degree of autonomy in shaping policy goals 
and organising and administering the bargaining coordination network. A respondent 
describes the role of national member unions in this bottom-up approach as follows: ‘Our 
organisations are UNI-Finance. They are the decision-makers’ (Interview 2 UNI-Europa 
Finance 2007). Intra-union structures are less hierarchical. According to one respondent, there 
is no clear separation of the European peak-level federation and the national member 
organisations. The Collective Bargaining Network of UNI-Finance is described as a ‘self-
sustaining structure’ created by the national member organisations in cooperation with the UNI 
Secretariat.  
  267  
Several groups of unions have already established collective bargaining networks within the 
framework of the finance section of the global trade union UNI-Europa. These union-led, 
multilateral projects aiming at the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining policy are 
though set up on a rather informal basis compared to the bargaining networks of the metal 
sector. However, some of the more recent examples such as the joint declaration on collective 
bargaining coordination and cooperation of banking sector unions from Belgium (Centrale 
Nationale des Employés – CNE and Landelijke Bedienden Centrale-NVK), France (Fédération 
des Employés et Cadres), Italy (Federazione Italiana Bancari e Assicurativi), Austria (Union of 
Salaried Employees – GPA), Sweden (Financial Sector Union of Sweden - Finansförbundet) 
and Germany (Unified Service Sector Union – Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft, ver.di) in 
November 2004 (Broughton 2005) and the Collective Bargaining Project in Insurance with the 
participation of the German ver.di, the British Amicus, the Italian FISAC/CGI and FDS/CFDT 
from France in the same year, resemble their counterparts in the metal industry. The 
decentralised approach to collective bargaining policy coordination in the finance sector and 
the high degree of autonomy of UNI Finance’s member organisations is demonstrated by 
cross- border union co-operations initiated by national unions. For instance, the German multi-
sectoral white-collar union ver.di which organises workers in the finance sector has initiated an 
‘autonomous’ network with banking sector unions from Belgium, Austria, Italy, France, 
Denmark, Sweden and Greece in 2005. In regular meetings, representatives from these 
unions address bargaining-related issues such as the development of benchmarks on pay and 
remuneration or the formulation of joint positions on performance-related pay norms (Interview 
ver.di).  
 
In general, the banking sector unions’ initiatives are based on a regular, network structured 
coordination approach that goes beyond the pure exchange of information. It also includes the 
participation of trade union representatives in collective bargaining committee meetings of 
other partner unions and the support of partner unions in collective bargaining disputes. In 
contrast to the metal sector’s collective bargaining networks, the participation of 
representatives from partner unions in negotiations with employers is not part of the 
declaration. Due to the relative recent establishment of these cross-border initiatives, it has to 
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9.6.4 European social dialogue in the banking sector 
 
An informal working party has been established in the banking sector already in 1990. The 
banking sector was amongst those that established a sectoral dialogue committee in the first 
year after the Treaty of Amsterdam which provided for new European dialogue structures on 
the sector level came into force. On the workers’ side, UNI-Europa Finance was recognised as 
a social partner organisation by the Commission. The employers are officially represented by 
the European Banking Federation (FBE), the European Savings Bank Group (ESBG) that 
organises the interests of savings and retail banks and the European Association of Co-
operative Banks (EACB). This contrasts to other sectors such as the chemical industry, where 
no explicit external factor triggered the establishment of a sector committee. Rather, the 
structures from pre-Amsterdam European dialogues have been transferred into the new 
system of European sector dialogues. Among the most important topics are corporate social 
responsibility, lifelong learning and demography. The issue of flexicurity has mainly been 
brought up by employers. In general, topics addressed in European social dialogues are non-
controversial.  
 
9.6.5 Trade union actors’ perceptions in the banking sector 
 
Compared to the metal industry and the chemical sector, the financial sector unions’ approach 
to collective bargaining coordination is less centralised and top-down structured. The 
European-level sector organisation UNI Financee coordinates and actively supports 
coordination initiatives. Wage bargaining however is considered as to be exclusively in the 
realm of national unions. Despite the high concentration in the sector arising from the 
dominance of large companies – which are however predominatly operating in national 
markets – the transnational company-level as the the primary field for cross-border action is of 
greater importance than the sector-level.  
 
9.6.5.1  Trade union actors’ perceptions on transnational coordination against 
the background of internationalised markets 
 
The wave of mergers and acquisitions in the finance sector is perceived as the prior force that 
drives union-led coordination activities. In this respect, UNI-Europa Finance launches joint 
campaigns and pursues lobbying strategies in cases of major take-overs. However, trade 
union activists admit that their power for action – mainly backed by the support of the public 
opinion – is limited in influencing managerial decisions. An important source of power that 
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increases the capacity for action on the employees’ side is to obtain on-time information of 
planned mergers and take-overs. Thus, the major problem of trade union and employee 
representatives is the lack of information from management as far as future merger activities 
are concerned. Employee information policy of multinational finance companies is to a large 
extent determined by corporate law and stock exchange rules. Employee information rights 
are restricted under US stock exchange rules which apply to a greater extent also to MNC 
operating in Europe. Thus, higher European standards of worker information rights are 
undermined to an increasing extent by the internationalisation of capital markets. The direct 
effects of the asymmetry of power between labour and capital are reported to be most 
vigorous in the context of cross-border action by MNC management. Nevertheless, trade 
union respondents claim that transnational strategies of joint action are the most important 
instrument to counter business’ fairly unrestricted scope of action. However, finance sector 
trade unionists state that this is to be reached best on the transnational company level.  
 
9.6.5.2  Trade union actors’ perceptions with regard to central and de-central 
coordination approaches  
 
In general, both transnational bargaining coordination initiatives led by unions and European 
social dialogues on the sector level are considered as complementing each other. Tough, one 
respondent asserts that in transnational union networks it is often easier to identify common 
topics since participants do not have to follow the strict time frames imposed by the European 
Commission within the framework of European social dialogue (Interview 2 UNI-Europa 
Finance 2007) . On the other hand, the potential of achieving binding agreements concluded 
in European social dialogues on the sector level is perceived as particularly relevant.  
 
Surprisingly, the process of interest unification between trade unions is described as one of 
the most difficult tasks related to European-level social dialogue. In this respect, institutional 
heterogeneity and diverging collective bargaining practices in the member states are inhibiting 
the process of interest identification and unification among national trade unions. The principle 
of implementing agreements achieved in European social dialogues on the sector level feeds 
back to the initial phase of dialogue, that is, intra-organisational decision-making within the 
EIF. The question of whether to address a certain topic in the European social dialogue or not 
is closely linked to the role of the national social partners in implementing common standards. 
Hereby, the discussion on how to – and to what extent – involve national social partner 
organisations is perceived as decisive by one of the key bargaining policy coordination experts 
of UNI-Europa Finance. In this respect, the ambiguous nature of the interest unification 
process within the unions’ side compared to the clear position of the employers’ side becomes 
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manifest: 
 
‘Within the trade unions the main controversy centres around the question of how meaningful 
– and relevant – certain joint positions are and how they are implemented at national level. 
Employers tend to deal with social policy issues on the national level and our opinion is that 
the European level should appear - as to counterbalance this tendency’ (Interview 2 UNI 
Finance 2007).  
 
The dialogical pattern of interest formation of organisations representing labour (see section 
1.5.2.3) results in the problem of delineating competencies between national member 
organisations and European peak-level federations. The regulatory interests of both levels are 
partially contradictory. In contrast, business interests in social dialogue are unambiguous and 
clearly defined.  
 
One of the respondents gave a slightly different assessment of the relationship between 
central and de-central mechanisms of Europeanisation. Topics that are addressed in the 
European social dialogue could in principle also be taken up in bi- or multilateral cross-border 
initiatives led by trade unions (Interview 1 UNI-Europa Finance 2007). Thus, the changeable 
nature of both instruments may result in a competitive relationship between them. Due to 
restricted personnel resources trade unions embark only on one of the two approaches in 
order to avoid costly double-tracked strategies. However, it is stated that in terms of financial 
means, European social dialogue is not particularly demanding. It is rather the aspect of 
credibility – both vis-à-vis member organisations and the employers’ side – of embarking on 
one or the other approach that is of relevance. Once one strategy is pursued, it is difficult to 
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9.7 Cleaning Industry 
 
9.7.1 Economic background 
 
According to UNI Property Service currently around three million people are employed in the 
European cleaning industry. Given the high percentage of undeclared work in the sector, this 
figure could easily be doubled (Interview UNI-Europa Property Services 2007). The cleaning 
sector is a growing industry in terms of employment. The number of salaried workers in 
commercial cleaning (NACE code k747) has risen by around 15 % from 2002 to 2006 in the 
EU27 whereby the largest increases have been reported for Italy (i.e. above 220 %), Romania 
and Bulgaria (i.e. around 170 %) and Latvia (approximately 110 %) in the period under 
consideration (Eurostat 2008a). These figures however refer only to declared employment, the 
percentage of undeclared workers is considered as to be particularly high in the cleaning 
sector. The sector is dominated by small and micro-enterprises (IST 2004) although 3 % of the 
largest companies, i.e. those with more the 500 employees, account for almost half of the 
industry’s turnover (ibid.). According to a study of the European Federation of Cleaning 
Industries (EFCI) from 2003, Germany accounts for the largest number of salaried workers in 
the European cleaning industry, followed by the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Italy (IST 
2004). These countries represent the largest markets, accounting for almost 70 % of the total 
turnover in Europe (ibid.). Blue-collar workers and women are the largest employee groups in 
total employment, i.e. 86 and 76 %, respectively. Likewise, the number of immigrant workers is 
particularly high in industrial cleaning (Interview UNI-Europa Property Services 2007). The 
share of part-time workers in the totality of employees is high in the sector (Interview UNI-
Europa Property Services 2007). In 2006 the share of part-time workers in the total number of 
workers in the sector has amounted to approximately 29 % in the NACE category ‘other 
services’, compared to around 7 % in the manufacturing industries and 18 % for all NACE 
classes in the EU27 (Eurostat 2008b). In general, the level of skills is low in the industry. 
Absenteeism and turnover are high and bring about a discontinuity in employee relationships. 
Thus, due to the high risk that employees leave the company and work for a competitor, 
employers generally refrain from investments into training and qualification. Wages are 
generally low in the cleaning sector. Due to low wages and labour conditions as well as non-
standard (e.g. very late or early) working hours, the attractiveness of cleaning jobs is low.  
 
Another particularity of the cleaning sector is its dependence on public procurement. Public 
authorities account for a large part of the demand for cleaning services. Compulsory 
competitive tendering is a widely used practice in the cleaning industry that sharply increased 
price competition among suppliers of cleaning services. Outsourcing and the supply ‘all 
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included’ services, i.e. cleaning, security, hosting, reception, management of building, 
gardening, catering, are trends that can be observed in the industry. The combination of 
integrating cleaning and security services is particularly usual in MNC.  
 
 
9.7.2 The national systems of industrial relations in the cleaning sector 
 
In the following sections the sector-related systems of industrial relations will be analysed with 
regard to institutional key features. The countries are classified according to the degree of 
fragmentation of the union system of the cleaning sector, the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of 
the sectoral collective bargaining systems indicated by the prevalence of the practice to 
extend collective agreements and the sector’s collective bargaining coverage rate, the pre-
dominant mechanisms for the coordination of collective bargaining as well as the union density 
in the western European cleaning sector. The cleaning sector is defined in terms of the 
classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE). To put it more 
specifically, the sector refers to NACE class 74.7, i.e. industrial cleaning. All trade unions 
considered in Table 57 (Annex 7) are derived from the study on the representativeness of 
social partner organisations in the cleaning sector (IST 2004) which served as a guide of 
reference for the European Commission’s decision to recognise UNI-Europa Property services 
on the unions’ side and EFCI (The European Federation of Cleaning Industries) on the 
employers’ side as European social partners entitled to participate in the European social 
dialogue in the cleaning sector.  
 
9.7.2.1 Representative domain concentration/fragmentation of the union system  
 
The degree of concentration or fragmentation of the sectoral trade union system as one of the 
major factors for collective action (cf. section 1.5.2.4) on the national macroeconomic level is 
also of relevance when it comes to cross-border activities of unions. As postulated in 
hypothesis 6 (cf. section 4.1.6), a high degree of union fragmentation hinders collective action 
and therefore transnational initiatives aiming at the concertation of collective bargaining 
policies. Two factors determine the degree of a trade union system’s 
fragmentation/concentration, i.e. the number of trade unions in a sector, and the extent to 
which organisational domains overlap between these unions (cf. section 5.1.1). Table 38 aims 
at categorising the countries’ union systems in the cleaning sector whereby three types can be 
identified. The distinction is drawn first between countries which feature a single union system 
with only one sectoral trade union existing or equally, a ‘quasi-single’ union system with more 
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than one union the domains of which are however not overlapping, and second, between 
countries which are characterised by a moderate degree of domain fragmentation whereby the 
organisational domains of the sector-related unions are mainly differentiated along functional 
lines such as sub-parts of the sector and/or different employee groups. Trade union systems 
of the second type are typically not burdened with major problems of inter-union competition 
due to the existence of more or less specialised organisations organising a certain segment of 
the sector or a specific group of the sector’s employees. The third type of union systems 
features a considerable degree of inter-union competition and rivalry due to widely overlapping 
organisational domains of the sector-related unions.  
 
With regard to the cleaning sector, union fragmentation is comparably low and reaches levels 
such as in the metal sector that is characterised by a relatively homogeneous pattern of 
organisation of labour market interests (see table 38). Six out of the 14 countries under 
consideration feature a single or ‘quasi’ single union system summarised under category 1. In 
Germany, Greece and Ireland only one representative union organises workers in the cleaning 
sector. In contrast to Germany where one sectoral trade union (i.e. IG BAU – Construction, 
Agricultural and Environmental Workers Union) organises workers in the cleaning industry, in 
Ireland and Greece cleaning sector workers are organised within the multi-sectoral domains of 
the two peak federations, i.e. OIYE (The Greek Federation of Private Sector Employees) of 
Greece and SIPTU (The Services Industrial and Professional Union) of Ireland.  In Austria, 
distinctive organisations for blue- (i.e. the vida trade union87 and GBH – The Union of the Blue-
collar workers of the Construction Industry, Wood Working and Wood Processing Industry) 
and white-collar workers (i.e. GPA-DJP – Union of Salaried Private Sector Employees, 
Graphical Workers, Journalists and Paper Workers) are existing in the cleaning industry. The 
share of cleaning sector workers which fall into the organisational domain of GBH is however 
small88. In Finland, no major overlaps are reported to arise between the three largest and most 
representative sector-related unions, i.e. PAM – Service Union United organising blue-collar 
workers in the private sector, TU – Union of Salaried Employees and VAL – The Finish 
National Union of State Employees and Special Services. The same holds true for sector-
related unions in Sweden where the Swedish Building Maintenance Union – FASTIGHETS 
                                                 
87
 The vida trade union was formed in a merger of GHGPD (The Union of the Blue-collar Workers of Hotels, 
Restaurants and Personal Services), GdE (The Union of Railway Workers) and. HTV (The Union of Workers in 
Commerce, Transport and Traffic) in December 2006. Vida is a multi-sector organisation that comprises three 
sections, i.e. ‘transport’, ‘social, personal and health services’ and ‘private services’ which cover blue-collar 
employees in occupations related to tourism, commerce, cleaning and maintenance, as well as private security 
services.   
88
 For instance, the small group of chimney cleaners fall into the functional/sectoral domain of GBH. 
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organises the largest share of cleaning sector workers, and a smaller fraction of employees in 
the sectors are organised within Unionen, the largest private sector white-collar workers union 
which resulted from a merger of HTF (The Salaried Employees’ Union) and SIF (The Swedish 
Union of Clerical and Technical Workers) on 1 January 2008, and LEDARNA (The Swedish 
Association for Managerial and Professional Staff). Overlaps with regard to the organisational 
domain are neither existing between those three organisations, nor between them and the 
other reported sector-related union, i.e. KOMMUNAL (The Swedish Municipal Workers’ 
Union), which organises workers in the public sector.  
 
In line with the other two Scandinavian countries considered in this study, workers’ 
organisation follows functional lines also in Denmark, where separate organisations are 
existing according to occupations or employee status. However, in contrast to trade union 
organisation in the Finish and Swedish cleaning sector, domain overlaps are arising between 
3F - Fagligt Fælles Forbund (United Federation of Danish Workers)89, the section Cleaners’ 
Union of DFF-S (Danish Clerical Union) and the Danish Plumbers’ Union which organises a 
small fraction of workers in the cleaning sector (i.e. chimney sweepers). The fourth sector-
related union, i.e. FOA (National Union of Public Employees), has a clearly distinct 
membership domain. Although in the Netherlands workers’ organisation follows 
confessional/political lines, the country’s union system is classified as being characterised by a 
moderate degree of inter-union competition since only the two main federations, i.e. FNV 
Bondgenoten and CNV Bedrijvenbond, are reported to organise workers in the cleaning 
sector. In Portugal major domain overlaps are existing in particular between the blue-collar-
worker unions SLEDA and STAD (comprising mainly personal and business-related services) 
and between SITESE and SITESC mainly organising white-collar workers. In the United 
Kingdom domain overlaps are arising from the multi-sectoral structure of general unions 
covering workers in the cleaning industry, i.e. T&G which merged with Amicus in order to form 
Unite in May 2007, GMB and Unison. Other sector-related unions are also characterised by 
multi-sectoral though more specialised domains, i.e. PCS (The Public & Commercial Services 
Union) and USDAW (Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers).  
 
A considerable degree of inter-union competition is existing between the sector-related unions 
in Spain, France, Italy and Belgium. In Spain and Italy, the organisational domains of several 
                                                 
89
 Fagligt Fælles Forbund (3F) was formed in a merger of the National Union of Women Workers (Kvindeligt 
Arbejderforbund i Danmark, KAD, which organised the largest share of cleaning workers and featured a sectoral 
density of more than 80 % (IST 2004), and the Danish General Workers' Union (Specialarbejderforbundet i 
Danmark, SID) in 2004.  
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unions affiliated to the main federations are overlapping to a large extent. In Italy this is the 
case for the CGIL-affiliate FILCAMS, FISASCAT affiliated to CISL, UGL Environmental 
Hygiene and – to a lesser extent – UIL Transporti. In Spain the shares of cleaning sector 
workers organised by the sector-related organisations of the two peak federations CC.OO and 
UGT, i.e. FAADD-CC.OO (Diverse Activities Federation of Workers’ Commissions) and FEs-
UGT (Services State Federation of General Workers’ Union), are comparably large (IST 
2004). In addition, a number of smaller unions are organising workers in cleaning sector or in 
parts of the sector whereby the organisational domains are differentiated along 
regional/federal provincial lines. In France and Belgium workers are organised according to 
political and/or regional as well as occupational lines. Thus, large domain overlaps are existing 
between the Belgian socialist and multi-sectoral union FGTB and the christian CSC-AS (the 
Food and Services section of the CSC) on the one hand and between the white-collar unions 
CNE-GNC (Christian Wallonian) and LBC-NVK (Christian Flemish), the socialist SETCa and 
the liberal CGSLB on the other hand. In France the largest domain overlaps are arising 
between the reported sector-related organisations affiliated to the country’s main federations, 
i.e. the Service Federation of CFDT, the Equipment, Environment, Transport and Services 
Federation of CGT-FO, FNES-CGC organising managerial staff, the Commerce, Services and 
Sales Federation of CFTC and the Port and Docks Federation of CGT (IST 2004).  
 
 
Tab. 38 – Typology trade union system in the cleaning sector 
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of trade union system Countries (index sum) 




Category 1: Single union system, 
‘Quasi’-Single union system 
AT (0), FI (0), DE (0), GR (0), 
IR (0), SW (0) 




Category 2: Functional diversity 
and moderate union competition 
NL (2), DK (4),  PT (4), United 
Kingdom (4) 
> 5 points:  




cleavages and high degree of 
union competition  
ES (5), FR (5), IT (5) BE (6) 
Source: see table 66, Annex 7 
 
 
  276  
9.7.2.2 Extension Practice and collective bargaining coverage 
 
In general, collective bargaining coverage in the cleaning sector is comparably high 
(unweighted average for the countries under consideration for which data was available is 
approximately 85 %). However, it has to be noted that the figure of cleaning sector workers 
covered by any collective agreements at all was referred to the number of registered workers 
in the sector. Since the share of undeclared workers in the total of cleaning sector workers is 
comparably high (Interview UNI-Europa Property Services 2007), coverage rate is burdened 
with an upwards bias. collective bargaining coverage in the western European cleaning sector 
ranks from less than 10 % in the United Kingdom to up to 100 % in Belgium, Finland and 
Portugal (cf. table 67, Annex 7). In 11 out of 12 countries, collective bargaining coverage in the 
cleaning sector exceeds 80 %. The high coverage rate is partly the result of the pervasive 
practice of extending collective agreements to all employers in the respective field/s of 
application. This extension in the narrow sense, i.e. ‘erga omnes’, is applied in a number of 
countries, i.e. in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands. In addition to 
extension in the narrow sense, a more extensive mechanism of declaring collective 
agreements binding beyond its original sectoral scope (‘extensión’) in areas where no 
collective bargaining is carried out due to the lack of representative and officially recognised 
bargaining parties, exists in Spain and Portugal among the countries under consideration. 
However, the mechanism of extending collective agreements beyond its original sectoral 
scope is not applied in the cleaning sector. In the Portuguese cleaning sector, wages and 
working conditions are determined through legally binding ‘collective work contracts’ (CCTs) 
which cover 100% of employees in the sector (IST 2004). In Spain, no information on the 
collective bargaining coverage in the cleaning sector is available. It can however be assumed 
that the sector-related collective agreements are not covering the entirety of workers in the 
cleaning sector through the automatic extension of a collective agreement signed by parties 
which represent more than 50 % of employees in the sector. Despite the fact that 
organisational densities of both trade unions and employers’ associations in the sector are 
partly far below 50 % (IST 2004), the collective agreements concluded by bargaining parties of 
the provincial level cover all companies in the sector. Since collective bargaining takes place 
predominantly on the provincial level, it can be inferred that the majority of workers in the 
cleaning sector is covered by collective agreements. It can be further assumed that in the 
Spanish cleaning sector the principle of automatic extension (EC 2006) is applied in a more 
amply way in order to ensure that working conditions in the cleaning sector are regulated by 
collective agreements.  
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In most of the countries under consideration, collective bargaining coverage in the cleaning 
sector is more or less in line with the aggregate collective bargaining coverage rate 
(Marginson and Traxler 2005). The almost total coverage of cleaning sector workers in 
Belgium is the result of the regulation of the sector’s wages and working conditions through 
bipartite bodies. Two Joint Committees conclude several collective agreements for the 
cleaning sector. In the Netherlands, where the collective bargaining coverage rate in the 
cleaning sector exceeds 80 %, the sectoral agreement was subject to a general extension. 
The cleaning sector stands out in this respect since the practice of extending collective 
agreements is generally limited in the Netherlands (Traxler 1998a).  
 
Only in two countries large differences between aggregate collective bargaining coverage 
rates and the bargaining coverage in the cleaning sector can be observed, i.e. in Ireland and 
Germany. In Ireland, the strikingly high collective bargaining coverage rate of 93 % results 
from the co-existence of a voluntary framework of collective bargaining on the inter-sectoral 
(‘Programme for Competitiveness and Fairness 2002’ and ‘Sustaining Progress Agreement 
2003-2005’) and sectoral level (i.e. collective agreements in the framework of the ‘Employment 
Regulation Orders Contract Cleaning’) and the regulation of some working conditions in parts 
of the cleaning sector by law (IST 2004). The high collective bargaining coverage in the 
German cleaning sector is the result of pervasive extension practice on both the national and 
the regional level. For instance, in 2004 the framework agreement at national level as well as 
a number of regional-level collective agreements have been declared as binding for all 
employees in the sector, irrespective of whether the employer has joined the employers’ 
organisation (IST 2004). The far-reaching practice to declare collective agreements binding to 
all employers in the sector in the German cleaning sector does not correspond to the general 
pattern of a rather limited extension practice in this country (Traxler 1998a, Traxler et al. 
2001).  
 
9.7.2.3 Characteristics of the sector-level collective bargaining system 
 
The typology below (cf. table 39) aims at categorising countries according to the 
responsiveness of their collective bargaining system in the cleaning sector. The index the 
measures the degree of responsiveness comprises both sector-specific and general, national 
elements of the collective bargaining system. Three indicators of the institutional system are of 
relevance in this respect: First, the pre-dominant level of collective bargaining which varies not 
only across countries but also within countries across sectors, second, the existence of pattern 
bargaining as a de-central and covert mechanism for the coordination of collective bargaining, 
and third, the existence of both legal provisions that ensure compliance of lower-level 
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collective bargaining agents to the provisions stipulated in the collective agreement. The latter 
two determinants of the responsiveness of collective bargaining arrangements represent 
institutional characteristics of the national system of industrial relations. Hence, they do not 
vary across sectors. 
 
In seven out of the 14 countries under consideration collective bargaining in the cleaning 
sector is takes place within an institutional bargaining setting that is characterised by a low 
responsiveness (see table 39). In the case of the United Kingdom, this is due to the fact that 
collective bargaining in the cleaning sector takes place almost exclusively on the company-
level. Although the de-centralised determination of wages and working conditions does not 
require all-encompassing mechanisms for the vertical coordination of collective bargaining (cf. 
section 5.1.2), uncoordinated bargaining – as it is the case in the United Kingdom – is not 
responsive to changes in monetary policy. Thus, the capacity of the bargaining agents to bring 
their wage policy decisions in line with the monetary policy goals of the European Central 
Bank is limited (Traxler 2003). Belgium and the four Mediterranean countries share 
communalities insofar as collective bargaining in the sector of industrial cleaning takes place 
mainly at the sector level and the legal pre-requisites that ensure a high vertical co-ordination 
of collective bargaining are lacking. Since the mechanism for the coordination of collective 
bargaining across sectors and groups of employees in these countries are highly centralised, 
i.e. on the level of the peak-organisations of labour market interests (i.e. in Spain, Portugal) or 
through (a varying degree of) state intervention in wage policy (i.e. Italy, France and Belgium), 
deficiencies with regard to the vertical coordination become apparent (cf. section 5.1.2). In the 
case of Denmark, the collective bargaining system in the cleaning sector is classified as a low 
responsive one due to the high degree of de-centralisation of collective bargaining which limits 
the transnational coordination of collective bargaining policies. However, the de facto 
responsiveness of the Danish system of collective bargaining is high due to the system’s 
capacity to ensure the vertical coordination of collective bargaining.  
 
The collective bargaining system of the cleaning sector in six countries out of 14 is categorised 
as being characterised by a high formal responsiveness due to the existence of the legal 
provisions which ensure the compliance of lower-level bargaining actors to the provisions set 
in the collective agreement. This applies to all countries subsumed under category 2, with the 
exception of Ireland (i.e. Finland, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden) where the 
legal bindingness and enforceability of collective agreements is not guaranteed. Thus, the de 
facto responsiveness of the Irish collective bargaining system is clearly limited. However, with 
regard to the transnational dimension of collective bargaining, a higher centralisation – as it 
applies in the Irish cleaning sector – is conducive to the coordination of collective bargaining 
  279  
(cf. section 4.1.7).  
 
Only one country, i.e. Austria, is classified as being characterised by a highly responsive 
sectoral collective bargaining system. Despite the fact that both in Austria and Germany 
collective bargaining is coordinated through the mechanism of pattern-setting by an export-
orientated sector, i.e. the metal sector, only Austria is considered in category 3. This between 
the two countries arises from the fact that in Austria collective bargaining is less de-centralised 
than in Germany where collective bargaining in the cleaning sector takes place on the sectoral 
and company level to an equal extent. With regard to the transnational dimension of collective 
bargaining, the conditions for the cross-border concertatiation of sectoral collective bargaining 
policies are less favourable in a framework of de-centralised collective bargaining than in an 
institutional setting where collective bargaining takes place on the inter-sectoral or sectoral 
level as it is hypothesised in section 3.7.  
 
Tab. 39 – Typology collective bargaining system cleaning sector:  
 
Index sum:  
 
Type of collective bargaining 
system Countries (index sum) 
0-1 Low responsiveness of collective 
bargaining system: lack of 
institutional prerequisites to ensure 
vertical co-ordination  
United Kingdom (0), BE (1), 
DK (1), ES (1), FR (1), IT (1), 
PT (1) 
2-3 High formal responsiveness of 
collective bargaining system: 
supportive legal prerequisites to 
ensure vertical co-ordination                                                                                                              
FI (2), DE (2), GR (2), IR (2) 
NL (2), SW (2) 
<= 4 Highly responsive systems 
dominated by pattern bargaining  
AT (4) 
Source: see table 68, Annex 7 
 
 
9.7.2.4 Density of the sector-related trade unions 
 
Trade union densities in the cleaning sector of the EU15 (cf. table 40) are lower than the 
national aggregate density rates (EC 2006) in most of the countries considered in this study. 
Only in Italy and Spain the union density in the cleaning sector derived from the membership 
of the most important unions in the sector for which data was available exceeds the aggregate 
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national density rate. Italy reports a particularly high union density rate for the cleaning 
industry, i.e. above 43 %, compared to an aggregate density of 28 %. The findings on union 
density in the cleaning sector have to be interpreted with care since it is opposed to the finding 
that in Italy union organisation among unskilled blue-collar workers – which tend to constitute 
the majority of cleaning sector workers – is lower, i.e. 23 %, than union organisation on the 
aggregate level (EC 2006). Likewise, union density in the Spanish cleaning sector has to be 
regarded with reservation since it exceeds the density rate for blue-collar workers, i.e. 14 %, 
which in turn is somewhat lower than the national aggregate union density (i.e. 16 %).   
 
Since the majority of workers in the cleaning sector are unskilled blue-collar workers, trade 
union organisation among this group of workers serves as a reference point in order to assess 
union density in the cleaning industry. With the exception of Spain, Finland and Italy, union 
density rates in the cleaning sector are lower than density rates of unskilled blue-collar 
workers. The largest differences between trade union organisation among unskilled blue-collar 
workers and that of cleaning sector workers exist in Belgium, i.e. a density rate of 37 % in the 
cleaning sector compared to a density rate of unskilled blue-collar workers of 67 %, in Finland 
where the sector’s density (i.e. above 41 %) is generally low compared to other sectors or 
groups of workers, including unskilled blue-collar workers (i.e. 72 %). The same organisation 
pattern can be observed in Sweden where union organisation among cleaning sector workers 
is considerably lower than that of unskilled blue-collar workers in general (i.e. 74 %). A similar 
pattern of considerably weaker worker organisation is also reported for the Netherlands 
although on a generally lower level (i.e. union density in the cleaning sector of around 7 % 
compared to a union density of 23 % for unskilled blue-collar workers).  
 
As table 40 shows, the level of trade union density rates in the cleaning sector of the countries 
considered is comparably low. In half of the countries under consideration trade union density 
in the cleaning sector is below 25 %, in another five out of 14 countries it is between 30 and 45 
%. Only in Denmark trade union density rate in the cleaning industry is comparably high, i.e. 
79 %.  
 
In the case of France and Portugal, data was only available for a certain number of sector-
related unions (for both blue- and white-collar workers) which have been referred to the total 
number of employees in the sector. Thus, a minimum measure for the sectoral density that is 
in line with general organisational patterns of typical workers in the sector (i.e. unskilled blue-
collar workers) has been estimated in order to avoid a down-ward bias of the aggregate 
sectoral density. In the case of Belgium data is only available for one union organisation, i.e. 
FGTB, that however mirrors workers’ organisation in the cleaning sector in general according 
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to findings from expert interviews. Estimates on the sectoral union density for Greece have to 
be considered with caution since it is based on membership figures referring to a certain 
segment of public sector cleaners (IST 2004). Thus, it can be assumed that union density in 
the private segment of the cleaning sector is lower.  
 
Tab. 40 – Density of sector-related unions – cleaning sector 
 
Density rates  (aggregate a) sector density 
< 25 
 
ES (~ 23 %), FR (~ 8 %), DE (7 %), GR (< 20 
%), IR (25 %), NL (7 %), PT (> 15 %) 
< 50 
 
AT (35 %), BE (37 %), FR (> 41 %), IT (> 43 






DK (79 %) 
Source: Table 69, Annex 7; 
a Due to the incompleteness of reported data, sector density is derived ideally from membership data on 
all of the reported sector-related unions as it is the case for Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom divided by the number of employees in the cleaning sector (IST 2004). If membership 
data was available only for the most important sector-related unions, a minimum measure based on 
membership data of these trade union organisations referred to the sector’s total of employees is used 
as an estimate for union density in the sector (i.e. France and Portugal). The organisational densities of 
the most important unions in the sector with regard to their organisational domain are referred to as 
sector densities in the case of Austria and Belgium since membership data of all other sector-related 
organisation is lacking.  
b In the case of the United Kingdom only general unions are organising workers in the cleaning sector. 
Since membership data in the cleaning sector is not available, an estimate has been derived on the 
basis of union densities among personal service occupations (Grainger and Growther, 2007). 
 
 
9.7.3 MNCs as the focal point for UNI Property Services European-wide 
strategies for the improvement of labour standards and working 
conditions 
 
The coordination of collective bargaining policies across-border is no prior aim for the cleaning 
sector’s EIF, UNI Property Services. Although collective bargaining coverage rates are 
reported to be relatively high (see section 9.7.2.2), sector-related national trade unions are in a 
particularly defensive position. Thus, collective agreements in the cleaning industry often 
provide for the lowest pay rates compared with those in other industries. In the cleaning sector 
the share of statutory or collectively agreed on minimum-wage earners in total employment is 
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reportedly high (Interview UNI-Europa Property Services 2007)90. Atypical forms of 
employment such as agency and temporary (Eurostat 2008c) employment are widespread. 
The share of part-time workers in the other private sector services is above the EU27 average, 
i.e. 29 % in the majority of countries (e.g. Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Malta, Italy, 
Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, France and Denmark (see section 9.7.1). In the Netherlands 
where part-time work is most common within the EU, the share of part-time workers in other 
community and personal services is almost 70 % (Eurostat 2008b). The high percentage of 
immigrant workers in the sector (cf. section 7.1) is considered as a hindrance for trade union 
organisation as these groups of workers are generally difficult to recruit (Interview UNI-Europa 
Property Services 2007). Despite the large proportion of atypical and immigrant employment, 
the collective bargaining coverage rate in the cleaning sector is relatively high in the western 
European member countries (see section 9.7.2.2) with the exception of the United Kingdom. 
The collective bargaining coverage rates ranges from above 80 % in the Netherlands to a de 
facto full coverage of all workers employed in the sector in Belgium (IST 2004). However, it 
has to be kept in mind that the high percentage of ‘irregular’ and ‘undeclared’ workers is not 
considered in these estimates. Despite the presence of large MNC, a large part of cleaning 
services providers are SME that are generally well integrated in the scope of collective 
bargaining systems. Only in a few countries such as the Netherlands collective bargaining 
activities of trade unions are predominantly carried out on the company level.  
 
As far as the transnational coordination of collective bargaining policies is concerned, UNI 
Property Services member organisations are not actively promoting a Europe-wide approach. 
Due to their defensive position, unions are mainly concerned with organising members and 
improving their representativeness. Thus, resources are scarce and legitimacy to re-direct 
them to the European level is not supported by the rank-and-file. This is particularly true for 
workers’ organisation in the CEEC where the cleaning sector is a largely ‘un-organised zone’ 
(Interview UNI-Europa Property Services 2007). This is due sector particularities such as the 
fact that cleaning is still to a large extent carried out as an ‘in-house’ service. Thus, cleaning 
workers are affiliated to the respective union in the domain of activity of the employer. 
However, outsourcing cleaning services is also an increasing trend in the ‘new’ member 
countries.  
 
The lack of a ‘leading’ union that actively promotes cross-border coordination of collective 
bargaining requires a strong coordination role of sector’s EIF. The organisational structure of 
UNI-Europa that includes a range of sectors such as finance, commerce and 
                                                 
90
 More substantiated empirical evidence is though difficult to obtain from Eurostat and other sources as sector-
aggregated data on minimum wage earners are not available 
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telecommunication, follows a cross-industry approach of ensuring working conditions on the 
European level. The nature of property services, i.e. its additional character, strongly links it 
with other industries. Cleaning services are provided in private companies of various sectors 
as well as the public sector. Therefore, UNI Property Services established it’s so called 
‘contracting policy’ aiming at ‘good practice’ of companies in various sectors such banking and 
finance when bidding for cleaning and security services. Since UNI Property Services directs 
this policy mainly to large and multinational companies European Works Councils (EWCs) 
play an important role in providing information and monitoring policy implementation. Co-
operation between UNI-Europa Sectoral Federations (e.g. between UNI Property and UNI 
Finance) are common in certain areas of activity are common.  
 
A large extent of cleaning services is provided in the public sector whereby public authorities 
and agencies bid for these services. Best practice in public procurement of cleaning services 
is thus an important goal of UNI Property Services, in particular in the framework of European 
social dialogue on the sector level (see section 9.7.4 below). Likewise, the increased 
integration of services, also referred to as ‘all-included services’ to businesses, such as 
cleaning, security, hosting, reception, management of building, gardening and catering, that 
are provided by MNC required an integrated approach to improving and maintaining working 
standards for workers in different branches such as cleaning, private security and building 
maintenance.  
 
The coordination of wage bargaining is not an issue that is addressed in an organised Europe-
wide approach by UNI-Europa Property Services. Neither a web-page based reporting system 
on collective bargaining information nor the adoption of common criteria for wage bargaining 
are applied in the cleaning sector. Due to the limited importance of collective bargaining as an 
issue for transnational policies among the member trade unions, the establishment of a more 
formal structure for collective bargaining coordination on level of the EIF is not a prior goal in 
the immediate future. Indicatively, the online-documentation of collectively negotiated wage 
accords and other collective bargaining topics is accessible for UNI-Europa Property’s 
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9.7.4 European Social Dialogue in the Cleaning Sector 
 
European social dialogue in the cleaning sector dates back to 1992. In 1999 the informal 
working group has been transformed into the newly established sector committee. The most 
important topics for dialogue are health and safety such as ergonomics, best practice in public 
procurements and working time. However, it has been stated that the European social 
dialogue in the cleaning sector is not functioning very well (Interview UNI-Europa Property 
Services 2007). The focus of activity is limited to drafting manuals on health and safety topics 
(2000) and best practice concerning awarding contracts for cleaning services (2001) and 
formulating declarations on topics such as working time such as day-time cleaning (2007). The 
practical impact of joint declarations is very limited due to the lacking engagement of 
employers in implementing the declared provisions. Even the political impact of declarations 
produced in the European social dialogue is assessed as being at least ‘short-term’ (Interview 
UNI-Europa Property Services 2007). Employers’ commitment can be observed only on a very 
small scale, mostly with regard of single topics. For instance, Belgian employers are reported 
to take a more active role in promoting daytime work (ibid).  
 
According to trade union respondents, the main problem is not the implementation of common 
declarations but overwhelming competitive pressures that force client companies to select 
cleaning services only in terms of their costs. Thus, even if service proving companies agree 
on implementing the criteria formulated in the social dialogue, their influence is limited with 
regard to enforce their adoption in the client companies. The most controversial topic is 
reported to be the ‘Services Directive’ (Directive 2006/123/EC) that was rejected by UNI-
Europa Property Services. Likewise, daytime cleaning turned out to be a protracted issue that 
required more extensive research before negotiations could start. In general, the European 
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9.7.4 Trade union actors’ perceptions in the cleaning sector 
 
9.7.4.1 Trade union actors’ perceptions with regard to European sectoral social 
dialogue and union-led cross-border coordination initiatives  
 
Since structures for the cross-sectoral collective bargaining coordination are lacking on the 
level of the sector’s EIF and collective bargaining policies are co-ordinated almost exclusively 
within the framework of European social dialogue, the perceptions of social partners are 
predominantly focused on the European social dialogue in the cleaning sector. As far as 
constellations of decision-making and influencing collective bargaining coordination policies 
according to national lines are concerned, the Belgian trade unions are reported to have taken 
on an important role. Due to their strong tradition in tri-partite social dialogue on the national 
level, they have been active in promoting innovation and best practice with regard to collective 
bargaining results and practices. Other countries such as Sweden and the United Kingdom 
are not regularly represented in the social dialogue meetings. The Nordic’s scepticism vis-à-
vis ‘Europeanised’ collective bargaining coordination strategies can be also observed among 
the social partners of the cleaning sector. The strengths of national social dialogue in the 
Scandinavian countries and the perceived superiority of their own industrial relations system 
results in the trade unions’ reluctance to actively participate in European social dialogue. In 
contrast, the British absenteeism in European Social dialogue originates in their complete lack 
of knowledge and practice of social partner involvement in macroeconomic social policy 
concertation. A certain ‘North-South’-divide can be observed also on the employers’ side. 
Those employers coming from countries with strongly institutionalised structures and practice 
for social dialogue are more willing to engage into dialogue on the European level than those 
from the – predominantly southern-European countries – where dialogue traditions in the 
sector are weaker.   
 
The lacking engagement of trade unions from the CEEC is due to the weakness of labour 
interest organisations. This finding which is a common feature of trade union organisation in 
the ‘new’ member countries in general, is exacerbated by the fragmented structure of the 
cleaning sector. The provision of cleaning services is to a large extent integrated within other 
services providing and industrial companies such as banks or public agencies. The ‘additional’ 
character of cleaning services is underlined by the still very unusual practice of outsourcing 
these rather basic services to specialised provider companies. The integration of cleaning staff 
in a company’s general workforce constitutes one of the largest obstacles for the organisation 
of these workers. The problem of foreign language skills is considered as one of the major 
  286  
problems for coordinating collective bargaining policies across borders.  
 
With regard to the role of the European Commission trade union actors are complaining about 
its focus on the quantitative outcome of the European social dialogue. Social partners on 
labour’s side repeatedly point to the generally weak substantial results of the sector’s 
dialogue. However, the Commission clearly refrains from interfering in the social partners’ 
dialogue activities in order to strengthen the material and substantial content of produced 
results. The establishment of follow-up mechanisms that are considered in the texts to an 
increasing extent is assessed as a positive development by both sides of the industry. 
However, it is stated that the inclusion of follow-up procedures in joint texts turns out to be a 
difficult and sometimes protracted process due to employers’ reluctance to define clear rules 
for implementation that increase the efficiency of social dialogue outcomes. Topics that are 
currently promoted by the Commission are restructuring, the services directive (Directive 
2006/123/EC) and the cross-sectoral agreement on work-related stress (2004). But even 
within the sector’s EIF agreement on relevant dialogue topics is not reached easily as the 
discussions about the draft of the so called ‘compendium’ that lists important issues indicates 
(Interview UNI-Europa Property Services 2007).  
 
According to trade union respondents, the main function of European social dialogue is not to 
produce substantive outcomes but to present an instrument for the exchange of best practice 
and information exchange. However, the political function of European social dialogue is not 
considered to be of particular relevance due to the limited engagement of the European 
Commission and the general disinterest of the cleaning sector’s employers. However, trade 
union actors underscore the dynamic nature of European social dialogue that is still perceived 
as a ‘learning’ experience. European social dialogue is regarded as a self-promoting process: 
The precondition to ensure acceptance and efficiency of the instrument is the conclusion of 
binding results that commit both sides of the industry to implement the agreement. Otherwise 
the involved actors are unwilling to invest their resources in European social dialogue 
activities. However, until now European social dialogue did not evolve into an instrument for 
effective policy coordination. Thus, the bleak assessment of European social dialouge in the 
cleaning sector is not surprising (Interview UNI-Europa Property Services 2007). Employers 
agree in their blank rejection of entering into the dialogue whereas among trade unions there 
is no clear position on entering into social dialogues. The strong unions from countries with 
highly institutionalised systems of industrial relations are sceptic vis-à-vis European 
coordination approaches since they fear common standards will undermine their own system 
of collective bargaining. Thus, it is rather the weak unions which set their hopes in European 
agreements concluded within the framework of European social dialogue. However, their 
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influence and capacity for action is even more restricted on the European than on the national 
level.  
 
9.7.4.2 Trade union actors’ perceptions with regard to central and de-central 
coordination approaches  
 
Similarly as in other sectors, union-led collective bargaining coordination initiatives on the one 
hand, and the European social dialogue on the sector-level are perceived as two instruments 
of the Europeanisation of collective bargaining that are mutually complementary. However, 
inter-union projects are not very numerous in the cleaning sector. Therefore, the involvement 
of the EIF in coordinating such initiatives is rather weak and is restricted to the provision of 
information. Conversely, the EIF depends on bottom-up information by the national member 
organisations. Strikingly, the relatively weak position of the cleaning sector’s European peak-
level organisation vis-à-vis it’s members is underscored by the admitted dependence on 
members’ information and support. In the framework of mutually inter-depending top-down 
and bottom-up activities the provision of legitimacy by national rank-and-files is decisive for 
building up a forum for transnational action. Most trade unions in the cleaning industry do not 
consider the European level as an efficient arena for coordinating collective bargaining 
policies. The main reason for the perceived shortcomings of European-wide action is the fact 
that employer counterparts are non-existing or reluctant to participate. The focus on national 
industrial relations and mechanisms of social dialogue and collective bargaining narrows the 
scope of activity on the transnational level. Thus, national member organisations of cleaning 
sector’s EIF are not willing to direct resources to the European level.  
 
In contrast to other sectors (e.g. the metal industry), the complimentary nature of central and 
de-central coordination approaches is not contradictory to a perceived substitutability of topics 
that could likewise be addressed in central and de-central coordination approaches. Thus, the 
common distinction between ‘hard’ topics addressed in collective bargaining (e.g. pay, working 
time) and ‘soft’ topics such as training and health and safety does not apply in the cleaning 
sector. However, European social dialogue is considered as an arena to address a wider 
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10. Quantitative Sector Analysis: testing the hypotheses 
 
Based on empirical findings obtained by means of expert interviews, approaches to the 
transnational coordination of collective bargaining policies in the sectors under consideration 
follow two principal patterns. In the metal and chemical sectors, collective bargaining 
coordination is characterised by a predominantly centralised approach. In both sectors, there 
are elements that indicate a strongly institutionalised, top-down approach to the cross-border 
coordination of collective bargaining. These include a highly formalised structure for collective 
bargaining policies in the form of strongly established and highly active policy bodies within the 
EIF; a monitoring and reporting system set up and maintained by the respective EIF; and an 
electronic information system on collective bargaining and social policy information. 
Furthermore, there are pronounced top-down inter-sectoral learning and information exchange 
processes. This is also reflected in the strong structural and organisational linkage of both 
sectors within the multi-sectoral network for the Europe-wide coordination of collective 
bargaining, Eucob@n. This contrasts with the approach to coordination predominant in the 
other sectors under consideration. Initiatives aimed at the cross-border coordination of 
collective bargaining policies in the food industry, telecommunications, construction, banking 
and industrial cleaning typically take a decentralised approach to the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining. Bi- or multilateral projects initiated by national trade 
unions are widespread in these sectors; inter-union initiatives aimed at coordinating collective 
bargaining issues across borders are characterised by a high level of autonomy for union 
actors. Involvement of the EIF in coordinating, monitoring or guiding such initiatives is clearly 
limited or non-existent. The same applies with regard to common, formalised instruments and 
policy guidelines for the transnational coordination of collective bargaining – wage bargaining 
in particular – which are reported as being absent from these sectors.91  
 
The hypothesised relationshipship was tested between the dual pattern of the Europeanisation 
of collective bargaining – that is, a centralised, top-down or a decentralised, bottom-up 
coordination process – and the institutional and economic factors of influence, taking into 
consideration a number of caveats (see section 10.1), by logistic regression analysis.  
 
 
                                                 
91
 This finding does not support the existence of quantitative ‘wage formulas’ in other sectors, such as banking, 
chemicals and construction (Dufresne/Mermet 2000). At the sectoral level, the European Trade Union Federation 
adopted a European coordination rule in 1999 (see section 3.2.1), though its implementation has been very limited.  
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10.1 Methodological remarks: limits of the regression analysis  
 
Results gained through log-linear regression analysis did not significantly contribute to the 
explanation of the hypothesised relationships between economic/institutional factors and the 
emergence of a centralised or decentralised approach to collective bargaining coordination in 
a given sector. The cross-sectoral research design imposes clear limits on the regression 
analysis as the number of variables is high in relationship to the number of cases. The number 
of missing values – which frequently occurs in a systematic pattern, for instance, gaps in 
several categories for a certain country – is high.  
 
Due to the lack of distinctiveness of sector-aggregated data for some of the variables, in 
particular institutional variables which are strongly determined by the national characteristics 
of the collective bargaining and industrial relations system, cross-sectoral analysis will clearly 
be limited. The restricted availability of data, in particular on economic indicators, at the 
sectoral level is a fundamental problem inherent in sector-based comparative analysis. In a 
number of cases, sectoral delineations did not correspond to the NACE classifications used as 
reference categories in the various studies on the representativeness of social partner 
organisations. The aggregate level at which some of the data – for example, the number of 
non-EU citizens by economic activity (cf. chapter 7.1) – were gathered tends to be too general 
compared to industry-based categorisation schemes such as NACE.  
 
The results obtained from the regression analysis should therefore be considered as 
complementary to empirical findings from expert interviews. As the adoption and development 
of a certain approach to collective bargaining coordination is strongly actor-driven, the 
limitations on quantitative analysis do not severely inhibit the explanatory power and insights 
derived from this study. In order to undertake a comprehensive analytical investigation of the 
phenomenon in question, the results of both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis are 
summarised on the basis of a hypothesis-testing approach in section 11. 
 
 
10.2 Export dependence and union density as influential factors in the 
Europeanisation of collective bargaining 
 
An investigation of the relationshipship between the patterns of Europeanisation and their 
hypothesised institutional and economic determinants yields rather ambiguous statistical 
results. In the logistic regression of the two types of Europeanisation of collective bargaining 
on sector-specific variables such as export dependence, FDI, labour mobility, degree of 
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product market regulation, fragmentation of the trade union system, collective bargaining 
coverage rate, level of collective bargaining, bargaining coordination and union density, only 
two of these variables are significant at the 5%-level, namely export dependence and union 
density (Annex 9).  
 
Export dependence exerts a significant influence on the pattern of Europeanisation. This 
finding supports the general assumption that bargaining agents in export-oriented sectors that 
are directly exposed to international competition pursue a more comprehensive strategy of 
wage determination. Negative externalities resulting from disproportionate pay hikes are taken 
into consideration by wage bargainers. With regard to the cross-border coordination of 
collective bargaining, it can be inferred that trade union bargaining actors in highly export-
dependent sectors pursue a more stringent, top-down approach to coordination than sectors 
that are more sheltered from international competition. The metal and the chemical sectors 
exhibit the highest export dependence (see Table 77, Annex 10). In the metal sector in 
particular, for which cross-border wage coordination has been proven by quantitative empirical 
analysis (Traxler 2008a; Traxler and Brandl 2009), policy guidelines and instruments for the 
European coordination of collective bargaining – and of wage bargaining in particular – were 
adopted in the early 1990s. The same holds true – though to a more limited extent – for the 
chemical sector, in which EMU and its implications for international competitiveness are 
regarded as the main forces driving EMCEF to pursue a transnationally coordinated approach 
to collective bargaining. Although the effects of EMU are not considered in the quantitative 
analysis, it can be assumed that it exerts a direct and considerable influence on export 
conditions through effects such as increased labour cost transparency and the abolition of the 
exchange rate mechanism to adjust for imbalances in international competitiveness which shift 
the burden of adjustment directly to wages. The downward pressure on wages arising from 
increased international competition urged wage bargainers to find strategies to counter 
business demands for wage moderation. Thus, trade union bargainers in export-oriented 
sectors were among the first to adopt a top-down, cross-border approach to collective 
bargaining coordination.  
 
 
This finding is in line with the hypothesised relationshipship between a high level of export 
dependence and the existence of a bargaining coordination approach dominated by a 
centralised form of Europeanisation (see H5.a section 4.1.5). The coordination approaches 
adopted in the metal and chemical sectors, which exhibit the highest values of export flows 
compared to the other sectors considered in this study (see section 7.3), are categorised as 
representing such a centralised pattern of Europeanisation. To a certain extent this also holds 
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true for the food industry, which is also comparatively export dependent (see table 77, Annex 
10). As the pattern of Europeanisation is conceived as a dual process that arises either in a 
decentralised or a centralised form, it clearly fails to grasp the complex reality of the dynamics 
of Europeanisation. Coordination approaches at the transnational level do not necessarily 
correspond to the conception of a gradual process implying incremental change. Rather, the 
process of transnational coordination that involves a multiplicity of instruments and strategies 
may oscillate between centralisation and decentralisation, and incorporate different levels of 
action succeeding, complementing and affecting each other. Not surprisingly, the coordination 
approach in the food production sector features more elements of a centralised approach, 
although it clearly lacks the degree of institutionalisation and formalisation of collective 
bargaining coordination approaches in the metal and chemical sectors. However, according to 
empirical evidence obtained by means of expert interviews, the process of inter-sectoral 
learning and best practice is particularly pronounced between manufacturing sectors such as 
metal, chemicals and food production. It can be assumed that some convergence will occur in 
the coordination approaches of these sectors in the future, in the course of which EIF 
collective bargaining agents in the food sector will orientate their bargaining coordination 
policies towards the metal and chemical sectors’ model of transnational coordination (see 
section 9.3.3). 
 
The other variable that proves to be significant at the 5%-level is union density. As 
hypothesised, union strength is a decisive factor in the intra-organisational dimension of 
collective action. Thus, the higher the organisational density of a member organisation 
supporting a centralised approach to the transnational coordination of collective bargaining, 
the more probable it is that other members will follow and comply with collective norms, such 
as common bargaining criteria and guidelines. However, country effects are not taken into 
account in the regression analysis; rather the empirical findings that served as a basis to 
develop typologies of the trade union system in the sectors under consideration are referred to 
when it comes to verifying hypothesis H5.b (see section 4.1.5). The general finding that a high 
union density in a sector is favourable to the emergence of a centralised, EIF-driven approach 
to collective bargaining is complemented by a more detailed analysis of the intra-sectoral 
interest and power configuration of the sector’s union actors in section 11.1.5. 
 
Empirical evidence is scarce for the influence of other variables on the predominant pattern of 
Europeanisation of collective bargaining. The factors ‘product market regulation’ and the 
mechanism of ‘collective bargaining coordination’ are significant at the 10%-level (Annex 9). 
Whereas a high level of product market regulation is associated with the emergence of the 
decentralised pattern of Europeanisation, a high degree of bargaining governability deriving 
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from the existence of legal pre-requisites to ensure the compliance of lower level bargaining 
agents to centrally negotiated agreements in a sector is associated with the occurrence of a 
centralised approach to transnational collective bargaining coordination (see section 4.1.8). 
However, due to the severe limits on statistical analysis (see previous section) no final 
conclusions can be drawn from these findings. Regarding the mean values of the variables for 
product market regulation (Table 80, Annex 10) and bargaining governability measured by the 
bargaining coordination index (Table 84, Annex 10), the coordination variable (which is also 
burdened with a large standard deviation) clearly fails to explain a significant amount of the 
variation in the dependent variable (cf. Table 41). However, the extent of product market 
regulation is – on average – higher in sectors in which a decentralised pattern of 
Europeanisation prevails than in the metal and chemical sectors, in which union actors pursue 
a centralised approach to collective bargaining. This difference is not significant in the 
regression analysis, however – and should be regarded as a tendency that can be observed in 
univariate analysis. The variable of product market regulation does not turn out to exert a 
significant influence on the dependent variable in a multivariate analysis (see Annex 9).  
 
Table 41 depicts mean values and standard deviations of the institutional and economic 
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Tab. 41 – Frequencies of variables according to the predominant pattern of 
Europeanisation 
 
EUCEN a EUDEC b 
EXP Mean 25.07986 
Std. Dev. 14.89092 
50% Percent. 25.60194 
Mean 2.318098 
Std. Dev. 3.815903 
50% Percent. 0.720651 
FDI Mean 6.10191 
Std. Dev. 7.49838 
50% Percent. 3.036985 
Mean 3.591767 
Std. Dev. 5.769634 
50% Percent. 1.74202 
LMOB Mean 5.687099 
Std. Dev. 3.3406 
50% Percent. 4.891821 
Mean 5.113653 
Std. Dev. 4.359769 
50 % Percent. 3.885351 
PMR Mean 2.892857 
Std. Dev. 1.499118 
50% Percent. 2 
Mean 5.785714 
Std. Dev. 6.622082 
50% Percent. 3  
FRAG Mean 3.357143 
Std. Dev. 2.627691 
50% Percent. 3 
Mean 3.588235 
Std. Dev. 2.85592 
50% Percent. 4 
CBC Mean 85.3125 
Std. Dev. 24.38942 
50% Percent. 95 
Mean 84.55847 
Std. Dev. 22.19858 
50% Percent. 90 
LEV Mean .6785714 
Std. Dev. .4130798 
50% Percent. .5 
Mean .8642857 
Std. Dev. .4656414 
50% Percent. 1 
COOR Mean 1.517857 
Std. Dev. 1.357299 
50% Percent. 1 
Mean 1.514286 
Std. Dev. 1.126015 
50% Percent. 1.25 
UD Mean 59.0625 
Std. Dev. 27.03473 
50% Percent. 60 
Mean 39.95231 
Std. Dev. 27.87951 
50% Percent. 32 
a Centralised pattern of Europeanisation is predominant in the metal and chemical sectors. 
b Decentralised pattern of Europeanisation prevails in food production, construction, 
telecommunications, banking and industrial cleaning. 
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11. Putting the hypotheses to the test – results of the qualitative and 
quantitative analyses 
 
In the following sections are presented the results of the empirical – both qualitative and 
quantitative – analysis concerning the hypothesised relationships between the pattern of 
Europeanisation of collective bargaining and the economic and institutional factors of 
influence. The results of the sector-based analysis underscore the benefits of a combined 
analysis approach that includes both qualitative and quantitative methods. The rather limited 
explanatory contribution of the quantitative analysis and the problems identified with the 
regression analysis (see above) indicate the importance of including a qualitative approach 
when it comes to analysing an actor-driven phenomenon such as the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining policies.  
 
11.1 Centralised or decentralised Europeanisation of collective 
bargaining? 
 
As shown above, only two independent variables proved to be significant in the regression 
analysis, namely export dependence and union density. Testing the hypotheses on the 
relationshipship between the predominant form of Europeanisation in the sectors under 
consideration and the economic and institutional factors therefore requires that the results 
obtained from both qualitative and quantitative analysis are combined. The results of the 
combined analytical approach are summarised in the following sections.  
 
11.1.1 Labour mobility: H1.a and H1.b 
 
The factor of labour mobility, which proved not to be significant in the regression analysis, has 
thus to be tested against empirical findings from the qualitative analysis.92 In sectors 
characterised by high labour mobility, such as construction, the elements of a decentralised 
approach to collective bargaining coordination prevail. Cross-border trade union cooperation 
and bi- and multilateral structures for relatively autonomous inter-union activities in the 
coordination of collective bargaining policies are of particular relevance in the construction 
sector. The role of the respective EIF is comparatively weak, as no clear top-down approach 
characterised by a highly formalised and institutionalised policy to collective bargaining 
                                                 
92
 Data on the employment of non-EU citizens by sector do not differentiate between manufacturing branches and 
therefore limit the testing of hypotheses H1.a and H1.b through multiple regression analysis.  
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coordination has been adopted by EFBBW (see section 9.5.3). In manufacturing sectors, 
however – in which labour mobility is also high compared to the other sectors considered in 
this analysis – a centralised, EIF-driven coordination approach is being pursued. This differs 
from the hypothesised relationshipship between labour mobility and the predominant pattern of 
Europeanisation (H1.a). However, since data on the number of non-EU citizens employed in a 
certain sector do not differentiate between different branches of manufacturing, no final 
conclusion can be drawn with regard to the relevance of labour mobility as a factor influencing 
policies on the transnational coordination of collective bargaining in the manufacturing sectors 
considered (that is, metal, chemicals and food production). The lack of ambiguity of labour 
mobility as an explanatory factor for the emergence of a decentralised or centralised pattern of 
collective bargaining becomes further evident in the case of the cleaning sector. Although 
labour mobility is comparatively high in this sector, evidence of a decentralised approach to 
collective bargaining coordination (H1.b) is weak, according to interviews with relevant EIF 
representatives. In contrast to the building sector, in which the autonomy of national member 
organisations is high and inter-union cooperation in the cross-border coordination of collective 
bargaining is initiated without the pronounced guidance and involvement of the EIF, cleaning 
sector unions are less active with regard to transnational collective bargaining coordination 
(see section 9.7.3).  
 
11.1.2 Capital mobility: H2.a and H2.b 
 
The factor of capital mobility, measured as FDI positions, did not prove to have a significant 
effect on the pattern of Europeanisation prevailing in a given sector. Although the volume of 
FDI is on average higher in the two sectors characterised by a centralised pattern of collective 
bargaining coordination – that is, metal and chemicals – than in the other sectors in which a 
purely decentralised coordination approach is predominant (see section 9.6.3), no empirical 
evidence of a significant contribution to the explanation of the variability in the dependent 
variable was found in the multivariate analysis. Likewise, results from the qualitative analysis 
do not give a clear picture either. In the manufacturing sectors in which investment intensity is 
high, such as in metals and chemicals, consequences of investment decisions such as 
relocations are considered as a factor favourable to the setting up of European structures for 
the coordination of collective bargaining, and of wage bargaining in particular. In the banking 
sector, however – in which the value of investments is the highest among the sectors 
considered – a purely decentralised approach to collective bargaining is pursued. The limited 
explanatory power of FDI for the emergence of a particular pattern of Europeanisation is due 
to the type of investment and its particular effect on the intensity of international competition in 
a sector. In contrast to the manufacturing sectors, in which investment is primarily aimed at 
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reducing production costs by making use of wage differentials between countries, FDI in the 
banking sector is rather ‘market-seeking’, that is, aimed at accessing new local markets 
(Galgóczi 2008). Direct investments in the banking sector thus do not tend to increase 
international competition for locations. The issue of the relocation of production plants is much 
more relevant for trade union action in manufacturing sectors, such as the automotive 
industry, than in banking where subsidiaries of multinational banks operate primarily in local 
markets. Although trade union interview respondents from the EIF level underscore the 
importance of a speedy and up-dated exchange of collective bargaining information, they do 
not actively promote centralised structures for an institutionalised approach to the cross-border 
coordination of collective bargaining policies, as the coordination of wage bargaining does not 
rank among the top priorities of transnational union action in the banking sector (see section 
9.6.3). Thus, neither hypothesis H2.a (centralised pattern of Europeanisation) nor hypothesis 
H2.b (decentralised Europeanisation) is confirmed by the empirical evidence.  
 
11.1.3 Export dependence: H3.a and H3.b 
 
The extent of a sector’s export dependence is thus a favourable factor as regards trade union 
actors adopting a centralised approach to collective bargaining coordination (H3.a). Interviews 
with relevant bargaining actors at the EIF level underline the importance of export dependence 
and international market competition as incentives to coordinate collective bargaining, and 
wage bargaining in particular, across borders. Hypothesis H3.b is not supported in the 
regression analysis, however. In line with this finding from the quantitative analysis, it can be 
inferred that a high degree of export dependence and a high degree of international trade 
integration are generally not perceived as incentives for trade unions to enter into bi- or 
multilateral cross-border cooperation on collective bargaining policies, which is carried out 
exclusively by national unions and not integrated into a broader coordination approach 
supported and governed by the sector’s EIF. Other issues such as labour mobility and 
workers’ protection are more important for initiating transnational union cooperation aimed at 
the coordination of collective bargaining policies.  
 
11.1.4 Product market regulation: H4.a and H4.b 
 
Neither the hypothesised negative relationshipship between a high degree of product market 
regulation and the emergence of a centralised pattern of Europeanisation (H4.a), nor the 
positive relationshipship between a low degree of market regulation and the predominance of 
a decentralised pattern of Europeanisation, as formulated in hypothesis H4.b, were confirmed 
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in the regression analysis.93 Results obtained from the qualitative analysis are not believed to 
contribute further to the elucidation of the relationshipship between product market regulation 
and the form of Europeanisation prevailing in a sector since the operationalisation of the 
variable to measure the degree of product market regulation is based on a classification 
scheme that incorporates – besides a more general OECD measure on market regulation (see 
section 7.4) – assessments obtained from expert interviews. A certain degree of ambiguity 
derives from the fact that the sector that exhibits the highest extent of market regulation, 
namely the construction sector, is characterised by a purely decentralised approach, 
according to trade union experts (see section 9.5.3). With regard to the other sectors that are 
characterised by a relatively high degree of product market regulation, such as chemicals, 
telecommunications and – with regard to the provision of services (see section 9.7.4) – 
commercial cleaning, no clear pattern is discernible with regard to the prevailing form of 
Europeanisation. Whereas in the chemical sector a more centralised, top-down approach has 
been adopted to the transnational coordination of collective bargaining within the multi-sectoral 
framework of the Eucob@n system, the telecommunications and cleaning sectors’ approaches 
are comparatively decentralised, although they differ in nature. Whereas in 
telecommunications the international coordination of collective bargaining policies is carried 
out on the basis of the cooperation of European Works Councils (EWCs) from different global 
regions such as North and South America, Africa or Southeast Asia (see section 9.7.3), in the 
cleaning sector the European perspective is predominant. However, due to the weakness of 
national member organisations in terms of organisational strength and financial resources, as 
well as the generally weak organisation of labour in most eastern European countries, the role 
of the EIF in actively promoting and monitoring the process of policy coordination is of more 
relevance in industrial cleaning than in the other sectors, which are characterised by a 
decentralised coordination approach. However, collecting bargaining coordination as such is 
not a top-priority goal of UNI Property Services due to its limited resources (see section 9.6.3). 
EWCs are considered to be an important institution for the transnational coordination of 
collective bargaining policies. However, whereas EWCs in telecommunications are used as a 
strategic tool for information exchange in an internationalised and relatively concentrated 
market (see IST 1999b), the role of EWCs in the cleaning sector is much weaker and they play 
a role mainly because of the weakness of organised labour and industrial relations structures 
in this sector in general.  
 
                                                 
93
 Despite a significance of the product regulation factors at the 10%-level in the logistic regression based on the 
ordinal scale variable level for the export dependence and capital mobility factors this finding is not considered in 
the analysis in light of the considerable limitations to which the statistical analysis is subject due to data 
characteristics (see section 10.1).  
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11.1.5 Union density: H5.a and H5.b  
 
As hypothesised, the organisational strength of the relevant sectoral unions is important for 
the promotion of either a centralised (H5.a) or a decentralised approach (H5.b) to 
transnational collective bargaining. In the metal sector, the German IG Metall, the Belgian and 
Dutch unions, as well as the Nordic metal sector unions are most supportive of a coordinated 
approach (see section 9.1.4) characterised by a comparatively high degree of centralisation. 
Sectoral union densities in all of these countries are above average, in particular in the case of 
Belgium and Germany (see section 9.1.3.4). A similar situation applies to the metal sector, in 
which the German IG BCE – together with Belgian, Danish, French and Italian unions – takes 
a leading role when it comes to coordinating bargaining policies across borders. However, 
union densities in the chemical sector correspond more or less to the level of union density at 
national level. The only exception is Germany where the sectoral density of IG BCE 
considerably exceeds the aggregate density rate (see section 9.5.2.4). The hypothesised 
relationshipship between the strength of unions which are most active in pursuing a 
centralised approach to collective bargaining coordination is supported by the finding that only 
in the construction sector are one (or a few more) organisations perceived as taking the lead 
in a common approach to transnational bargaining coordination.  
 
In the service sectors – that is, telecommunications and financial services – there is no 
counterpart to the German industry unions in the metal, chemical and construction sectors. 
The German multi-sectoral white-collar union ver.di does not take a clear stance on the issue 
of transnational coordination of collective bargaining. This is for two reasons. First, a collective 
norm based on quantitative, macroeconomic criteria for the European coordination of wage 
bargaining is not considered as useful in the service sector, in which wage bargaining is rather 
decentralised and labour productivity is not a meaningful indicator, as it is for wage bargainers 
in the manufacturing sectors. Secondly, empirical evidence shows that a centralised approach 
to collective bargaining relies to a large extent on the support of the large and influential 
member organisations of the EIFs. The role of the German DGB member organisations in 
shaping the bargaining coordination process in the sectors under consideration can be 
regarded as an important factor in the Europeanisation of collective bargaining.  
 
The difference between the coordination patterns in construction and in the cleaning sector 
are instructive in this regard. In both sectors, the provision of the service and its consumption 
are inseparably linked. This contrasts to the provision of goods which can be separated from 
their consumption. In contrast to services for which supply and demand have to coincide in 
terms of time and location, the site of production of goods does not necessarily have to be 
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congruent with the location of sales markets.94 Thus, in labour-intensive services that can be 
provided directly, such as construction and commercial cleaning, the mobility of labour is more 
relevant than the mobility of capital. The provision of other services, such as 
telecommunications and financial services, depends much more on technical infrastructural 
pre-conditions and skills requirements for workers. Therefore, labour mobility is restricted in 
these sectors.  
 
Despite the commonalities of the construction and industrial cleaning sectors with regard to 
the conditions of service provision, the role of the German IG BAU in coordinating collective 
bargaining policies across borders differs in these two sectors. In contrast to the building 
sector, in which IG BAU pursues a rather decentralised coordination approach based on bi- 
and multilateral cooperation with trade unions from other countries (see section 9.5.3), inter-
union initiatives aimed at the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining are much less 
frequent in the cleaning industry. Union density is generally low in the cleaning sector (with the 
notable exception of Denmark where the sectoral density rate is around 80 per cent). Due to 
the lack of a leading member organisation, initiatives for bargaining coordination come mainly 
from the respective EIF. At the European industry level, IG BAU is much more influential in 
construction than in the cleaning sector. This corresponds to the organisation’s density rates in 
these two sectors: in the German construction sector union density is above the national 
aggregate level, while in cleaning it is far below the country’s aggregate union density rate 
(see sections 9.5.2.4 and 9.7.2.4). 
 
 
11.1.6 Union fragmentation: H6.a and H6.b 
 
Aggregate data on union fragmentation at the sectoral level clearly indicate that differences 
between sectors (Table 81, Annex 10) are less pronounced than differences between 
countries (cf. Annexes 1 to 7). Thus, the degree of fragmentation/centralisation of the trade 
union system is characterised by a high degree of variation between the western European 
countries under consideration. The highest average score for decentralisation is observed in 
                                                 
94
 However, the proximity of sales markets to the production site of a good is often a decisive consideration when 
it comes to the relocation of production. In highly dynamic economies, investors may profit from both low labour 
costs for production and an increasing demand for goods and services due to local growth markets and high labour 
cost differentials between countries and regions. Although no clear pattern is discernible, market seeking 
investment is predominant in service sectors such as banking and telecommunications, whereas in manufacturing 
cost-saving considerations tend to determine investment decisions.  
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the telecommunications and chemical sectors, whereas the union system in the metal and the 
industrial cleaning sectors is comparatively centralised. The ambiguity of the factor of union 
centralisation with regard to the explanation of the emergence of either a centralised or a 
decentralised pattern of Europeanisation becomes apparent when the two sectors 
characterised by a strongly institutionalised and centralised approach to the European 
coordination of collective bargaining are considered. As indicated in Table 41, mean values of 
union fragmentation do not differ significantly between those sectors in which a centralised 
pattern of Europeanisation prevails and those sectors characterised by a predominantly 
decentralised path towards Europeanisation. However, at a deeper level of analysis it 
becomes evident that the high degree of heterogeneity of the chemical sector in terms of 
markets, production structures and collective bargaining (see section 9.2.3) is perceived as 
one of the most important factors hindering the cross-border coordination of collective 
bargaining policies. This contrasts to the metal sector that characterised by a relatively high 
degree of homogeneity with regard to union organisation, sectoral scope of collective 
agreements and their duration of validity, as well as bargaining procedures. Furthermore, the 
degree of vertical integration of the production chain is typically high in the metal sector.  
 
Thus, the preconditions for the intra-sectoral coordination of collective bargaining, both at 
national and at European level are especially favourable in the metal sector. According to 
empirical evidence from the qualitative analysis, perceptions of the necessity and feasibility of 
a transnational approach to collective bargaining coordination are strongest and most positive 
among union actors from the metal sector. The low fragmentation of the union system in the 
industrial cleaning sector and – to a lesser extent – in the banking sector do not seem to have 
a positive influence on the establishment of a centralised approach to the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining policies. In the financial sector in general, the autonomy 
of the national member organisations of the sector’s EIF is quite high, and the involvement of 
UNI Finance in transnational bargaining coordination is reportedly moderate (see section 
9.6.3). As multi-union systems are predominant among the countries considered in this study, 
the high degree of centralisation of the union system in industrial cleaning may reflect the 
general weakness of organised labour in this sector. Empirical evidence suggests that the 
factor of union fragmentation/centralisation alone is not sufficient to explain the emergence of 
the pattern of Europeanisation in a certain sector. Rather, the combination of both the degree 
of union fragmentation/centralisation and the organisational strength of the sector’s unions has 
to be considered when it comes to identifying conducive or obstructive factors for the 
Europeanisation of collective bargaining. 
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11.1.7 Collective bargaining level: H7.a and H7.b 
 
The level of collective bargaining in a given sector does not prove to be a significant factor in 
explaining the prevailing pattern of the Europeanisation of collective bargaining. As indicated 
in Table 41 the difference is not very pronounced with regard to the degree of bargaining 
centralisation between sectors characterised by a centralised, top-down approach to the 
transnational coordination of collective bargaining and sectors in which a decentralised, 
bottom-up coordination process is predominant. Mean values for the degree of bargaining 
centralisation rather contradict the hypothesised positive relationshipship between a high 
degree of bargaining centralisation and a centralised pattern of Europeanisation (see section 
4.1.7), as the average value of bargaining centralisation in those sectors in which a 
decentralised approach to the Europe-wide coordination of collective bargaining prevails 
exceeds the average centralisation value in the sectors in which there is a centralised pattern 
of Europeanisation. This finding is also contrary to the assessment of trade union 
representatives of the EIF who generally underscore the existence of sectoral-level or inter-
sectoral level collective bargaining in the member countries as a precondition of the cross-
border coordination of collective bargaining. Problems ensuing from highly decentralised 
bargaining systems, such as in the United Kingdom, are mentioned as a severe hindrance to 
the coordination and monitoring of collective bargaining policies. This problem typically arises 
in the metal sector, in which collective bargaining coordination is most advanced and thus 
presupposes a comprehensive and regular exchange of bargaining information in accordance 
with a standardised procedure. In countries in which collective bargaining takes place mainly 
at company or plant level, union bargainers are often not able to oversee – or influence – the 
determination of wages and working conditions in the sector (see sections 9.1.3.3 and 9.1.6).  
 
Another reason for the low explanatory power of the bargaining centralisation variable, 
however, may be its lack of differentiation between sectors and the primary data on which it 
relies. The comparatively – and surprisingly – high levels of bargaining centralisation in 
sectors such as construction, food production and personal services seem at least 
questionable. In the case of the building industry, the centralisation value averaged over 
countries suggests the predominance of sectoral-level collective bargaining. However, it can 
be assumed that sectoral collective bargaining applies only to the segment of legally employed 
workers. Due to the high share of illegal employment in the construction sector, it can be 
assumed that for a considerable part of the labour force wages and working conditions are not 
regulated by collective agreements (see section 9.5.1). The high average values of bargaining 
centralisation in the personal services and food production sectors also point to the sector as 
the predominant level of collective bargaining. It is, however, unclear how high the number of 
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posted and illegal workers in these sectors is and whether they are included in regulations 
provided for in collective agreements, even when collective bargaining is predominantly 
carried out at the sectoral level. 
 
11.1.8 Collective bargaining coordination: H8.a and H8.b 
 
The relationshipship between the existence of a mechanism that ensures a high degree of 
bargaining coordination between sectors and employee groups (= ‘horizontal coordination’) 
and between bargaining units from different levels (= ‘vertical coordination’) and the emerging 
pattern of Europeanisation of collective bargaining, as hypothesised in section 4.1.8, has to be 
tested on the basis of a cross-country rather than a cross-sectoral analysis. This is because 
the coordination mechanism is a characteristic of the national system of industrial relations 
and generally does not differ greatly between sectors in the western European countries under 
consideration (see section 5.1). In order to put hypotheses H8.a and H8.b to the test the 
European intra-sectoral dimension has to be addressed. Also, the power relationships 
between national bargaining agents with regard to the ability of some ‘key actors’ or ‘pattern 
setters’ to lead the bargaining process and – of equal importance – the willingness of other 
bargaining actors to follow and to comply with bargaining norms adopted by the pattern-setting 
bargaining agents (see sections 1.5.2.5 and 5.1.2) have to be considered in the analysis. 
Since pattern-bargaining typically involves bargaining agents of the metal sector as pattern-
setters, and on the European intra-sectoral level the coordination of collective bargaining, and 
of wage bargaining in particular, is most advanced in the metal sector, hypotheses H8.a and 
H8.b are tested on the basis of arrangements for the transnational collective bargaining 
existing in this sector (see section 9.1.5).  
 
According to the findings summarised in section 9.1.3.3, the national collective bargaining 
systems that exhibit the highest values with regard to bargaining coordination capacity 
(‘bargaining governability’, see section 1.5.2.4.3) are found in the Nordic countries – besides 
Germany and Austria, where the mechanism of pattern bargaining that ensures high 
bargaining governability prevails. When coming to a final assessment of the implementation of 
formal instruments for the transnational coordination of collective (wage) bargaining, however, 
the capacity of German and – to a lesser extent – Austrian bargaining actors to lead the cross-
border coordination process is questionable. In Germany, a pronounced and continuing 
process of wage moderation has been observable since the beginning of Europe-wide 
coordination activities in the metal sector (see section 9.1.5). The same holds true for the 
other ‘key countries’ that actively support a centralised and formalised approach to the 
transnational coordination of collective bargaining, such as Belgium and the Netherlands. In 
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these countries, collective bargaining at the national level is characterised by a comparatively 
low level of efficiency with regard to the inter-sectoral and horizontal coordination of collective 
bargaining (see section 9.1.3.3). In the Nordic countries, however – in particular, in Finland 
and Sweden – the coordination capacity of national systems of collective bargaining is 
comparatively high. In consideration of the results of several rounds of assessment of the 
outcome of the European coordination of collective bargaining, the Nordic countries in general 
proved to be among those that attain quantitative wage bargaining goals most regularly. This 
contrasts with the performance of the western, central European countries – that is, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg – in which quantitative, productivity-oriented 
bargaining goals have been reached to a far lesser extent (see section 9.1.5). Thus, the 
existence of the mechanism of pattern bargaining at the national level is not sufficient to 
guarantee an influential role for trade union bargainers from these countries in the 
transnational process of collective bargaining coordination.  
  
11.1.9 Collective bargaining coverage: H9.b 
 
The hypothesised relationshipship between a high level of collective bargaining coverage in a 
sector and the adoption of a decentralised pattern of autonomous trade union cooperation 
aimed at the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining is not backed by empirical 
evidence from the regression analysis. As shown in Table 41, the average values of sectoral 
collective bargaining coverage do not differ greatly between those sectors in which a 
centralised, top-down approach to the transnational coordination of collective bargaining is 
pursued and those sectors that are predominantly characterised by a decentralised pattern of 
Europeanisation, driven by the cross-border action of national union actors. Mean values of 
bargaining coverage rates by sectors (averaged over the countries considered in this study) 
are highest in the food industry, followed by the metal sector (cf. Annex 10). This contrasts 
with the construction and chemical sectors, in which collective bargaining coverage is lowest. 
The ambiguity of the empirical findings hints at the lack of differentiation and accuracy of 
sector-aggregated data on collective bargaining coverage. Evidence from the qualitative 
analysis rather points to the fact that preconditions for the implementation of collective 
agreements are perceived as a central requirement of the effective cross-border coordination 
of collective bargaining. This assessment is made for both centralised and decentralised forms 
of the Europeanisation of collective bargaining. Thus, hypothesis H9.b is not confirmed by the 
empirical evidence, and it can be assumed that it does not directly influence trade union action 
with regard to the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining policies.  
 
 
  304  
11.2 The relationshipship between European sectoral social dialogue and 
the Europeanisation of collective bargaining 
 
One important research focus of this study is the relationshipship between European social 
dialogue at the sectoral level and the transnational coordination of collective bargaining. The 
question of the type of relationshipship between the two principal instruments for the Europe-
wide determination of wages and working conditions – which may be either positive, that is, 
mutually complementary, or negative, that is, mutually exclusive (see Annex 11) – has been 
addressed in the qualitative analysis. The perceptions of trade union actors with regard to their 
preferred arrangements for the transnational coordination of collective bargaining policies – 
that is, either by the coordination of collective bargaining policies at the European intra-
sectoral level within existing structures of bargaining policy coordination, or within the 
framework of European social dialogue at the sectoral level – were analysed in expert 
interviews. Although it has been reported that resources for both forms of European-level 
coordination are limited, European sectoral social dialogue is regarded as an important 
complementary arrangement for safeguarding working conditions by setting European 
minimum standards on a range of issues, such as training, health and safety and lifelong 
learning. However, the two instruments are perceived as genuinely different, aimed at different 
goals and serving the achievement of these goals in accordance with distinct mechanisms. 
Whereas union-led initiatives for the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining leave 
much room to manoeuvre with regard to both the structural and procedural settings, as well as 
agenda setting, European social dialogue is strongly shaped by and dependent upon the 
European Commission as the principal political actor. Without the active support of the 
European Commission, social dialogue in general tends to become deadlocked when 
representatives of both sides of industry – for example, employer organisations and unions – 
do not reach agreement on entering into deliberations and – later on – into negotiations (see 
section 1.3.1).  
 In what follows, the factors that have been identified as being of importance for the 
emergence of either a centralised, top-down or a decentralised, bottom-up pattern of 
Europeanisation of collective bargaining are investigated with regard to their influence on 
European social dialogue at the sectoral level (see hypotheses summarised in Annex 11).  
 
11.2.1 Export dependence as a factor conducive to European sectoral dialogue 
(H1.c)? 
 
As hypothesised (section 4.1.3), the social partners share important interests in export 
dependent sectors. Since competition-related issues – primarily raised by employers – and the 
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issue of social protection in open and internationalised markets allow for problem resolution 
via political exchange, European social dialogue should be facilitated. However, the empirical 
evidence does not support this hypothesis. Export dependence is highest in the metal sector, 
in which social dialogue is most fragmented and restricted (cf. section 9.1.7). In the chemical 
industry, which is also highly integrated into international markets, competition-related issues, 
such as vocational training and qualifications, are among the most relevant issues for both 
sides of the industry and are frequently addressed within the framework of European sectoral 
dialogue. However, the relationshipship between export dependence and the probability of 
European social dialogue is not straightforward but rather mediated by factors such as the 
existence and representativeness of mandated social partner organisations as the prime 
precondition for the establishment of structures for dialogue. Thus, market-related factors do 
not seem to be prior for social partners to promote European social dialogue. However, when 
structures for European social dialogue already exist, competition-related issues – in 
particular, supply-side topics, such as training – constitute an incentive for employers to enter 
into European sectoral dialogue (see section 9.2.5). 
 
11.2.2 Capital mobility as an incentive for European sectoral social dialogue 
(H2.c)? 
 
Empirical evidence for the hypothesised positive relationshipship between capital mobility and 
the intensity of European sectoral social dialogue tends to be weak or ambiguous. In those 
sectors that exhibit the highest level of FDI as an indicator of high capital mobility, such as 
banking, metal and chemicals, European social dialogue is not considered as the prime 
instrument for the establishment of a forum for European collective bargaining. Rather at the 
present stage European social dialogue is perceived as a means complementary to union-led 
initiatives for the cross-border coordination of collective bargaining. In the metal sector, 
European social dialogue is still at a very early stage. Sectoral dialogue committees have so 
far been established only in sub-sectors such as shipbuilding (2003) and steel (2006), 
whereas important sectors such as automobiles, non-ferrous metals and machinery are not 
yet represented in the formal structures of European social dialogue. In the banking sector, 
which is characterised by the highest level of capital mobility (see section 7.2), European 
social dialogue is comparatively less dynamic than in other sectors, such as construction, 
telecommunications and industrial cleaning, where capital mobility (with the exception of 
telecommunications) is low. Furthermore, activities in European social dialogue have become 
notably less dynamic in recent years compared to the early years after the establishment of 
the banking sector committee in 1999. In the chemical sector, the EIF – EMCEF – is 
comparatively active. Sectoral committees have been set up in areas such as mining, 
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chemicals, electricity and gas. Recent legal initiatives by the European Commission (for 
example, REACH, Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2003/87/EC on the emissions 
trading scheme) are regarded as an incentive for the chemical sector’s European social 
partners to enter into dialogue (see sections 9.2.5 and 9.3.2), and the output of European 
social dialogue in terms of joint social partner texts is comparatively high in the chemical 
sector.  
 
11.2.3 Liberalisation and privatisation and the resurgence of European sectoral 
social dialogue (H4.c) 
 
In line with the hypothesised relationshipship between the liberalisation and privatisation of a 
sector’s market and the intensity of European social partners’ activities in European sectoral 
dialogue (see table of hypotheses in Annex 11) findings from the qualitative analysis 
underscore the importance of the Commission’s deregulation initiatives in the telecoms market 
(see section 9.7.1) as a driving factor for European sectoral social dialogue (see section 
9.7.4). The liberalisation of the telecommunications infrastructure, in particular of operating 
networks, was accompanied by a substantive and continuing process of European regulation. 
The regulatory framework set by the Commission to harmonise the conditions of network 
access, market competition, users’ and consumers’ rights and data protection required the 
involvement of European social partners since the European regulatory initiative touched upon 
the issue of the provision of ‘public goods’, that is, services of general interest. As a 
consequence, European social dialogue in the telecoms sector was particularly intensive in 
the 1990s (Interview OSE 2007), even before the sectoral committee was established (1999). 
However, more recently European social dialogue in the telecommunications sector has 
revived to a certain extent with the conclusion of joint statements on the revision of the ‘new 
regulatory framework for the provision of electronic communication networks and services’ 
(COM 2000) (see section 9.7.1) and on the issue of health and safety.  
 
11.2.4 Union fragmentation as an obstacle to agreement in European sectoral 
social dialogue (H6.c)? 
 
The hypothesised relationshipship between a high degree of union centralisation and a high 
level of activity of the sector’s European social partners in European sectoral dialogue is not 
corroborated by empirical findings. In sectors in which the number of unions that organise a 
part or the whole of the workforce in the sector is high – such as in telecommunications and 
the chemical sector – European social dialogue has resulted in a comparatively high number 
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of joint social partner texts (cf. Pochet et al. 2006). Although union organisation in the metal 
sector is comparatively homogenous and centralised European social dialogue in the metal 
sector is comparatively limited. This holds true even for sub-sectors such as shipbuilding 
where the number of joint social partner texts is comparatively low. The reason for the 
restricted explanatory power of the centralisation of the union system for the emergence of 
European sectoral dialogue is evident, as the participation of the employers’ side is a 
precondition for setting up a dialogue committee and entering into discussions. The highly 
centralised trade union system in the cleaning sector and the comparatively high level of 
activity of the sector’s social partners in European sectoral dialogue, however, do not provide 
enough evidence for the sustainability of the hypothesised relationshipship. However, trade 
union respondents to the qualitative interviews pointed to the difficulty of interest unification in 
a highly fragmented trade union system and the protracted process of coming to a joint 
position with the employers’ side, not only on the issue that should be addressed in European 
social dialogue but also on the form of the outcome (that is, joint position, recommendation or 
agreement binding on the signatory partners) (see section 1.3). Therefore, a more in-depth 
analysis of European social partners’ activities in terms of the results of European sectoral 
dialogue that includes all sectors in which dialogue committees are established is needed to 
gain further insight into the preconditions of European social dialogue at the sectoral level.  
 
 
11.3 Lobbying for European regulation as a functional equivalent of the 
Europeanisation of collective bargaining? 
11.3.1 Labour mobility and European regulation: H1.c 
 
The high labour mobility in sectors such as construction has been clearly identified as a factor 
encouraging trade union actors to press for European legislative powers for Europe-wide 
regulation. The pattern of factor mobility in the building sector corresponds to that of service 
markets in which the provision of the service and its consumption are congruent with regard to 
time and location. For the provision of labour-intensive goods or services of this kind in 
globalised markets it is primarily the labour factor and not capital that is internationally mobile. 
Therefore, the main aim of employee interest organisations is to guarantee that immigrant or 
posted workers are covered by the regulations on employment and labour protection, as well 
as workers’ participation, which are in force in the country in which the service is provided. 
Since national rules are neither harmonised nor sufficient to ensure equal working conditions 
and wages for immigrant, commuting or posted and domestic workers European trade unions 
and their national affiliates pursue a lobbying approach in order to achieve European 
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regulation. However, against the background of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) rulings 
– the Laval and Rüffert cases are exemplary in this respect – the adoption of European 
minimum standards may turn out to be a pitfall since they open the door to the systematic 
application of lower standards for certain groups of workers, in particular posted workers (cf. 
Woolfson and Sommers 2006). The other option is to ensure the inclusion of posted workers 
in national collective agreements and/or legal norms that guarantee a high level of protection, 
high working standards and equal pay, and rule out the undercutting of the wages and working 
conditions of domestic workers. The adoption of European directives is carried out by national 
social partners and according to national practices, however, and generally results in 
considerable cross-country heterogeneity. For instance, varying levels of minimum wages 
within and between sectors have been adopted in Germany in the context of the adoption of 
the Posting of workers’ directive (Directive 96/71/EC). The directive has been criticised by 
trade unions as leaving too much room for interpretation and thus opening the door to social 
and wage dumping among the member states. The decisions of the ECJ have been heavily 
criticised by the European labour movement and the ETUC in particular. Whether a joint 
strategy of European and national trade unions to press for a revision of the Posting of 
workers’ directive will be adopted is not clear at the present time.  
 
 
11.3.2 Lobbying for EU regulation as a functional equivalent of low collective 
bargaining coverage: H9.c  
 
The empirical evidence does not clearly support the relationshipship between a low bargaining 
coverage rate and the inclination of the trade union actors in the sector to embark upon a 
lobbying approach aimed at the Europe-wide regulation of working conditions by European 
legislation. Although the collective bargaining coverage is lowest in the construction sector in 
comparison with the other sectors considered in this study, the reliability and accuracy of 
sector-aggregated data on collective bargaining coverage rates is restricted by an upward bias 
for most of the sectors considered. For instance, the finding that collective bargaining is 
second-lowest in the chemical sector and is exceeded by the coverage rates in service sectors 
such as industrial cleaning and banking gives rise to doubts concerning data reliability. In 
general, the empirical evidence tends to suggest that coverage rates are highest in 
manufacturing and the public sector and comparatively lower in the private services sectors 
(Traxler and Behrens 2002). Leaving aside considerations of data quality, findings from the 
qualitative, semi-structured interviews underscore the relevance of European legislation in 
sectors or in segments of the labour market in which the coverage of workers by collective 
agreements is not guaranteed. The construction sector unions’ approach is exemplary in this 
  309  
respect. Trade union respondents from the EIF level perceive the goal of establishing Europe-
wide regulation of working conditions and minimum wage standards as more important than 
the transnational coordination of collective bargaining policies (see section 9.4.3).  
 
The two main determinants of collective bargaining coverage – namely the pervasive practice 
of extending collective agreements to other employers that are not affiliated to the signatory 
party to the agreement – and the organisational strength of employers, cannot be influenced 
by trade union action. Although there are provisions for the extension of collective agreements 
in the majority of member countries – with the exception of Sweden and the United Kingdom, 
as well as Italy where there is a functional equivalent in the form of a constitutionally 
guaranteed right to fair pay (Traxler and Behrens 2002) – the de facto practice of declaring 
collective agreements generally binding in a certain sector or beyond is less widespread 
(Traxler and Marginson 2005). For instance, in Denmark collective agreements are extended 
only for the transposition of EU directives. In Greece, social partners and public authorities 
reported that they feel that the use of extension mechanisms has been challenged and thus 
extension practice is generally limited (Traxler and Behrens 2002). In Germany and the 
Netherlands collective agreements are declared generally binding only in exceptional cases 
and predominantly in sectors where the coverage of collective agreements is low (for example, 
industrial cleaning), and wages and working conditions are therefore not sufficiently 
guaranteed by autonomous collective bargaining. In Ireland, the practice of extending 
minimum wage provisions set by Joint Labour Committees has de facto come to a halt since 
the adoption of the Minimum Wage Act in 2000 (EC 2004b).  
 
Against the background of the erosion of employers’ organisations in some of the member 
countries, such as Germany, where companies are increasingly dropping out of employers’ 
associations or joining industry organisations whose sectoral collective agreements provide for 
lower wages and working conditions than in the sector of original membership, the extension 
of collective agreements by public authorities is becoming more important in order to 
guarantee comprehensive implementation of collectively agreed standards. However, the 
recent decisions of the ECJ with regard to the application of collectively negotiated wages and 
working conditions for posted workers calls into question extension rules as an instrument for 
maintaining wage rates and working conditions stipulated in sectoral collective agreements, as 
the Rüffert case has demonstrated (cf. Borelli 2008). Although the debate on the introduction 
of statutory minimum wages has gained much momentum among trade unions in countries in 
which there are no provisions for statutory minimum wages, such as Germany, no common 
position on the level has been formulated so far by the DGB. In Sweden, where legal rules for 
the extension of collective agreements are lacking, the Laval case prompted trade union 
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demands for statutory minimum wages. The implication of the ECJ rulings, as perceived by 
organised labour, is a general downward pressure on wages as minimum pay levels are 
referred to as a yardstick for the determination of wages for posted workers. Collective 
bargaining institutions and instruments such as the extension of collective agreements are 
perceived as being under threat and as losing their regulatory power. However, given that 
these EU-level developments are very recent it remains to be seen whether trade union 
perceptions and fears are mirrored by the empirical evidence, which so far has indicated a 
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12. Conclusions 
 
Findings from the qualitative analysis indicate that although the transnational coordination of 
collective bargaining policies is perceived as an important goal among trade union actors at 
both the national and the EIF levels, coordination activities have remained rather limited in a 
number of sectors. This is mostly due to limited resources in terms of financial means, 
personnel and organisational efforts, often requiring a trade-off between two fundamental 
goals of trade union action – increasing organisational strength and determining the wages 
and working conditions of employees, including non-members. Although trade unions obtain 
legitimacy from both types of activity one strategic approach dominates in most unions, 
depending on a set of economic, market-related factors that condition the production process 
in a given industry, institutional characteristics of the national and sectoral industrial relations 
systems, including collective bargaining institutions, and the perceptions and orientations of 
national unions and the European-level organisations they are affiliated to. The different sets 
of factors are interrelated and interlinked in a multilayered system of mutual relationships of 
influence. It is therefore a challenge to identify causal relationships between them (for 
example, Traxler et al. 2001). However, in this study different types of factors – economic, 
institutional and actor-specific – are analysed with regard to their effects on the emergence of 
a certain pattern of Europeanisation of collective bargaining. Transnational initiatives and 
arrangements for the coordination of collective bargaining policies have been established in a 
number of sectors whereby either a centralised, top-down approach in combination with a 
decentralised, bottom-up process of coordination, or a purely decentralised approach to 
coordination initiated autonomously by national trade unions and only to a lesser extent 
embedded in EIF-level policy arrangements may predominate in a given sector. Alternatively, 
‘non-collective bargaining’ approaches aimed at the Europe-wide regulation of working 
conditions and wage-setting procedures may be adopted, in particular in sectors in which 
labour mobility is high.  
 
Whereas EMU and the internationalisation of product and financial markets increased the 
perceived need for collective bargaining coordination in order to contain downward pressure 
on wages and labour standards, the conditions for coordination activities have worsened. 
Trade union bargainers are confronted by a trend towards bargaining decentralisation and the 
erosion of collective bargaining systems through the undermining of collective agreements. 
The most virulent problem hindering inter-union cooperation and decision-making is the 
growing importance of company-level negotiations that hamper a coordinated cross-border 
approach to collective bargaining. Decreasing unionisation rates, the weakness of peak 
organisations and slack labour markets are additional factors that weaken the bargaining 
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power of unions. In practice, differences in collective bargaining systems, practices and 
outcomes, such as scope, level and duration of collective agreements and desynchronised 
negotiation rounds in the member countries, are perceived as factors hindering the cross-
border coordination of collective bargaining policies. 
 
As the sector-based analysis revealed, the transnational coordination of collective bargaining 
is most likely in the form of flexible, non-hierarchical, network-structured arrangements. Since 
coordination is facilitated among a limited number of actors who share commonalities with 
regard to their strategic orientations and preferences, cross-border coordination activities are 
most feasible in certain regional areas. Such transnational ‘clusters of coordination’ between 
economically highly integrated countries and/or regions (for example, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium or the Nordic countries) have been emerging in particular in the metal 
sector, but also in other sectors, such as chemicals, construction and energy.  
 
At European level a number of multi-sectoral arrangements for the transnational coordination 
of collective bargaining policies have been established. The first inter-sectoral network-formed 
framework for European collective bargaining coordination was the Eucob@n system, set up 
by the metal and textiles sector in the late 1990s and then extended to the chemical sector. 
This network aims at a centrally organised exchange of up-to-date information on collective 
bargaining and social policy developments in the member countries and on the European 
level. Furthermore, the system provides for continuous monitoring and reporting on collective 
bargaining developments which are summarised in annual reports. Similar European-level 
structures have been established in the public sectors which fall under the purview of the 
respective EIF, that is, EPSU (European Federation for Public Service Unions), such as social 
health services, local government, national administration and public utilities. The sectoral 
scope of European structures for a centrally organised and highly institutionalised exchange of 
bargaining information and reporting on collective bargaining developments is strongly 
determined by product and labour market conditions prevailing in the sectors. The Eucob@n 
system, for instance, is limited to manufacturing industries that share commonalities with 
regard to a high degree of export dependence and market internationalisation, whereas the 
Epsucob@n system comprises public service sectors that are rather sheltered from 
international competition and in which transnational capital mobility is comparatively low. The 
recently liberalised public utilities sector stands out in this respect. Recently, a new approach 
to bargaining coordination has been taken up by EPSU in the energy sector (that is, electricity 
and gas), aimed at the promotion of social dialogue and the regular exchange of bargaining 
information. The initiative, characterised by a clearly defined geographical area, was launched 
in early 2008 and includes EPSU affiliates in the energy sector from Austria, Belgium, France, 
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Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Geographical proximity of bargaining actors in 
such transnational arrangements is typically linked to a high degree of market integration and 
economic interdependence, as well as with commonalities regarding industrial relations 
structures and collective bargaining systems (that is, within central-western Europe or 
Scandinavia).  
 
When it comes to drawing conclusions on the effectiveness of the transnational coordination of 
collective bargaining with regard to maintaining and promoting wage developments in line with 
productivity growth, as well as high standards in working conditions, encompassing 
arrangements in which elements of both a centralised and a decentralised approach 
complement each other are regarded as functionally superior to a purely decentralised 
coordination approach driven by autonomous cross-border union cooperation. Leaving aside 
the applicability of the metal sector’s approach to other sectors, any assessment of the 
outcome of transnational collective bargaining coordination has to take the coordination 
approach of the European metalworkers’ federations as a point of reference. Although the 
coordination of wage policies is central to the metal sector’s coordination approach the 
coordination of non-wage issues such as training, qualifications and lifelong learning, as well 
as retirement and pension regulation is perceived as gaining in importance. With regard to the 
future development of transnational wage bargaining coordination two decisive questions 
arise. First, is Germany fulfilling its leadership role in wage bargaining, and second, can a 
‘critical mass’ of countries that closely orchestrate their bargaining goals and outcomes be 
reached? Although German wage bargaining results tended to be in line with the EMF’s 
Coordination Rule, the low dynamic of the development of unit labour costs95 at the 
macroeconomic level casts the country’s role as pattern-setter in doubt. It can be concluded 
that the Europe-wide coordination of wage bargaining guided by a productivity-oriented 
coordination rule is a rather restricted phenomenon, limited to the metal sector. In 
consideration of the outcomes of wage bargaining coordination in the metal sector, the 
efficiency and effectiveness of pattern-bargaining as a mechanism for the transnational 
coordination of wage bargaining, whereby Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium as the ‘core 
countries’ provide the yardstick for bargaining agents in other countries, is highly questionable. 
It remains to be seen whether pattern bargaining can be established as an efficient and 
mutually recognised form of transnational bargaining coordination.  
 
However, the phenomenon of the transnationalisation of collective bargaining goes beyond a 
purely output-based process aimed at the de facto alignment of wage developments within the 
EU and includes a normative dimension of collective interest and policy formation. Although 
                                                 
95
 In Germany, annual unit labour cost development was negative from 2004 to 2007 (EC 2008).  
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the influence of economic and institutional factors on the emergence of a certain pattern of the 
Europeanisation of collective bargaining is undisputed, the Europeanisation process is 
strongly driven by trade union actors. Their normative orientations and perceptions directly 
affect the form of coordination arrangements and practices. In contrast to the 
transnationalisation of business activities and the increasing internationalisation of markets, 
the transnationalisation of collective bargaining policies can be regarded as a relatively 
nascent phenomenon. Whereas in the business sphere transnational action is immediately 
oriented towards and corrected by market conditions and requirements, the cross-border 
coordination activities of unions presuppose intricate and often protracted processes of 
internal interest unification and formation. Collective action by union organisations is based on 
processes of mutual learning, and the identification and adoption of relevant issues and 
models of best practice. Thus, the coordination activities of organised labour require a certain 
set of favourable preconditions such as a limited number of actors, relatively homogenous 
interest and power constellations and reconcilable communication and conflict-solving 
patterns.  
 
A crucial question arises from the relationshipship between the emergence of a European 
system of industrial relations providing a framework for different forms and levels of European 
social dialogue and autonomous trade union activities aimed at the Europe-wide coordination 
of collective bargaining. Both centralised and – to a lesser extent – decentralised patterns of 
union-driven cross-border coordination of collective bargaining are embedded in the multi-level 
structure of the European system of industrial relations. The implications of the 
Europeanisation process in the field of social policy and industrial relations for the 
transnationalisation of collective bargaining are unclear, however. Three lines of argument can 
be invoked in this respect.  
 
First, the promotion and development of European-level structures for social dialogue, both in 
its tripartite and bipartite, ‘autonomous’ form have promoted the transnationalisation of 
collective bargaining policies as new arenas for transnational action. Both European (sectoral) 
social dialogue and Europe-wide initiatives and arrangements for the coordination of collective 
bargaining complement and mutually reinforce each other and have triggered off far-reaching 
processes of information exchange and ‘political learning’. The formalisation and advanced 
regulation of procedures for the determination of wages and working conditions have helped to 
strengthen the position of labour vis-à-vis business.  
 
Second, the process of Europeanisation towards the promotion of ‘autonomous’ European 
social dialogue and the adoption of the subsidiarity principle have shifted the burden of inter-
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class interest unification and collective bargaining to the European and national social 
partners. Due to divergent and often irreconcilable interest positions between business and 
labour, the transnationalisation of collective bargaining is exclusively driven by and dependent 
on union action. Furthermore, recent decisions of the European Court of Justice on the 
applicability of collectively negotiated standards for wages and working conditions for posted 
workers have been heavily criticised by unions as resulting in the systematic application of 
minimum standards and putting downward pressure on the pay and conditions of both 
domestic and posted workers.  
 
Third, taking a rather ‘Euro-realist’ perspective, the emergence of a multi-layered system of 
European industrial relations requires a multi-level approach to the transnationalisation of 
collective bargaining policies in which actors at the European and national levels have to 
coordinate and align their policy approaches. The outcome depends on the social partners’ 
ability to unify and formulate their interest positions across borders, as well as to enter into 
transnational cooperation and build issue-specific alliances with both the employers’ side and 
political actors. Policy-making and collective action in a multi-level system of industrial 
relations may involve different sets of actors in a pragmatic approach to addressing specific 
issues arising in a certain sector or segment of the labour force. Thus, in some sectors the 
adoption of alternative, ‘non-collective bargaining’ forms for the Europe-wide determination of 
wages and working conditions is an effective and pragmatic strategy of trade union action 
rather than an indication of their deficient capacity for collective bargaining or the existence of 
a competitive, mutually exclusive relationshipship between regulation and ‘autonomous’ 
collective bargaining.  
 
Against the background of the erosion and weakening of collective bargaining institutions 
indicated by declining collective bargaining coverage rates in some of the member states (in 
particular in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Baltic countries), as well as increasing in-
work poverty, the debate on European minimum wages can be regarded as following the 
‘euro-pragmatic’ line of argument. Rather than being the result of a Europe-wide, top-down 
initiative by the European legislator, European minimum wages should be set either by 
collective agreements or by law. Following the approach of the open method of coordination, 
only the relative level of minimum wages (as a percentage of the national mean wage) would 
be defined at the European level (Schulten and Watt 2007), and minimum wages would be 
implemented according to wage-setting procedures established in the member countries.  
 
Trade union-led initiatives for the transnational coordination of collective bargaining policies 
which are based on a ‘centralised’ approach with regard to the harmonisation of bargaining 
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procedures by formulating commonly applicable – and not necessarily quantitative – 
orientation criteria and guidelines can therefore be considered as being central to the effective 
transnational coordination of collective bargaining policies. European-level arrangements for 
social dialogue at the sectoral level are generally regarded as a complementary element of an 
encompassing collective bargaining approach rather than as a functional equivalent. However, 
increased competitive forces unleashed by the internationalisation of markets and the latest 
enlargements of the EU, accompanied by the general, aggregate trend of a decentralisation of 
collective bargaining, have put a strain on well-established and highly institutionalised systems 
of multi-employer bargaining which are considered to be the principal precondition for the 
coordination of bargaining policies at the European sectoral level. The increased complexity 
and scope of transnational bargaining coordination requires a great deal of initiative, resource 
mobilisation and organising capacity on the side of organised labour. It remains to be seen 
whether European and national trade unions as the principal actors of the Europeanisation 
process are up to these challenges and will succeed in effectively and substantially influencing 
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Annex 1: Tables METAL SECTOR  
 
Table 42 : Representational domain concentration/fragmentation – metal sector 
 
Country a Number of sector-





(OD): (1= yes, 0 = no) 
Index value (n_unions 
x OD), increases with 
level of fragmentation 
AT 2 0 0 
BE 6 1 6 
DK 2 0 2 
ES 3 1 3 
FI 5 1 5 
FR 4 1 4 
DE 1 0 0 
GR 1 0 0 
IR 1 0 0 
IT 3 1 3 
NL 4 1 4 
PT 3 1 3 
SW 3 1 0 
UK 3*  1 3 
Source: EMF 2005 ; 2006, own research. 
* before the merger of Amicus and T&G (Transport and General Workers’ Union) on 1st May 2007; 
a
 The identification of union organisations considered here is based on the researcher’s own survey on 
union density in the metal sector. Names of the organisiations and possible domain overlaps between 















  334  
 
 
Table 43: Extension practice and CB coverage – metal sector 
 
Country Extension practice 
pervasive = 2/moderate 
= 1/marginal or non-
existing = 0 a 
CB coverage (steel 
industry) 
AT (2) 100 
BE 2 b 90-95 
DK 0 ~100 
ES 0 < 100 
FI 2 100 
FR 2 ~100 
DE 0 c ~100 
GR 0 d ~100 
IR 0 ~16.5 
IT (2) 100 
NL 0 d ~100 
PT n.a. n.a. 
SW 0 ~ 90 
UK 0 ~ 66 
a functional equivalents in () 
Sources: Beguin, J.-M (2005), Industrial relations in the Steel Industry, EIROonline, 2005 
Eucoba Report 2006 
b
 Sectoral collective agreements concluded in two joint committees for blue-collar and white-collar workers providing for 
minimum pay and conditions. Since collective bargaining takes place mainly at the firm-level and coverage is outstandingly 
high, it is assumed that extension practice is pervasive in the metal sector and on the intersectoral level as well (seee EIRO 
2005, Marginson/Traxler 2005). 
c
 Sectoral, regional collective bargaining although it is reported that some (multinational) companies do not adopt the sector 
agreement and conclude own company agreements. The coverage of the sectoral agreement is almost 100%. 
d
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Table 44: Sector-level CB – metal sector 
Country Dominant level of 
CB (DL): 
central/inter-
sectoral = 2, 
sectoral (national) 
= 1, company-level 
= 0; if two levels 
equally important 
sum/2 
Existence of covert 
coordination 
mechanisms in the 
form of pattern 
bargaining (CM): 













DL x CM x 
BGOV 
AT 1 2 2 4 
BE 0,5 ((1+0)/2) 1 1 0,5 
DK 0,5 ((1+0)/2) 1 2 1 
ES 0,5* ((1+0)/2) 1 1 0 
FI 1 1 2 2 
FR 0 1 1 0,5 
DE 1 * 2 2 4 
GR 1 1 2 2 
IT 0,5 ((1+0)/2) 1 1 0,5 
IR 1 (2+0)/2 1 1 1 
NL 0,5 ((1+0)/2) 1 2 1 
PT 0,5 ((1+0)/2) 1 1 0,5 
SW 1 1 2 2 
UK 0 1 1 0 
* regional sectoral 
ES: Multi-employer agreements for the metalworking industry have been concluded on the provincial 
level which are supplemented by a large number of company-agreements (Eucoba Bericht 2005).  
FR: Eucoba Bericht 2005: Company-level bargaining pre-dominant!  
Sources: Beguin (2005), IR in the Steel Industry, EIROonline, 2005; EC, IR in Europe 2004; EMF 2005 
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Table 45: Union density of representative trade unions – metal sector (2007) 
 
Union density (in %) Country: 





















































































































70 d - > 80 e (West), 































































































~ 29 a 
 
 














































Source: own survey EMF member organisations in the respective countries, EMF (2006), Beguin 
(2005)  
*) domain overlaps with other sector-related organisations; 
a
 Eucoba Report 2006: definition of the metalworking sector: NACE DJ (27, 28), DK (29), DL (30, 31, 
32 and 33) and DM (34, 35);  
b
 Beguin (2005), Industrial relations in the Steel Industry: sectoral definitions: ‘steel sector’ = NACE 
code 27.20 : Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain; ‘ferrous metal 
sector’ = NACE 27.10, 27.20 and 27.30: Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, 
Sweden and the UK 
c overall metalworking 
d 




 The two white-collar unions SIF and HTF merged in 2008 to form Unionen. 
g Amicus and T&G (Transport and General Workers’ Union) merged on 1st May 2007 in order to form 
Unite. 
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Annex 2: Tables CHEMCIAL SECTOR  
 
Table 46: Representational domain concentration/fragmentation – chemical sector 
 
Country Number of sector-





(OD): (1= yes, 0 = no) 
Index value (n_unions 
x OD), increases with 
level of fragmentation 
AT 2 0 0 
BE 6 1 6 
DK 11 1 11 
ES 4 1 4 
FI 3 1 3 
FR 5 1 5 
DE 3 1 3 
GR 5 1 5 
IR 1 0 0 
IT 7 1 7 
NL 4 1 4 
PT 3 1 3 
SW 4 1 4 
UK 5 * 1 5 
* before the merger of Amicus and T&G (Transport and General Workers’ Union) on 1st May 2007; 
Source: Study on the representativeness of the social partner organisations in the chemical industry 
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Table 47: Extension practice and CB coverage – chemical sector 




existing = 0 
Index CBC (>= 50 %, 
1= yes, 0= no) 
+ Extension practice  
 
CB coverage  
AT (2) 3 100 
BE 2 3 100 
DK 0 0 ~ 75-80 
ES 2 3 ~ 85 
FI 2 3 90 
FR 2 3 ~ 90 -100 
DE 0 1 ~ > 90 
GR 1 b 3 n.a. 
IR 0 0 ~ 22 
IT (2) 3 n.a. 
NL 0 1 ~ 85 
PT 2 3 n.a. 
SW 0 1 ~ 95 
UK 0 0 ~ 40-45 a 
Source: Study on the representativeness of the social partner organisations in the chemical industry 
(EU25), Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut des Sciences du Travail, 2006 ;  
Traxler, F. (2008), Representativeness of the social partners: Gas sector. European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.  
a estimate includes collective bargaining coverage in electricity, gas and water supply sectors, dti, trade 
union membership 2006 
b
 Due to the lack of data on the practice to extend collective agreements in the Greek chemical industry 
and on the sector’s CBC it is difficult to assess whether extension is a common practice or not. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the extension of sector-related collective agreements is not pervasive since 
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Table 48: Sector-level CB – chemical sector 
Country Dominant level of 
CB (DL): 
central/inter-
sectoral = 2, 
sectoral (national) 
= 1, company-level 
= 0; if two levels 
equally important 
sum/2 
Existence of covert 
coordination 
mechanisms in the 
form of pattern 
bargaining (CM): 













DL x CM x 
BGOV 
AT 1 2 2 4 
BE 1 1 1 1 
DK 0,5 ((1+0)/2) 1 2 1 
FI 1,5 ((1+2)/2) 1 2 3 
FR 0,5 ((1+0)/2) 1 1 0,5 
DE 1  2 2 4 
GR 1,5 ((1+2)/2) 1 2 3 
IR 0  1 1 0 
IT 0,5 ((1+0)/2) 1 1 0,5 
NL 0,5 ((1+0)/2) 1 2 3 
PT 0,5 ((1+0)/2) 1 1 0,5 
ES 0,5 ((1+0)/2) 1 1 0,5 
SW 1 1 2 2 
UK 0 1 1 0 
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Table 49: Union density of sector-related trade unions – chemical sector  
 
Union density (in %) Country: 












































CNE/LBC* n.a.  4.1   
LBC-NVK* n.a. n.a.   










85 ~ 90 
3F* 70-75 0.25   
HK 45-50 1.0   
Dansk Metal* 80 n.a.   
DEF* 75 n.a.   
TL* n.a. 1.0   
DL-F n.a. 59.0   















LH* n.a. n.a.   
FI:   78 80-90 
Kemianliitto* n.a. 90.0   
Sähköliitto* n.a. n.a.   










9 < 10 
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– CGT* n.a. 5,4 
FCE-CFDT* n.a. n.a.   
Fédéchimie CGT-
FO* 












































































































































14 ~ 15-20 
SW:   88 ~ 85 
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~ 25-30 f 
Source: IST (2006), Study on the representativeness of the social partner organisations in the chemical 
industry, Université Catholique de Louvain, IST – Institut des Sciences du Travail. 
*) domain overlaps with other sector-related organisations; 
a
 sector definitions vary slightly between Member Countries, see IST (2006);  
b
 IF Metall merged with Industrifacket – The Industrial Workers Union in 2006. Before the merger, 
Industrifacket’s share of members working in the chemical industry was estimated to be 42.2 % (IST 
2006) 
c
 EC (2004b) 
d EC (2006) 
e The two white-collar unions SIF and HTF merged in 2008 to form Unionen. 
f
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Annex 3: Tables FOOD SECTOR  
 
Table 50: Representational domain concentration/fragmentation – food sector 






(OD): (1= yes, 
pervasive; 0 = no, 
minor) 
Index value 
(n_unions x OD), 



























































































2 1 2 
                                                 
96
 SIPTU (Services Industrial Professional Technical Union) founded in 1990, resulting from a merger of ITGWU 
(Irish Transport and General Workers Union) and FWUI (Federated Workers Union of Ireland) and affiliated to 
ICTU – Irish Congress of Trade Unions.  



























8 1 8 
SW: 
IF Metall*, SIF* a, 
Ledarna*, Sveriges 
Ingenjorer* 
4 1 4 
UK: 
GMB*, T&G b *, 
Amicus a *, 
BFAWU* 
4 1 4 
*) domain overlaps with other sector-related organisations; 
a
 The two white-collar unions SIF and HTF merged in 2008 to form Unionen. 
b
 before Amicus – T&G merger to form Unite in 2007 








                                                                                                                                                           
97
 BFAWU – Bakers, Food and Allied Workers Union, reports to have 30.000 members in England, Scotland, 
Wales, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. According to Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) gross 
membership amounted to 1.091 members in Ireland in 1995.  
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Table 51: Extension practice and CB coverage – food sector 
 




existing = 0 
Index CBC (>= 50 




CB coverage  
AT (2) 3 100 
BE 2 3 100 
DK 0 1 100 
ES 2 2 98 
FI 2 3 ~ 100 
FR 2 3 100 
DE 0 1 ~ 100 
GR 0 b  n.a. 
IR 0  n.a. 
IT (2) 3 100 
NL 0 1 ~ 100 
PT 2 3 ~ 90 * 
SW 0 1 ~ 100 
UK 0 0 20 a 
Sources : Glassner (2008a); Traxler and Behrens (2002); EFFAT (2006); 
a 
estimate based on CBC by industry, Grainger and Growther (2007), Trade Union Membership 2006, 
Department of Trade and Industry, UK.  
b minimum requirement of extension, i.e. employers covered by CA most at least employ 51 % of 
employees in sector/occupation (EC 2006).  
* according to expert interviews, the coverage rate in the food production industry is lower than in the 
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Table 52: Sector-level CB – food sector 
Country Dominant level 
of CB (DL): 
central/inter-
sectoral = 2, 
sectoral 
(national) = 1, 
company-level = 


























DL x CM x 
BGOV 
AT 1 2 2 4 
BE 1 1 1 1 
DK 1 1 2 2 
ES 1 1 1 1 
FI 1 1 2 2 
FR 1 1 1 1 
DE 1 2 2 4 
GR 1 1 2 2 
IR 1 ([2+0]/2) 1 1 1 
IT 1 1 1 1 
NL 1 1 2 2 
PT 1 1 1 1 
SW 1 1 2 2 
UK 0 1 1 0 
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Table 53: Union density of sector-related trade unions union density of sector-related 
trade unions – food sector 
 
Union density (in %) Country: 
Organisation Domain density of 






n.a. 30,67 b 
BE: 
Horval,  
CSC alimentation et 
services/ACV voeding en 
diensten98 
both 






n.a. 49 c 
ES: 
FAyT (1995 a) 
n.a. 8,2 c 
FI: 
SEL (1998 a) 




CFTC-FGA (1994 a):  
FNAF  (1994 a) 
FAA-FO (1994 a) 











SIPTU Food & Drink 
section 
n.a. n.a. 
IT: 19,5 18 b * 
NL: 
 n.e. 
Voe-FNV (1997 a) 
IVB-CNV (1997 a) 
De Unie (1997 a) 
 
n.a. 
~13,0 c * 
PT: 




SINTAB (5.2 %), SETAA 
(3.7 %);  
 
~ 5 c * 
(SINTAB+SETAA) 
                                                 
98
 Both blue and white-collar workers in several sectors such as horeca, tourism. In food production industry only 
blue-collars;  
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SW: 
Livs (1998 a) 
n.a. 72 c 
UK: 
BFAWU (1995 a) 
n.a. 5.7 c 
Sources: Glassner (2008a); EC (2006) 
a Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000) 
b 
estimates according to membership data from Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000) and the Eurostat Population 
Census 2001 
c 
estimates according to membership data from Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000) and the Eurostat enterprise 
statistics, no. of employees (1998);  
* weighted by members, referring to total membership of those sectoral unions for which membership 
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Annex 4: Tables TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR  
 
Table 54: Representational domain concentration/fragmentation – telecom sector 
 
Country *) Number of sector-





(OD): (1= yes, 
pervasive; 0 = no, 
minor) 
Index value 
(n_unions x OD), 



























































































































































5 1 5 




2 1 2 
*) domain overlaps with other sector-related organisations; 
a
 with IL, SEFE and TEK 
b small unions, usually organising less than 200 employees in the sector 
c IST 1999 
d The two white-collar unions SIF and HTF merged in 2008 to form Unionen; 
Source: Traxler (2007c) 
 
 
Table 55: Extension practice and CB coverage – telecom sector 
Country Extension practice 
pervasive = 2/moderate 
= 1/marginal or non-
existing = 0 
CB coverage  
AT (2) 100 
BE 2 100 
DK 0 90 
ES 0 97 
FI 2 ~ 90 
FR 2 100 
DE 0 n.a. 
GR 0 n.a. 
IR 0 n.a. 
IT (2) ~ 80 
NL 0 n.a. 
PT 0 23 
SW 0 90 
UK 0 39 
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Table 56: Sector-level CB – telecom sector 
 
Country Dominant level 
of CB (DL): 
central/inter-
sectoral = 2, 
sectoral 
(national) = 1, 
company-level = 


























DL x CM x 
BGOV 
AT 1 2 2 4 
BE 1,5 1 1 1,5 
DK 1 1 2 2 
ES b 0 1 1 0 
FI 1,5 1 2 3 
FRa 1.5 1 1 1.5 
DEb 0 2 2 0 
GRb 0 1 2 0 
IR c 1 (2+0/)2) 1 1 1 
IT 1 1 1 1 
NL d 0 1 2 1 
PT c 0 1 1 0 
SW 1 1 2 2 
UK 0 1 1 0 
a
 Centralised bargaining covering the public sector as a whole includes the telecommunication sector’s 
employees still employed under public law terms. The majority of employees in France Telecom have 
civil servant status.  
b
 no sectoral multi-employer bargaining, collective bargaining exclusively or predominantly on 
company-level 
c A central agreement that includes the telecom sector exists at national level. At company-level, single-
employer bargaining is applied.      
d
 no sector-related collective agreement, majority of collective agreements on company-level 
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Table 57: Union density of sector-related trade unions – telecom sector 
 
Union density (in %) Country: 













AT: 35,4 27    
GPA   18,6 n.a.  



















   




















AC Tele    100  
Lederforening en i 
TDC 
   100  
DEF    75  
(~ 80 %)  
FI: 71,2 64   (~ 65-70) 

















      
FR: 
 
9,7 12    
CGT PTT (1998)   31,16   
FUPT-CFDT (1998)   22,4  ~ 20-25 
DE: 
DPG (1998) 
23,2 16  


























  16   
UILCOM-UIL    14,4  
IR: 
CWU (1998) 







 AbvaKabo (1998) 




< 20  
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PT: 
STT 








  25   
ES: 
FTCM-UGT (1998) 






FCT CC.OO (1998)   11,40  ~ 57 
SE: 
SIF (white-collar) 








  33,76   
UK: 
CONNECT 






CWU   45-50 40  
Sources: Traxler 2007c; EC 2004b; 
a
 EC 2006. 
b
 1998 figures are derived from  the Rapport annuel sur la concertation et la négociation. Les 
organisations d’employeurs et de salariés dans le secteur des télécommunications au sein de l’UE, 
Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut des Sciences du Travail, 1999. Thus, membership data refers 
only to employees of the state-owned telecommunication operators. Densities refer to the membership 
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Annex 5: Tables CONSTRUCTION SECTOR  
 
Table 58: Representational domain concentration/fragmentation – construction sector 
Country *) Number of sector-






(OD): (1= yes, 
pervasive; 0 = no, 
minor) 
Index value 
(n_unions x OD), 













































2 0 0 
GR: 
OOSEE 





9 1 9 
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OPATSI* 











5 1 5 
NL: 
FNV Bouw*  
























4  1 4 
*) domain overlaps with other sector-related organisations; 
a EFBWW-affiliated organisations 2007 plus other sector-related organisations according to the study of 
the University of Louvain, IST 1999.  
b 
organising the small segment of workers in the wood and plastics sector; 
c Amicus results from a merger of AEEU (Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union) and MSF 
(Manufacturing, Science and Finance) as well as the finance sector union UNIFI  and GPMU (The 
Graphical, Paper and Media Union) in 2001. AEEU itself resulted from a merger of EETPU (Electrical, 
Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbers Unions) and PTU (Plumbing Trades Union) in 1992. 
d
 Amicus and T&G merged to form Unite in May 2007.  
e small union organising less than 100 workers in the sector 
f
 The two white-collar unions SIF and HTF merged in 2008 to form Unionen. 
 Source: IST 1999a, EFBWW (list of affiliates May 2007) 
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Table 59: Extension practice and CB coverage – construction sector 
Country Extension practice: 
 2 = pervasive 
functional equivalents 
(in brackets), moderate 
= 1, marginal or non-
existing = 0  
CB coverage rate 
(2001) a 
AT (2) < 100 
BE 2 >90 c 
DK 0 75 
ES 2  71 
FI 2 > 80 c 
FR 2 90-95 c 
DE 2 84 (West), 51 (East) 
GR 1 n.a.c 
IR 0 n.a. 
IT (2) 70 c 
NL 2 98 
PT 2 91 b 
SW 0 > 90 c 
UK 0 24 
Sources : Traxler/Behrens (2002), Marginson, P./Traxler, F. (2005)  
a 
adjusted coverage rates defined as the number of employees covered by a collective agreement as a 
proportion of the number of employees equipped with the right to bargain.  
b 1999 
c
 coexistence of one sector agreement that covers the totality of workers in the sector and is 
supplemented by several other agreements – often specified according to occupational groups and crafts 
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Table 60: Sector-level CB – construction sector 
 
Country Dominant level of 
CB (DL): 
central/inter-sectoral 
= 2, sectoral 
(national) = 1, 
company-level = 0; if 





mechanisms in the 
form of pattern 
bargaining (CM): 
2= yes, 1 = no 












DL x CM x 
BGOV 
AT 1 2 2 4 
BE 1,5 1 1 1,5 
DK 1 1 2 2 
ES  0,5 (1+0)/2 1 1 0,5 
FI 1,5 1 2 3 
FR 0,5 1 1 0,5 
DE 1 2 2 4 
GR 0,5 (1+0)/2 1 2 1 
IR  2 1 1 2 
IT 1 1 1 1 
NL  1 1 2 2 
PT  0,5 (1+0)/2 1 1 0,5 
SW 1 1 2 2 
UK 0 1 1 0 
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Table 61: Union density of sector-related trade unions – construction sector 
 
Union density (in %) Country: 
Organisation National average  Aggregate sectoral density (reported gross densities) 
(IST 1999 a)  
AT: 35,4 38 
GPA, GBH   
BE: 55,8 ~ 95 
FGTB, CSC    
DK: 73,8 ~ 90 

















FR: 9,7 9,5 
FO-BTP, FNCB 




DE: 23,2 26 
IG Bau, IG Metall 
  
GR: 26,7 (1999) 54 
OOSEE 
  
IR: 35,9 52 
SIPTU, BATU, 
UCATT, OPATSI,  
AAEU c, TEEU,  




IT: 34 32 
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FAILEA  
NL: 22,5 53 
FNV Bouw,  
Hout en Bouwbond 
CNV, HZC,  
VHP 
  




SE: 78 86 




UK: 30,7 21 
UCATT, T&G d 




Sources: IST 1999a, EC 2004b; 
a 
own estimate based on IST 1999a, on the basis of organisations for which data were available; 
b In 2004 SID (Specialarbejderforbundet) – The National Union of General Workers in Denmark – 
merged together with KAD (Kvindeligt Arbejderforbund i Danmark) - The National Union of Women 
Workers – to create Fagligt Fælles Forbund (3F). 
c AEEU (Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union) and MSF (Manufacturing, Science and 
Finance) as well as the finance sector union UNIFI  and GPMU (The Graphical, Paper and Media 
Union) merged in 2001 in order to create Amicus. AEEU itself resulted from a merger of EETPU 
(Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbers Unions) and PTU (Plumbing Trades Union) 
in 1992. 
e The two white-collar unions SIF and HTF merged in 2008 to form Unionen. 
d Amicus and T&G merged to form Unite in May 2007.  
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Annex 6: Tables BANKING SECTOR  
 
Table 62: Representational domain concentration/fragmentation – banking sector 






(OD): (1= yes, 
pervasive; 0 = no, 
minor) 
Index value 
(n_unions x OD), 


















































































IBOA*, SIPTU*, Amicus a* 
3 1 3 
IT: 










FNV Bondgenoten*, CNV 
Dienstenbond*, De Unie* 
3 1 3 
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PT: 
SBSI*, SBN*, SBC*, 
SNQTB* 






6 1 6 
UK: 
Amicus a*, GMB*, 
CWU*, PCS*, 
ACCORD* 
5 1 5 
*) domain overlaps with other sector-related organisations; 
a
 before Amicus – T&G merger in May 2007!  





Table 63: Extension practice and CB coverage – banking sector 




existing = 0 
Index CBC (>= 50 




CB coverage  
AT (2) 3 100 
BE 2 3 > 90 a 
DK 0 1 100 
ES 1 2 98 
FI 2 3 > 97  
FR 2 3 83 
DE 0 1 > 65 a b 
GR 1 2 70 
IR 0 0 n.a. 
IT (2) 3 ~ 80 
NL 0 1 ~ 90 
PT 2 3 < 100 
SW 0 1 > 90 
UK 0 0 41 
a Marginson et al. 2003 
b 65 % CBC in Western Germany 
Sources : IST, 2000; EC, 2004b, OECD, 2004. 
 
 






Table 64: Sector-level CB – banking sector 
Country Dominant level 
of CB (DL): 
central/inter-
sectoral = 2, 
sectoral 
(national) = 1, 
company-level = 







the form of 
pattern 
bargaining (PB): 















DL x PB x 
BGOV 
AT 1 2 (2) 4 
BE 1,5 1 1 1,5 
DK 1 1 2 2 
ES 1 1 1 1 
FI 1 1 2 2 
FR 0.5 1 1 0.5 
DE 0.5 2 2 2 
GR 1 1 2 2 
IR 0 1 1 0 
IT 1 1 (1) 1 
NL 0.5 1 2 1 
PT 1 1 1 1 
SW 1 1 2 2 
UK 0 1 1 0 
*) functional equivalents in () 





Table 65: Union density of sector-related trade unions – banking sector 
Union density (in %) Country: 
Organisation Sector aggregate  Service sector 
general 
Manufacturing  
AT:  27 40 
GPA-DJP 43   
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BE:  45 55 
SETCa, CNE, LBC < 60   
DK: 
 
 77 85 
FF 
~ 98   
ES: 
 14 14 
COMFIA, FES, FITC < 30   
FI: 
 64 78 
SUORA 88   
FR: 
 12 9 
CFDT Banques, FEC-
FO, CFTC Banques, 
CGT, SNB-CGC 
11   
DE: 
  16 29 
Ver.di < 15   
GR:  14 20 
OTOE 84    
IR:  23 44 
IBOA, SIPTU, MSFa ~ 30   
IT:  26 25 
FISAC, FIBA, UILCA 51   
NL:  19 32 
FNV Bondgenoten, 
CNV Dienstenbond, De 
Unie 
~ 20   
PT:  13  
SBSI, SBN, SBC, 
SNQTB 
~ 90  13 





~ 80   
UK:  15 22 
MSF, UNIFI a < 10   
a MSF (Manufacturing, Science and Finance) as well as the finance sector union UNIFI, GPMU (The 
Graphical, Paper and Media Union) and AEEU (Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union) 
merged in 2001 to form Amicus. 
Sources: IST, 2000, EC 2004b, own research UNI Finance ;  
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Annex 7: Tables CLEANING SECTOR  
 
Table 66: Representational domain concentration/fragmentation – cleaning sector 







(OD): (1= yes, 
pervasive; 0 = no, 
minor) 
Index value 
(n_unions x OD), 









6 1 6 
DK: 3F*a, SF*, FOA,  
Blik og Rørforbundet*   
4 1 4 
ES: Servizos-CIG*, FeS-
UGT*, Área de Servicios-
USO*, FAADD-CCOO*, 
ELA-ZERBITZUAK* 
5 1 5 
FI: PAM, TU, VAL, The 
cleaning sector union  
4 0  0 
FR: CFDT*, CGT-FO*, 
CFTC*, FNES-CGC*, 
CGT* 
5 1 5 
DE: IG BAU 1 0 0 
GR: OIYE 1 0 0 
IR: SIPTU 1 0 0 
IT: FILCAMS*, 
FISACAT*, UIL 
Trasporti*, UGL Igiene 
Ambientale*, 
FENASALC* 
5 1 5 
NL: FNV Bondgenoten*, 
CNV Bedrijvenbond* 
2 1 2 
PT: SLEDA*, SITESE*,  
SITESC*, STAD* 
4 1 4 
SW: Fastighets-anställdas 
Förbund F, HTF, 
Kommunal, Ledarna 
4 0 0 
UK: TGWU*, GMB*, 
PCS*, Unison*, USDAW* 
5 1 4 
Sources: IST, 2004.  





  367  
 
Table 67: Extension practice and CB coverage – cleaning sector 




existing = 0 a 
Index CBC (>= 50 




CB coverage  
AT (2)  98  
BE 2  100 b 
DK 0  76,5 
ES 2  n.a. c 
FI 2  100 
FR 2  89,45 
DE 2  > 87 
GR n.a.*  n.a. 
IR 0**  93 
IT (2)***  ~ 90 
NL 2*)  > 82 
PT 2**)  ~ 100 
SW 0  85-90 
UK 0  ~ 10 d 
Sources: IST (2004), Marginson/Traxler (2005);  
a
 functional equivalents in () 
b Two Joint Committees (No. 121 Cleaning and Disinfection Enterprises, No. 218 White-collar workers) 
conclude several collective agreements, see Université Catholique de Louvain (2004); 
c
 Most collective bargaining in the cleaning sector takes place at autonomous community and provincial 
levels. All Spanish provinces and some autonomous communities have their own collective agreements, 
and these cover all companies in the cleaning sector in the relevant area. However, since there is no data 
available on the coverage rate of agreements concluded by provincial-level bodies, the CBC in the 
entire sector cannot be soundly estimated.  
d 
estimate based IST (2004) and Grainger/Growhter (2007);  
* In Greece, three different collective agreements which cover workers in the cleaning sector, i.e. 
commerce sector collective agreement, services collective agreement; manufacturing industry cleaners’ 
agreement. No information about extension in the narrow sense, i.e. the extension of the agreement in 
its entire field of application provided that at least 50 % of employees in the sector or occupation are 
covered by the agreement. Could be possible for the manufacturing industry cleaners – however, there 
is no data available on the number of cleaning sector workers who are covered by this agreement. In 
Greece, no legal provisions for the extension of collective agreements to other branches are existing 
(Traxler/Beherens 2002).   
** In Ireland, the high collective bargaining coverage rate in the cleaning sector results from the co-
existence of a voluntary framework of collective bargaining on the inter-sectoral (‘Programme for 
Competitiveness and Fairness 2002’ and ‘Sustaining Progress Agreement 2003-2005’) and sectoral 
level (i.e. collective agreements in the framework of the ‘Employment Regulation Orders Contract 
Cleaning’) and the regulation of some working conditions in part of the cleaning by law (IST 2004).  
*** As to the coverage rate of the national collective agreements, Italy’s “erga omnes” practice of 
extension of collective agreements makes it difficult to calculate precise statistical data. The existence 
of two different industry-wide agreements applying to several types of company, and of a third 
agreement between autonomous associations, as well 
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make it much more complicated (IST 2004). 
*) The cleaning sector agreement was subject to a general extension. Thus, coverage in the cleaning 
sector exceeds 80 % (IST 2004). 
**) The collective work contracts (CCTs) applied in the sector have a coverage rate of 100% in the 





Table 68: Sector-level CB – cleaning sector 
 
Country Dominant level 
of CB (DL): 
central/inter-
sectoral = 2, 
sectoral 
(national) = 1, 
company-level = 


























DL x CM x 
BGOV 
AT 1 2 2 4 
BE 1 1 1 1 
DK 0,5 (1+0) 1 2 1 
ES 1 1 1 1 
FI 1 1 2 2 
FR 1 1 1 1 
DE 0,5 (1+0) 2 2 2 
GR 1 1 2 2 
IR 2 1 1 2 
IT 1 1 1 1 
NL 1 1 2 2 
PT 1 1 1 1 
SW 1 1 2 2 
UK 0 1 1 0 
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Table 69: Union density of sector-related trade unions – cleaning sector 
 
Union density (in %) Country: 





AT:   







DK:   








FI:   
PAM, TU, VAL 
 > 41a  
FR:   
CFDT-Services Federation, 
CFTC-Commerce, Services 
and Sales Federation, CGT 
Port and Docks Federation 
 8 b 
DE: IG BAU  7 
GR: OIYE  < 20 
IR: SIPTU  25 
IT: FILCAMS, FISACAT, 
UIL Transport, UGL Igiene 
Ambientale 
 > 43 
NL: FNV Bondgenoten, 
CNV Bedrijvenbond  
 7 
PT: SLEDA, UGT  > 15 
SW: Fastighets-anställdas 
Förbund F, HTF, Kommunal, 
Ledarna 
 45 
UK:  30,5c 
Source: IST, 2004.  
a Sector density based on the number of members of the 3 sector-related unions for which data is 
available (IST 2004). However, since sectoral membership of the The Cleaning Sector Union – for 
which data is lacking – is expected to be higher, the aggregate sector density is estimated to be slightly 
higher.  
b
estimate includes membership figures of CGT-FO Equipment, Environment, Transport and Services 
Federation for 1995, in Ebbinghaus/Visser (2000);  
cpersonal service occupations, in Grainger/Growther (2007), Trade Union Membership 2006. 
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Annex 8 – Market Regulation  
 
 
Table 70 – Index market regulation: Metal sector  
 






















1,6:  3= high 
PMR-values > 
=1,7)  
1 = low 
2 = medium 




1 = low 
2 = medium 





AT 2 1 1 2 
BE 2 1 1 2 
DK 1 1 1 1 
ES 2 1 1 2 
FI 2 1 1 2 
FR 3 1 1 3 
DE 2 1 1 2 
GR 3 1 1 3 
IR 1 1 1 1 
IT 3 1 1 3 
NL 2 1 1 2 
PT 2 1 1 2 
SW 1 1 1 1 
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Table 71 – Index market regulation: Chemical sector  
 






















1,6:  3= high 
PMR-values > 
=1,7)  
1 = low 
2 = medium 




1 = low 
2 = medium 





AT 2 2 1 4 
BE 2 2 1 4 
DK 1 2 1 2 
ES 2 2 1 4 
FI 2 2 1 4 
FR 3 2 1 6 
DE 2 2 1 4 
GR 3 2 1 6 
IR 1 2 1 2 
IT 3 2 1 6 
NL 2 2 1 4 
PT 2 2 1 4 
SW 1 2 1 2 
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1,6:  3= high 
PMR-values > 
=1,7)  
1 = low 
2 = medium 




1 = low 
2 = medium 





AT 2 1 1 2 
BE 2 1 1 2 
DK 1 1 1 1 
ES 2 1 1 2 
FI 2 1 1 2 
FR 3 1 1 3 
DE 2 1 1 2 
GR 3 1 1 3 
IR 1 1 1 1 
IT 3 1 1 3 
NL 2 1 1 2 
PT 2 1 1 2 
SW 1 1 1 1 
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Table 73 – Index market regulation: Telecommunications sector 
 






















1,6:  3= high 
PMR-values > 
=1,7)  
1 = low 
2 = medium 




1 = low 
2 = medium 





AT 2 2 1 4 
BE 2 2 1 4 
DK 1 2 1 2 
ES 2 2 1 4 
FI 2 2 1 4 
FR 3 2 1 6 
DE 2 2 1 4 
GR 3 2 1 6 
IR 1 2 1 2 
IT 3 2 1 6 
NL 2 2 1 4 
PT 2 2 1 4 
SW 1 2 1 2 
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Table 74 – Index market regulation: Construction sector 
 


























1,3-1,6:  3= 
high PMR-
values > =1,7)  
1 = low 
2 = medium 




1 = low 
2 = medium 





AT 2 3 3 18 
BE 2 3 3 18 
DK 1 3 3 9 
ES 2 3 3 18 
FI 2 3 3 18 
FR 3 3 3 27 
DE 2 3 3 18 
GR 3 3 3 27 
IR 1 3 3 9 
IT 3 3 3 27 
NL 2 3 3 18 
PT 2 3 3 18 
SW 1 3 3 9 
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Table 75 – Index market regulation: Banking sector 
 






















1,6:  3= high 
PMR-values > 
=1,7)  
1 = low 
2 = medium 




1 = low 
2 = medium 





AT 2 1 1 2 
BE 2 1 1 2 
DK 1 1 1 1 
ES 2 1 1 2 
FI 2 1 1 2 
FR 3 1 1 3 
DE 2 1 1 2 
GR 3 1 1 3 
IR 1 1 1 1 
IT 3 1 1 3 
NL 2 1 1 2 
PT 2 1 1 2 
SW 1 1 1 1 
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Table 76 – Index market regulation: Cleaning sector 
 






















1,6:  3= high 
PMR-values > 
=1,7)  
1 = low 
2 = medium 




1 = low 
2 = medium 









AT 2 1 2 4 
BE 2 1 2 4 
DK 1 1 2 2 
ES 2 1 2 4 
FI 2 1 2 4 
FR 3 1 2 6 
DE 2 1 2 4 
GR 3 1 2 6 
IR 1 1 2 2 
IT 3 1 2 6 
NL 2 1 2 4 
PT 2 1 2 4 
SW 1 1 2 2 
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Annex 9 – Output regression analysis  
 
Logistic regression                                         Wald chi2(9)    =    1610.16 
Log pseudolikelihood = -19.627451              Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
                   Pseudo R2       =     0.4308 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 11 clusters in count) 
 
sector_d Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
 




































3.70    
-0.17    
-0.35   
-1.86   
0.51    
1.80  
-1.11 
0.54   
4.26    













.1195648    .3888387 
-.2600882    .2185059 
-.4325338    .3021284 
-.2500895    .0063302 
-.1953131    .3320488 
-.0071728    .1685376 
-18.11498    4.989657 
-1.597263     2.81188 
.0251696    .0681305 




                                
Logistic regression                                                      Prob > chi2     =     0.0005 
Log likelihood = -19.627451                        Pseudo R2       =     0.4308 
 
sector_d Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
 


























































.0221016     .486302 
-.2880584    .2464761 
-.4093167    .2789113 
-.379094    .1353347 
-.3298476    .4665833 
-.0017051    .1630698 
-12.17435   -.9509817 
-.7692864    1.983903 
.0121824    .0811178 
-13.2398   -1.522293 
 
 
Variables: exp = ‘export dependence’; fdi = ‘foreign direct investments’; lmob = ‘labour mobility’; pmr 
= ‘product market regulation’ (index); frag = ‘union fragmentation’ (index), cbc = ‘collective 
bargaining coverage’; lev = ‘bargaining level’; coord = ‘bargaining coordination’ (index); ud = ‘union 
density’, for a detailed variable description see table 4, section 5.  
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Annex 10 – Frequencies economic and institutional variables by sectors 
 
Table 77 – Export dependence: 
 
sector Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.       Min         Max 
MET 14 37.28445     9.301524    19.27797    52.85274 
CHEM 14 12.87527     7.293669    5.890779      31.929 
FOOD 14 7.93195     4.925156    1.721016    18.47922 
COM 13 .8064516     .4234936    .3217988    1.906383 
CON 13 .6635489     .4234936    .0213567    1.381962 
FIN 13       1.4319     2.205726    .1129603    8.105795 




Table 78 – Capital mobility (FDI): 
 
sector Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.       Min         Max 
MET 11     6.942971     7.697432    .8141003    25.51824 
CHEM 11     5.260849     7.567514    1.075179      27.238 
FOOD 11     2.649517     2.961521    .2194869    10.14565 
COM 10     3.084649     4.445528    .3422115    15.40531 
CON 10     .4576555     .5166353 -.0292938    1.74202 
FIN 11    
 
9.90818     9.05665    3.83122  35.75129 
PSER 11     1.527815     2.156805   -.9225469     6.96808 
 
 
Table 79 – Labour mobility: 
 
sector Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.       Min         Max 
MET 13     5.687099     3.409486    1.169943    11.81579 
CHEM 13    
 
5.687099     3.409486    1.169943    11.81579 
FOOD 13     5.687099     3.409486    1.169943    11.81579 
COM 13     4.354887     2.751937    1.034807    9.431746 
CON 13     
 
7.639041  7.331088     .904264    27.36892 
FIN 13     2.712332     2.636794    .4591883     9.90869 
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Table 80 – Product market regulation (Index): 
 
sector Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.       Min         Max 
MET 14         
 
1.928571   .7300459       1 3 
CHEM 14              3.857143     1.460092          2 6 
FOOD 14               1.928571     .7300459          1 3 
COM 14              
 
3.857143  1.460092          2 6 
CON 14             
 
17.35714     6.570413          9 27 
FIN 14     1.928571     .7300459          1 3 
PSER 14     
 




Table 81 – Union fragmentation (Index): 
sector Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.       Min         Max 
MET 14           
 
2.428571     2.208873          0     7 
CHEM 14              
 
4.285714     2.757607          0 11 
FOOD 12     3.416667     2.193309          0 8 
COM 14 
 
4.857143     3.799942          0 15 
CON 14   
 
3.785714     2.694112          0 9 
FIN 14           3.357143     2.706321          0     7 




Table 82 – Collective bargaining coverage: 
 
sector Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.       Min         Max 
MET 13     89.61538     23.94886       16.5         100 
CHEM 11         80.22727     25.04732         22     100 
FOOD 12            92.33333     22.95978         20 100 
COM 10             
 
80.9     27.30669         23 100 
CON 12         79.54167     20.42665         24     100 
FIN 13         
 
84.92308     17.44736         41     100 
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Table 83 – Collective bargaining level (Index): 
 
sector Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.       Min         Max 
MET 14               
 
.6428571     .3631365          0 1 
CHEM 14            
 
.7142857     .4688072          0 1.5 
FOOD 14     .9285714     .2672612          0           1 
COM 14     
 
.6785714      .638723          0         1.5 
CON 14            
 
1     .4803845          0           2 
FIN 14     
 
.7857143     .4258153          0         1.5 
PSER 14     
 
.9285714     .4322189          0           2 
 
 
Table 84 – Collective bargaining coordination mechanisms (Index): 
 
sector Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.       Min         Max 
MET 14     
 
1.357143     1.307207          0          4 
CHEM 14     
 
1.678571     1.435902          0          4 
FOOD 14     
 
1.714286     1.138729          0          4 
COM 14     
 
1.142857     1.277446          0           4 
CON 14     
 
1.714286     1.266647          0           4 
FIN 14     
 
1.428571     1.035098          0           4 
PSER 14     
 
1.571429     .9376145          0           4 
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Table 85 – Union density:  
 
sector Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.       Min         Max 
MET 10     
 
76.75     16.75187         40    92.5 
CHEM 14            
 
46.42857     26.19664         10   90 
FOOD 12            29.49167 
 
24.01974          5   72 
COM 11         42.27273     25.98496         11      80 
CON 14         47.46429     31.13152          8     95 
FIN 14        50.71429    32.33581         10       98 
PSER 14     29.67857     19.47346          7         79 
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Annex 11 – Overview of the hypotheses and factors in relation to the Europeanisation process:  
 
Factors of influence Centralised Europeanisation Decentralised Europeanisation Alternative Approaches 
 





Formalised and strongly institutionalised 
coordination approach adopted by the EIFs 
and the ETUC (‘top-down’), involving 
common European principles and guidelines 
for the transnational coordination of 
collective bargaining policies, including 
formalised instruments for wage bargaining.  
 
Transnational collective bargaining 
networks and autonomous inter-union 
initiatives for the coordination of wages 
and working conditions which are not 
backed by centralised EIF policies and 
instruments for the cross-border 
coordination of CB (‘bottom-up’). 
 
Non-CB approaches:  
• European sectoral social 
dialogue 
• Lobbying for European 
regulation 








H1.a: A high degree of labour mobility is a 
disincentive for EIFs to take on a strong role 
in setting up structures for the transnational 
coordination of CB since they prefer other 
strategies than collective bargaining to 
safeguard the wages and working conditions 
of transnationally mobile workers (e.g. 













H1b: A high extent of labour mobility in a 
sector is an incentive for trade unions to 
initiate cross-border coordination projects 
and activities aimed at the protection of 
national/local labour markets and 
standards. Such autonomous inter-union 
cooperation is not backed by EIF policies 
and instruments for the Europe-wide 







H1.c A high degree of labour mobility 
in a sector is an incentive for the 
European social partners to directly 
press the EU legislator for legislative 
initiatives. Thus, lobbying the 
Commission and other EU institutions 
in order to guarantee legally binding 
Europe-wide minimum standards is an 
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Alternative Approaches  
Capital mobility  
 
Hypothesis H2  
 
H2.a: A high degree of capital mobility 
establishes an incentive for European 
Industry Federations to agree on European 
minimum standards and thus to adopt top-
down elements for CB policy coordination.  
 
H2.b: A high level of capital mobility 
fosters the establishment of decentralised, 
trade union-led initiatives for the cross-
border coordination of collective 
bargaining.  
 
H2.c: A high degree of capital mobility 
establishes an incentive for European 
Industry Federations to agree on 
European minimum standards within 
the framework of European sectoral 
social dialogue. 








H3.a: The stronger the export dependence of 
a sector, the higher the probability that the 
European social partners will conclude 
European (top-down) rules and criteria for 
the coordination of working conditions and 







H3.b: The stronger the export dependence 
of a sector, the lower the probability that 
trade unions will engage in a purely 
decentralised approach to the cross-border 
coordination of wages and working 
conditions which is not backed by EIF 
policies and instruments for the Europe-
wide coordination of CB.  
 
H3.c: A high degree of export 
dependence is conducive to the 
establishment of institutionalised 
structures for the transnational 
coordination of CB, whereas the 
(statutory) regulation of wages and 
working conditions is not considered 
as effective by the European social 
partners in the respective sector. Thus, 
European trade union actors prefer a 
collective bargaining approach over 
the regulatory ‘harmonisation’ of 
working conditions.  
 
A high export dependence increases 
the importance of competition-related 
issues which are of general interest for 
employers. Thus, the conditions for 
European sectoral dialogue are 
favourable in export dependent sectors 
as employers are more inclined to 
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Alternative Approaches  
Product market regulation 




H4.a: In highly regulated industries EIFs 
pursue a ‘legislation-oriented’ approach 
(H4.c.). Since CB coordination is only a 
secondary goal, they refrain from 
establishing top-down elements within a 
formalised framework for transnational CB 
coordination. 
 
H4.b: Market deregulation/liberalisation 
establishes an incentive for trade unions to 
engage in cross-border coordination 
initiatives.  
 
In recently privatised or liberalised 
sectors the social partners tend to 
conclude European agreements within 
the framework of European sectoral 
dialogue.  
 
Institutional factors of the 
industrial relations (IR) 
systems 
   
Strength of organised labour 
 
Hypothesis H5 
H5.a: The higher the trade union density of 
certain national affiliates of the EIF, the 
more likely these members are to influence 
the pattern of Europeanisation which is 
adopted by the respective EIF.  
 
H5.b: The higher the organisational density 
of the largest trade union in a sector, the 
higher the probability for bi- or multilateral 
cross-border initiatives for the coordination 
of collective bargaining which are not 
backed by EIF policies and instruments for 
the Europe-wide coordination of CB. 
 
The degree of organisational strength 
of trade unions and employers’ 
associations has no influence on the 
Europeanisation of the coordination of 
wages and working conditions. 
Characteristics of the 




H6.a: The higher the degree of concentration 
of the sector’s associational system, the 
more favourable are the conditions for the 
EIF to adopt top-down elements for cross-
border CB coordination.  
 
H6.b: The higher the degree of 
fragmentation of the sector’s trade union 
system, the higher the probability that 
unions will enter into autonomous cross-
border initiatives for the coordination of 
CB policies which are not complemented 
by EIF policies and instruments for the 







H6.c: The higher the degree of 
concentration of the sector’s 
associational system, the more 
favourable are the conditions for 
sector-level regulatory initiatives 
within the framework of European 
sectoral dialogue. 
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Mechanisms of the collective 
bargaining coordination  
 
Hypothesis H7 
H7.a: In sectors in which CB tends to be 
highly centralised, EIFs pursue a top-down 
approach to transnational CB.  
 
H7.b: The more decentralised CB is in the 
sector, the higher the probability that trade 
unions will enter into cross-border 
coordination partnerships which are not 
backed by EIF policies and instruments for 
the Europe-wide coordination of CB. 
 
The mechanism of collective 
bargaining coordination has no 









H8.a: The more non-hierarchical and less 
centralised the mechanisms for the 
coordination of collective bargaining are – in 
the form of pattern-bargaining – in the 
system of collective bargaining, in 
combination with legal provisions for the 
vertical coordination of collective 
bargaining in order to ensure a high degree 
of bargaining governability, the more 
effective is the national system of collective 
bargaining coordination as such. 
Furthermore, the conditions are more 
conducive for adopting EIF-led top-down 
elements of transnational collective 
bargaining coordination. 
 
H8.b: The more non-hierarchical and less 
centralised the mechanisms for the 
coordination of collective bargaining are – 
in the form of pattern-bargaining – in the 
system of collective bargaining, in 
combination with legal provisions for the 
vertical coordination of collective 
bargaining in order to ensure a high degree 
of bargaining governability, the more 
effective is the national system of collective 
bargaining coordination as such. 
Furthermore, the conditions are more 
conducive for national trade unions to 
engage in purely decentralised, inter-union 
cross-border collective bargaining 
coordination initiatives. 
The relationship between inclusive and 
exclusive systems of IR is generally 
not subject to a pronounced dynamic. 
The majority of countries in the 
Eurozone are characterised by stable, 
inclusive IR systems. However, in 
sectors in which the CBC is notably 
low, a European regulatory approach is 
pursued in order to guarantee a 













H9.b: The higher the collective bargaining 
coverage rate in a sector (>80%), the more 
conducive are the conditions for the 
establishment of transnational networks for 
the coordination of collective bargaining. 
 
H9.c: The lower the CB coverage in a 
sector, the more probable it is that the 
social partners will embark on a 
strategy to lobby EU legislation in 
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AT – Austria 
BE – Belgium 
CZ – Czech Republic 
DK - Denmark 
DE - Germany 
ES – Spain 
FI – Finland 
FR – France 
GR – Greece 
HU – Hungary 
IR – Ireland 
IT – Italy 
LU – Luxembourg 
NL – Netheralands 
PL – Poland 
PT – Portugal 
SE – Sweden 
SK – Slovakia 
SI – Slovenia 
UK – United Kingdom 




European socical partner organisations 
 
Business Europe - Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe 
 
CAEF – The European Foundry Association 
 
CEEMET – Council of European Employers of the Metal, Engineering and Technology-based 
Industries  
 
CEEP – European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General 
Economic Interest 
 
CEFIC – European Chemical Industry Council 
  391
    
 
CEFS - The European Committee of Sugar Manufacturers 
 
CESA – Community of European Shipyards Associations 
 
CIAA – Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of the EU 
 
CLEPA – European Association of Automotive Suppliers 
 
CLITRAVI – The Liaison Centre for the Meat Processing Industry in the European Union 
 
EACB - European Association of Co-operative Banks 
 
ECEG – European Chemical Employers Group 
 
FBE - European Banking Federation 
 
EFCI – European Federation of Cleaning Industries 
 
EFFAT – European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions 
 
EMCEF – European Mine, Chemical and Energy Workers’ Federation 
 
EMF – European Metalworkers’ Federation  
 
ESBG - European Savings Bank Group 
 
ETUC – European Trade Union Confederation 
 
EUROFER – European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries 
 
EUROMETAUX – European Association of Metals  
 
UNI-Europa Finance – Union Network International Europe Financial Services 
 
UNI-Europa Property Services - Union Network International Europe Property Services 
 












    
National social partner organisations  
 
Country  Abbreviation *  Full name 
AT GANG Agricultural, Food, Beverage and Tobacco 
Workers' Union c  
 
GBH Union of Construction and Wood 
Workers 
 
GdC  Union of Chemical Workers  
 
GHGPD Hotel, Restaurant and Personal Services 
Trade Union 
 
GMT Metalworking and Textiles Union a  
 
GMTN Metalworking, Textiles, Agriculture and 
Food-processing Union  
 
GPA Union of Salaried Employees b  
 
GPA-DJP Union of Salaried Private Sector Employees, 
Graphical Workers, Journalists and Paper 
Workers  
 
GPF Post and telecommunications workers’ union 
 
WKÖ Economic Chamber of Austria 
BE ABVV-Metaal/CMB-
FGTB 
General Union of the Belgian Metal Industry  
 
CGSLB/ACLVB Federation of Liberal Trade Unions of 
Belgium  
 
CGSLB Métal/ ACLVB 
Metaal 
Metal sector branch of the Federation of 
Liberal Trade Unions of Belgium  
 





General Confederation of Public Services 
Telecom-Aviation  
 
CNE-CSC National Federation of White-Collar 
Workers  
 
CSC/ACV Confederation of Christian Trade Unions  
 
CSC alimentation et Confederation of Christian Trade Unions – 
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services/ACV voeding 
en diensten,  















Transport and Telecommunication sector 
branch of the Confederation of Christian 
Trade Unions  
 
FGTB/ABVV Belgian General Confederation of Labour  
 
HORVAL Food–Horeca (hotels, restaurants, cafés) –
Services Trade Union  
 
LBC-NVK National Federation of White-Collar 
Workers  
 SETCa/BBTK Belgian Union of White-Collar Staff, 
Technicians and Managers  
(affilated to CGSLB/ACLVB) 
 SLFP-Groupe 
Belgacom 
Free Trade Union of Civil Servants  
 VBO/FEB Belgian Federation of Employers  
DK AC-Tele 
 
Telecommunication sector branch of the 
Danish Confederation of Professional 
Associations  
 
Blik og Rørforbundet Danish Plumbers’ Union 
 
BRD National Union of Plumbers 
 
CO-industri Central Organisation of Industrial 
Employees  
 




Association of Danish  
Pharmacists  
 
Dansk Metal National Union of Metalworkers  
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DEF Danish Union of Electricians  
 
DL-F Danish Laboratory  
Technicians  
 
DM The Danish Association  




FOA The National Union of Public Employees 
 
3F – Fagligt Fælles 
Forbund  
United Federation of Danish Workers 
 
HK Union of Commercial and Clerical 
Employees in Denmark  
 
IDA The Danish Society of Engineers 
 
Lederforeningen  The Association of Managerial Staff 
 
LH  The Organisation of Managerial  
and Executive Staff in Denmark  
 
NNF The Danish Food and Allied Workes' Union  
 





Timber- Industry and Construction Workers 
Union 
 
SF Sanitørernes Fagforening – The Cleaners’ 
Union 
FI Kemianliitto Chemical Workers’ Union 
 
Metallityöväen Liitto  Finnish Metalworkers’ Union  
 
PAM The Service Union United 
 
Puulittoo Wood and allied workers´ Union 
 
RL - Rakennusliitto The Finnish Construction Trade Union 
 
Sähköalan ammattiliitto  Finnish Electrical Workers’ Union 
 
SAK Central Organisation of Finnish Trade 
Unions  
 
SEFE Finnish Association of Business School 
Graduates 
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SEL  Finnish Food Workers’ Union  
 
SUORA Trade Union SUORA ry  
 
TEK Finnish Association of Graduate Engineers  
 
TT Technology Industries of Finland 
 
TU ry Union of Salaried Employees  
 
UIL ry Union of Professional Engineers in Finland 
 
VAL The Finnish National Union of State 




Federation of Professional and Managerial 
Staff  
FR BATI-MAT TP-CFTC Fédération Bâtiment-Matériaux-Travaux 
Publics 
 CFDT French Democratic Confederation of Labour  
 CFDT-Cadres 
 
Fédération française des syndicats CFDT 
banques et sociétés financières 
 CFE-CGC  French Confederation of Managerial 
Employees – General Confederation of 
Professional and Managerial Staff  
 CFE-CGC AGRO National Federation of Workers in Agro-
Alimentary – General Confederation of 
Professional and Managerial Staff  
 CFTC  French Christian Workers’ Confederation  
 CFTC Banques Fédération CFTC des Banques 
 CFTC Métallurgie Metal sector branch of CFTC 
 CFTC-PTT 
 
Post and Telecommunications Workers 
Federation  
 CGT  General Confederation of Labour  




CGT-FO Communication Workers 
Federation  
 CGT-PTT CGT Post and Telecommunications Workers 
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 Federation  
 FAA-FO Agriculture, Food and Tobacco Workers’ 
Union (new name FGTA-FO) 
 FEC-FO Fédération des employés et cadres de la FO 
 FCE-CFDT  Federation of the Chemical and Energy 
Industries-CFDT  
 Fédéchimie CGT-FO  Chemical Federation CGT-FO 
 Féderation Chimie, 
Mineurs, Textile, 
Energie CFTC  
Federation of the Chemical, Mine,Textile 
and Energy Industries-CFTC  
 
 Fédération des 
industries chimiques – 
CGT 
Federation of the Chemical Industries-CGT  
 






Federation of managerial and professional 
staff of the Chemical, Parachemical and 
Related Industries-CFE-CGC  
 
 FGA-CFDT General Federation of Workers in Agro-
Alimentary – French Democratic 
Confederation of Labour  
 FGTA-FO General Federation of Workers in 
Agriculture, Food, Tobacco and Allied 
Services – Force Ouvrière  
 FGMM-CFDT 
 
General Federation of Minig and Metal 
Workers  
 FFSBSF-CFDT Fédération des banques et société financières 
  
 FNAF-CGT  National Federation of Workers in Agro-
Alimentary and Forests – General 
Confederation of Labour  
 FNCB CFDT The National Federation of Construction and 
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Wood workers  
 FNES-CGC The National Management, Commerce and 
Services Federation – CGC 
 FO-BTP Fédération Générale Force Ouvrière du 




Fédération des Finances FO 
 FO Métaux Metal sector branch of Force Ouvrière 
 FTM/CGT Metalworkers’ Federation of CGT 
 FTC CGT Federation of Construction Workers  
 FSCOPA-CFTC 
(AGRI) 
General Federation of Workers in 




Fédération CGT des Syndicats du Personnel 
de la Banque et de l’Assurance 
   
 F3C-CFDT 
 
CFDT Communications, Consulting and 
Cultural Workers Federation 
 SNB CFE-CGC Syndicat national de la Banque et du crédit 
CFE-CGC 
 SNCTBTP CFE- CGC Syndicat National des Cadres, Techniciens, 
Agents De Maîtrise et Assimilés des 
Industries du Bâtiment, des Travaux Publics 
et des Activités Annexes et Connexes  




SUD (‘Solidaire, Unitaire, Démocratique’) 




Union générale des ingénieurs, cadres et 
techniciens 
 UIMM Union of Metal Industries and Crafts 
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 UNSA-Télécoms Telecommunication sector branch of the 
National Federation of Independent Unions  
DE CGBCE Christian Chemicalsand Energy Workers’ 
Union 
 
CGPT Christian post and telecoms workers’ union 
 
DBV German Association of Bank Employees 
 
Gesamtmetall Umbrella association of the regional 
employers’ associations in the German metal 
and electrical  industry 
 
GNGG Trade Union of Food, Beverages, Tobacco, 
Hotel and Catering and Allied Workers  
 
IG Bau Construction workers' Union 
 
IG BCE Mining, Chemical and Energy Industrial 
Union 
 
IG Metall Metalworkers’ Union  
 
VAA Chemicals Executives Union  
 
ver.di Unified Service Sector Union 
 Transnet Rail Workers’ Union 
GR OEFSEE 
 
Federation of Employed Pharmaceutical and 





Employee Federation of the Chemicals’ 
Industry of Greece  
 
OIYE The Greek Federation of Private Sector 
Employees 
 
OME-OTE Greek Telecom Employees’ Federation  
 
OOSEE Construction Workers and Allied Trades 
Federation  
 




Panhellenic Association of Pharmacists  
 
 
POEM Panhellenic Federation of Metal Workers 
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POIE Hellenic Federation of Medical Advisers  
 
PSHV Panhellenic Association of Manufacturing 
Chemical Scientists  
IT CGIL General Confederation of Italian Workers  
 
CISAL The Italian Confederation of Free Workers' 
Unions 
 
CISL Italian Confederation of Workers’ Union 
 
Dircredito Federazione Nazionale Personale 
Dirigenti Aziende di Credito e Finanziarie 
 
FABI The Independent Federation of Italian Bank 
Workers 
 
FAI-CISL Agro-industrial, Food and Environment 
Federation – Italian Confederation of 
Workers’ Unions  
 
FAILEA (CISAL) Federazione Autonoma Italiana Lavoratori 
Edili e Affini  
 
FALCRI The Independent Federation of Italian Credit 
and Savings Workers 
 
FEDERMECCANICA Federation of Italian Metal and Mecanical 
Industries  
 
FEMCA-CISL Energy, Fashion, Chemicals and Allied 
Industries Federation of the Italian 
Confederation of Workers’ Union 
 
FENASALC The National Federation of Autonomous 




National Federation of Wood and Building 
Workers of the Union of Italian Workers 
 
FIALC-CISAL Italian Autonomous Federation of Chemical 
Workers of the Italian Confederation of Free 
Workers' Unions 
 
FIBA The Italian Banking and Insurance 
Federation 
 
FILCA (CISL) Italian Federation of Construction Workers 
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 of the Italian Confederation of Workers’ 
Union 
 
FILCAMS The Italian Federation of Trade, Services and 
Tourism Workers  
 
FILCEA-CGIL Chemical and Allied Workers' Union of the 




Italian Federation of Wood and Building 
Workers of the General Confederation of 
Italian Workers   
 
FISAC The Italian Federations of Credit and 
Insurance Workers’ Trade unions 
 
FIM-CISL Federation of Italian Metal and Mecanical 
Workers 
 
FIOM-CGIL The Italian Federation of Metalworkers of 
CGIL  
 
FISACAT The Italian Federation of Trade, Services and 




Federation of Entertainment, Information 
and Telecommunications – Italian 
Confederation of Workers’ Unions  
 
FLAI-CGIL Italian Federation of Agro-industrial 





Federazione Nazionale Sindacati Autonomi 





Communication Workers’ Union – General 
Confederation of Italian Workers  
 




General Union of Construction Workers of 
the General Labour Union 
 
UGL Igiene Ambientale  The UGL Environmental Hygiene  
 
UIL Union of Italian Workers 
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UILA-UIL Italian Federation of Agro-alimentary 
Workers – Union of Italian Workers  
 
UILCA  The Union of Italian Credit, Collection and 
Insurance Workers 
 
UILCEM-UIL Union of Italian Chemicals, Energy and 





Union of Italian Communication Workers – 
Union of Italian Workers  
 
UILM-UIL Union of Italian Metal-Mechanical Workers 
of UIL 
 
UIL Trasporti The Union of Italian Transport Workers  
IR Amicus  Amicus the Union Ireland 
 
BATU (ICTU) Building and Allied Trades Union 
 
BFAWU Bakers, Food and Allied Workers Union 
 
CPSU Civil, Public and Services Union  
 
CWU Communication Workers’ Union of Ireland  
 
IBEC Irish Business and Employers’ 
Confederation 
 
IBOA Irish Banking Officials Association 
 
ICTU Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
 
IMPACT Public Sector Trade Union  
 
MPGWU Port and General Workers' Union 
 





Operative Plasterers’ and Allied Trades’ 
Society of Ireland  
 PSEU Public Service Executive Union 
 SIPTU The Services, Industrial, Professional and 
Technical Union 
 TEEU Technical, Engineering and Electrical Union 
 T&G Transport and General Workers’ Union 
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 Ireland 
 UCATT (ICTU) Union of Construction, Allied Trades and 
Technicians 




Union for Telecom personnel 
 
CMMF/VPP Union for middle and higher staff  
 
CNV Bedrijven Bond National Federation of Christian Trade 
Unions  
 
CNV Dienstenbond The Christian Services Union 
 
CNV Publieke Zaak Public sector federation of the CNV 
 
De Unie Union for Industry and Services  
 




Bouw en Houtbond FNV 
 
 
Hout en Bouwbond 
CNV 
 
The Federation of Wood and Construction 
Workers of the National Federation of the 
Christian Trade Unions 
 
HZC Vakvereniging Het Zwarte Corps 
 
IVB-CNV  CNV Industry and Food Union 
 
Vereniging FME-CWM  Association of Employers in Technological 
Industries   
 
VHP Metalektro Union for Managerial and Executive Staff in 
the Metal, Electrical and Electronics Sector  
 
VHP Association of Higher Personnel 
 
Voe-FNV FNV Union in Food Industry 
PL MZP Malopolski Zwiazek Pracodawcow - The 
Employers Union of Malopolska  
 
NSZZ Solidarność  NSZZ Solidarity 
 
OPZZ All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions  
PT AIMMAP Association of Metallurgy, Mechanical 
Engineering and Allied Industries of 
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Portugal 
 
CGTP General Confederation of Portuguese 
Workers 
 
FENAME The National Federation of the Metal 
Industry 
 
FNSCMMMC Fédération Nationale des Syndicats de la 






Federação Intersindical das Indústrias 
Metalúrgicas, Química, Farmacêutica, 
Eléctrica, Energia e Minas  
 
FESAHT-GTP Federation of Unions in Agriculture, Food 
and Beverages Industries, Hotels and 
Tourism of Portugal – General 
Confederation of Portuguese Workers  
 
FETESE-UGT Federation of Service Workers’ and 
Technicians’ Unions – General Workers’ 
Confederation  
 
SETAA Union of Agriculture, Food and Forests  
 
SETACOOP Sindicato dos Empregados, Técnicos e 
Assalariados da Construção e Obras Públicas 
 
SIABAHORTA Union of Professionals in Food, Beverages 
and Similar Industries of the Azores  
 
SIMA (UGT) Sindicato das Industrias Metalurgicas e 
Afins 
 




Democratic Trade Union of Energy, 




Trade Union for Chemical, Pharmaceutical, 
Petrol and Gas Worker of the North  
 
SNQTB Sindicato Nacional dos Quadros e Técnicos 
Bancários 
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SINTAB Union of Workers in Agriculture, Food, 





National Union of Telecommunication and 




Union of the Workers of the Portugal 
Telecom Group  
 
SITESE Union of Service Workers and Technicians  
 
SITIAC Union of Workers in the Food Industries of 
Central and Southern Portugal and Islands  
 
STIANOR Union of Workers in the Food Industries of 
Northern Portugal  
 
UGT General Workers Union 
ES APLI 
 
Asociación Profesional Libre e 
Independiente  
 
AST Alternativa Sindical de Trabajadores  
 
CC.OO Trade Union Confederation of Workers’ 
Commissions  
 
CIG La Confederación Intersindical Galega 
 
COBAS Comisiones de Base  
 
CONFEMETAL National Employers' Organization of Metal 
Sector in Spain 
 




Basque Workers’ Solidarity – Diversity of 
sectors  
 
FACOC-CCOO Federation of Food and Agriculture – Trade 
Union Confederation of Workers’ 
Commissions  
 
FAyT National Federation of Construction, Wood 




Federación de Comunicación y Transporte 
de CC.OO  
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FECOMA-CC.OO State Federation of 





Federation of Wood and Construction of the 
General Workers’ Confederation 
 





Federation of Related Industries of Workers’ 




Federation of Textile-LeatherIndustries, 
Chemicals and Related Industries of 
Workers’ Commissions  
 
FM/CC.OO Federation of Industry of CC.OO 
 
FTA-UGT Federation of Food and Agriculture – 




Federación de Transportes, 
Communicaciones y Mar  
 
FTM-ELA Metal sector branch of ELA 
 





Sindicato de Trabajadores de 
Comunicaciones  
 
UGT General Workers’ Confederation  
 
UTS Unión Telefónica Sindical  
SE  CF The Swedish Association of Graduate 
Engineers  
 
CIVILEKONOMERNA The Swedish Association 




Förbund F,  
The Swedish Building Maintenance 
Workers´ Union  
 
Finansförbundet The Financial Sector Union of Sweden 
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HTF Tjänstemannaförbundet HTF – Union of 
Commercial Salaried Employees 
 





The Association of Graduates in Law, 
Business Administration and Economics, 
Computer and Systems Science, Personnel 
Management and Social Science 
 
Kommunal The Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union 
 
Ledarna The SwedishAssociation for Managerial and 
Professional Staff  
 
Livs Swedish Food Workers' Union 
 
Målareförbundet The Swedish Painter’s Union 
 
SACO The Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Associations 
 
SB The Swedish Building Workers’ Union 
 
SBP Svenska Bleck- och plåtslagareförbundet 
 
SEF The Swedish Union of Electricians  
 
SEKO Union of Service and Communication 
Employees 
 
SI  Swedish Assocation of Graduate Engineers 
 
SIF Swedish Union of Technical and Clerical 
Employees 
 
ST The Union of Civil Servants in Sweden 
 
Sveriges Ingenjör Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers 
(affiliate of SACO) 
 
TCO The Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Employees 
 
TEKNIKFÖRETAGEN Association of Swedish Engineering 
Industries 
 
Unionen d Unionen The Union Sweden 
SI GZS Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
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Slovenia  
UK ACCORD Independent Union of Halifax Staff 
 
Amicus e Amicus the Union United Kingdom 
 
BACM The British Association of Colliery 
Management 
 
BFAWU Bakers, Food and Allied Workers Union 
 
CWU Communication Workers Union  
 
CONNECT Union for Professionals in Communications  
 
GMB National Union of Gasworkers and General 
Labourers 
 
PCS Public and Commercial Services Union 
 
T&G e Transport and General Workers’ Union 
 
TGWU Transport and General Workers’ Union  
 
Unison The Public Sector Union 
 
Unite Unite the Union United Kingdom 
 
USDAW Union of Shop, Distributinve and Allied 
Workers 
*
 Full name (original language) if no abbreviation exists 
a
 merged in 2006 with GMT in order to form GMTN  
b merged in 2006 with the Printing, Journalism and Paper Union (DJP) in order to form GPA-DJP 
c
 merged in 2006 with GMT in order to form GMTN 
d
 Unionen (founded in January 2008) results from a merger of SIF and HTF. 
e















    
Abstract Dissertation Thesis 
 
The issue of an efficient approach on the transnational coordination of collective bargaining 
policies has greatly gained in importance against the background of the European Monetary 
Union. With the enlargement of the EU collective bargaining activities are becoming further 
challenged. The principal argument of this thesis is that arrangements for the transnational 
coordination of collective bargaining are most feasible and efficient on the European sectoral 
level. This is due to the fact that the necessity for inter-sectoral wage moderation is reduced under 
a macro-economic regime that is primarily aimed at containing price increases. In return, the 
social policy actors of the sectoral level gain additional room for transnational action with regard to 
the coordination of collective bargaining policies. The importance of sectoral coordination 
initiatives is underscored by the finding that only decentralised and flexible coordination 
mechanisms guarantee that wages and working conditions are brought in line across borders.  
 
The fundamental research question is which factors enhance or inhibit cross-border union 
activities aiming at the coordination of collective bargaining and carried out by the European 
Industry Federations and its national member organisations. Since coordination approaches differ 
between industries, a typology of transnational collective bargaining arrangements on the 
European sector level is developed. The selection of both manufacturing sectors such as the 
metal and the chemical industries and service sectors such as banking and telecommunication 
ensures a high degree of variety in terms of institutional and economic particularities. In order to 
analyse the relations between the dependent variable and a set of sector-related explaining 
factors, both institutional (i.e. fragmentation of the union system, collective bargaining coverage, 
union density, collective bargaining level, collective bargaining coordination mechanism) and 
economic (capital and labour mobility, export dependency) of the national and on the European 
(European sectoral social dialogue, European regulation of product and labour markets) level, a 
regression analysis is combined with an actor-focused, interview-based approach. The 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods allows for an in-depth analysis of the inter-
relatedness of explaining factors and the phenomenon under investigation and of the motivations 
and perceptions of the key actors involved. The consideration of the actor’s perceptions is of 
particular relevance since transnational collective bargaining coordination is to a large extent an 
actors-driven process.  
 
The analysis of transnational bargaining coordination on European sector level provides valuable 
insight into the inter-relatedness of the European and the national/regional level of collective 
bargaining coordination within a multilevel framework of European industrial relations, a topic that 
has not yet been systematically addressed.  
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Zusammenfassung der Dissertation  
 
Das Thema der transnationalen Koordinierung der Lohnpolitik hat vor dem Hintergrund der 
Europäischen Währungsunion (EWU) und der ‚Erweiterung’ der Europäischen Union an 
Bedeuting gewonnen. Hauptargument dieser Arbeit ist, dass eine grenzüberschreitende 
Koordinerung der Tarif- und Lohnpolitik am effizientesten und am besten realisierbar auf der 
Europäischen sektoralen Ebene ist.  
 
Im makroökonomischen Regime der EWU ist die Eindämmung des Preisauftriebs prioritäres Ziel. 
Da die Notwendigkeit einer Politik der Lohnzurückhaltung auf makroökonomischer Ebene deshalb 
an Bedeutung verliert, gewinnen die lohnpolitischen Akteure der sektoralen Ebene an 
Handlungsspielraum, ihre Lohnpolitik über die Grenzen hinweg zu koordinieren. Die Relevanz 
sektoraler Initiativen zur Koordinierung der Tarifpolitik gründet sich auf empirischen Ergebnissen, 
denen zufolge nur dezentrale und flexible Mechanismen die transnationale Koordinierung von 
Löhnen und Arbeitsbedingungen sicherstellen.  
 
Die grundlegende Forschungsfrage ist jene nach den Faktoren, die eine grenzüberschreitende 
Koordinierung der Tarifpolitik der Europäischen Industriefederationen (EIF) verhindern oder 
begünstigen. Da Initiativen zur europaweiten Lohnkoordierung zwischen den Sektoren im Hinblick 
auf Institionalisierungsgrad und geografische Reichweite variieren, wird eine Typologie von 
Arrangements der Koordinerung etwickelt. Die Auswahl verschiedener Sektoren sowohl der 
industriellen Produktion als auch des Dienstleistungssektors stellen eine hohen Grad an 
Heterogeneität bezüglich der institutionellen und ökonomischen Determinanten der Koordinierung 
sicher. Um die Beziehung zwischen der abhängigen Variable und einem Set von institutionellen 
Varibalen (Fragmentierungsgrad des sektoralen Gewerkschaftssystems, Tarifbindung, 
Gewerkschaftsdichte, Koordinierungsebene/n und Koordinerungsmechanismus des Tarifsystems) 
und ökonomischen Erklärungsfaktoren (Kapital- und Arbeitsmobilität, Exportabhängigkeit) der 
nationalen und Europäischen Ebene (Europäischer Sozialdialog, Regulierungsgrad von Produkt- 
und Arbeitsmärkten) zu untersuchen, wird eine quantitative Analysemethode 
(Regressionsananlyse) mit einem qualitativen Analyseansatz (Experteninterviews) kombiniert. Die 
Kombination qualitativer und quantitativer Analysemethoden stellt eine umfassende Untersuchung 
der Zusammenhänge zwischen Erkärungsfaktoren und dem Phänomen der transnationalen 
Tarifkoordinierung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Wahrnehmungen der wichtigsten 
lohnpolitischen Akteure sicher. 
 
Die Analyse der Bedingungen der transnationalen Tarifkoordierung auf der Europäischen 
sektoralen Ebene bietet wertvolle Einsicht in die Funktionsweise eines komplexen 
Mehrebenensystem Europäischer Industriebeziehungen. Die Ebene der sektoralen tarifpolitischen 
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Koordinierung ist dabei von zentraler Bedeutung, eine Ebene, die bisher noch kaum einer 
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labour market interests, the coverage of collective agreements, the degree of 
organization of unions) are analyzed according to their propensity to enhance 






• Short description of the Dissertation 
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